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Summary 
 
At the core of any effort by a nation state to regulate new technologies for public release is an 
implicit navigation of uncertainty. The case of Bt cotton in India presents a very timely and 
pragmatic example of how nation states grapple with uncertainty in a regulatory context.  While 
much attention has been given to how government actors form regulation, far less is given to how 
actors outside of the government spheres act as catalysts for regulatory reform.  In practice, it is 
often these parties that drive regulation as a process.  The question is how.   
 
This paper outlines the findings of fieldwork conducted in India between March 2007 and July 2009 
in addressing this central question: what does regulation really mean in a context where new 
technologies burdened with uncertain consequences are introduced?  How do preferences, 
decisions, and regulatory norms adapt to this introduction based on the interactions of a multitude 
of parties acting on multiple framings of understanding what risk means?  
 
The conclusion is that regulation – in the context of Bt cotton in India - is far from a set of 
government policies derived from scientific measures of risk assessment. Civil society, firms, and 
farmers themselves all have tremendous influence on how a nation state navigates uncertainty in a 
regulatory context.  It is a process forged on risk interfaces, where constructions of risk both 
complement and oppose one another. The actors involved enter these spaces, invited or otherwise.  
What the government may have initially imagined as ‘regulation’ is subject to multiple technical, 
economic, and political framings of risk from each actor.  As a result, regulation is a co-
evolutionary, co-constructed process.  This process of negotiating these spaces is what regulation 
really means.   
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The market introduction of crops derived from recombinant DNA, or transgenic, technologies 
presents a series of concerns to all societies globally, but is of particular relevance to those 
developing economies that are creating domestic legislation addressing the management of these 
resources.  In economies that are primarily agrarian, transgenic crop technologies may improve 
yields in the face of biotic and abiotic stressors, provide opportunities to grow new crops that 
command higher returns, address concerns relating to population growth and limited resources, 
and provide a more stable nutritional source to combat the adverse economic development that 
malnutrition presents.  These potential benefits are often voiced not only by those firms developing 
such technologies, but are also often shared by the governments of those countries who have an 
interest in them. 
 
Yet, within the same government that may believe in the promise of transgenics in agriculture, 
there may be scepticism.  And outside the halls of government and the boardrooms of the firm, 
other parties may not be convinced.  These new technologies often cost more, the long-term 
environmental, health, and socio-economic impacts are mired in uncertainty, the rise of substitute 
suppliers taking advantage of these technologies may adversely affect developing economies that 
historically supply these markets, and the market forces behind commercial research do not 
necessarily have nutrition, and correspondingly, poverty reduction, as their primary incentive.  As 
a corollary to this broad swathe of potential effects, the implication of the regulation of these 
technologies are equally as broad, incorporating intellectual property rights (IPR), incentives to 
trade, the conduct of research and direct investment, and the development of participatory public 
processes directed toward the creation of this regulation.  And at the ground level where these 
technologies are being adopted – the arena that presents the demand that propels the industry and 
the efforts of the government to manage them – farmers are facing decisions that are novel, 
matching the novelty of what these technologies purport to offer.   
 
All of this points to the need for some system of managing these demands, these new markets, 
these new risks, and these often incalculable uncertainties.  These new technologies have to be 
regulated.  Globally, the formulation of regulation in current practice is rooted in a post-Second 
World War context where neo liberal treatises on trade have become the lingua franca among most 
policy-makers. The notion of multilateralism, most acutely represented by the prescriptive 
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measures mandated via the over sixty agreements within the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
has epitomized the primary catalyst for domestic regulatory reform.  From a regulatory 
perspective, these agreements present an attempt at regulatory harmonization among member 
states to a nearly homogenous set of principles, best practices, and strategies.  There are a number 
of overarching trends that correspond to this process1. 
 
First, the deliberative process by which, historically, sovereign states have created regulation, has 
moved into a realm where it requires compliance to an externally prescribed set of minimum 
criteria.  It is determined to be compliant by parties that reside outside the legal jurisdiction of 
sovereign member states, based on a series of terms and concepts that are often transposed from 
one geographic and cultural context to another. It is enforced by a body that does not impose 
legally punitive measures under a domestically enforced legal construct, but rather a system of 
often opaque dispute settlement.  Individual countries operate and develop their own regulatory 
frameworks in a world where management is directly affected by multilateral frameworks and 
requirements. 
 
Second, participatory processes where the perspectives and inputs of citizens interface with 
regulatory deliberation and formation (i.e. referenda and public discussions) are left to individual 
member states and agents to facilitate.  These processes are often compromised by bilateral 
negotiations occurring outside of a multilateral context, or the requirement of domestic regulation 
to be created along a predetermined schedule, rendering what historically may have taken 
generations to develop into a process that necessitates results in a matter of years.  Individual 
countries, as member states of multilateral agreements, must themselves enact domestic regulatory 
regimes that address their own local realities effectively, navigating previously unknown territories 
where a multiplicity of interests has to be accounted for. 
 
As this thesis shows, these challenges are particularly relevant to developing economies, where 
prior regulation may not have existed, where the human capital required to effectively develop 
effective regulatory frameworks may be low, and where local systems of governance, market 
epistemologies2, and political and legal representation may be either diverse or non-existent.  
Framing all of these concerns is one theme: technological innovation has introduced goods that 
present a higher level of risk due to the application of recent advances in scientific research and 
development that are mired in uncertain consequences.  In the context of the regulation of 
transgenic crop technologies, uncertainty is conventionally characterized by a quantified measure 
of risk, as determined by a process of scientific inquiry in a closed system, namely the laboratory 
and controlled field trials, often initiated by private sector agents according to guidelines developed 
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by the government.  The key term here is biosafety.  These procedures can only characterize what 
scientists ‘know’, and thus any metric of risk concerning transgenic technologies is reflective of an 
embedded, if not explicit, level of ignorance regarding the full consequences of market 
introduction.  The challenge is to develop and implement regulation that is effective, tenable, and 
compliant in the global arena within the context of goods and services that are available with an 
often inaccurate (or at least incomplete) characterization of risk as biosafety. 
 
But - and this is really what frames the challenge as I have depicted it - risk is not, and cannot, be 
understood in terms of biosafety alone.  Risk has multiple meanings, multiple contexts in which 
these meanings are understood, and correspondingly, multiple arenas where opposing 
understandings of risk collide.  In such a milieu, the process of creating regulation is a complex and 
highly involved undertaking, one that encompasses and challenges notions of legal representation 
and culpability, the role and efficacy of science and citizens in rendering uncertainty legible, and 
the power dynamics and real politik implicit in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations.  Yet 
regardless of these contexts and challenges, regulatory frameworks are to be developed, due to the 
commitments that result from membership of multilateral frameworks such as the WTO or the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD), the market incentives that surround the development 
and availability of these risky goods and services, and elements of national pride and ambition.  If 
an opportunity beckons, and the parameters are attractive, no country wants to be left behind.   
 
The discussion of how this could be achieved in the context of risk, hazard, biosafety, containment, 
and public engagement – all central themes in any present day regulatory regime around 
biotechnology - started at the 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA. The themes that 
underpinned that seminal gathering of scientists and ‘experts’ still – for the most part - hold true 
today.  In the words of the organizer, the Nobel laureate Paul Berg, “(…) we gained the public’s 
trust, for it was the very scientists who were most involved in the work and had every incentive to 
be left free to pursue their dream that called attention to the risks inherent in the experiments they 
were doing (Berg 2004: 4).” But there is one crucial difference that distinguishes then from now: it is 
no longer scientists and experts who are engaging with these issues alone.  The public’s trust can no 
longer be taken for granted.  A far wider section of the public has concerns regarding these risks, 
and there is a correspondingly far wider variety of how these risks are understood.  And most 
crucially, it is impossible to ignore them.   
 
This all results in a very different dynamic; one that moves away from purely technical 
understandings of risk towards economic and political understandings.  Berg argues that, in the 
current climate,  
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there is little prospect for consensus in our society on the ethical issues concerning 
foetal tissue and embryonic stem cell research, genetic testing, somatic and germ-
line gene therapy, and engineered plant and animal species and hence little 
incentive to seek a compromise. Compromise in those instances may only be 
achievable by political means, where majority rule prevails (Berg 2004: 5). 
 
The arena of those qualified to discuss risks and hazards have broadened, with corresponding 
effects on these new realms of knowledge interface with the regulations themselves.  This is the 
arena I wanted to engage with.  This is what motivates this research. It is the process of how 
different parties armed with different market epistemologies interface with one another, given their 
own unique framings and constructions of risk – technical, economic, and political.  These 
interactions occur in the face of new hazards and opportunities.  And these hazards and 
opportunities present new challenges, new ways of revising knowledge, and ultimately, new 
pathways of evolution for formal regulatory frameworks.  Yet, the frameworks are not what 
characterize regulation.  This research will argue that the interfaces between those who have a stake 
in the technology, as framed by their own ways of understanding risk, is what truly characterizes 
regulation.  And given that the contested realms of knowledge are premised on often colliding 
framings of risk, these interfaces are often not merely a negotiation – it is more akin to a battlefield.  
This is the battlefield of regulation. 
 
1.1 The Starting Point: Biosafety Regulation In India 
 
I wanted to look at the Indian example for a combination of personal and professional reasons.  
First, I have engaged with the regulations surrounding plant genetic resources in India since my 
graduate studies in economics.    Second, and given that, I have engaged with a number of people 
and parties involved in this story since 2001.  I had a context to work from.  And third, given that 
the experience to date in India is so rich, so engaging, and so dynamic, a critical focus on the 
underlying principle – what regulation means in practice – presented exactly the kind of canvas I 
wanted to work on.  This thesis is not about policy alone; it is about process. 
 
Since Asilomar, the past thirty-five years has seen an ongoing and increasingly contentious debate 
regarding the alleged success, failure, safety, and rationale of transgenics in agriculture.  In India, 
the catalyst for the debate was the introduction – initially illegally and outside the purview of 
formal directives - of Bt cotton3, and the sowing of this crop in the context of various stresses and 
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controversies since its formal commercial release in 2002.  This debate has taken place in a wide 
variety of spaces.  Regulators, academic and scientific ‘experts’, farmers, civil society, and the 
mainstream media have all deliberated on the technology in both public and private spaces4.  The 
discussions have touched on issues such as state sovereignty in the context of corporate influence 
and incentives, legal culpability and agency in context of unauthorized commercially released 
technologies, how the public perceives and negotiates the introduction of new technologies in terms 
of ‘safety’, which parties are included within the deliberation and creation of regulation, and how 
these new technologies may affect the future of those who derive their livelihood from agriculture.  
The experience of regulating Bt cotton in India presents a classic study on how one nation has 
grappled with the exercise of creating regulation in the context of a technology burdened with 
uncertainty due to scientifically incalculable risk.  It allows a remarkable insight on how formal and 
informal processes interact and influence such a regulatory regime5. 
 
While some elements of India’s regulatory regime predate independence, much of the regulatory 
framework was first established in the mid to late 1980s.  This period in India’s history corresponds 
with three enduring Congress administrations; first, the Indira Gandhi administration – which 
formed the basis for a “pro-business” environment, followed by her son - Rajiv Gandhi – and the 
administration he presided over.  During his tenure, he began the process of dismantling the 
license-quota raj that prior administrations had built.  His reforms aimed to privatize industry and 
remove the often complex maze of licenses and red tape that enterprise in India was bound to.  This 
marked the first real policy measures that led to the erosion of a Nehruvian, socialist model of 
development.  Following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the P.V. Narasimha Rao 
administration then began to further these initial steps towards liberalization (Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2004).   
 
While Indira Gandhi’s tenure created a warmer environment for collusion between firm and state 
in a lobby context, the series of reforms in 1991 mandated by the Rajiv Gandhi administration and 
implemented by the Rao administration created a policy environment conducive to economic 
liberalization.   Interestingly, these measures were overseen by then Finance Minister and current 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and then advisor to the Prime Minister and current minister of 
Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh.  Both - but the latter in particular - play key roles as 
actors in the more recent aspects of this ongoing story. There were measures taken to increase 
government support for science and technology and associated industries, reduce import quotas, 
taxes, and tariffs on technology-based industries, and to move India to a market economy premised 
on a neo-liberal model of development.  In understanding how the regulations began to gel and the 
overall context in which they did, the story begins in earnest here.  The first embryonic stages of the 
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regulatory environment were in gestation during the mid to late eighties.  They are key to discuss 
here, as they frame the entire formal side of regulation that is still being adapted at the time of this 
writing. 
 
1.1.1  The System on Paper: Hazard and Ambition 
 
In 1986, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) established the Department of 
Biotechnology (DBT). The aims and objectives of the DBT as stated by the MST are to facilitate a 
deep involvement of the scientific community via consultations, but also to foster the growth of the 
India’s capacity for R&D (MoEF 2006a).  This reflects two objectives: to ensure scientific validation 
via procedural rigour and review, and to ensure and promote the overall development of India as 
framed not only by the growth of industry and becoming an Asian leader, but also the promise of 
raising the incomes of farmers, given that most Indians still engage with farming as a means of 
livelihood.  There were technical, economic, and political incentives at play, and corresponding 
technical, economic, and political framings of risk that meshed with these underlying incentives, 
propelling these ambitions forward in formalized decision making.    
 
During the same year, the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF), was established.  The management of transgenics in agriculture 
as referred to in the EPA is mandated in the context of environmental pollution.  This was the 
starting point in practice.  The EPA established the role of the government to “make rules” relating 
to “the procedures and safeguards for the handling of hazardous substances” (MoEF 1986).  
However, nowhere within the EPA are transgenic technologies mentioned explicitly.  In the words 
of Dr. S.R. Rao, scientific advisor within the DBT and someone who has seen the regulatory process 
evolve from the very beginning notes, 
 
[c]lauses six and eight [of the EPA] framed the whole thing in the context of 
‘hazard’.  So the DBT wrote a letter to the MoEF saying that ‘OK, you are making 
these rules, but annex the biosafety aspect of genetically modified organisms’.  
That’s basically how the [1989 Rules] came about6. 
 
In 1989 the MoEF established the Rules for the Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of 
Hazardous Micro-organisms and Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells (hereafter referred to 
as the Rules, or the 1989 Rules).  These Rules then mandated the creation of six institutions under 
the aegis of both the MST and MoEF that span the three tiers of governance in India7.  
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Since the formation of the 1989 Rules, these institutions have been the most active components of 
the regulatory regime surrounding transgenic technologies; not only in agriculture, but in 
pharmaceuticals as well.  While the initial creation of the 1989 regime was borne out of domestic 
concerns and ambitions – but also a pressing need to address “hazard” as framed within the EPA - 
these and other frameworks have been amended to ensure compliance to international fora on 
trade (i.e. the WTO via plant variety protection and patent law) and safety standards and best 
practices (i.e. the UN via biodiversity and labelling).  In total, the Indian regulatory regime 
currently spans across six ministries, and is in a continual state of development due to these 
obligations8.   
 
Since 2005, new efforts have been put in motion to consolidate this rather “cumbersome” system 
into a more tractable means of “single window clearance”; the National Biotechnology Regulatory 
Authority (NBRA).  Driving the NBRA is an aim to foster growth by making it easier to conduct 
business.  At the time of this writing, the bill that will serve to formally mandate the roles and 
responsibilities of the NBRA is being discussed in the Indian parliament.  Authored essentially by 
one person in the DBT, Dr. S.R. Rao, and one legal counsel from the Ministry of Law9, the bill has 
been highly controversial, reflective of the climate and ongoing battles that surround the 
technologies to date.  This system is in a continual state of evolution, triggered by catalysts from 
both within and outside India.  And central to this thesis is the fact that it is not just science that is 
the basis of this evolution. 
 
1.1.2 The System in Practice: “We have no expertise, can you help us?” 
 
India started from scratch.  Biotechnology was a new industry in the early eighties, not only in 
India, but worldwide.  The importance of the industry in the years to come was not lost on those 
who had the foresight, and those working in a regulatory, science infused context.  In the words of 
Shantu Shantharam, a former regulator at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
current director of the Association for Biotechnology Lead Enterprises (ABLE), a newly formed 
industry lobby group,  
 
[i]n 1982-83, the government of India started the National Biotechnology Board 
(NBB), which became the DBT.  [Dr. M.S.] Swaminathan was the chairman, and 
[Dr. S.] Ramachandran was the secretary.  Ramachandran used to come to the 
National Institute of Health10 to seek collaboration, and some [Indian] embassy 
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people told him about me, as an Indian working as a senior biotechnology 
regulator [in the USDA in Washington, DC].  So he sought me out, and he told me 
[that India, as a country grappling with how to regulate these new technologies,] 
had these problems – ‘we have no expertise, can you help us’.  I said ‘sure’.  I went 
back and got permission from the USDA, and that’s how that first contact was 
made.  I mean, you know how the diaspora is, so everyone came to know about 
me.  That’s when I sent a copy of USDA regulations to Ramachandran, who then 
passed it on to the Ministry of Environment and Forests.  They printed a gazetteer 
in which they published the rules and regulations, [which were] lifted right out of 
that USDA book!  That was rather shocking to me, that they would just lift it.  I 
mean, without thinking of the pros and cons of adopting in wholesale.  I think they 
wanted to announce, ‘we are taking charge, we are in control’.  That’s what 
happened.  But of course, they didn’t follow those regulations at all.  Later on, they 
came into contact with other regulations worldwide, and they cut and paste, and 
made the 1986 Environmental Protection Act and 1989 Rules11.” 
 
These early stages are key to discuss here, as they are at the root of many of the challenges that 
India faces today in terms of what is on paper outpacing what can be achieved in practice.  The 1986 
EPA and 1989 Rules presented a means not only to regulate the usage of transgenic technologies 
within India, but also to promote them.  Recall that the regulations were not enacted just to approve 
technologies, but also to ensure sectoral growth.  I would argue that this broad mandate lies at the 
root of many of the challenges faced in managing transgenics in agriculture, both historically but 
also in the present.  It is this seeking of a balance between safety and ‘not missing the biotech boat’ 
that lies at the core of the struggle of developing and enacting an effective regulatory regime.  As 
Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi, someone who has been observing the regulatory processes surrounding 
transgenics in India recalls,  
 
[w]ithin a few years [after the Planning Commission suggested the NBB in 1981], it 
was clear that it wasn’t working.  Coordination was a problem, and [the formation 
of] a department was suggested.  But the thing is, if a bunch of bureaucrats were 
failing to coordinate, how could a mammoth organization like a department ensure 
that?  On top of that, regulation and promotion can’t be separate.  How can a 
responsible organization have regulation and promotion as two separate exercises?  
The promotion part was part of the DBT, and the regulatory part was under the 
EPA, managed by the MoEF12. 
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In practice, the DBT has had significant influence and authority concerning the regulatory part, 
both in terms of approval - though this is technically the mandate of the Review Committee on 
Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) - and in forming the new regulations, such as the still deliberated 
NBRA bill.  There are clearly gaps between what is on paper and what occurs in practice, and from 
the very beginning, much of the regulatory ambition itself was framed not only by management 
practices lifted from other countries, but as I will argue in more detail in chapter three, the 
fundamental notions of risk as biosafety that underpin the entire system.  It was an iterative process 
- both adoptive and as well as adaptive – that was premised on these notions of risk and hazard.   
 
There were multiple framings of risk, held both by those within the ministries, but more crucially, 
those outside the ministries.  The points of intersection where these different framings meet are 
what propel this research.  The spaces that characterize these points of intersection is where 
regulatory evolution occurs, and contrary to the technical risk assessment context that the formal 
regulation emerged within, entry into these spaces does not require knowledge in the form of 
scientific expertise.  Everyone looks at the technologies as embedded with different risks, and there 
is nothing close to consensus on the implications of these risks.  Given this, regulation is a complex, 
interactive, iterative process, framed by different market epistemologies and different constructions 
of risk.  This is the battlefield of regulation, this is what I have observed, and this is what this 
research addresses. 
 
1.2 Why This Research? 
 
So this brings us to the obvious question.  How does a regime premised on minimizing hazard 
while balancing industrial ambition fare in practice?  What happens when a regime rooted in the 
classical formulations of ‘how to regulate’ – often as adopted from other jurisdictions - is 
implemented?  Post implementation, what happens when the regulations are contested by a variety 
of actors due to alleged failures of the technology by users and those who claim to represent these 
users?  And given that these parties do not all frame risk as biosafety, what happens when these 
different understandings collide?  While some observers have characterized the emergence of 
biosafety regulation in India13, there is a dearth of analysis of how this regulation actually operates 
and evolves in practice. How do the multiplicity of parties involved in the ongoing story of 
regulation as set in motion by the Bt cotton experience affect this regulation, given the fact that risk 
is not understood as merely biosafety by all concerned?   
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To begin with, consider a bit of context.  The numbers surrounding Bt cotton adoption are 
impressive. Indian cotton production has increased from 13.6 to 29 million bales between official 
release in 2002 and 2009, and per hectare yields have increased from 308 kg in 2002 to 591 kg in 
2008 (James 2008: 52).  As of 2009, 5.6 million farmers have adopted Bt Cotton on 8.4 million 
hectares of land (James 2009: 7)14.  All of this lead one observer to comment that Bt cotton adoption 
“(…) represents perhaps the most rapid rate of diffusion for any technology [in India] after the 
mobile phone15.” The approximately 830 varieties of Bt cotton currently available on the market 
comprise 87% of all cotton grown in India (James 2009; Karihaloo16 and Kumar 2009).  In the face of 
such numbers, there has been no shortage of analyses of the Bt cotton experience in India.  
 
There have been a number of peer reviewed articles on how the technology has fared on the ground 
in terms of yield and performance17.  There are a wealth of narratives arguing how Bt cotton is 
either directly linked to the agrarian crisis in India, or conversely, how it has lifted farmers out of 
poverty.  Careers have been made on the ongoing and still unfolding story.  ‘Anti-GM’ campaigners 
have risen in the ranks of their organizations on the basis of their successful work in delaying 
release, ministers have gained higher profiles given their stance on the technology and what they 
have done about it, and columnists have won awards and gained international recognition in 
depicting the story to a wider audience.  Even Bollywood movies have been released to varying 
levels of acclaim on elements of this story18.  But somehow, to me, there is really something that is 
missing in the ongoing discussion of Bt cotton in India.  And in many ways, it is the most obvious 
thing.  Maybe it was just too obvious to have been considered in any detail to date. 
 
In speaking of biotechnology, what really frames the entire debate – though I personally refuse to 
succumb to the bipolar ‘for’ or ‘against’ debate as I find it misses the point entirely – is risk19.  The 
more interesting question is how policy in practice, and science as a series of guiding principles, 
relate to one another when the knowledge that informs both is contested by different actors who 
interface with one another.  Ultimately science can only present one dimension of risk - biosafety.  
But as this does not resonate with a general public who - from the perspective of an often frustrated 
and sometimes condescending science establishment - is not trained in the state of the art.  There 
are different languages and no interpreter, and as a result, there is little scope for agreement or 
trust, let alone dialogue.  Directly outside the boundaries that science presents are a wealth of other 
considerations, which are no less relevant given the political dimension of policymaking, and the 
economic nature of incentive construction.  This is the core of the risk framing argument I present 
throughout this work.  There are also notions of ethics – a vastly different arena to frame risk within 
when compared to scientific principles, but one that, unlike science, does resonate with those who 
reside outside these boundaries.  This is what characterizes the battlefield, and this is where 
 11 
regulation really occurs.  Regulation is not simply the policies that guide management, it is the 
process of how these policies are formed.  Simply put, it is impossible for one party to manage such 
a diverse array of risk framings, and consensus is virtually impossible to achieve given that all the 
parties involved look at risk in different ways.  This is the debate, and this is why regulation is far 
removed from mere scientific evaluation for the public good.   
 
There is not one party who is capable of knowing what is really in the interests of the public given 
the uncertainty of new technologies like Bt cotton.  Moreover, there is no one that can conclusively 
say what will happen when transgenic crops are released into the environment.  No scientist, no 
policy maker, no activist, no one.  We just do not know.  We cannot know.  The time frames 
involved to really determine what might happen when transgenic technologies are released into the 
environment – anything ranging from ‘nothing’ to “superweeds20” to Parkinson’s disease21 if one 
reviews the narratives - are simply beyond what industry, regulators, , civil society, the public, and 
farmers can wait for.  Mechanisms providing a means to govern the technology have to in place in 
the meantime.  So they have been – the Indian system is a testament to this.   
 
No one has the patience to wait and observe how generations of living things are affected, and as I 
have depicted, history shows that no one is going to start entirely from scratch. As the old adage 
goes, ‘time is money’.  From my perspective, any attempt at debating the merits of the technology 
itself really misses the point.  The products resulting from transgenics in agriculture are in the 
market.  There is a demand for them.  Suppliers are keen to meet this demand.  And among those 
nations that are open to the idea, the market is ready.  It does not matter whether or not one 
opposes or supports it – boiling it down to such bipolar parameters ignores the underlying 
narratives that these technologies have been developed within.  
 
Regulation in the typical sense of managing the technical risks of transgenics means very little.  
Such a limited focus is just not reflected in fact.  If we move away from points of entry and R&D 
and look at the situation on the ground, most farmers tend to gravitate towards technologies that 
have the potential to make their enterprise more cost and labour effective, though framed by a very 
complex decision making calculus.  I do not wish to render farmers as mechanistic welfare 
optimizing agents, but at the same time, they are entrepreneurs in exactly the same way as those 
supplying the technologies are, and they will cross borders if they have to in order to get their 
hands on the technology.  Regulation in the formal sense means little to them; the government 
cannot monitor every plot of land.   So yes, there are risks.  And no, we do not know what the risks 
are.  No one does.  So what.   
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1.3 So what? 
 
If we start with the premise that transgenics is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, the story could end there.  But 
that would be tragic.  It should not end there, because actually, the whole basis of the ‘debate’ – all 
the formal regulation, all the opposing viewpoints, all the mobilizations, all the massive incentives 
to enter new markets like India, all the packets of Bt cotton legal and illegal seed purchased by 
farmers – all of these elements of the story are framed by one notion: risk.  This is a huge word.  If 
one digs a bit deeper - one should - what really frames this debate is a far more sophisticated notion 
of risk than just saying “well, we don’t know what we don’t know”.  Stirling (1999: 15) 
characterizes risk along five lines.  First, it can be premised on how broad the effects of the 
unknown may affect those in a bounded physical space, and second, over generations.  Third is the 
possibility that these adverse effects can be reversed, while the fourth relates to how much time 
might occur between the event catalyst and the observed outcome.  Finally, fifth is the potential of a 
broader public to mobilize, given a commonly held sense of potential consequences.  We might not 
know what we do not know, but we certainly deal with that fact in a space contained by certain 
inescapable boundaries. 
 
While this serves to better specify how one can consider risk, there is still the issue of application. 
There may be criteria in which to characterize the notion of risk, but how does this relate to 
regulation?  Based on historical observations in the US and Europe, Millstone (2007, 2009) presents 
a means to consider how risk framings and policy relate.  First is a technocratic model, where policy 
- as a consequence of formal regulation - is borne of science, and science alone.  This reflects what 
initially happened in India, with the regulations that characterized policy drawn from science based 
guidelines worldwide.  Second is a decisionist model.  Here, risk in a policy context takes on two 
dimensions, of assessment and of management.  While assessment remains a technical process, 
management relates to the political and economic spheres of regulatory deliberation.  This began to 
happen in India just before formal release, when the government had to act in the face of 
widespread adoption of illegal, unauthorized Bt cotton in Gujarat.  In that example, the 
management of political and economic risks trumped technical risk assessment; the state had little 
other option.  Finally, the third model is co-evolutionary, which recognizes the intersections of the 
technical, economic, and political spheres and their corresponding risk framings.   
 
In this model – which this research adopts – assessment also begins to move out of the realm of 
science, with management correspondingly addressing these new risk framings. As Millstone 
(2007: 498) argues, regulation premised on scientific deliberation alone does not fully 
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characterize the process of regulation; a process “(…) located in particular contexts, which have 
social, economic, ethical, and policy dimensions.”  The scientific framing of risk – biosafety in 
particular – co-evolves as an approach to risk management given the variety of parties who hold 
distinct framings of risk. Regulation evolves and changes along a co-evolutionary path, with 
some framings of risk dominating over others as a consequence of influence and transferability. 
Biosafety itself – though a highly technical means by which to characterize and frame risk – is 
itself framed by non-scientific assumptions.   
 
I characterize the evolution that Millstone distinguishes as premised on different ways of 
understanding the technical, economic, and political risks inherent within the adoption of Bt 
cotton in India.  And as time progressed, a very different picture of policy emerged and evolved.  
Regulation as a process of this policy evolution incorporates these different ways of 
understanding risk.  This thesis argues that the intersection between science and policy is where 
the action is.  This is where the practice of regulation, and the associated battles over meanings, 
framings, values, ethics and politics, creates policy.  That is actually what regulation is – a co-
evolutionary process of negotiating risk, set in motion by a number of parties.  It is not an end 
result or a set of rules.  It is not as though science has disappeared, but rather that it is clearly not 
the only means to assess, but more importantly to construct and frame, the risks of new 
technologies.  
 
And that is where this research is placed.  I am interested not merely in how Bt cotton has fared 
in India, but who has driven this process, why have they engaged in the way they did, and 
ultimately, how this process of co-evolution characterizes the battlefield of regulation.  On the 
battlefield, some framings of risk dominate others, with regulation as a process reflecting these 
conflicts.  It is tempting to merely look at adoption and yield statistics, and conclude that in India, 
Bt cotton is a runaway success. As Shantharam argues, ”[w]hy do we have to keep talking this 
bullshit?  Farmers have spoken, they go back and buy Bt cotton.  What more do you want22?”  Well, 
I want a lot more actually.  Why have farmers adopted it?  Why have civil society organizations lent 
so much effort to opposing it?  Why are firms so keen to enter the Indian market?  Why has India 
enacted the regulatory regime that it did?  Who was behind it?  And ultimately, how do all the 
different parties involved understand this word ‘risk’?  What does it really mean?  Why do some 
framings of risk dominate others?  Now, I am not the first to ask these questions, especially the final 
one.  But no one has really applied that question to the Indian context as of yet. 
 
There has to be a means to govern these technologies in the face of not only domestic and 
international interests in promoting these technologies, but also a national aim of becoming a 
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regional leader in biotechnology. Traditionally, that would be the role of the government; to assess 
risk in terms of biosafety, and to enact guidelines for firms and public sector researchers to follow 
in developing, testing, assessing, and releasing the technology to make this leadership ambition 
come true.  And on paper, this is what India has done, cutting and pasting passages from existing 
guidelines throughout the world, and then enacting a regulatory framework that is tailored for 
India’s interests and unique position.  Off paper however, something else entirely has taken place.  
And this is where it gets really interesting.   
 
There are a multiplicity of parties outside the state-firm-science nexus that have an interest in the 
technology.  There has to be.  The nature of the technology is such that it affects everybody 
involved.  These are publicly marketed goods.  In enacting a means to manage and assess the risks 
of Bt cotton, the government has shown that this nexus alone is simply not capable of enacting rules 
that society is expected to follow without questioning the science that lies behind it.  This is 
exciting, and for two reasons.  First, the capacity of the government itself to actually understand 
that science in the first place has been questioned.  In the words of one regulatory affairs manager 
of a multinational company,  
 
[t]he assistant to the member secretary of the [Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee] GEAC doesn’t have any scientific background.  So she can’t 
differentiate between a single and stacked event.  In fact, we had an application a 
month before for GM tomatoes, but given we applied again for the stacked event, 
she got confused between the two – ‘why are you applying again23?’ 
 
If there are these kinds of gaps within the corridors of where science based regulation is the mantra, 
one has to wonder how such a mantra could possibly be upheld in practice.   
 
Second, and as a consequence, I will argue this entire debate actually has far less to do with science.  
Science becomes less and less relevant as the starting point for any discussion of risk when only a 
select few have scientific training, and many within the public simply do not trust what scientists 
say.  This is the departure from Asilomar in 1975 – this is India in 2010.  As Jairam Ramesh, the 
recently tenured minister of the MoEF argued, “[s]cientists are not gods24”.  Now, if such a 
statement came from anyone outside the firm-state-science nexus, it would not mean much.  But 
coming from the Minister of the authority that has a massive stake in the entire process of release, it 
means a lot more.  It reflects the climate that surrounds the issue, and summarizes the argument 
quite well – this is not just about science anymore.  Which, given that the entire issue focuses 
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around a particular technology developed according to rigorous and highly sophisticated scientific 
procedure, is rather confusing. 
 
But confusion frames the entire story.  No one really knows what the long term effects might be, 
and it seems everyone has an opinion, whether informed by science or not.  It is nearly impossible 
to gauge what the science really means.  Studies contradict each other; some are based on data 
supplied by the firm, others are based on funding from organizations historically opposed to 
biotechnology, and both are quoted to support the arguments of those who can use the evidence 
best.  If not confusion, it is a series of opposing opinions around the technology itself, rendering a 
clear picture of how the technology actually fares quite fuzzy indeed.  Did India really need Bt 
cotton?  Is it safe?  Did it do what it was supposed to do?  Was the release rushed as a response to 
farmers adopting it illegally in Gujarat before the government approved it?  Is it appropriate for 
areas where the majority of farmers do not have access to irrigation?  Was the extant agricultural 
extension network prepared to help farmers use it correctly?  Is there even clarity on where the 
government stands on transgenic versus integrated pest management specifically, and transgenics 
in agriculture generally?  All of these questions were asked, but one wonders if they were asked 
before the release.  I argue that they might have been, but at the end of the day, everybody was just 
looking to see what would happen in farmers’ fields.  
 
In a country like India, opening up the borders to trade in 1991 set a whole series of processes in 
motion.  Of course, these are not related to farming alone. But agriculture is still what drives the 
country economically and politically.  A party cannot successfully be elected at either the central or 
state level without winning the farmer vote. So when a new technology like Bt cotton is introduced, 
it resonates.  Maybe not initially among the general public, but among those observers and end 
users who have an interest in it, things are bound to happen.  These ‘things’ are what I am 
interested in, as they are what generate the confusion that I alluded to earlier, and allow precisely 
the kinds of insights into how risk is framed that forms the core of my analysis.   
 
In this research, I limit my focus to four groups: the government, civil society, the private sector, 
and farmers themselves.  These are the four parties that have best characterized who affects 
regulation, invited or otherwise. Regulation is not a top down process developed by the 
government and adhered to by those it addresses.  The formulation of rules and their being enacted 
is a reflexive process that is steered and reframed by a multiplicity of parties. Given this 
multiplicity, it cannot be based on a uniform notion of risk.  In the context of Bt cotton, biosafety 
may have been the guiding principle that the government envisioned framing the process at the 
initial stages of regulatory formation.  But such a framing of risk does not equally resonate with the 
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other parties involved; biosafety itself means different things to different people.  And as a result, 
the nature of formal regulation adapts – risks are not just technical, they are also economic and 
political.  This is why I wish to present a different view of what regulation really means, and this is 
what my thesis is about. 
 
1.4 The Battlefield Of Regulation:  Contested Knowledge And Clashing Risk Framings 
 
So, this is the more interesting story.  Yes, there are risks involved in adopting transgenics in 
agriculture.  But these risks are not homogenous.  They differ depending who you consider in this 
ongoing story.  The government frames risk in one particular way, just as civil society, firms, and 
farmers do.  So how do they frame it?  When and how are these framings generated?  That is what I 
wanted to know.  At the root of the battle or the debate are not hard facts, empirical proofs, or 
scientific evidence.  As I said, empirics have less and less to do with how the technology is 
managed from a regulatory perspective – it is not just science that frames this debate as not 
everyone can, wants, or needs to understand the science.  The basis of disagreement is on different 
ways of understanding risk outside of the realm of biosafety.   
 
What is universal, however, are the information subsets in the public domain that inform 
preferences.  For instance, an awareness of new technologies, an understanding of what they are 
meant to do, cues as observed from the experiences of others, and so on.  They may differ in their 
modality, but the premise of basing an awareness of some observed reality is the same, and these 
information subsets often overlap among the actors.  The distinction begins with the incentives that 
underpin and motivate action.  These incentive structures mesh with how the decision maker 
perceives the risks involved in using the technology, which further differentiates parties.  These two 
factors – risk framings and incentive structures - lead to some measure of uncertainty.  And based 
on this metric, a decision is made. But this decision is bound by a combination of what is known - 
information subsets.  These are referred to in order to get what one wants, and are subject to the 
implicit unknown of what the future holds along technical, economic, and political dynamics - risk 
framings.  And based on how the decision maker (and others) observe the outcomes of that decision, 
attempts to seek accountability will occur, depending on how satisfied the parties involved might 
or might not be.  Seeking accountability can either use established formal tools (i.e. legal 
instruments, regulatory clauses), or informal tools (i.e. bribes, kidnapping, arson).  These 
observations then facilitate a reflexive feedback loop, further enriching the information subsets that 
generated the initial incentive structures and risk framings of the decision maker and those 
observing the decision making process and its outcomes, and the process repeats itself.   
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1.4.1 An Illustrative Example 
 
Consider a simplified sketch of the decision making processes of the early days of civil society 
engagement with transgenics in Indian agriculture and how this led to regulatory reform.  The 
story begins in earnest in the late nineties, with iconic leaders like Vandana Shiva generating the 
debate in terms of gene use restrictive technologies (GURTs, or “Terminator” technologies), the 
perils of globalization, the threat of patents on life in the face of TRIPS and article 27.3b, the threat 
of multinational domination in India, and the need to protect and preserve a means of farming in 
India.  The information subsets are observed along the lines of post 1991 economic reforms, with 
firms entering the Indian market, and the government referring to, for the first time, the then 
untested regulatory structure.  The firm to watch is essentially singular – it is Monsanto, the only 
firm with the stamina and resources to push the process along.  Their tenacity is both impressive 
and threatening, but impossible to ignore.  Their past practices of introducing toxic chemicals is 
referred to – this is the firm that developed Agent Orange, who bought out Delta Pine Land and 
acquired the patents on GURTs, and who have gone on record saying that control of the food 
system is their ultimate goal.   
 
The narrative is forged on three premises.  First is to “cremate” Monsanto given their apparent 
single minded focus on dominating Indian agriculture.  There are underlying themes of Gandhian 
non-violence in the face of oppression, of the identity of a country which only fifty years ago was 
under foreign rule, of India’s first prime minister Nehru’s statement soon after Indian 
independence in 1947 that “[e]verything else can wait, but not agriculture.“  Or put another way, in 
the words of the second prime minister Shastri, “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan”; hail the soldier, hail the 
farmer.  Defend India, and protect India’s agricultural heritage.  This frames the second incentive: 
to ‘protect’ the interests of Indian farmers, though both Shiva and Sahai’s alleged representation of 
these farmers is suspect given their urban, upper middle class reference points.  Third is to portray 
to a wider audience how ‘dangerous’ this firm and how ‘unprepared’ Indian regulators are for their 
onslaught.  Or as prime minister Vajpayee further modified Shastri’s slogan after the first successful 
nuclear tests of 1998, “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan, Jai Vighyan” – hail the soldier, hail the farmer, hail 
science.  As interpreted by Shiva and Sahai, well, science may be worth celebrating, but one should 
not be carried away. 
 
The risk framings are along three lines; the technical risks involved with the nature of the 
technology (GURTs disallow farmers to save seed, though in practice hybrids have been around for 
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years and no farmer in his right mind or capacity to do otherwise would save an F2 seed), the 
economic risks (the costs of a farmer to purchase transgenic seed is staggering and beyond their 
means, regardless of the fact that farmers are not clueless when it comes to an investment and are 
willing to spend money now to get higher returns later), and the political risks (if we do not 
sensitize a wider public to these issues, regulators in collusion with firms will get away with 
murder).  Uncertainty is then measured considering these factors; the situation is dire indeed, and 
given these parameters, the outcome that will occur is one where India will be subject to 
multinational domination in the name of science, commerce, and the ambition of a government 
playing with some very fundamental notions of Indian identity.  This is what the future holds.  
They cannot let this happen. 
 
So, they had to do something.  They had to find out to what extent the government is acting on 
these concerns, so they filed public interest litigations on the basis that the government is not 
following the rules they themselves have put on paper.  Or, they would organize rallies to bring 
farmers together to create a visual complement that the media would pick up.  Or, they would 
work within the government to ensure that farmers’ rights are a central component of Plant Variety 
Protection (PVP) laws that were being drawn up as a TRIPS compliancy measure.  These are but 
three examples for the sake of illustration, though all based on actual fact.  And once these 
decisions were made and acted upon, they observed the outcome.  Did the strategy work?  Did they 
get the outcome we expected?  Did using legal means force the government to respond?  Did the 
rally attract enough media attention to warrant broader public debate?  Did they manage to get 
farmers’ rights into the PVP laws that were being developed in like of multilateral obligations?  If 
so, or if not, why?  Depending on the outcome, why did or did it not happen?  What went wrong?  
Who was responsible for disallowing it to happen?  Who do we address for the outcome?  
 
Once that was established, new strategies were drawn up for future actions.  Just as government 
regulation to date in India is an evolutionary process, so is the regulation that surrounds these 
strategies.  Battles are forged on how these risk framings and incentive structures lead to decisions 
that pit parties against each other.  The battle is fought because, in this example, technical risks 
dictated that the government might have had their own view of the potential benefits or unwanted 
consequences of GURTs.  In this example, the Indian laws that were enacted disallowed GURTs, 
arguably because that particular framing of risk resonated with regulators.  Economic risks may 
have dictated that seeds should have been priced at a premium according to the firms stated 
technology transfer fee.   Here, the government did intervene in pricing and forced seed suppliers 
to cap the price, though this was changed not due to the arguments of civil society alone, but rather 
political incentives at the state level.   But there are interfaces between these risk framings, in this 
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case those of civil society and those of a Chief Minister meshing in harmony.  Finally, political risks 
may foster a space where the public does react positively to how civil society has framed 
transgenics as being ‘unsafe’.  This is exactly what happened in the more recent Bt brinjal25 
moratorium given the assertion of the current minister of the MoEF, Jairam Ramesh, that the system 
that evolved and was observed in practice over the Bt cotton experience is not adequate to manage 
a food crop effectively.  But on the other hand, he was also responding to a political climate, one 
where much of the general public had become sceptical of the safety – the risk - of Bt brinjal as 
framed successfully by civil society.  Again, this represents successful meshing of risk framings; 
technical risks as understood by civil society meshing with the political risks as understood by the 
government. 
 
Ultimately, this process of regulation is far, far different from anything resembling the science 
based, biosafety centric view of regulation borne out of Ramachandran’s initial stab at 
appropriating USDA guidelines, the DBT requesting a separate set of rules for biosafety given that 
lacking inclusion in the EPA, or arguably even the central tenets of a ‘one stop shop’ as envisioned 
in the still gestating NBRA bill.  This simple sketch shows that, depending on whether risk 
framings mesh or collide, the actions of one of these actors can force an interaction with other actor 
or actors, thereby pushing the debate into directions it may have never been intended to go.  But 
these directions cannot be guided by any single party.  This is regulation; something far removed 
from the standard views of regulation presented in the literature, and discussed in chapter two.   
 
Observers in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) have termed this way of looking at 
policy as an “argumentative turn” (Fischer and Forrester 1993; Fischer 1999; Hoppe 1999).  
Regulation has to incorporate multiple arguments based on how persuasive they may be, as 
opposed to arguments based on technical considerations alone.  It has to acknowledge the existence 
of multiple framings of risk, and belief systems that generate power dynamics.  And in the context 
of a democracy, there has to be a dialogue between planners and the public in the context of the 
frameworks they enact. But I will go one step further, and argue that this dialogue in the context of 
Bt cotton occurred not merely out of an obligation of the state, but because they had no choice in the 
matter.  It was a reflection of an urgency, characterized the risk framings of those outside the sphere 
of government.  
 
This is where this research is placed.  While the following chapter will discuss the canonical 
literature on regulation and my methodology, the core of this thesis are the middle four chapters.  
These chapters deconstruct the risk framings of the four parties that I observed as having both the 
most pressing stake in the dynamics surrounding Bt cotton in India, detailing the technical, 
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economic, and political realms.  It is as much about risk assessment as it is risk management, but 
the real thrust of my empirical work is not to merely characterize what I have seen along these two 
lines, but more how regulation then plays out as a co-evolutionary, co-constructed process that sees 
these risk framings clashing, meshing, and always evolving.  Because, this is really what regulation 
is all about.  This research is premised on a series of observations, conversations, and experiments.  
The results of all of this will reveal and better identify these constructions and framings.  In doing 
so, a clearer picture of what regulation means will emerge.   
 
Distinct risk framings pit parties against each other, but also forge alliances in ways that were never 
imagined.  However, to fully appreciate why, we need to see how risks are constructed and 
understood.  Because of the fact that they differ amongst all the parties I consider, there are 
conflicting views of the technologies involved.  Ultimately, political, economic, and technical risk 
framings come full circle, and the interfaces forge reactions.  This is the battlefield, and this is the 
basis for how the regulation surrounding transgenics in Indian agriculture actually evolved (and 
evolves) in practice. 
 
1.5 Next… 
 
The following chapter will review the literature on regulation to better place how my approach is 
both a product and a departure from the work of others.  After that, I will provide a more localized 
explanation of how I conducted my research; where I did it, who I spoke to, how I shared those 
perspectives across the actors, how I struggled and attempted to overcome the challenge of 
positionality in any kind of anthropological research, and why I chose the methodology I did.  
Chapters three to six then present the core, empirical side of my work.  Over the course of two 
years, I interviewed actors of all four parties – the government, civil society, the firm, and farmers 
themselves.  I should note here that among these four actors, the vast majority of my time – almost 
half of it – was spent with farmers.   
 
The reason for this is simple, and borne again of both personal and professional motivations.  
Personally, it was something I had wanted to do for many years.  I wanted to know what it was like 
to be a farmer growing Bt cotton.  I wanted to live in a farming community.  I wanted to grow Bt 
cotton myself.  I wanted to learn Hindi enough to actually release myself from relying on my 
translator so I could work on my own schedule.  I achieved all these things.  That is personal.  
Professionally, I strongly believe that to really understand this technology, one has to spend time 
with those who really drive the entire debate – farmers.  Not doing so would render all of this 
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research just like many of the other large number of narratives on Bt cotton in India.  And that is 
not why I chose to do a PhD. 
 
Finally, chapter seven will conclude.  After establishing why I wanted to do this research and the 
underlying theoretical framework of my entry into the questions, after establishing what the 
literature has already said about these questions, and after applying the analytical framework I 
have established to ask and process the questions and their answers, what does it all mean?  The 
aim, in sum, is to rethink regulation. 
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Endnotes: Chapter 1
                                                
1 Since 2007, the STEPS centre at the University of Sussex has begun to systematically deal with these themes; the rethinking 
of regulation in particular (Leach, Scoones, and Stirling, 2007; Leach, Scoones and Wynne 2005; van Zwanenberg et al 2008, 
2010).  Refer to http://www.steps-centre.org/publications/index.html for a series of publications.  It is a limited field, and 
one that is only now receiving more attention. 
2 I characterize market epistemologies those overarching theories of knowledge that dictate how agents rationalize the 
incentives they are faced with in deciding how to act within a market, dictated by the normative frameworks - as determined 
by cultural factors - that these agents operate in.   This diversity is a product of the variety of cultures that economic agents 
work within, and the variety of perspectives that color and imbue how these agents make decisions; for instance, the 
accumulation of debt among families due to the cost of paying for the marriage of daughters and/or dowries.  In practice, 
this can be applied to farmers in India who appear willing to accept significant amounts of debt secured from private money 
lenders in order to afford a new technology such as Bt Cotton, regardless of the uncertain performance of the technology.  
Such behaviour counters the “risk averse” and “informed” agent of neoclassical economics, borne of a unique framing of of 
risk: a distinct market epistemology. 
3 Briefly, Bacillus thuringiensis, or Bt, is a soil-dwelling bacterium. The bacteria forms protein toxins from Cry1Ac genes. 
When Bt is genetically incorporated into crop species, these toxins have lethal effects on species of caterpillars and beetles, 
and more specifically, the bollworm. As a result, the application of pesticides used to combat these pests is allegedly not 
required, as the pesticide is incorporated into the plant itself. 
4 There are a wealth of academic and mainstream studies focusing on the regulation of Bt cotton in India and its 
performance. Refer, for instance, to Ahuja 2007; Bambawale 2010; Bambawale et al 2004; Barwale et al 2004; Bennet et al 2004, 
2005, 2006; Crost et al 2007; David and Sai 2002; Glover 2010; Gujar et al 2007, 2008, 2010; Gupta and Chandak 2005; Glover 
2002, 2010; Herring 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; 2010; Karilahoo 2009; Kranthi and Kranthi 2004; 
Kulkarni 2002; Kuruganti 2006, 2008, 2009a, 2010; Kuruganti and Ramanjaneyulu 2006; Morse, Bennett, and Ismael 2005a, 
2005b; Morse 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Narayanamoorthy and  Kalamkar 2006; Newell 2003a, 2003b, 2008; Pemsl et al 2004; Qaim 
and Zilberman 2003; Qaim 2003; Qaim et al 2006; Qayum and Sakhari 2005; Ramamurthy 2009; Ramanjaneyulu and 
Kuruganti 2006; Ramasundaram et al 2007; Kameswara Rao 2010; Sahai 2002, 2003; Sainath 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Scoones 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2008; Subramaniam and Qaim 2009, 2010; Sahai and Rahman 2003, 2004; Smale et al 2008. 
5 The general notion of informal vs. formal in the social sciences poses an institutional framework against something outside, 
or the other, often characterized as non-governmental.  The primary point of departure for this delineation is well defined in 
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CHAPTER 2  
WHAT IS REGULATION: THE LITERATURE AND HOW TO RETHINK IT 
 
The process of regulation is addressed at length in a wide variety of disciplines, cutting across a 
wide variety of contexts.  It presents a fascinating tableau to consider how a state entity can manage 
the incentives, desires, ambitions, and expectations of a public.  There are symmetries across the 
disciplines – notions of governance, the role of the state, the firm, and civil society – and the 
introduction of new technologies presents a common link between them all.  The literature I have 
reviewed certainly applies to what I have seen over the course of my research. In terms of where 
the Indian government initially was heading at the outset of regulatory creation, many of the tenets 
of what I present here are relevant.  Classical formulations of technical risk, managing competition 
in the face of monopoly pricing, and adhering to international best practices were all hallmarks of 
the first stages of regulatory formation around transgenics in India.  However, there is an analytical 
gap in the literature.   
 
My analysis starts from a way of looking at risk proposed by Beck (1992), and a regulatory model 
argued by Millstone (2007, 2009). From there, I fuse it with arguments put forth by a number of 
scholars associated with the STEPS centre regarding citizenship, uncertainty, science, and 
regulation (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Leach et al 2007; Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2007; Levi-Faur 
2005; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2003; Newell 2002; Scoones 2002, 2003; Scoones et al. 2007; van 
Zwanenberg, Ely, and Smith 2008).  In doing so, I offer a way of looking at risk interfaces in the 
context of regulation that I have not come across in the literature.  My argument focuses on a co-
evolutionary, co-constructed model of regulation, where risk interfaces generate a process of 
regulation as opposed to policy formulations as regulation.  There has to be a way to consider how 
the parties involved in regulatory deliberation and evolution interface with one another - and how 
this process is actually regulation - as opposed to a mechanistic focus on risk and policy 
instruments alone.  But to see why such a focus is both key and novel, a review of what the literary 
canon has observed is necessary.  This chapter will address both the state of the art, as well as how 
what has been written to date both complements and falls short of explaining what I have found 
over the course of this research.  
 
I first present the literature, with a focus on three classic subsets: economics, political science, and 
international relations. The literature on regulation is of course vast, and what follows is necessarily 
only a limited subset. However, in my reading for this thesis, I have tried to gain a sense of 
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dominant perspectives, and resulting gaps and limitations. The aim is not to provide a complete 
synthesis, but to carve out a focus for this work, one that takes a broad view of regulation, but is 
also aware of the limitations of any particular framing.   
 
Economics frames how agents interact with one another in the context of incentives, risk, and 
decisions.  Beyond that, it addresses how this arena is managed; the role of the state, how much of a 
role it should have, and what happens in spaces where the state cannot reach.  The political science 
literature focuses more on these spaces – it moves the analysis away from government and more 
into governance. It presents a focus on the broader inclusion of a public who have a stake in 
regulation, particularly in the context of new technologies released to a broader public who have 
their own notions of hazard.  There is recognition of nonjudicial forms of regulation; of the informal 
realm along with the formal.  Finally, through a wider lens, the international law and relations 
literature takes a global view, and addresses what happens when both the economic and political 
science literature are applied not just to individual nation states, but the interface between nation 
states in the context of both trade and governance.  Just as the individual actors frame risk in 
distinct ways, so do disciplines. 
 
Second, and as a consequence of what the literature does and does not address, I present a series of 
questions that builds on this literature and more concretely place this research within this canon of 
work.  While I have attempted to establish why this research is important in the preceding chapter, 
references to the existing bodies of work surrounding regulation will render my ambition clearer, 
and provide additional evidence as to why this research is novel, relevant, and timely.  Finally, with 
both the literature presented and a more explicit rationale for my research justified, I move to how 
exactly I conducted my research – the methodology.   
 
2.1 Economics 
 
Posner (1974) defines regulation in an economic context as “ (…) taxes and subsidies of all sorts 
[and] explicit legislative and administrative controls over rates, entry, and other facets of economic 
activity”.  More broadly, Chang (1997: 704) defines it as “(…) government activity that is intended 
to affect directly the behaviours of private sector agents in order to align them with the ‘public 
interest’”.  Both definitions (one implicitly, the other explicitly) cast a role of an agent that enforces 
control, which is broadly as some sort of regulatory authority.  A definition such as this places 
regulation firmly within the context of a market consisting of parties who, due to the incentives 
present within a capitalist system, engage in activities characterized along the lines of various 
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modes of production, with the result being a good or service available for consumption in the 
market.  However, such a characterization is somewhat in opposition to the classical view of 
optimal market behaviour. 
 
2.1.1 The Neoclassical Tradition 
 
In the context of regulation, there are three core tenets of the neoclassical school.   First, efficiency 
results from competitive markets.  Second, a wide variety of agents in a competitive market will 
result in the determination of a price that is best suited for what the market can support.  Where 
there are many competitors, and assuming perfect information, prices will adjust to Pareto optimal 
levels.  Third, and this is where the government could – but should not – intervene, any efforts by 
the state to fix prices or otherwise intervene in this negotiation of value between firms will create 
distorting incentives, thereby resulting in the misallocation of resources and perverting the process 
of attaining efficiency. 
 
With particular reference to the final assumption, some individuals - initially Keynes - have 
presented arguments for government intervention within this system to address the “excesses and 
contradictions” of capitalism. His work was not limited to theoretical exercises, and his ideas and 
presence were highly influential in the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, which acted as the 
catalyst for the ITO, and ultimately, GATT and the WTO.  Yet while the Keynesian approach called 
for state intervention - particularly with regards to fiscal as opposed to monetary policy - current 
trends within the context of globalization and neoliberalism have seen the implementation of 
privatization schemes, the decreasing role of individual states in creating policy, and attempts at 
the harmonization of trade policy to facilitate the exchange of goods and services across borders 
(Chang 1997: 714).  Indeed, it is as though these are attempts to regulate deregulation.  
 
2.1.2 Regulation and “Development” 
 
Regulation in a post second world war context can be further characterized by two geographic 
distinctions; developed and developing economies. Chang (1997: 704) refers to the post-colonial 
period beginning in the 1960s as the “age of regulation”, where the former group emphasized the 
correction of market failures (in the neoclassical sense) via government intervention.  The focus 
shifted towards “developmental” objectives, namely Import-Substitution-Industrialization, or ISI.  
This focus began to change in the 1970s, with the developed economies moving away from 
interventionist regulation, and developing economies becoming dissatisfied with ISI.   
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Two of the primary arguments against intervention during this time were regulatory capture 
(Stigler 1971: 13), or where interventionist policies reflect the interests of particular groups - 
lobbyists - as opposed to the public, and rent seeking (Tullock 1967: 224), where monopolies 
allocate resources to ensure the excludable nature of their activities, this ensuring profits, or rents.  
Similarly, in the developing country context, concerns arose regarding the notion of efficiency, and 
the fact that the imposed nature of policies aimed at speeding up industrialization via the 
promotion of efficient markets raised inefficiencies themselves (Toye 1987).  Finally, in the 1980s, 
policies appeared to come full circle, with a focus on deregulation and privatization.  
 
Parker (2001: 6) characterizes six elements that apply to both developed and developing economies.  
First are the economics of market failure.  This applies to where the notion of competitive markets 
efficiently allocating resources fails due to externalities (Scitovsky 1954: 144), information 
asymmetries (Akerlof 1970: 490), public goods (Samuelson 1954: 387), merit goods, incomplete 
markets, monopolies, or income inequalities.  Second are the economics of state failure.  A state fails 
in such a context if it does not act in the best interests of the citizenry.  Third are the economics of 
regulating prices and profits.  This applies primarily in the context of monopolies, natural or 
otherwise, and the role of the state in limiting the potential of monopoly pricing abuses.  Fourth is 
the notion of regulatory efficiency, seen not just through the lens of competition, but also 
legitimacy, and central to this thesis, risk.  Fifth is how regulation affects business practice.  Does it 
facilitate an environment that is conducive to economic growth, or is it overly cumbersome?  Or put 
another way, it is the management of “red tape”.  Sixth is the nature of policy transfer, or what 
happens when one nation state adopts the regulatory structures of another in the face of time or 
resource constraints; the prescriptive measures of the WTO and other international guidelines being 
the obvious example.  
 
2.1.3 The Big Picture: Information, Competition, and the State 
 
In applied practice, some have argued that different industries need different mixes of institutional 
arrangements free of ideology (Kahn 1988), while others have argued that a diversity of regulatory 
objectives disturb regulatory balance and any attempt at harmonization (Holmes and Young 2001: 
32).  There is clearly a difference of opinion here, one that is particularly hard to navigate within 
current trends of globalization, particularly as represented by the WTO.  Others have stated that 
any regulatory action must be subject to a cost-benefit test as a means of determining the 
uncertainty implicit in enacting a regime within a market, and using the United States as an 
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example, argue that over half of the frameworks developed by the American government would 
fail such a test (Hahn 1998: 201). Still others have noted that excessive regulation can be a barrier to 
innovation, but on the other hand can be a “spur” to it (White 1997: 1).   The debates continue. 
 
In summary, there are three common themes that run across much of the economic literature, all of 
which present a framework for an economic understanding of risk.  First is the notion of 
information asymmetries.  This applies both in the context of “not having enough information”, but 
also when one party has information, while the other does not.  Second is competition, relating 
primarily to the risk of monopoly abuse.  Third relates to the role of the state; how excessive 
government “intrusion” may be harmful to growth.  Regulation has to strike a balance between 
allowing for growth while still maintaining the primacy of the public interest.  The overarching 
theme is the reduction of barriers to trade and increased privatization/liberalization, coming full 
circle to the neoclassical tradition.  However, while information, competition, and liberalization are 
all key elements in the story of Bt cotton, what the literature does not really address is how these 
themes play out amongst the wider series of participants in regulatory deliberation and evolution, 
and the conflicts that arise out of these interfaces.  While the battlefield of regulation is premised on 
these catalysts and dynamics, the real underlying factor is the diversity of market epistemologies as 
framed by a diversity of risk framings, as opposed to the neoclassical school of market dynamics 
alone.  
 
2.1.4 Farm Level Dynamics and Risk 
 
Moving away from the nation state and focusing more on individual communities and agents, 
another literature - rooted in microeconomics, statistical probability, and game theory - analyzes 
risk through a lens of rational decision making (Hicks 1931; Tintner 1941; Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1947; Friedman and Savage 1948; Turvey et al. 1949; Arrow 1951; Boan 1955).  This 
canonical body of work formed the basis for a more specific consideration of farm planning under 
uncertainty (Dillon and Anderson 1971; Just 1974; Wolgin 1975; Brink and McCarl 1978; Dillon and 
Scandizo 1978; Young 1979; Binswanger 1980; Feder 1980; Binswanger 1981; Hamal and Anderson 
1982; Chavas and Holt 1990; Foster and Rausser 1991; Feder and Umali 1993). Using these 
quantitative efforts as their basis for entry, recent criticisms to such an approach have argued that 
such a framework focuses too narrowly on neo-classical economics as a basis for explaining 
behaviour; that is, risk is not merely a probabilistic parameter.  As Adams (1982: 668) argues: “if 
farmers are taken as risk-averse or risk-takers for subjective reasons (…) we are once again plunged 
back into the projection of mentalistic constructs and taken away from the behavioural realm.”   
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Cultural references have been discussed, either under the aegis of how religion and faith offers a 
form of “insurance” against unforeseen consequences - “a long term strategy to avoid future loss” 
(Iannaccone 1995: 288; Miller 2000: 8) - or the relationship between farming practice and the longer 
term effects of new technologies on what is perceived as “nature”, or more broadly, the 
environment (Tomalin 2004: 266). 
 
However, rationality does not hinge entirely on a notion of benefit, or expected utility 
maximization as represented by stylized variables that aim to characterize elements of decision 
making.  Adams (1982: 664) argues that “one can at best talk about a qualified in situ economic 
rationality, which for want of a better term I will call ‘demi rationality’ (…) economic rationality 
must be considered in context; there is an economic interest but it flickers like a candle, sometimes 
burning intensely, sometimes waning.”  There are other factors outside the neoclassical formulation 
of the rational agent, and the underlying factor is risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983).  However, 
beyond risk and probabilities is one additional, crucial factor. It is how risk is framed or understood 
uniquely by different individuals or groupings of individuals.  Following from that, within 
different groupings of decision makers interfacing with one another emerge “class and risk 
positions” that further differentiate these risk framings (Beck 1992: 53). As Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981: 453) and Druckman (2003: 1) note, “[a] framing effect occurs when different, but logically 
equivalent, words or phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” While there are 
mechanisms to mitigate risk based on price indications, expected yields, and information subsets, 
there are other factors that generate what actions are “right” now in order to achieve the “right” 
outcome later.  And these factors are distinct from observed cues; they are threads woven into a 
cultural fabric that cloak the unknown, providing a structure for facilitating a characterization of 
what the “right” action is to achieve the “right” outcome.  
 
Economics has established the role of expectations, information, and quantifiable risk explicitly, 
with others then elaborating on these basic principles – their relevance, limitations, and application.  
Yet, regulation is not merely a function of the degree of state intervention, individual choice as a 
function of expected utility, and the maximization of this measure of welfare.  While at the core of 
any effort to regulate among these lines are state agents and those they are mandated to manage in 
terms of market oriented decisions, there is – in a democratic context - the additional and crucial 
role of political processes and governance that oversees the implementation of such efforts.  If risk 
cannot be rationalized, then how can one consider it?  No doubt it has been addressed in the 
literature, but I am more interested in the framings.  Beck’s assertion is key here; and more than any 
of the classic analyses of risk in the economic literature, this is where the battlefield is found.  
Beyond class, the battlefield plays out between actors who have their own constructions of risk that 
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underpin these divisions. 
 
2.2 Political Science 
 
Clearly, one cannot separate markets from the political underpinnings of the agents that comprise 
the markets and make decisions given their particular framing of risk - both those who supply and 
demand economic goods, but also those who manage the conduct of such incentives. But these 
incentives are borne of interests, and this is where a political analysis becomes crucial.  The conflicts 
that characterize the battlefield are also based on conflicting interests, which play out not only in 
economic, but also political spaces.  There are ownership issues  -  of knowledge, of primacy, of 
urgency. While economics has primarily addressed the role of the government in managing these 
incentives and risks, the political science literature addresses the broader notion of governance.  
The focus is on the wider net of stakeholders who do affect regulation, though the literature does 
not address this question in the context of risk framings.  However, it does sketch a context where 
the question begs addressing. 
 
2.2.1 Principles and Theories of the State and Governance 
 
The World Bank (1991: 23) defines governance as “(…) the form of political regime 
(parliamentary/presidential, military/civilian, authoritarian/democratic), the processes by which 
authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources, and the 
capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in general, to discharge 
government functions”, while Pierre and Peters (2000) characterize it simply as the capacity of 
government - as an institution of the state - to steer society towards achieving collective goals.  
Pierson (1996) characterizes the modern, Westphalian state (by way of Weber) along five criteria: 
monopoly control of the means of (legitimate) violence, territoriality, sovereignty, bureaucracy, and 
taxation.  
 
The starting point is how the state enacts regulation given these aspects of governance, taking into 
consideration the fact that governance encompasses parties apart from the government.  Regulatory 
reform in the current political context can be traced back to state initiated economic reform efforts 
in the U.S.; first the Progressive Era of the late 19th century, followed by the New Deal - relief, 
recovery, and reform - during the Great Depression. These initiatives were characterized by state 
directed intervention, and most of these attempts were focused on economic regulation; to ensure, 
define and establish the preconditions for “good” market performance1 (Nichols 2000).  In the US at 
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this time, intervention and regulation were almost interchangeable terms.  
 
After 1930, two issues arose: first, the acknowledgment of the contributions of the economic 
literature - regulatory capture, rent seeking behaviour and concerns of regulatory independence 
(Moran 2002: 393) - and second, the movement of state sponsored regulation into unprecedented 
social spheres such as health and safety and the environment during the 1960s and 70s.  This era 
represents the beginning of the modern regulatory era (Wiener 2004: 483).   
 
2.2.1 The Regulatory State 
 
Movement into social spheres produced litigation and a growing legalization of regulation for 
maintaining authority, characterized in the literature as command and control (Rhodes 1997).  As 
Millstone (2007) has observed, there is not only risk assessment behind regulation, but risk 
management as well – the decisionist model of regulation - which is the distinction that this 
movement into social spheres represents. This was distinct from the prior negotiation of outcomes 
between state agencies and industry (Stewart 1988).  Because of these changes, the notion of the 
Regulatory State arose, in contrast with the (Keynesian) Welfare State. The Regulatory State 
contains more emphasis on the use of authority, rules and standard-setting, and shifted the 
emphasis of control from traditional bureaucratic mechanisms towards instruments of regulation.  
This is in contrast to the Welfare State emphasis on public ownership, public subsidies, and directly 
provided services, often offered via a partnership of local and central government (Hood et al. 1999, 
Scott 2003: 6; Jones 1998: 959).   
 
Scott presents three core assumptions of the Regulatory State.  First, that regulation is instrumental 
and standardized in character.  Second, that the state is necessarily central to regulatory 
governance.  Third, that state law is the central instrument of regulatory governance.  However, 
given the movement of the state into social spheres, and the broadening scope and Schumpeterian 
evolution of different approaches, the Regulation Approach diverged from these assumptions in 
the 1970s as an attempt to characterize this new process2. 
 
2.2.2 The Post Regulatory State 
 
More recently, the 1990s have seen further movement away from these assumptions, as some critics 
have viewed them as overly theoretical (MacLeod 1997: 531; Moran 2002: 411). The Post Regulatory 
State shifts the focus of analysis from state law to the wider range of norms and mechanisms to 
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assert or achieve control due to tensions resulting from the interface of the social and economic 
goals of regulatory politics.  Starting from Foucualt (1979)3, Parker (2001: 29) and Morgen (2003: 
489) present the notion of metaregulation, characterized as an instance of nonjudicial legality, 
situated at the intersection of two trends – an increasing legalization of politics and a growing 
reliance on nonjudicial mechanisms of accountability.  
 
An additional factor in the Post Regulatory State is the nature of those technologies regulated, 
particularly in the context of risk, uncertainty, and public health (Wiener 2004: 487).  Smith (1991: 
235) presents the example of food policy in the 1980s via an outbreak of salmonella, where the 
consensual policy community was obliged to evolve into more socially pluralistic issue networks.  
Vignon (2003) argues that knowledge is no longer “given” and made accessible by specialist 
expertise, but is rather constructed and renewed in a process of collective learning that draws 
support from social pluralism.  Purcell (2002: 303) characterizes this as a re-scaling of the state - 
from government to governance - with the state transferring some of its traditional duties to civil 
society (in a Gramscian sense) at the local level, and at the international (globalized) level, re-
territorialization to inter/supra-state entities (i.e. WTO, EU, NAFTA, etc).  
 
Mann (1997: 473) and Scott (2003: 15) characterize this “weakening” of the state as follows. First, 
that global capitalism is undermining the nation state, as there is a variety of norms to account for.  
Second, social and environmental problems of a global risk society (Beck 1992) grow beyond the 
reach of singular states, and necessitate a variety of control mechanisms.  Third, new identity-based 
movements compete with national and class identities and highlight demands of civil society.  
There are a variety of controllers and controllees.  In sum, Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 2) presents 
the current role of the state concerning regulation along four lines.  First, there is an evolution and 
transformation of the notion of regulation.  Who regulates? What does regulation mean?  Is it 
merely adopted by other states or uniquely created?  Second, even though economists have debated 
this for over a century, regulating competition in the context of efficiency is still an overarching 
theme.  Third, the state determines the political character of the regulatory state, neoliberal or 
otherwise.  Fourth is the issue of trust and the regulatory state, and those actors outside the halls of 
government whose perspectives are impossible to ignore – from individual politicians, to civil 
society, to experts, and everyone they claim to represent. 
 
This re-scaling – or weakening - of the state is reflective of the uncertainties embedded in 
transgenics.  The government as the “controller” is no longer capable of managing all the risks 
implicit in Bt cotton adoption alone, because they are not alone in having the capacity to frame risk.  
There is much more going here than biosafety alone, and the technical risk framings embedded in 
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the biosafety narrative just do not capture all the elements of what might happen once Bt cotton is 
released and adopted.  These are the concerns of other controlees, and these concerns enter policy, 
not just due to technical risk framings, but political risk framings as well.  Science is just one 
component of how regulation unfolds; there are many other realms of contested knowledge that 
force their way in to the space of regulatory deliberation. 
 
2.3 International Law And International Relations 
 
Overarching the capacity of individual states and notions of governance versus government is the 
arena of interaction between individual states and the market incentives that exist between them at 
a global scale.  The battlefield of regulation unfolds within individual nation states, but there are 
linkages to complementary battles that happen internationally.  Framing the incentives are rules; 
rules that are not bound by borders, but are to be applied equally across them.  The definition and 
applicability of international law as a regulatory instrument is debatable.  The rationale for these 
debates is rooted in the (lacking) mechanisms for enforcement, retortion and reprisal excepted.  
Some have argued that the efficacy of an international legal system is directly a function of the 
capacity of domestic legal systems, rendering the notion of “international” law somewhat 
misleading, as it is domestic law that ultimately implements international directives.  Malanszuk 
(1997: 65) identifies three main functions of any domestic legal system; law making (legislature), 
determination (courts/tribunals), and enforcement (police/army). 
 
2.3.1 Vertical vs. Horizontal Systems 
 
However, in contrast to domestic law, international law is a horizontal legal system.  It lacks any 
one supreme authority, a centralized source of force, or a manifestation of the three functions 
embodied in the domestic context.  The UN General Assembly, Security Council, or International 
Criminal Court do not and cannot embody the functions of their analogues in a domestic context 
(Malanczuk 1997: 3).  Moreover, international law (i.e. the International Court of Justice) differs 
from (common) law as it does not recognize past legal precedence, or stare decisis (Shahabudeen 
1996).  de Senarclens (1998: 91) identifies two main factors behind recent changes and the resultant 
distancing from Eurocentrism within the arena of international relations (IR) and regulation: the 
end of the Cold War, and the process of globalization, both of which coincided with the moves 
towards regional integration, and the resultant reconsideration of what sovereignty really means 
(Lake 2003).  Gilpin (1987: 3) identifies three additional factors that have also facilitated change: the 
Bretton Woods agreements, stable currencies, and as discussed within the review of economics, the 
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deterioration of liberalism in the 1970s and the promotion of free markets4.   
 
2.3.2 Ideological Interfaces and the WTO 
 
When considering regulation within the context of international relations and law, the WTO 
presents an applied architecture for analysis that the literature of both disciplines refer to 
considerably, particularly from the mid 1990s onwards.  The legal implications of the WTO and the 
intrastate dynamics that result from the incentives to engage in trade, while still international in 
scope, are distinct from other international legal instruments due to the process and architecture of 
dispute settlement and the treaties that govern interaction. The legal status of the WTO is tractable 
via a series of treaties.  The WTO constitutes hard law, characterized by Abbott and Sindal (2000: 
421-422) as legally binding obligations that delegate authority for implementation (i.e. covenants, 
contracts).  On the other hand, soft law is characterized as legal arrangements that are less precise 
in terms of obligation, precision, and delegation (i.e. international best practices, many UN 
agreements).  
 
Yet, the real question is how effective all these rules really are in practice.  How does it link to what 
actually happens in the battlefield of regulation? While international markets do present a metric 
on which the minimum support prices are calculated, and farmers then pick up these cues during 
the cotton harvest, does central government regulation really link to these multilateral frameworks?  
Much of what has happened in India around regulation is less focused on trade guidelines – save 
for IPR regulation – and more around domestic negotiations that took place in the courts, as chapter 
four will detail.  There was a noticeable transfer of scientific language and content from a variety of 
international best practices and guidelines like the OECD Blue Book, TRIPS, and the CBD, but 
again, these were all mostly premised on technical risk framings.  In reality, the co-evolutionary 
process of regulation, co-constructed by parties not versed in science, renders multilateral 
agreements as something on paper, but only relevant when contested in a legal setting.  And in 
terms of what happened around Bt cotton, those cues were less based on multilateral rules, and 
more on the rules that emerged out of the risk interfaces between the state and the other actors in 
this story. 
 
2.4 Looking Backwards And Forwards: The Literature, Regulation, And Bt Cotton 
 
The literature reviewed here addresses many of the issues that framed the queries that propelled 
my desire to conduct this research.  If the process of regulation was merely an exercise in top down 
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governance, undertaken primarily by the government, then this research would be rather dull 
indeed.  But, it is not, and it was not, and for one reason – everyone constructs risk in different 
ways, and the decisions that arise out of these constructions present a sort of window into how 
these risk framings relate to outcomes. These are windows that anyone can look through.  These 
decisions resonate with others in a public sphere, and given the stakes that individuals may have in 
characterizing the outcomes of these decisions in particular ways, there emerges a space where 
these risk framings collide. This is what the literature does not address in enough detail.  Rather 
than a focus on the institutions of regulation and the more mechanistic, economic framings of risk, 
what is missing are an analysis of risk interfaces. 
 
There are points of intersection where the firms producing such technologies, the state as manager 
of conduct (at least on paper), civil society as a representative body, and end users of the 
technologies – in this case cotton farmers – all meet, clash, agree, or disagree, and sometimes all 
four at once.  This is the battlefield (Long and Long 1992)5.  While the economics literature does 
consider risk as a function of decision making, critics have wondered how such probabilistic 
constructs can be truly representative of a notion as abstract as risk (Adams 1982).  There are so 
many cultural cues, contexts, and constructions that no quantitative model can incorporate – faith, 
trust, and expectations are parameters that a statistically derived metric of risk can approximate 
and represent, but never completely.  Utility maximization in the context of expectations and 
welfare measures is based on microeconomic axiomatic assumptions, which are often violated.  The 
state does manage release, and all of the concerns outlined in the classic economic literature – 
government intervention, ‘red tape’, rent seeking, regulatory capture, information asymmetries – 
do resonate.  Yet, most of the interfaces considered are between firms and the state.  What of the 
management of this relationship as it relates to the additional parties that are affected by the 
structures that these two parties have historically negotiated?   
 
The political science literature does present the notion of metaregulation as a vehicle to explain 
what happens when a new technology emerges within the “public sphere” is questioned by society 
perceiving hazards borne of a non-science based perspective.  This is the risk framing that 
economics has addressed, but without the political implications that it carries.  Clearly, governance 
is not simply a function of the government, and the emergence of transgenic in agriculture certainly 
reflects this assertion.  The classic formulation of biosafety does frame this construction of risk, as it 
lies at the root of the often assumed and yet unknown hazards.  And while metaregulation and the 
post regulatory state in the context of unknown unknowns does characterize the multitude of 
parties that enter the milieu of regulatory formulation – invited or not – there has been little 
discussion about parties outside of civil society who enter this arena.  Moreover, though risk is 
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discussed – Beck arguably single handedly presented a new way of looking at the notion – there is 
little discussion in the political science literature about risk interfaces.  This is really the core of the 
matter.  These interfaces - borne of “socially pluralistic issue networks”, a “nonjudicial” means of 
addressing accountability, and the distinct ways in which these networks characterize risk - are 
what really form the basis of the entire debate.  Political science has identified the nature of the 
movement from government to governance, but has not considered, in detail, the nature of the 
interface from the perspective of risk construction.  This is key to flag here, as my observations have 
led me to conclude that political processes as framed by political risks are at the core of what 
propels regulatory evolution.   
 
Yet, there are economic and technical risks as well, framed by a combination of the motivations to 
enter multilateral trade negotiations, to adopt (often wholesale) regulatory frameworks from other 
jurisdictions, and to do so under pressures.  These pressures find their root not only in political 
opportunity, but also a paucity of technical capacity – the ability to really ascertain technical 
biosafety metrics – as well as the economic risks of missing the biotech boat.  The international 
relations literature characterizes multilateralism – the WTO as hard law and UN covenants like the 
CBD as soft, but beyond that is something more pressing.  Given these frameworks, how do they 
play out on the ground?  Do international norms really affect domestic regulation, and do these 
elements of culpability as enshrined in dispute settlement really make any difference on the 
ground?  Given economic, political, and technical risks, I would argue that something else occurs, 
something that, again, is the result of how different parties who frame risk in their own way, armed 
with their own interests in the technology itself, interact in the battlefield of regulation.   
 
The release of Bt cotton may have initially been governed by regulatory frameworks adopted from 
outside India in the face of time, resource, and capacity constraints. Yet, as time passed, distinct 
political, economic, and technical risk framings as held by the multitude of parties that were and 
are involved are what truly characterize the dynamics that triggered regulatory evolution.  This is 
the battlefield of regulation, and these processes are what really characterize regulation as I see it. 
 
2.4.1 Where Does This Research Fit? 
 
Drawing from Long and Long (1992), the battlefields of knowledge they refer to are, in my mind, 
more akin to a battlefield of regulation.  I look at regulation as a far more holistically inclusive 
process, one that has decision making processes at the core, but one that is premised not merely on 
decisions, but the underlying framings and constructions of risk that propel decisions under 
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uncertainty.  These decisions are observed when the multitude of parties involved as stakeholders 
interact with one another.  However, these interactions are not merely based on commonly shared 
interests, as that alone is not what propels the interactions.  These parties uniquely frame risk, and 
that is the basis for the interactions.  Knowledge may differentiate parties, but regulatory evolution 
characterizes the battlefield.  This research considers these interactions as the interfaces that reveal 
what regulation really means, with these unique risk constructions forming the basis for the 
interface. 
 
As such, this research attempts a rethinking of regulation.  My aim is to consider why regulation 
evolves, changes, is challenged, and is accepted.  There are formal frameworks that do overarch the 
entire process, and these formal frameworks mirror the classic notions of regulation as discussed in 
the literature.  However, of additional interest here are the informal frameworks that affect the 
management of these technologies.  The premise of the distinction is based on assertions of 
accountability (Goetz 2005: 10) that arise after decisions are made and observed.  One can either 
assert their desire for accountability formally via legal redress and an electoral vote, or informally – 
nonjudicially - via direct actions, vandalism, or bribes.  And most crucially, both are intrinsic to the 
practice of regulation. 
 
This research is a response to Bt cotton adoption in India, but the overarching theme is regulation in 
the context of risk, and the way in which regulation plays out in practice (Braithwaite, Coglianese, 
and Levi-Faur 2007; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Leach et al. 2007; Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2007; 
Levi-Faur 2005; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2003; Newell 2002; Scoones 2002, 2003; Scoones et al 
2007; van Zwanenberg, Ely, and Smith 2008).  In order to conduct this research, I had to understand 
first, how the stakeholders involved framed risk, and second, what the consequences of these 
framings were in an applied context, using the story of Bt cotton in India as my vehicle of analysis.  
There were many I needed to interact with – farmers, firm representatives, government officials, 
and civil society campaigners.  Given the focus on risk, there had to be a way to address the queries 
that came out of my initial research outline via some form of systematic and sustained interaction.   
 
2.5 Techniques, Trials, And Timing: The Methodology  
 
The starting point of the fieldwork component of this research was based on a desire to understand 
how these risk framings are constructed, understood, and find their character in practice.  It was 
based on a series of approximately fifty interviews across urban India, but at the level of the farm – 
where this research offers its unique addition to the literature – a longer series of sustained 
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interactions occurred, less structured around interviews and more on daily interactions.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, I have not referred to the over 200 informants I interviewed.  My focus 
here will be on those who spoke at length on their experience as observers of the regulatory 
process from 1982 onwards, those who have engaged in both the formal and informal realm as 
agents co-evolutionary regulatory reform, and of course those farmers who have – or have not – 
adopted Bt cotton.  Over the four core empirical chapters of this thesis, I address the role of four 
parties: the government, civil society, firms, and farmers.  The rationale for this approach as 
opposed to a chronological treatment of the actors as the story unfolded is to keep the focus on 
risk framings; to delineate how each party constructs risk along technical, political, and 
economic lines, thus rendering the co-evolutionary dynamics of regulatory reform clear.   
 
I spent approximately one year conducting my fieldwork in India, cumulatively occurring between 
April 2007 and July 2009.  The primary reasons for choosing India were a combination of the 
professional and personal.  I chose to look at Bt cotton as I had been looking at the regulatory issues 
surrounding transgenics in Indian agriculture since my time as a graduate student of economics.  I 
was familiar with both the formal and informal regulatory landscape, and I also had a working 
relationship with many of the key players involved.  It was where I had a background; not just in 
terms of being familiar with the research landscape, but also as a Canadian of Indian descent.  
Spending time in the village where I conducted the bulk of my fieldwork was a combination of 
many things for me.  The experience forced me to challenge many issues related to my identity, 
which was not always pretty.  Granted, similar things happened during my time in Bombay – 
worlds apart in so many ways – but in the rural setting, I never felt judged by anyone.  I dealt with 
these conflicts openly and freely, and never felt embarrassed about my efforts to learn Hindi, the 
person I was, or the person I was becoming.  And all of this is mirrored in a practice, a means of 
achieving a goal.  Just as I was there to conduct this research and had a set (at least initially) plan 
for doing so, all the farmers I encountered had a similar plan for their own farming practice.  And 
just as I had to adapt given realities I was facing, internalizing, and reassessing, the same happens 
for farmers facing new choices – that of Bt cotton adoption and all the corresponding inputs and 
practices it entails. 
 
Beyond these personal and professional motivations, I also wanted to explore in more detail how 
research and participatory video (PV) could intersect.  Over the course of the five years that I 
conducted the entire process surrounding this phase of my life, I spent around a year and a half 
freelancing as a video producer and photographer.  I had to in order to pay for this process, but 
beyond finances, working with the visual medium – both the still and moving image - was (and is) 
a function of compulsion. As I had trained many people throughout Asia in the two years prior to 
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my beginning this DPhil on how to shoot and edit video in a project documentation context, it 
became clear that there was no reason why I could not merge that experience with academic 
research.  This realization found its catalyst in my reading the anthropological literature on 
positionality, fieldwork, and bias over the course of my first year, a body of work that I had not 
engaged with previously, but was amazed at the symmetries between what I was reading and what 
I had experienced as a video trainer, producer, and photographer.    
 
Beyond a research tool however – the precise deployment of which I will provide more of an 
explanation on later in this section – I also documented most of my interviews (especially those at 
the farm level) on video.  Throughout the remaining chapters, many quotations are hyperlinked to 
streaming video content on my website; any quotation followed by the  symbol is linked to a 
video, a full list of which can be found on my website at ranaghose.com/thesisvideo.  It offers a 
unique window to actually see, hear, and maybe even know a bit about these people beyond verbal 
cues; their cadence of speech, their body language, the kind of people they might be.  It is not a 
common approach in academic research, but I hope it will be something that becomes more so.  
Those who informed this research should never be rendered as mere names in an endnote alone.  
Like any story, the characters are often the most compelling feature of the narrative. 
 
Finally – and this is something that perhaps overarches everything – there is my (conflicted) 
relationship to the discipline of economics.  To put it succinctly, I love economics as much as I hate 
it.  I always have.  I adore pulling apart the decisions we make as people burdened with egos, how 
we value outcomes, and how expectations are generated.  I always was drawn to how economics 
presents a framework for analyzing this.  To be sure, it may reflect a capacity on my part to 
overthink everything, but it is a reflection of the kind of person I am.  This is what relates to the, 
shall I say, unloving aspect of my relationship with the discipline.   
 
Something happened after completing my Masters in economics that threw me off balance.  I could 
no longer take the state of the art seriously.  There were too many assumptions based on clever 
econometric modelling that pointed to the direction in which the discipline was heading, and I no 
longer wanted to be a part of that world.  The core tenets of the discipline are still very close to my 
heart, and I do find mathematics to be a beautiful language, but essentially, there is essentially more 
than math in understanding and characterizing the choices we make as humans.  I wanted 
immersion.  I wanted to spend time with the people who would inform this research.  I wanted to 
know how they made the whole series of choices that surround Bt cotton in India.  And I wanted to 
grow Bt cotton myself, and make these choices myself.  I did all these things.   
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2.5.1 Locations and Strategies 
 
The research occurred within four spaces: the central level of government in New Delhi, the state 
level in Maharashtra, at the district level within Wardha District in eastern Maharashtra, and of 
course at the village level. At a state level, I chose Maharashtra as it historically has been the main 
cotton growing area in India, and within Maharashtra, the eastern region of Vidharba has been the 
area where most of the cotton has been grown6. Vidharba presents a rich context to place this 
research given the amount of attention the area has received since 2006 in the media as being an 
epicentre of what is commonly termed the agrarian crisis (Bunsha 2006; Deshpande and Arora 2010; 
Mishra 2008; Mishra et al. 2006; Reddy and Mishra 2009)7.  The scale of civil society mobilization in 
the area, state responses to the “crisis” by way of allocating billions of rupees of relief packages, and 
the continuous (though somewhat subdued) call among some for the region to achieve sovereignty 
as a independent state were all appealing factors to consider.  There are political, technical, and 
economic risk factors and framings all interweaved within the cultivation of cotton in this area.  The 
introduction of Bt cotton has simply added another level of complexity to what is already a 
fascinating area to observe how decision making and technology adoption by farmers, how other 
parties manifest their preferences via representing the interests of these farmers, and, central to this 
thesis, how technical, economic, and political risks are framed in such a context. 
 
Second, while the area piqued my interest for these reasons, I had to also ensure that logistically, it 
would work.  After some initial queries I sent to colleagues in India regarding assistance with 
contacts on the ground, I chose that Vidharba, and that region alone. At the level of how individual 
states operate within central directives surrounding transgenics, Vidarbha presents a unique case 
study.  Seventy percent of the 30,000 agrarian suicides that have occurred in the state of 
Maharashtra have occurred in Vidarbha8.  The press, both Indian as well as international, have been 
particularly vocal in depicting the area as the epicentre of the agrarian crisis – the “Bt Cotton 
Nightmare” (Ho 2010: 1).  Vidarbha consists of “killing fields9” where the government has failed, 
farming has become “deadly10”, and “killer Bt Cotton11” is responsible for the suicides of thousands 
of farmers.  Each growing season, there are fresh mentions of farmer suicides, of fields sown with 
“seeds of despair” in the Vidarbha “suicide belt”, where a “GM genocide” is unfolding12.  As the 
headlines indicate, there are aspects of sensationalism that overtake fact in many cases (Gruere et al. 
2008).  However, linking agrarian suicide to widows becoming prostitutes13 sells copy.  Of course, I 
cannot argue that Bt cotton alone is responsible for the crisis, as the reality is far more complicated. 
 
What I can state is that the region has seen a significant adoption rate of the technology, though 
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with mixed results in terms of the purported benefit that the technology presents – increased yields 
due to pest resistance and lower farm input factor costs.  Yet, the adoption statistics are hard to 
ignore. Among other factors behind such trends, the marketing effort is quite sophisticated and 
aggressive14, and farmers do observe real evidence of the benefit of the technology, something I 
address in far more detail in chapter six.  Yet this has occurred in the face of real challenges. Bt 
cotton is not meant for rain fed cultivation, though 70% of all farmers in Vidarbha do not have 
access to perennial irrigation15.  Second, there is limited knowledge among farmers of how best to 
harness the technology, thereby limiting the extent of benefit that can be derived from it.  The 
application of a refugia to counter inter plot pest and gene transfer, monocropping, the onset of 
new viral and fungal infections, the incorrect application of pesticides for secondary pests, and a 
disconnect between farmers and state extension services are all factors among those farmers who 
have not found Bt cotton as beneficial as hoped.   
 
My initial desire to look at three states now seemed less likely to provide me with the depth I 
required to really get my head around the complex series of risk framings that only a focused and 
more long term immersion on one community would allow.   My initial plan was a comparison of 
three states – Maharashtra, Punjab, and Andhra Pradesh.  But in practice, such a wide net of 
localities would have diluted the strength of my analysis.  Because of these factors, the bulk of the 
research occurred in one small farming community in Wardha District: Chikhali.   
 
Farm Level Fieldwork Location 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rationale for Chikhali was both pragmatic and logistical.  Pragmatic as historically, 
communities in the Vidharba region of Maharashtra have grown cotton since time immemorial.  
Logistical as Chikhali is relatively small – 170 households – and a strong connection was quickly 
 42 
forged with one group of people; the Chikhalkar family and a close friend of theirs, Kiran Raut.  
This community represents the bulk of the farm-level observations that occurred over those two 
years, though observation and interviews alone were not the only means by which information was 
gathered.   
 
The primary means by which information was gathered was via in depth interviews with a wide 
variety of stakeholders: policy makers in central and state capitals, civil society members in both 
rural and urban settings, scientists, representatives of private sector firms, and most significantly, 
farmers in Chikhali.  Though I interviewed well over 100 farmers in Chikhali and the surrounding 
area over the course of this research, this thesis focuses primarily on the quoted contributions of 
only those who I felt provided the most revealing and pertinent insights.  Their voices are the ones 
that inform the written aspect of thie research via often longer direct quotations, but the voices of 
all are embedded within the observations I made and my corresponding analysis.  Questions were 
formalized prior to engagement, but most often interaction was fostered via conversations of, on 
average, one hour in duration.  Initially, I employed a translator, but over time (particularly in 2009) 
my growing proficiency in Hindi allowed for interactions to occur without the need of the 
translator, at least on a broad day to day level.  Apart from conversations, I spent much of his time 
interacting with people daily – farmers primarily, but not only.   
 
While meeting regulators, scientists, and civil society members were fairly straightforward 
exercises, the farm level research presented a very different landscape.  I was fortunate to have 
forged a friendship with the Chikhalkar family, one that allowed for my living in their home, and to 
share a wide variety of experiences with them over the course of those two years.  Via such 
activities as cultivating two acres of cotton for my own cultivation of Bt cotton, visiting extended 
family members of the Chikhalkar family, accompanying them on day to day exercises (i.e. visiting 
the doctor, conducting banking, microfinance meetings, a variety of weddings and other social 
engagements), and simply having conversations with people in the village during periods when 
they were not engaged with their work, a broad subset of varied experiences enriched my 
understanding of the researcher of the context in which farmers make decisions within.  While a 
wide variety of farmers within Chikhali were interviewed here, the bulk of the responses were 
gleaned from a core group of ten farmers, chosen via a combination of landholding size (from large 
to small), crop selection (Bt cotton, non Bt cotton, or soybean), perceived success levels (yield 
amounts as well as how the community viewed their level of success), and whether or not they 
were employed as farmers or landless labourers (the majority were farmers). 
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2.5.2 The Purity of Perspective: Participatory Video as a Research Tool 
 
As a means of capitalizing on the visceral nature of the medium and its ability to be shared widely, 
digital video was used as a participatory research tool16 to reallocate who forms questions in a 
research context, primarily by allowing farmers themselves to forge narratives based on scripts they 
themselves authored and shot on issues relating to Bt cotton adoption. This process fostered a more 
holistic perception of local realties, with all content screened back to the community for further 
consideration and feedback.  Using video as a tool in this manner is not entirely novel (Friere 1970; 
Chambers 1983; Snowden 1984; Crawford 1997; Johansson 1999; White 2003), but using it in an 
academic research context is.  The primary rationale for using this tool was based in an awareness 
of the positionality of the researcher (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Geertz 1990; Scheper-Hughes 1995), 
and to address this pragmatically by reallocating whose perspective could generate research 
questions depending on their own framings and reference points.   
 
Many of the interviews conducted were videotaped and played back to both people in Chikhali 
along with others – policy makers, scientists, civil society members – in an attempt to create a space 
where the central themes of this research could be made more explicit relative to who was framing 
the discourse. Ultimately the multitude of perspectives that were represented among those 
interviewed were shared amongst all in real time, corresponding to the multiple framings that the 
difference stakeholders involved possessed.  This unique feedback loop then acted as the catalyst 
for conversations based on an awareness of these multiple framings in an applied, current context 
that otherwise may never have occurred.  And while there may have been an element of those I 
spoke to telling me what they thought I wanted to hear given the nature of the camera, I would 
argue that for the purposes of the novel means I used to visually share research findings, the effects 
were minimal.  My using a camera was to record the moment, to be able to refer to it later, and to 
ultimately edit a series of video footnotes, which I have done here.  Moreover – with the exception 
of four civil society members - I made it a point to develop a relationship with those I spoke with 
before I recorded them.  This was especially the case in Chikhali, where it was months before I 
actually recoded them on camera.  I was and am certainly aware of the capacity of the camera to 
alter dynamics; but in what follows, I argue that rather than that dynamic being a hindrance, it can 
be capitalized upon by changing who is on the other side of the camera. 
 
However, the real application of the tool was deployed in Chikhali itself.  In 2006, I began to 
consider in more detail what would happen during my initial entry point into Chikhali as a 
researcher.  I had questions, but I also knew that after I left, I would then internalize the responses I 
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have transcribed and carried around with me for two years now, ultimately to better isolate some 
semblance of a theme, notion, or narrative.  I did not want those who formed the basis of my 
understanding to merely be embedded in this work; translated, transcribed, arguably transparent, 
or perhaps translucent.  On the one hand, my role as a DPhil candidate is to learn how to do 
research, via a combination of my appreciating the experiences of others and through my own 
experiences.  On the other hand, my role is to represent a certain reality to an audience who has 
never been to this community.  It is this process of contextual accuracy in my representing my 
dynamic with this community - and how I rationalized my perception of what I found - that was 
the driving premise of deploying this tool. 
 
To address this, I wanted to reallocate the responsibility of asking the question to those individuals 
who possessed the experiences that I wished to better understand. An exercise in asking farmers to 
answer predetermined questions I authored would, I felt, present a combination of what they 
expect I want to hear and their own honest interpretation of these terms.  My challenge was to distil 
the latter down by removing the former as much as possible.  In another representation of this 
dichotomy, it was to remove myself from this process as a directive element, and to allow those I 
was working with the opportunity to navigate these questions on their own terms.  It was, in 
essence, to retain the integrity of the purity of perspective (Ghose 2007: 18). 
 
2.5.3   The Bt Cotton Show: A Case Study 
 
The precise objective of my using digital video has been to address my positionality as a researcher, 
and to minimize my directive role as an ‘asker of questions’.  In practice, a series of productions 
were undertaken by farmers on a number of themes, not limited to my own research interests, but 
to whatever they felt was relevant to my research from their perspective.  The example I present 
here was based primarily on my prior experience in training individuals on how to use a digital 
video camera, but also on some additional PV methodology training I received from Insight Share17 
in 2006 and the invaluable inputs of some Bombay based colleagues professionally involved in 
performance art18 and film production19 who joined me in Chikhali on several occasions.  To 
illustrate how I used the tool and the kinds of insights it allowed for, the following outlines one 
production undertaking by farmers in Chikhali on their chosen theme of agrarian suicide.   
 
Who are you?  
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I first introduced the tool to farmers in Chikhali by doing a series of house-to-house visits to ask the 
elementary questions that would allow me to focus logistically and thematically (i.e. your name, 
how much land you have, what you are growing). I first asked these questions to one household, 
and after their response, showed them how to engage the camera to record.  They would then ask 
the same questions to the next household, with that person showing the next how to engage the 
camera to record, and so on.  This was done over 170 households over three days, which was then 
screened back to the community each evening for their comments and reactions, which were well 
attended and the source of much entertainment.  This occurred during my second week there, and 
it served to introduce the camera  - and me - to the residents of Chikhali. 
 
What is Your Story?   
 
In the days after this initial exercise, I began to introduce farmers to the concept of storyboarding.  
On the steps of the anganwadi, or primary school, I brought a piece of paper, which would be 
divided into six sections for six scenes.  After giving an example of a story, I would then ask the 
groups of farmers who began to gather in curiosity to tell me a story in these six (or more) boxes by 
drawing it out, referring to themes of their own choice.  In the first instance of doing this, one of the 
participants scripted a dialogue to complement the storyboard with input from others, which was 
beyond what I had expected.  The chosen narrative was agrarian suicide, and the vehicle was Bt 
cotton adoption. 
 
The Shoot 
 
The participants would then find actors and a ‘set’ to shoot the story, based on the proceeding 
exercise.  After deciding on who the cameraperson, sound technician (I had a microphone attached 
to a simple boom pole – actually a broken tripod leg), actors, and extras would be, they would then 
shoot it on camera.  All editing was done in camera – scenes were shot sequentially onto tape - 
which allowed for immediate playback and minimal technical challenges. 
 
The Screening 
 
After the shooting was complete and credits were added (i.e. a still shot of a piece of paper with the 
names of the ‘crew’ written on it), my camera was hooked into my laptop, which was then fed into 
an LCD projector and enlarged onto a white bed sheet approximately ten feet high in the front of 
one farmers house, Dilip Taywade.  It was broadcast in a common space where people could easily 
gather, and began after dinner around eight in the evening. An amplifier and speaker were 
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borrowed from the panchayat20 hall and a microphone was placed near the speaker of my laptop to 
amplify the sound. 
 
“Late Night with Kiran Raut” 
 
After the piece was screened, Kiran acted as talk show host, and people came up to the microphone 
and in front of the camera, which projected their interaction to the rest of the audience, about one 
hundred people.  Kiran would ask questions (in this case, about farming and cotton in particular) 
and conversations (often quite entertaining) would occur. 
 
Processing and Analysis 
 
This process would occur over an eight hour period over the course of a day.  After it was complete, 
usually around midnight and just after often impromptu concerts (microphones, cameras, and 
projectors have multiple usages) I would begin to the footage translated of the piece and the talk 
show, and attempt to make the necessary links to my research in terms of themes and their 
representation.  Of course, it is the last element, processing and analysis, which presented the most 
pressing challenge of all.   
 
2.5.4 ”Farmer Suicides” 
 
The final cut 21 provided some unique insights on Bt cotton adoption and choices.  There are 
distinct themes that arose: what constitutes a “good” farmer (i.e. following instructions as 
presented by scientific institutions, avoiding debt, capitalizing on new technologies such as seed 
and pesticides, accumulating material wealth) and a “bad” farmer (i.e. what could be termed 
laziness, alcoholism, the acceptance of debt, and the resultant resort to suicide as a final solution the 
problems incurred from his decisions).  Of interest to me here was this notion of formal regulation 
in terms of farming practice, as well as the role of credit in farmers’ decision-making processes (as 
voiced by the main scriptwriter at the end of the piece).  The narrative seems to allege that in order 
to be successful as a farmer, one must capitalize on formal knowledge, and avoid informal debt.   
 
In terms my own work, the link here is the relationship between traditional farming practice and 
new, “scientific” techniques, such as using Bt cotton and other inputs.  “Progress” is determined by 
successful application of these new technologies, and that information on how to do so should be 
gleaned from third parties; in this case, an agricultural university.  This will lead to success: having 
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two gas cylinders, a “Hero Honda Super Splendour”, cotton plants “up to my waist with 100 bolls 
and 200 flowers”. The exercise provided additional insight on how farmers consider the 
introduction of new technologies, and the resultant onset of new ways of “regulating” their farming 
practice. If you want to succeed and be prosperous, you must adapt to new technologies in an 
informed manner, as the consequences of not doing so are dire indeed.   
 
Prior to this exercise, I had not asked about what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ farmer; I did not 
really consider it on those terms, as I was more focused on an understanding of regulation, risk, 
and uncertainty. In allowing those I was working with an opportunity to form their own narrative, 
I was able to gain access to a process of asking a question that I would not have asked otherwise, 
with the corresponding production and themes arising (i.e. a judgment of progress as fuelled by 
behavioural change via technological adoption as a means to avoid severe consequences) furthering 
my own capacity to understand what I was seeing.  And while a video camera always carries with 
it the capacity to generate stunted responses when one hits “record” – people saying what they 
believe they are supposed to say, or what the person behind the camera wants to hear – the fact that 
farmers had authorial power directly addressed this dynamic in this research.  Ethnographic 
fieldwork always presents the spectre of bias in presenting the findings to a wider audience, as the 
basis of the analysis is often embedded in the voice of the author.  But my ambition was to maintain 
that purity of perspective.  The camera may have influenced what they said, but only based on their 
desire of how they wanted to portray themselves, a mutual acceptance of those terms based on 
inclusive and participatory scripting, and the skills they acquired to do so.  Using the tool as I did 
formed the basis, along with the more traditional aspects of fieldwork, that chapter six on risk 
framings among farmers will elaborate on, in far more detail. 
 
2.6 From Literature, To Practice, And On To The Field 
 
The next four chapters will indicate how I used all of these elements – the established viewpoints 
from the literature, the gaps that I identified in my fieldwork and in practice, the tools and locations 
that I chose to utilize and focus on – to address, inform, and relate my findings more explicitly.  The 
focus is on risk constructions; similar to what the literature has presented in terms of decision 
making, the role of the state, and international guidelines as a means to navigate these new worlds, 
but with a focus on how this notion of risk translates into practice via the interfaces that 
characterize the battlefield of regulation.   
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In my view, what really characterizes the entire debate that surrounds transgenics in India has little 
to do with the science, or even the formal regulations that the MoEF or MST have devised.  At the 
core of the debate is the points where risk framings either mesh or conflict one another – this is the 
battlefield, and this is regulation.  As a process as opposed to a series of guidelines, as a negotiation 
as opposed to an accepted framework, and as embodied in technical, economic, and political 
contexts, as opposed to mere policy alone.  The science may be what brought Bt cotton to farmers’ 
fields as a technology, but the technology is not merely about the science.   
 
The adoption of the technology is not merely about rational decision making by individuals – Bt 
cotton farmers.  It is about those who claim to represent farmers politically, firms who look at 
market potential and strive to capture demand, civil society groups that, though removed from 
farmers fields, claim to know what is best for Indian farming, of a state who wants to lead the Asian 
biotech race, and of course of farmers who make decisions in their own way.  And unlike the other 
three parties I consider here, farmers’ framings of risk cannot be lumped in to the technical, 
economic, or political realms so easily.  There is a whole other world removed from those spheres 
that motivates their own regulatory practice.  This is the setting, and this is what the core of the 
thesis – the next four chapters – will address. 
 
In the first three chapters – on the government, civil society, and the private sector respectively – I 
look at risk framings along three lines: technical, economic, and political.  These groupings were not 
something I had initially planned to do, but rather emerged out of the writing process as presenting 
a more tractable means to consider the nature of the risk framings I observed.  Much of this thesis 
emerged in this way; pragmatism in the face of analysis and new ways of looking at the volumes of 
material I had collected necessitated it.  At the end, however, one element of my initial outlook 
remained constant.  Regulation is fascinating.  It aims to control, but it is controlled.  It sets out to 
prescribe a means to achieve a set goal, but its formation is itself a goal that is regulated.  It changes, 
is subject to shocks, and is governed by a multitude of different perspectives, all of which foster 
continual evolution and change.  And no one really knows what form it will eventually take.  
Regulating uncertainty is an uncertain process in itself.  But, when the nature of the risks – that 
which lies at the core of uncertainty – is revealed, the process becomes tractable.  That desire for 
tractability is the purpose of what follows. 
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Endnotes: Chapter 2
                                                
1 Competition (TVA), labour unions (Wagner Act), bank insurance (FDIC), and regulating the stock market (SEC) are 
examples.  
2 See Jessop (1997).  The main authors and works of this are Aglietta (1976) and Boyer (1979) - the Parisian School. 
3 Foucault (1979) argued that the “state” is just one site of managing the “conduct of conduct”. 
4 Though these notions have come back into favour since the mid 1990s via neoliberalism and the process of globalization. 
5 The notion of a “battlefield” is adapted from the work of Long and Long, who characterized “battlefields of knowledge”. 
They argued for the need in research to develop “ (…) an analysis of ‘interface’ situations where the different life-worlds [of 
actors] interact and interpenetrate” (Long and Long 1992: 6).  I extend this interface to risk framings, where the interface of 
these framings play out in what I term the battlefield of regulation. 
6 A third of all the cotton grown in India is grown in Maharashtra, and the Vidharba region holds just under half of the 
entire cotton acreage of the state. Along with cotton, soybean is the other major crop, along with millets, gram, oranges, 
vegetables, and to a lesser degree than in the west, sugarcane as well. The region generally receiving two thirds the amount 
of rainfall compared to the state averages, but the rains are erratic.  Though the black, loamy soil is well suited for cotton 
cultivation, conversations I have had with Vijay Jawandhia have painted a picture where this has changed over the last 
fourty years, with the soil quality deteriorating.  In his observations, the cropping patterns have changed since the 
introduction of hybrid cotton in the 1960s, displacing the historical planting of jowar (sorghum) one year, which has shallow 
roots, followed by cotton the next, which has deeper roots.  Due to farmers shifting to annual cotton cultivation, he argues 
that there has not been enough time to allow the topsoil to regenerate.  This information is based on a combination of 
calculations derived from http://indiastat.com and my own data collection. 
7 The journalist P. Sainath has written extensively on the crisis, a body of work that has been seminal in not only the term 
itself, but of how the state has addressed it, something I address in more detail in chapter 5.  Refer to 
http://www.indiatogether.org/opinions/psainath/vidharbha.htm for a selection of his writing on the subject. 
8 “Maharashtra: ‘graveyard of farmers’”, Hindu, 14 November 2007. 
9 “Indian Cotton Meadows Turn Into Killing Fields”, Bernama, July 18, 2007. 
10 “The Suicide Belt”, Columbia City Paper, 10 November 2009. 
11 “Killer Bt Cotton Fails Again in Vidarbha”, Merinews, 19 October 2008. 
12 See for instance “Life's cheap in the Bt cotton fields of Gujarat”, Times Of India, 28 August 2009. 
13 Refer to “Lokmat editor slams NDTV story on Vidarbha widows” at 
http://www.andolan.blogspot.com/2007/05/lokmat-editor-slams-ndtv-story-on.html for a translation of the original 
Marathi article. 
14 Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/2-1. 
15 Refer to “Constraints Analysis of Cotton in India” at http://www.cicr.org.in/research_notes/constraint.htm. 
16 Refer to http://ranaghose.com/research/prapv.pdf for a table of PRA tools and their application towards PV over the 
course of the author’s fieldwork. 
17 Refer to http://insightshare.org. 
18 Refer to http://www.nikhilchopra.net. 
19 Refer to http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3086939. 
20 The term panchayat translates into English as an assembly (yat) of five (panch) village elders, as chose by the community.  In 
South Asia, it represents the lowest level of governance – panchayati raj.  The Panchayat hall in Chikhali (and in many other 
villages) is often a venue for meetings, formal paperwork, and sometimes social functions. 
21 Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/2-2. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE MIRAGE OF BIOSAFETY: THE STATE AND REGULATORY POLITICS 
 
As the custodian of formal regulatory instruments that govern the introduction of goods and 
services in a market context, the government has a distinct role to play.  Along the three disciplines 
detailed in the preceding chapter, there are three general trends that describe the context for formal 
regulatory deliberation.  The economics literature presents a narrative where the goal is to ensure 
efficiency via competition and to limit the power of monopolies, and in the face of information 
asymmetries, to find a balance between fostering competition and ensuring that efficiency is 
maintained.  With regards to international law, multilateral regulatory frameworks are ultimately a 
function of the efficacy of individual sovereign states, and are primarily determined by a 
combination of hard (legally binding obligations) and soft (best practices) laws.  Finally, the 
political science literature argues that the classic firm-state-expert nexus disintegrates when 
regulation moves into social spheres such as health and the environment. 
 
However, my observations point to something less institutional and mechanistic, particularly 
concerning the economic and international relations literature.  While the state certainly has a role 
to play in managing these dynamics – that of efficiency, information, and legal culpability – the 
actual practice of regulation is far less about management alone.  As Millstone (2007, 2009) argues, 
risk assessment and management splinter in the face of new technologies embedded with 
incalculable uncertainty, and a wider inclusion of stakeholders enter the regulatory battlefield as a 
result.  Co-evolutionary trajectories characterize this battlefield, and risk framings are at the core of 
what motivates – and differentiates these stakeholders.  Again, though the Indian government may 
have started from framing risk as biosafety, the real story is far more complicated – and interesting. 
 
The state has to manage political and economic risks just as much as the technical risks.  This is 
what has happened in practice, and this paints a far different picture of regulation than what the 
literature I have reviewed has presented.  Co-evolution and co-construction breed conflict.  
Managing competition via licensing arrangements, and adhering to international best practices of 
biosafety and plant variety protection, both soft and hard, do characterize the formal regulatory 
instruments that the Indian government has undertook since the 1986 introduction of the 
Environmental Protection Act (EPA).  But in line with the central argument of this research, the 
uncertainty surrounding new technologies like Bt cotton has fostered spaces where the government 
must respond to the concerns of the public.  
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I characterize a regulatory space ripe with interactions; interactions that occur outside the firm-
state-expert nexus, with direct consequences on formal regulation as managed by the government.  
Biosafety risk assessment, as gleaned from a variety of international best practices and guidelines, 
does characterize the fundamental aim of formal regulation of transgenics in India.  This is the 
classic formulation of any regulatory regime surrounding transgenics.  But aside from this 
scientifically derived understanding of risk, there are other, less quantitatively explicit factors that 
guide this process – there are other understandings of risk that interface and interplay with risk as 
biosafety.   
 
This chapter will address how the Indian government has developed and enacted the frameworks 
that surround transgenics in India, but unlike the review that opened this thesis, I characterize the 
dynamics using risk framings as the central theme.  First, I will present a consideration of how 
exactly risk is framed among government actors along the three lines - technical, economic, and 
political.  Within that exploration of risk, I will explore and detail the current formal regulatory 
frameworks that govern transgenics, and the context where their continual evolution plays out 
given these framings of risk.  And finally, I will discuss how the regulations themselves, once 
subject to interactions with other parties outside the firm-state-expert nexus, are consequentially a 
product of the battlefield of regulation. The following four chapters constitute the empirical content 
of the core argument of this thesis.  Once these empirical realities are presented across these four 
chapters, a clearer picture of the interactions implicit in any regulatory process will be revealed, 
and a distinct understanding of what regulation really means will emerge. 
 
3.1 The Practice of Regulation: Risk, Knowledge, And Co-evolutionary Processes 
 
The first framing of risk is based on elements embedded in formal, global frameworks; a means of 
mitigating risk as gleaned from a combination of widely recognized guidelines and an observation 
of Indian realities and needs.  While this forms the basis for technical risk assessment, and by 
extension, a practice for biosafety, these guiding principles cannot and do not exist in a scientific 
vacuum.  They may fundamentally characterize the regulatory frameworks that address the 
technology in terms of establishing fundamental notions such as biosafety, containment, and 
precaution, but the prescriptions of these frameworks interact with other, more abstract notions.   
 
If the first stream of risk framing is based on scientific laboratory procedure and eventual release, 
the second stream is premised on a national identity as forged on the pursuit of scientific excellence 
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and financial reward.  Those guidelines that address how risk is to be controlled and understood in 
a laboratory setting run tandem with more pragmatic concerns of how these regulatory frameworks 
can either impede or foster growth in what is recognized and championed as a “sunrise industry”. 
In the view of the Indian government, biotechnology, as characterized as a natural progression in 
agricultural innovation after the Green Revolution, has tremendous potential.  This applies not only 
to the potential benefits that farmers can derive from pest resistant varieties as developed by local 
and imported scientific expertise, but also the potential benefits that can be derived by firms 
developing new technologies for what is perceived as a lucrative market.  
 
This discourse of biotechnology as a component of national identity and aspiration is forged on 
notions of being a regional leader in biotechnology - to be recognized as world class, and to attract 
the best of the best in terms of R&D capacity, state of the art facilities, and informed regulators 
(Visvanathan and Parmar 2002).  This desire then frames another aspect of risk – the economic risk 
of losing the biotech race due to state governance being out of sync with central governance, delays 
caused by the concerns of civil society, institutional inadequacies, or strategic short-sightedness.  
While premised on something more abstract – pride, a desire for recognition, or perhaps even 
insecurity – the abstraction ends when this risk framing is adapted to formal regulatory ambition. 
 
The third stream lies at the confluence of these two preceding streams.  The statistics are often 
repeated, but the relevance of this fact is impossible to ignore.  Farmers, by virtue of their numbers, 
have tremendous influence politically via their constitutional right to vote.  When Bt cotton appears 
to ‘fail’, or when the government can (and does) intervene in the pricing of cotton by paying a 
premium for Bt cotton, a breeding ground of political opportunism is created.  In these spaces, 
Indian states can manifest their constitutional right to address agriculture as a state domain1, and 
can (and have) challenged central directives under the claim that these directives do not suit the 
interests of their electorate.  If an astute politician can capture the imagination of enough farmers, 
while still relating to the needs of their urban counterparts, their chance of attaining political power 
is almost guaranteed.  This also applies to when a broader public becomes sensitized to the 
‘dangers’ of transgenics. Such sentiment can translate into political capital, which ultimately can 
change the direction that policy follows.  However, in practice this was something fostered more by 
the actions of civil society, and as such, I will address this in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
In the context of this research, two strategies on the part of government to attract and consolidate 
political power have emerged – a series of central and state relief packages for Vidarbha, and the 
setting of minimum support prices for cotton.  Farmers respond to these signals, and are motivated 
politically to respond in a way that best characterizes their satisfaction with these offered 
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incentives.  This then characterizes a third framing of risk – the political risk of alienating farmers 
by not presenting the correct incentives to secure their political support.  This has direct influence 
on who secures state leadership, which then has implications on the interplay between formal 
central and state level regulation.  All of this points to a form of co-evolutionary regulation that is 
far less about technical risks, and in recent times, even economic risks.  It is about political risks, 
and how all the parties involve interact in the battlefield of regulation. 
 
3.1.1  Technical Risk: Biosafety, Regulatory Regimes, and Science 
 
The GEAC provides guidance on how to go about testing [transgenic technologies] 
before it is released.  For most of the transgenics, there are three kinds of biosafety 
concerns, which have to be advocated.  Biosafety concerns for human and animal 
health, biosafety concerns for environmental safety, and third, the social an ethical 
concerns.  All of them received tests for allergenicity, toxicity, pollen flow, 
agronomic performance - all these tests which we, in our guidelines, have been 
prescribed, have been scrupulously followed2. 
 
In 1996, Monsanto wanted to expand into India.  They saw India as an emerging 
market.  They spent some six to eight million US dollars to get that license here.  
The Indians thought ‘Well can we do it?  Can we handle this kind of licensing?’ (…)  
Those 100g of seed [that Monsanto wanted to import into India for testing] started 
the whole biosafety process.  In 1998 the MoEF and the DBT decided that the 
Guidelines weren’t sufficient.  But remember, all of that is rooted in those 100g of 
seed.  It’s Bt cotton that has really shaped our regulations3. 
 
These two quotes illustrate the starting point of this story: in the eyes of the formal Indian 
regulatory machinery, technical risk assessment is key and rigorous on paper, but, the real catalyst 
for assessment – and ultimately management – was the entry of Monsanto in India.  That event is 
what really got the ball rolling in practice. Monsanto first applied to enter the Indian market in 
1990.  At that time, they were denied because of high technology transfer fees, and concerns relating 
to the backcrossing of an American variety of cotton with local varieties.  Five years later, a new 
application was approved - the pivotal request to import 100g of Bt cotton seed for backcrossing 
and testing (Bharathan 2000: 1068).  These two events set in motion a previously untested structure 
and momentum to the ongoing process of forming regulation.  The starting point of the regulations 
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surrounding transgenics was, and is, biosafety, and the upholding of biosafety standards is 
sacrosanct amongst regulators.  On paper at least.   
 
In the words of one senior regulator and one senior scientist, “[b]iosafety is our focus; that’s it4. (…) 
Agronomics is separate; our focus was, is, and will be on biosafety5.”  This framing is reflected in 
official documentation authored by the DBT in formulating a strategy for the latest iteration of the 
regulatory structure surrounding transgenics in India, the 2009 National Biotechnology Regulatory 
Authority of India (NBRA) Bill: 
 
Scientific risk assessment is a cornerstone of biotechnology regulatory systems and 
public policy decisions related to the safety and acceptability of GMOs. A strong 
scientific capacity and knowledge base is widely viewed as key to assessing risk; 
which entails identifying hazards, assessing their magnitude and duration, and 
estimating their likelihood of occurrence while recognizing the nature and 
importance of the attendant uncertainty in each phase. Risk assessment of 
biotechnology products and processes is an intensive and scientifically demanding 
activity. (DBT 2009: 9). 
 
The role of “science” clearly lies at the crux of any assessment of risk in terms of the formal 
regulations on paper – the only way to ascertain potential outcomes is to identify, assess, and 
estimate the likelihood of potential outcomes.  More explicitly, the role of science based practice 
towards ascertaining a measure of risk can be characterized along four substrates: to provide 
objective, scientific information on potential environmental risks and benefits for scrutiny by the 
scientific community and the public; to help identify any potential risks that may be associated with 
introduction, so these can be avoided and managed as appropriate; to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of current regulations and guidelines in India, compile and analyze international 
approaches to regulating transgenics, and provide recommendations to improve the risk 
assessment framework for transgenics; and to evaluate if additional scientific capacity may need to 
be developed within the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority to support future safety 
assessments of transgenics by the Risk Assessment Unit  (DBT 2009: 12).  Ultimately, the outcome of 
such a process in a formal, regulatory context can only be binary in nature.  In the words of one 
regulator at the DBT, “I can’t call a technology ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  I can only say if it is ‘safe’ or 
‘unsafe’.  And, if that technology is safe, then it should be released to the market6.” 
 
Regulation Before 2004: “Do the science…” 
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We are technocrats, so you can put us anywhere.  We may not be experts in 
everything, so we seek consultations.  I mean, I may be an expert in biotechnology, 
but if it is another subject, the approach is the same: find experts. (…) We have cut 
and paste from six sources to make our system.  We took what we thought was the 
best7. 
 
Though risk assessment can, by construction, only result in bipolar conclusions – yes or no – 
assessment as a process requires a basis to manifest in practice.  Expertise comes from experience.  
But what if that experience is not present?  While the Indian experience with establishing guidelines 
on laboratory research dates back to 19838, the text that most obviously began to shape current 
notions of biosafety and risk assessment in a formal regulatory context internationally – as well as 
within India - can be traced back to 1986.  The Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations published 
by the OECD, or the “Blue Book”, has emerged as the most cited document in terms of international 
best practice on the management of biotechnology (Balazs 2007).  This 74-page document addresses 
a number of concerns with regards to the management of organisms derived by recombinant DNA 
techniques, but the primary focus was on safety.  It presented “…a range of scientific considerations 
to be taken into account when assessing [the] potential risks of industrial and environmental 
applications of micro-organisms, plants and animals and selecting appropriate safety measures 
(OECD 1986: 24).”   
 
In applied terms, safety is discussed within the more specific context of risk assessment.  With 
reference to a 1981 US Office of Technology Assessment document, the Blue Book refers to risk 
assessment along five lines: formation, release, proliferation, establishment, and effect.  All of these 
themes are firmly embedded in a quantification of probabilities, epidemiological or toxicological 
consequences, and how new micro organisms interact with the existing ecosystem.  However, 
surrounding this characterization of risk assessment is a clear caveat: “[p]otential ecosystem 
interactions between genetically-modified micro-organisms and other existing organisms are 
extremely difficult to describe or predict accurately (OECD 1986: 25).”  Regulators interviewed here 
indicated the influence of Blue Book on initial stages of the construction of regulatory mechanisms 
in India, along with the regulatory frameworks of other countries such as Canada, the EU, and the 
United States9.  
 
In the same year as the Blue Book was released, India passed the Environmental Protection Act, 
which was, I have detailed in the first chapter, firmly embedded in a USDA narrative. The EPA 
occupies a unique space in the Indian regulatory hierarchy.  While not explicitly concerned with 
biotechnology, it is the cornerstone of the Indian regulatory structure surrounding biotechnology.  
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This is due to the focus on “…the protection and improvement of [the] environment and the 
prevention of hazards to human beings, other living creatures, plants and property (MoEF 1986: 
1).” The EPA mandates that regulatory structures must be put in place to protect society against the 
potential damage caused by goods that do have the capacity to cause harm by preventing such 
hazards. The key term here is “hazard”. 
 
Three years after the EPA was introduced, legislation explicitly addressing biotechnology was 
introduced based on a perceived lack of biotechnology risk management as desired by the DBT. 
The 1989 Rules for Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous Microorganisms, 
Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells were introduced with a mandate based on “…the 
powers conferred by sections 6, 8 and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act (…) and with a view 
to protecting the environment, nature and health, in connection with the application of gene 
technology and micro-organisms (DBT 1989: 1).”  In the words of one regulator at the DBT who has 
been at the centre of much of this regulatory evolution from day one, the Rules were developed an 
enacted “[b]y zabardast (under oppression; in an overbearing way), and by the time they were 
approved, it was 198910.” 
 
The “Rules”, as they are often referred to, aim to protect “(…) the environment, nature, and health, 
in connection with the application of genetechnology and micro-organisms (DBT 1989: 1)”, and to 
address activities involving the manufacture, use, import, export, storage and research of 
transgenics including microorganisms, plants and animals (Damodaran 2005).  In terms of a 
framework, the Rules further mandate and characterize the role of six competent authorities for the 
management of transgenics.  In the face of “…a growing awareness of the commercial potential of 
[b]iotechnology” and the efforts within the government to “…promote large scale use of 
indigenously relevant biotechnologies (MST 1990: 1)”, the Rules mandated the 1990 Recombinant 
Safety Guidelines (RSG), which rendered a more explicit series of guidelines for research, large 
scale operations, and most relevant here, environmental risk.  Drawing from a variety of best 
practices including the WHO Laboratory Safety Manual and the US Centre for Disease Control & 
National Institute of Health risk group classifications, the 1990 RSG presents a series of laboratory 
guidelines, best practices, and perhaps most significantly, an institutional framework for dealing 
with the research, testing, release, and monitoring of biotechnology in India.  While acknowledging 
that the guidelines can never be considered static, they were introduced in a context where there 
exists “…a sense of concern among scientists working in biological areas and others to find ways 
how safely the research in the field should be carried out” due to the nature of “…pathogenic 
microorganisms and genes of virulence (MST 1990: 1).”  Again, the language is firmly embedded in 
notions of safety in the face of potential hazard, with an implicit indication that while all efforts can 
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be lent towards minimizing those hazards, the best one can do is to follow well established 
guidelines to address that risk.  
 
3.1.2  Economic Risk: Barriers, Pride, and Commercial Interests 
 
You know, I am today, in this country, perhaps the single most vocal opponent of 
the release of GMOs without adequate risk testing (…) But as it turns out, not a 
single product has been released according to such procedures (…) Unfortunately 
in biotechnology [what occurred was] all on account of the people involved…it 
got into the hands of willy-nilly people who were purchasable – very simple, I can 
put it in one word – they were purchased11. 
 
As Dr. Puspha Bhargava12 would agree, what is on paper and what happens in practice are often 
two very different things.  The technical risks were assessed according to established guidelines – a 
product of domestically tailored needs and internationally recognized standards.  But either 
something got lost in translation, or perhaps more accurately, economic incentives as framed by 
economic risks took precedence over the technical realm.  In its first iteration, the Indian regulatory 
system was thorough in its coverage, wide in its breadth across six ministries, and ambitious in its 
scale.  In the face of entrants, biosafety guidelines had to be enacted, and rapidly.  Yet in the Indian 
context, regulatory ambition can often outpace what is institutionally required to meet the 
regulatory requirements.  It would be false to state that India does not have the capacity to 
adequately run the scientific tests required to arrive at conclusive evidence on biosafety.  Similarly, 
it would be false to state that biosafety alone is what really drove – and drives - the actual 
formulation of the regulations.  There are additional pressures that often demand a more 
immediate, and often industry friendly, response in a regulatory context. Given this urgency, there 
is evidence that the regulations themselves have not always been adhered to.  Further, one cannot 
assume that they are created solely with public interest – as characterized by biosafety - as the 
guiding principle.  One case in point was the adoption of the Cry1Ac event in hybrid seeds as 
opposed to OPVs.  In the words of the current director of the Central Institute for Cotton Research 
(CICR),  
 
[straight line] varieties are pure, but hybrids have a 25% chance of impurity. But 
the GEAC approved hybrid varieties [of Bt cotton] due to commercial concerns – 
the fact that you can’t save hybrids.  That and the typical understanding [among 
farmers] that hybrids offer higher yields13.   
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More pointedly, the director of the Central Institute for Research on Cotton Technology (CIRCOT) 
observed that within the Indian scientific community, “[w]e know hybrids bring many problems.  
But, hybrids are what we are used to14.” Bhargava on the other hand – whose relevance in this story 
is something I will discuss in much more detail in the following chapter – is far less more direct 
about the rationale for hybrids.  He notes that while he asked  
 
(…) friends in the agricultural scientific community, ‘why have we not developed 
to date - given [the] modern techniques of cellular molecular biology - why have 
we not developed alternatives to hybrids?’  We don’t do this, because if we do 
there will be no seed business.  And therefore those who benefit from the seed 
business will [no longer] benefit15. 
 
This is a consequence not only of the rapid private sector development of additional varieties of Bt 
cotton (let alone Bt maize, rice, aubergine, and so on) but perhaps more important, the ambition 
that frames so much of India’s rapid economic rise since the 1991 economic liberalization overseen 
by the Rajiv Gandhi and subsequent P.V. Narasimha Rao administration.  Since my being based in 
India since 2001, I have had the luxury of seeing an entire nation (and in particular an entire 
generation) consumed by a near obsession to be recognized – to become a player, to be taken 
seriously in the global imagination, and more than anything else, to succeed on their own terms.  
This ambition to succeed – utterly inspiring in its conviction, dizzying in its rapidity of deployment, 
and highly conducive to allowing personal gain to overshadow protocol – is perhaps the only thing 
that can truly foment change at a national level from the perspective of regulatory construction.  In 
a public setting, protocol must be adhered to in the face of a keenly observant civil society.  But 
protocol alone certainly does not dictate outcomes, though firmly embedded in highly ambitious 
environment.  In the words of one senior regulator in the DBT, “we want to be a regional [Asian] 
hub; we want to be leaders16.” 
 
But the question is at what cost?  For this ambition to manifest in practice, the formal, ‘on-paper’ 
regulatory landscape has to strike a balance.  One cannot jettison the guiding principles of biosafety 
in the face of personal and aggregated ambition due to a combination of multilateral commitments, 
such as being a signatory to the CBD, as well as arguable simple common sense and precaution.  
Similarly, there are logistical factors, though coupled with concerns of the incentives of the firm 
overtaking those of farmers.  By construction, the public sector does not have the same capacity for 
R&D that the private sector has.  In the words of the Joint Director of Agriculture for the state of 
Maharashtra,  
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[w]e ask the private sector to get involved in research.  If we closed that option, we 
never would have got the technology (…) Generally, the government believes that 
we should encourage the private sector.  Firms are free to market their products, 
though it is true it may not be in favour of the farmers, but then farmers will decide 
and share their experiences with other farmers17. 
 
Dr. K.K. Tripathi, a senior scientist within the DBT (and someone who was often in court dealing 
with civil society PILs when we first tried to meet), offered a more pointed analysis. “You can look 
at it this way: industry, [Indian agricultural] universities, and regulators are all linked - they 
interact and depend on one another.  But our funding constraints require private sector 
assistance18.”  The private sector and the public sector are linked given a meshing of economic 
incentives in the face of lacking capacity within the state.  However – and this is where risk 
management and assessment split - along with these shortcomings and the space it offers for 
private sector involvement, are the actual approvals of the technologies themselves.  In the words 
of Bhargava, a Supreme Court nominated observer within the GEAC,  
 
[w]e have evidence that the data of trials in forty places was dismissed by the 
committee in twenty minutes as OK.  Now, I am a professional scientist – for me to 
review one paper takes me a couple of hours.  If I were to review data for forty 
sites, I’ll at least take fifteen hours.  They were done in twenty minutes19.  
 
It is not just observers who share these opinions.  Dr. S.R. Rao, another senior scientist in the DBT 
and the primary author of the forthcoming NBRA Act noted that, 
 
[l]ook, the DBT is basically three people.  Compare that to the 9,000 people in the 
US Food and Drug Administration! (...) Granted, we aim to hire thirty more people 
this year, and our budget has increased from 40 crores (INR 400 million) in 1989 to 
1,100 crores (INR 11 billion) in 200920. 
 
The balance then is best characterized as follows – adhere to biosafety norms, at least on paper, but 
do not forget that this is a race that India has to win.  As I will discuss in the following chapter, this 
economic framing of risk interfaces with that of civil society, and in many ways these opposing 
framings – though both based on the same principal of opportunity costs – represents the core of 
much of the debate.  However, the firm trusts the capacity of the government to manage these 
potential hiccups.  In the words of M.K. Sharma, the Mumbai based managing director of Mahyco,  
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[i]f NGOs have a dialog with government officials, it will be difficult [for the 
NGOs], as it will become clear to them that the government is simply doing their 
job.  They want to paint this picture that the private sector and government are 
linked (…) Anyway, the Right to Information Act is available, so what is the 
problem21? 
 
Regulation After 2004: “…but cut the red tape…” 
 
This balance between balancing the public interest and the aspirations of a country is rendered 
quite explicit in the second iteration of the regulatory system.  The system mandated by the RSG 
1990 was further revised in 1998, 1999, and 2008 via the Guidelines for Research in Transgenic 
Crops. This evolution reflects the dynamic nature of research and development within the field, as 
well as a response to new entrants and new technologies.  But these revisions took place in an 
environment where there were increasing concerns both within and outside the government 
regarding the state of the regulatory system.  It was considered cumbersome, particularly given the 
large number of regulatory texts and the different ministries that were involved.  More specifically, 
it was seen as a possible barrier to research and the further development of the domestic 
biotechnology industry.  This concern was rooted in the observation of the “…extraordinary 
growth of the Indian biotechnology sector”, and that this growth “…has significant implications for 
policy in the area of regulation (MST 2008: 1).  As the DBT argues, 
 
[t]he Indian Biotechnology sector is gaining global visibility and is being tracked 
for emerging investment opportunities. (…) Biotechnology can deliver the next 
wave of technological change that can be as radical and even more pervasive than 
that brought about by IT (…) [and] (…) as a business segment for India [it] has the 
potential of generating revenues to the tune of US$ 5 billion and creating one 
million jobs by 2010 through products and services.  This can propel India into a 
significant position in the global biotech sweepstakes (MST 2005: 4). 
 
The usage of the term “sweepstakes” is telling in framing the sense of urgency.  In terms of material 
responses to this sentiment, two external reports were commissioned.  First, the 2004 Report of the 
Task Force on the Application of Agricultural Biotechnology chaired by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan 
recommended the establishment of an “autonomous, statutory and professionally-led National 
Biotechnology Regulatory Authority (…) for generating the necessary public, political, professional 
and commercial confidence in the science based regulatory mechanism in place in the country 
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(MoA 2004: 4, 8).”  In 2005, the Report of the Task Force on Recombinant Pharmaceuticals chaired 
by Dr. R.A. Mashelkar also recommended the formation of a National Biotechnology Regulatory 
Authority in order to facilitate ”…a professionally managed single window mechanism for giving 
various clearances including biosafety issues (MoEF 2005: 8).”  The aim was to ensure that red tape 
and bureaucracy do not impede growth.  A balance had to be achieved. 
 
Soon after these two reports were disseminated, the DBT published the 2005 National 
Biotechnology Development Strategy.  In line with the recommendations of the Mashelkar and 
Swaminathan reports, it recommended, 
 
(…) a competent single National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority [to] be 
established with separate divisions for agriculture products/transgenic crops, 
pharmaceuticals/drugs and industrial products; and transgenic food/feed and 
transgenic animal/aqua culture (MST 2005: 18). 
 
The Swaminathan and Mashelkar reports are key to the ongoing evolution of the regulation.  The 
Strategy concluded that the approval process was too long, there was too much duplication in 
terms of roles and processes across the different ministries, and risk assessment standards were not 
being fully adhered to due to resource and institutional constraints.  On the one hand, the system 
seemed to present a sound basis for risk assessment in terms of biosafety, though clearly one that 
responded to Bt cotton as the litmus test.  In the words of C.D. Mayee, a former member of GEAC 
and board member of the biotech industry consortium ISAAA,  
 
[t]he system that was developed in India was fairly rigorous because [Bt cotton] 
was the first product, and we were very cautious as to test it against everything. 
Like for example, Bt cotton, although the impact may not be in the fish, but we 
have data on fish.  We have data on birds, predators, parasites, soil macroflora, on 
goats, large animals, small animals…all that was asked to be generated.  I think the 
government mechanism which has been established for that was fairly good and I 
would say that sufficient biosafety testing has been done22. 
 
On the other hand, there were observers who, while agreeing that biosafety is a sound basis on 
which to ascertain risk, were acutely aware of the commercial interests at stake.  The issue is the 
interface between risk as biosafety and risk as “missing the boat”, with the erosion of biosafety 
standards as a consequence.  As Bhargava recalls,  
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[w]hen we heard of the sheep deaths in Andhra Pradesh, I wrote to my friend [Dr. 
R.A.] Mashelkar, director of CSIR [and author of the Mashelkar report], and I said I 
was very concerned.  He forwarded it to Rakesh Tuli of the National Botanical 
Research Institute in Lucknow, who had done all the tests.  And Rakesh told me – I 
know him extremely well - he told me he fed [the animals] the seeds.  I asked him, 
‘who gave you the seeds?  If Monsanto gave you the seeds, how do you know they 
were Bt seeds?  Did you test them?  Maybe they gave you normal seeds as they 
were afraid the Bt seeds would have a toxic effect!  Did you test the seeds?’  No 
reply.  I asked ‘did you feed them the leaves as well?’  They said ‘we didn’t feed 
them the leaves.’  It’s like they have already approved it – they just need the 
paperwork23. 
 
The Future of Regulation: “…and control dissent.” 
 
Bhargava’s observations were (and still are at the time of this writing) impossible to ignore if one 
was sceptical of the government’s intentions.  It is at this stage - post 2004 - that the battlefield of 
regulation begins to take shape, and where economic risks began to overpower technical risks.  In 
2007, the Government of India formally adopted the National Biotechnology Development Strategy.  
The most salient feature of the strategy was the formation of the National Biotechnology Regulatory 
Act, in order to  
 
(…) provide an opportunity to consolidate and enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of biotechnology regulation, increase collaboration with state 
governments in this area, promote public confidence in the regulatory system, and 
facilitate international trade (MST 2008: 3). 
 
To formalize the strategy, a draft of the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India 
(NBRA) Bill was tabled in 2009 (MST 2008).  At the time of this writing, the exact wording of the Bill 
has yet to be finalized, but it is unprecedented in its content, and for three primary reasons.   
 
First, article 27 provides a space to overrule the existing Right to Information (RTI) Act in cases 
where “confidential commercial information” may be compromised.  Second, articles 61 and 63 
allow the state to penalize anyone who either ”…provides any information or produces any 
document that the person knows is false or misleading”, or “…without any evidence or scientific 
record misleads the public about the safety” of biotechnology products.  The penalties are severe; 
“…imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and also with fine which may 
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extend to five lakh24 rupees“ or “...imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months 
but which may extend to one year and with fine which may extend to two lakh rupees or with both” 
respectively.  Third, article 87.2 presents the possibility of state laws to be overruled by the Bill.  
This provision challenges the constitution on India, as agriculture has always been a state level 
domain. 
 
These three provisions are reflective of the combative environment that surrounds the formal 
regulation of biotechnology, with a particular focus on the actions of civil society organizations.    
As Dr. S.R. Rao at the DBT again recalls,  
 
1999 saw the first arson of field trials in Karnataka, followed by the court cases filed 
by Vandana Shiva.  The business of NGOs started then (…) but why against GM?  
Why not cigarettes?  Chewing tobacco?  What about the state of sanitation in India?  
The only reason is because it’s a business, and that’s where the money is.  If you 
don’t oppose, you are out of a job25. 
 
The NBRA in its current form is a response to civil society organizations that have, first, used the 
RTI Act to secure information regarding ongoing research, and second, been publicly vocal about 
their concerns regarding the safety of biotechnology.  It is also a response to the preferences of 
individual state governments, given the current ongoing debate surrounding the release of Bt 
brinjal, the first transgenic food crop being considered for release.  At the time of this writing, nine 
Indian states have indicated serious doubts about Bt brinjal, with an additional two states banning 
transgenics in agriculture altogether26.  This of course is a thorn in the side of a central government 
keen on release. All of these factors have significantly delayed the release of further transgenic 
technologies in India, much to the chagrin of those regulators interviewed here, though not without 
a certain wit.  As Dr. K.K. Tripathi at the DBT puts it, “[w]e are thankful to the petitioners for 
making our processes and organization more robust27.” 
 
Perceived barriers towards Indian progress in the field of biotech – be it state interventions as a 
barrier to central directives or the delays caused by civil society actions - present a fascinating 
insight into the battlefield of regulation: how regulatory evolution interfaces with the public and 
their preferences. Civil society and firms have had distinct effects on how formal regulatory 
ambition is both tempered and executed.  The top down approach championed in the economic and 
international relations literature concerning fostering competition and adhering to international 
best practices holds to a certain degree.  The nature of the licensing of the technology from 
Monsanto to other domestic seed developers is a testament to this, just as the NBRA bill taking time 
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to be enacted and finalized “ (…) due to our obligations to the Cartegena Protocol [on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity]28.”   
 
The architect of the NBRA bill, Dr. S.R. Rao, offered a particularly candid insight into how 
regulation actually gets approved. Just as the bill was being tabled for the parliament debate, Rao 
was sent to personally visit the MoEF minister, Jairam Ramesh, as an ambassador from the DBT.  
He recalls that, 
 
(...) the moment I went to him, he asked me, ‘what is your level?’  I said, ‘I am a 
scientist, I have no level.’  I mean compared to [a minister], I am a Joint Secretary 
Plus; the ‘plus’ is because I am a scientist.  He was initially demoralized.  I had five 
slides to show him.  The [NBRA bill] file had to be signed, so it was my job to 
convince him. (...) I told him that, ‘the biotech market was like this: what is the 
potential, and what is the myth?  And can we catch up?  To do this, here is the 
GEAC, here is the RCGM.  These are the limitations.’  I mean, I didn’t say it as an 
affront - we are all one right - we are in the government.  The four slides were: ‘this 
is the FDA.  This is the Australian system.  This is the South African system.’  Three 
slides.  ‘This is where we are.  This is where we are thinking of going.’  I mean, a 
copy of everything, an attempt to show what others are doing.  ‘The choice is 
yours.’  I mean, the last slide was literally ‘the choice is yours’.  Then he said, 
‘aaaaaaaaah’ [long exhaling sound], like that.  ‘Hmmmmm.  OK.  Give me ten 
minutes.  Do you have anything else to say?’  I said, ‘Mr. Minister.  There was an 
editor of Nature, Luther Ford, and he said that he didn’t want to be an editor.  So 
he said - in his appointed role as editor - letters to the editor will be 800 words 
down from 1200.  There were comments from some Nobel prize winners, and in 
the next editorial, he wrote that if you can’t say what you have to say in a few 
words, then you haven’t done it or understood it.  So I think ten minutes [with you] 
was enough.’  How arrogant, right?  Anyway, he said ‘OK, give me ten minutes.’ 
He comes back in ten minutes.  ‘Dr. Rao, done.’  No questions.  ‘What about a 
coffee?’, I asked.  ‘I mean I got here at eight o’clock, and my wife couldn’t give me a 
coffee.  Can we celebrate these good words?’ He said, ‘why not’, and he brought 
the coffee. 
 
As a scientist, Rao’s role was to convince Ramesh why the NBRA bill was worth it.  But as a civil 
servant, technical risks were not really at the core of his submission.  It was more based on an 
argument of where India should be in comparison to the rest of the world.  It was the economic risk 
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of missing the boat made manifest, both in light of recent civil society actions, but also the bigger 
picture of India on the global stage. It is the political science literature that best characterizes the 
more recent evolution of these frameworks and renders the top down regulation untenable and 
unrecognizable – despite the economic imperatives and technical arguments.  Other parties outside 
the state-firm-expert nexus do affect formal regulation, and this is due to the nature of the 
technology; its incertitude, its urgency, and its political ramifications.  These political ramifications 
are equally as important to consider as biosafety and urgency.  Indeed, if economic risks took 
precedence over technical risks post 2004, what is happening now points to political risks 
overtaking both. 
 
3.1.3 Political Risk: Political Pragmatism, Bailouts, and Price Intervention 
 
While technical and economic risks do frame one side of the story, political risks are also calculated.  
This aspect of regulation will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, as it is civil 
society who has truly generated this political risk framing in a way that the government and firms 
were forced to respond to.  But from the perspective of internally generated political risks, there are 
those that are a direct response by those in power to farm level realties.  This frames the third 
characterization of risk; the risk of alienating the electorate. 
 
Bt cotton has been wildly successful in the region in terms of adoption, either due to perceived 
benefits on the part of farmers from trusted sources of information, massive marketing campaigns, 
and first hand information in the form of observation of trial plots indicating apparent success.  
Perhaps most importantly, in the area where I conducted the farm-based element of my research, it 
is nearly impossible to find anything but Bt cotton at seed shops.  Ultimately, Bt cotton is a 
significant source of income for farmers.  And politicians are acutely aware of this.  The agrarian 
crisis has presented a challenge to both the central and Maharashtran government.  Due to how the 
situation has been narrated to a wider audience via media and civil society representatives, it was 
forced to respond.  Inaction is political suicide.  But as a result, it is not a challenge without the 
potential for political gain.  
 
In terms of pragmatic responses by the central government, there have been two strategies to 
address this.  The first has been the a series of relief packages targeted towards distressed farmers, 
and the second has been state pricing interventions in the form of minimum support prices and 
monopoly procurement for cotton, both as a buffer to global market fluctuations, but also as a 
function of political gain.  A party that promises a high Minimum Support Price (MSP) will often 
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win the farmer vote.  MSPs and relief packages generate expectations on the part of farmers for 
what the government should do in the face of the crisis. Sainath has illustrated this interaction 
between the expectations of farmers and the capacity of the government to respond in his many 
articles on the agrarian crisis.  In narrating the experience of a recent agrarian suicide in Cotton, he 
notes: 
 
[h]is message to Mr. Deshmukh: ‘Mr. Chief Minister give us the price’ And to 
Home Minister R.R. Patil ‘if you do not give us a price of Rs. 3,000 per quintal29, 
suicides will surge.’ Kuchankar wrote: ‘The cotton price has fallen to Rs. 1,990 a 
quintal. We cannot manage with that. Which is why I am giving up my life.’ The 
suicide note is a bunch of anguished scribbles across a sheet of paper. 
 
Closer to where I conducted my village-based research, similar sentiments have been echoed in the 
context of the local panchayat election and expectations of formal government.  In the words of one 
farmer in Chikhali, Sharadrao Chikhalkar, “[b]asically, we base our decisions on whether or not 
[the candidate] can bring schemes here.  What will they bring to the village?  If they have political 
contacts, one candidate can capture the imagination of the entire village30.”  In this way, the third 
framing of risk can be simply put as the risk of alienating the farmer vote.  In the same way that 
biosafety frames a scientific formulation of risk, and urgency frames the risk of missing the 
opportunity to shine, this third risk relates to keeping political parties in power, and what political 
parties can and will do to ensure their continued leadership.  The regulations that surround these 
are both state and centrally mandated, but both are focused on financial incentives for cotton 
farmers.  The mode is short-term monetary concessions that serve to quell collective feelings of 
neglect.  
 
The Prime Minister’s Package 
 
2006 saw the central government mandating a fairly broad reaching relief package, targeted 
towards, on paper, alleviating the difficult conditions farmers in the Vidarbha region have been 
facing.  In the face of difficulties securing credit, poor monsoons, and perhaps most politically 
sensitive, agrarian suicide, the central government allocated over 37.5 billion Indian rupees towards 
a relief package for farmers.  Among other things, the salient features of the package were direct 
grants to suicide affected families (each district collector was mandated 5 million rupees to use at 
their discretion), debt forgiveness, restructuring, and interest waiving, irrigation infrastructure, drip 
irrigation, and rainwater harvesting, a 50% subsidy on public sector seed (mostly soybean in my 
observation), the fostering of further government extension, and the facilitation of alternative 
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sources of farm based livelihoods (i.e. dairy, horticulture, and aquaculture)31.   
 
The farmers’ leader Kishore Tiwari sums up the rationale of the package as being problematic from 
the start. He argued that, 
 
[i]f you look at the agrarian crisis, Vidarbha has been recognized by the state.  The 
chart [behind me] says in June 2005 the government officially admitted 1,000 
farmers committed suicide. (…) They released about 1,000 crore32 (10 billion) 
rupees.  In June 2006 they pumped another 3,760 crores (37.6 billion).  Then after 
one year, they pumped 70,000 crore (700 billion) as a loan waiver, then another 
13,000 (130 billion) as a loan waiver.  Then in January 2009 the state [of 
Maharashtra] has pumped 6,208 crore (62 billion) as a bailout package.  [But] if you 
look at the result of bailout packages, either the relief packages are not targeted, or 
the government failed to control to he agrarian crisis.  One has to admit 
something33.   
 
The release of this package had varied affects at the ground level, but what is of interest here is not 
so much how the packaged performed or did not perform, as I would argue that was never really 
the point of the package.  The purpose of the package was to foster political support among farmers 
locally, and as a response to the press generated understanding that Bt cotton was responsible for 
the crisis nationally.   
 
Beginning in 2006, Sainath began to document the realities of farmers’ experiences on the ground in 
a series of articles for both the Indian and international press.  These articles were impossible to 
ignore politically, as it created an unprecedented awareness among the mostly middle class readers 
of the papers where the stories were published of what appeared to be an epidemic on home turf, 
something akin to a source of shame within a country where rapid growth and development is a 
cherished assumption; an almost narcissistic conviction that India deserves to shine.  I found it 
quite illustrative in my own experiences in Bombay of how people were reacting to these reports: 
young musicians writing songs about it34, ‘aunties’ wondering why farmers were killing themselves 
and why the government was not responding35, and an overall collective sense of guilt, though 
tempered with the sense of distance that the urban-rural class and geographic divide in India 
presents - “well, that’s the way farming goes anyway…they should probably get out if it36”.  More 
specifically in the context of this argument however are the ramifications that this collective sense 
of shock could – and arguably has – had on those who reacted to the crisis, when one considers this 
public as a voting electorate.   
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The popular press, and Sainath in particular, have often linked the agrarian crisis with the adoption 
of Bt cotton.  The popular press narrative can be summarized as follows37:  
 
1. As a technology, Bt cotton was never targeted – or meant for - rain fed farming. 
2. There are few sources of formal credit available to farmers, resulting in a massive informal, 
unregulated informal credit industry where moneylenders are the primary sources of credit 
charging interest anywhere from 20-100%. 
3. In the face of poor monsoons, insect attacks, and fungi or viruses, any expectation of future 
yields is mired in uncertainty.  In the face of crop failure, harvests are never sufficient to 
outweigh expenses, particularly when massive amounts of factor inputs (pesticides and 
fertilizers) are applied by farmers based on advice from that most trusted extension officer, 
the input dealer. 
4. Given the farmers’ inability to repay the loan in the face of a poor harvest, the debt burden 
becomes impossible to bear, and due to a number of factors (pride, stigma, fear, or a 
combination of the three), farmers resort to suicide. 
5. While the factors behind suicide are varied38 the debt burden cannot be ignored as a factor.  
And ultimately, the entire crisis could have been averted, if not for government policy that 
favoured the interests of the firm as opposed to the welfare of farmers by not authorizing 
straight line varieties of Bt cotton that could be saved instead of hybrids, by allowing Bt 
cotton to be targeted to rain fed zones, and by not allowing for easier access to credit for 
farmers. 
6. Most regulators – central and state - are corrupt and easily malleable to the interests of the 
firm (i.e. allowing Bt cotton in the first place) or for personal gain (i.e. district level 
bureaucrats pocketing the money or distributing it to their patrons, or regulators taking 
bribes to authorize Bt cotton).  This is why the packages haven’t worked well, and this is why 
farmers are suffering. 
 
The near axiomatic linkage of Bt cotton and agrarian distress in the popular press was clearly not 
lost on the prime minister, who called Sainath for a one on one consultation on the evening of June 
22, prior to his visiting Vidarbha between June 30 and July 1, 200639.  It would not be a stretch to 
argue that the PM sought advice from Sainath on how exactly to address the crisis, though in effect, 
the visit and subsequent packages did not achieve their intended benefit – suicides have not 
decreased.  But that is not to say no benefits were accrued.  Sainath argues that: 
 
 [t]here was a political benefit to the PM’s visit; nothing in terms of the economy. 
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There was also a complete exposure of the Union Agriculture Minister who’d stood 
in Parliament to say that nothing much was the problem, that the suicides were 
‘normal’. (…) Neither the CM nor the Union Agriculture Minister had visited any 
of the distressed families and spoken to them. To find the positives in the 
government’s actions, you would need a microscope40. 
 
Soon after the central government announced the package, the Maharashtran state government 
chimed in with their own relief package.  More recently, the Maharashtran state government has 
requested a second relief package of 72 billion rupees in 2010 – more than double the amount of the 
first package in 2006.  These responses are firmly embedded in a framing of risk that puts losing 
political support front and centre.  The press coverage of the crisis and the alleged ineffectiveness of 
the relief packages provides context for civil society to further question the government on its 
motives, as it captures the imagination of enough of a public to question whether or not Bt cotton is 
responsible for the crisis.  But the government cannot undo release.  The technology is out there and 
is in high demand by farmers, regardless of what the press says regarding the technology being 
responsible for the crisis.  The only way to mitigate the political risk implicit with the release of Bt 
cotton and the way it has been linked to the crisis is to offer concessions to farmers, with the aim of 
securing their political support.  And for the most part it seems to worked, even in the face of the 
“GM Genocide41”. 
 
Minimum Support Prices 
 
This Congress-NCP came to power in October 2004 on the promise that it would 
restore the MSP to Rs 2,700 per quintal, that’s what they said when Madam Gandhi 
canvassed [in Vidarbha] for votes. Then, within a year, the government drops the 
MSP to Rs 1,700 per quintal. Just restoring it to the pre-2005 level would have saved 
lives this year. Then, they withdrew the advance bonus of Rs 500 per quintal which 
would have cost the government Rs 1,100 crore (INR 11 billion) a year. It’s a purely 
ideological decision but the farmers are paying with their lives for it. After all this, 
the chief minister keeps saying suicides have nothing to do with prices42. 
 
While the relief packages present one depiction of the political risk framing of regulators, the 
pricing of raw cotton as purchased from farmers by the state presents another.  The link between 
the MSP and Bt cotton is based on grading, and the staple length in particular.  Based on my visits 
to the Agricultural Produce Marketing Centre (APMC) in Deoli, the administrative centre of the 
taluka43 where Chikhali is located, higher prices are paid by the APMC for Bt cotton varieties as they 
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exhibit longer staple lengths44.   As such, Bt cotton is preferred to farmers given the pricing 
incentive because of longer staple lengths45.  It is the dictation of the prices, set from the centre to 
the state annually, that determines the scale and allure of this incentive.  And during election years, 
these prices often outpace what the markets can truly support.  The links between MSPs, Bt cotton, 
political risks, and the expectations farmers have of the government in the context of the agrarian 
crisis are clear.  Sainath makes the link in the above quote, but the perspective from a farmer is even 
more telling.  Once again, from Sainath’s profile on Kuchankar: 
 
‘Don’t blame my family for my action,’ says the suicide note of young Kuchankar. I 
will never forgive anybody who does.’ He perhaps foresaw a standard government 
explanation of farm suicides: ‘family dispute.’ And in one poignant sentence, 
addresses the 19-year-old girl he had wed just six months ago: ‘Pratibha, I am 
sorry. Please get remarried.’ He blames the procurement price for cotton as the 
source of farmers’ distress. ‘We are fed up with the delay in procurement and 
crashing prices. This will further aggravate the situation46.’ 
 
It would appear that monopoly procurement has become less a tool for protecting the interests of 
farmers, and more a means to ensure political support; a sentiment echoed by one observer who 
opined that monopoly procurement “(…) is just a political tool – vote bank politics47.”  Maharashtra 
is unique in India by the means in which the state procures cotton from farmers. In 1971, the state 
enacted the Maharashtra Raw cotton (Procurement, Processing and Marketing) Act. This mandated 
state monopoly procurement of cotton to ensure stable prices to farmers.   Private trading was 
banned, and all cotton was to be procured by the Maharashtra State Cooperative cotton Growers 
Marketing Federation Limited (MSCCGMF). In 1972, the state government undertook an initiative 
to allow stable prices for farmers as a means to buttress the fluctuations presented by global 
markets.  The Maharashtra Government Monopoly Procurement Scheme (MGMPS) guaranteed a 
stable price for purchasing cotton, with any difference between the MSP and global prices covered 
by state sanctioned funds.  Although this has been achieved in a far from efficient or effective 
manner.  Even nearly twenty five years ago, one observer argued that the scheme 
 
(…) has, however, been incurring losses on operating the monopoly scheme 
reflecting the difference between the prices it has been paying to the growers and 
those realized by it on cotton sold to the textile mills as well as the cost of carrying 
large unsold stocks. The state government claims to have incurred a loss of Rs 350 
crore (3.5 billion)48. 
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More recently, farmers’ leader Vijay Jawandhia – long a vocal supporter of state intervention in 
pricing – noted that:  
 
[t]he accumulated losses due to the procurement scheme, since it started in 1972, 
are Rs. 5,000 crores (50 billion). The Maharashtra government has a debt of Rs. 1.35 
lakh crores (1.35 trillion).  On whom is all this money being spent?  In comparison, 
Rs. 5,000 crores is a small price to pay to ensure that 24 per cent of our agriculture 
remains viable. Are not the U.S. and China heavily subsidizing their farmers49? 
 
Moreover, multilateral obligations towards the WTO and the reduction of the tariff to 5% in 2002 
allowed the cheap import of US subsidized cotton into India, resulting in a fall in the price of cotton 
in India and the government incurring massive losses in maintaining the scheme (Mishra 2002).  
Yet, the scheme continues.  And this is mostly because farmers now expect the state to provide an 
MSP that is higher than market prices.  Though the state cannot really afford to this financially, the 
reigning political party can also not afford to withdraw it, as to do so would be political suicide.  As 
Godbole (1999: 252) observes,  
 
[n]one of the successive governments at the centre, belonging to various political 
parties, had the courage to reject the requests of the state government at any time 
during the last 26 years [to continue the scheme]. (…) The only ostensible reason 
for the continuance of the scheme is to pander to the vote bank of cotton farmers. 
 
At the state level, the necessity to secure the support of the electorate is paramount.  Regardless of 
central directives regarding the release of Bt cotton and the embedded notions of risk that those 
decisions are made within, the leadership of Maharashtra is based largely in part on the preferences 
of farmers, as dictated by their own unique incentive structure.  That is, to use their democratic 
right to ensure that whoever is in power will ensure high prices for cotton, debt relief, and other 
financial incentives.  And if not their democratic right, they have other means to dictate their 
preferences.  As Jawandhia argues,  
 
[u]nfortunately or fortunately, I say always this: the suicides of the farmers has 
compelled some people to think of [what is happening in Vidarbha].  So we 
farmers must be indebted to those farmers who have committed suicide (…) When 
mass agitation has failed, I think this new type of agitation, committing suicide, is 
the one way of agitation. And there cannot be an agitation bigger than this.  And 
after this agitation also, if your system is not going to think about the real problems 
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in agriculture, I think it will be a very sorry state of affairs50. 
 
A co-evolutionary model of regulation with risk framings at its core would indicate that no one 
party can single-handedly manage these technologies.  In the face of uncertainty – and in this case, 
the linking of highly complex political phenomena such as the agrarian crisis with Bt cotton – non-
judicial means of affecting regulation become commonplace.  This is the political risk of Bt cotton, 
and this is how it plays out in terms of affecting regulation.  It was never something the 
government could have imagined around the time of the establishment of the National 
Biotechnology Board in 1982.  Even up to 2004, such dynamics may have been present, but nothing 
like what has happened could really have been predicted.  The contested nature of the technology 
brought a far wider cache of the public into the battlefield.  It was not about experts anymore.  As a 
result regulation as I see it – the practice of negotiating these contested fields of knowledge and risk 
framings – was the outcome.  And it is far from over. 
 
So what does this mean?  If regulation started as a process of technical assessment, morphed into a 
balance of technical risk assessment and management, and finally became a co-evolutionary process 
that made the technical risks far less relevant, what does regulation really mean?  Why has the 
government reacted in this way?  And what effect does all of this really have on Bt cotton, or 
indeed, the whole slew of transgenically derived agricultural products that are in the Indian R&D 
pipeline? 
 
3.2  The Politics And Practice Of Regulation 
 
Look, activism is a business.  There’s hundreds of millions of dollars of money 
changing hands every year.  In a country like India, even one to two percent of that 
is significant.  (…)  But our regulations respond to these catalysts; we adapt.  
Sometimes, [civil society] is required – because of them, our systems respond.  But 
I’m not convinced that they really represent the public.  It’s not that I am against 
NGOs, I’m just doing my job51. 
 
[T]hose NGOs never send people to our consultations.  If they do, they just come 
and leave.  I think they need to resolve their own issues – it would make the whole 
process better (…) You know, [Dr. P.] Bhargava has his ‘laundry list’ of preferences, 
but he flip flops.  There’s a difference between what one ‘needs’ to know what is 
‘nice’ to know (…) It’s not Frankenstein, and we’re not idiots52. 
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These telling quotes from two senior regulators in the DBT and MoEF respectively point to one 
clear admission – like it or not, regulation has to be a co-evolutionary process.  The “NGOs” they 
refer to might not be experts in technical risk assessment, but that is irrelevant.  They have – and 
will – utilize their own distinct framings of risk as a weapon in the battlefield of regulation, and 
they use it well.  This is why regulation from the perspective of a state engineered technical 
assessment process is simply not tenable or reflected in practice, and this is why I want to offer a 
way of rethinking it. 
 
The role of the state is not trivial of course, but the real outcome of all this is a new way of looking 
at what purpose the state really serves in the face of this conflicting risk framings.  All of these 
elements of risk and how the government understands them interface with other parties.  And as 
recent history has shown, economic and political risk framings are as important as managing the 
technical risks of biosafety alone.  As I have argued, the battle ensues when those parties enter the 
regulatory arena armed with their conflicting understandings of these three types of risk.  And 
overarching the battle is a desire to affect change.  
 
3.2.1 Technical Regulation 
 
Just as the overarching technical risk framing of the government is embedded in biosafety, those 
outside the government who have a stake in the regulation seek also to frame risk as biosafety.  
And just as the framing of technical risks is embedded in standards adopted from other 
jurisdictions adapted for an Indian context, the same could be argued for the other parties involved.  
However, as we shall see in the following chapters, biosafety itself means slightly different things to 
different people, though the underlying principles of managing hazards remain intact. The 
technical process is contested by those who are not technically versed due to both judicial and non-
judicial means of seeking it – the RTI act, filing PILs, burning trial plots, and so on. 
 
In the lead up to the release of the Swaminathan and Mashelkar reports, the task forces that were 
commissioned for the initial discussions that led to the reports had significant input from firms.  
Framing their interests were a desire for science based regulatory approval.  As such, the NBRA 
reflects this ambition rather well.  But this only occurred in a context where the government felt 
accountable to the private sector - and to a lesser degree, the public sector - in providing a 
framework that could balance the dual prongs of where the firm wanted regulation to go.  The 
balance was to win the race, but to also to protect the public interest.   
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On the other hand, and whether they liked it or not, the wider public as ostensibly represented by 
civil society had their own concerns borne of their own unique risk framings.  This aspect is 
something I address in great detail in the following chapter, but in a regulatory context, the 
motivations were also based on technical risk framings – biosafety – though seen through a slightly 
wider lens.  Civil society wanted to ensure that the other economic risk framing of the government 
– missing the biotech boat – did not overtake the biosafety element.  There were assertions that the 
government was working too closely with industry.  In the words of one of the lawyers who 
represented Greenpeace,  
 
If you look at the manner in which (…) both the RCGM and the GEAC has been 
functioning, you begin to wonder why are they functioning in this manner?  When 
you examine this matter more closely, then you realize that many of them have 
serious conflicts of interest.  In fact the co-chairman53 of the GEAC [CD Mayee] is 
on the board of an organization called the ISAAA, which has been set up, funded, 
and run, by the biotech companies, which have a commercial interest in this matter 
(…) The patent holders of Bt Mustard have been made the chair of an expert 
committee of GEAC to evaluate Bt brinjal54. 
 
These facts are not lost on the broader public, who are responding to technical concerns but from a 
non-expert perspective.  But their level of expertise is not an issue.  It is their own technical risk 
framings, borne not of technical skill but a construction of risk surrounding technical unknowns 
that propels regulatory evolution. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Regulation 
 
What is key to note here is that even though both civil society and the government shared similar 
concerns regarding technical risks, I do not think the government initially imagined themselves 
having to respond to civil society in the way that they did. This will be addressed in far more detail 
in the following chapter, but the primary vehicle for this interface occurred in the courts.  In the 
words of Divya Raghunandan, information was sought on  
 
(…) the location of all the field trials that had been approved between 2005-6, so 
that people would know where these trials were being conducted.  Second was the 
toxicity, allergenicity, and any other health or environment related issues for which 
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tests had been conducted, specifically brinjal, okra, mustard, and rice.  And the 
third thing we said was that because the RCGM was a public body, we wanted 
their minutes to be put up on the website, so that people know how these decisions 
are reached, and how they conduct these field trials55. 
 
It was the legal means of addressing these technical concerns that really forced the government to 
follow the rules they had established on paper.  Not only those, such events affected further fine-
tuning of the regulations to avoid such “nuisances” in the future.   
 
In the words of S.R. Rao at the DBT on how the NBRA bill has responded to civil society actions, 
 
[t]he main [issue of contention in the draft NBRA bill] was about misleading the 
public without scientific evidence.  That has been deleted.  But if someone is going 
to say ‘it will stop reproduction’ and all this, well, it’s all bullshit.  There’s a limit 
for that.  The second issue was the RTI clause.  But that was a commercial clause.  
For patents, for instance, you must have data protection.  And that’s even covered 
in the RTI itself, but we still took it out [of the NBRA bill].  Our intention was to 
protect such information, just as other countries have.  Like, if someone says I have 
AIDS, perhaps that is private, right?  But [another] clause [in the RTI] also says, 
‘while it is in the public interest, it overrules confidentiality’.  People are reading 
the NBRA bill as though we are taking over the whole RTI.  It’s purely an 
interpretation.  Commercial information - until it is patented - is not [the concern of 
civil society].  Why do [they] want to know56? 
 
I would argue they want to know because how they frame risk is quite different in terms of both the 
technical risks as embodied in toxicity and allergenicity data, but also in terms of the economic risks 
of the bill being geared towards the interests of the firm.  In the words of Raghunandan,  
 
I had requested to separate the information pertaining to section 8(1)(d) of the RTI 
Act 2005, which offers exemption to commercial confidence, intellectual property 
and trade secrets, from the RCGM minutes and provide the rest of the information. 
This is clear in my appeal (…) Thus ‘spatial inseparability’ as an excuse by the 
appellate authority to refuse information or to delay the information is entirely 
unjustifiable57. 
 
So while yes, Rao does correctly point out that it is a matter of “interpretation”, a conflicting 
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interpretation of technical and economic risks is what lies at the core of this conflict.  And it is in 
such a space that accountability is sought, rendering changes in regulation.  Growth and prestige 
may mean a lot to the firm and the state, but less to others.  Given this distinction, the ambition of 
growth – the economic risk of losing the race – finds its mirror image among the wider net of 
concerned parties who frame economic risk in a different way.  From their perspective, the risk is 
that such a focus detracts from the unknown effects of Bt cotton adoption, something that the state 
has to consider before their stated desire to win the “sweepstakes”. 
 
3.2.3 Political Regulation 
 
Finally, at the level closest to those who use the technology – farmers themselves – representation 
means everything, and political risks are paramount. Farmers’ leaders interviewed here referred to 
the spate of agrarian suicides as perhaps the only way in which farmers themselves could draw 
attention to the situation they face, and have characterized the extreme step of suicide as a signal to 
the government to react.  In the words of Kishore Tiwari, leader of the Vidarbha Jan Andolan 
Samiti, 
 
[these] are not suicides, it’s a mass genocide – these people are being killed by the 
wrong policies of the state. (…) [You may wonder] how can Monsanto be blamed 
for killing cotton farmers in Vidarbha?  But if you look in deep penetration, it is 
true.  The chemical farming support by the government of India, official support to 
the GM revolution, it’s just dragging the farmer in a vicious circle.  The investment 
of the farmer in cultivation has increased a lot.  [Granted, the] return on that 
investment has [also] increased a lot.  But when there is no return, the losses are 
huge.  Debt and crop failure have been killing the farmers - that is the truth. (…) 
The only solution is administrative reform. [It] should be done - a smaller state 
should be formed - and accountability should be increased58. 
 
The means by which a response from the government is sought by farmers is distinct from civil 
society.  This is again due to their distinct incentive structure and framing of risk.  Farmers do not 
represent themselves in these fora, which is where the space for someone like Tiwari or Jawandhia 
emerges.  In Tiwari’s words, 
 
[w]e take out the same demands of the farmers with the government.  If the 
government is not listening to us, then we move to the human rights commission, 
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or we move to constitutional authorities like [the] high court, supreme court, 
MRTPC, UNDP, World Bank - everywhere we are going.  What we want is that [if 
there are] people who want to say something, those who are victimized due to 
wrong policies of the state, [they] should not be victimized like this (…) System 
failure is a much more difficult task to address then the wrong practices adopted 
by individuals.  Vidarbha will go to that hell.  Naxalites are active in four districts.  
They may be active in next 5 years in all districts.  Because they are finding the 
good soil to promote Naxalism59. 
 
So while a democratic system of governance may have inbuilt mechanisms to control for electoral 
dynamics – if you do not approve of a leader, you will not vote for that candidate again – this is 
frustrated by the presentation of bailouts, packages, and so on. In the words of one farmer, “[w]e 
feel Tiwari will help us to receive justice.  We remained silent up to this point, and the government 
has deceived us.  But Tiwari managed to provide justice and so we trust him.  It’s our last chance60.”  
Indeed, political leadership here is not forged on electoral politics, but rather what a farmer leader 
can offer given his contacts, strategies, and reach. 
 
While the multiplicity of risk framings bound the arena where the conflict occurs, it is the way by 
which these realms of knowledge are contested that lies at the root of the conflict.  In the context of 
the negotiations around regulation, the process has been influenced by interfaces with both civil 
society and private sector actors. These interactions have thrown up new constructions of risk, and 
challenged the standard technical regulatory approach that the state set out with. In the following 
chapters, I will look in more detail at the way civil society and private sector actors construct risk, 
and ultimately, regulatory practice. 
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CHAPTER 4  
FOOTSOLDIERS:  CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE BATTLEFIELD OF REGULATION 
 
While the government may sanction regulatory frameworks, the actual process of governance 
includes other parties, all of whom enter the process with their own unique framings of risk and a 
distinct series of incentives that motivate action.  This space where parties enter is not an invitation-
only affair, especially when the issue being governed – transgenics in agriculture – is embedded 
with risks that are defined differently by all parties involved.  The process of governance 
incorporates a far wider range of perspectives than what is found within the halls of government 
alone, and adapts not only to the classic scientific and economic risks as framed by the government, 
but a wider cache of political risks. Though parties outside of government may also frame risk in 
the context of science or economics, they do so on their own unique terms. And within these spaces 
where these often clashing risk framings meet is where one finds the catalyst for much of the 
ongoing evolution of regulatory practice around transgenics in India.   
 
From government, therefore, I turn my focus to how civil society has worked within these spaces.  
The release of Bt cotton has been a harbinger of an unprecedented display of unity amongst civil 
society actors.  The scale of their effect varies, but one cannot ignore the effect their actions have 
had on the continually unfolding story of the regulation of transgenics in India.  It is a reflection of 
the evolution of social movements and their interface with policy - from ‘old’ class based struggles 
to ‘new’ social movements based on solidarity in the face of a common struggle.  Unlike their 
predecessors, these new movements operate in the realm of contested forms of knowledge (Brass 
1994; Castells 1997; Evers 1985; Habermas 1996; Leach and Scoones 2007).  Global trade, capital and 
knowledge flow, and market reforms are what laid the basis for the battle that ensued (and 
continues to ensue), and this distinguishes the new from the old (Castells 1997).  In essence, Bt 
cotton presented a catalyst for a new social movement in India, premised on the uncertainties that 
surrounded the release and adoption of the technology.  
 
To be sure, social movements in India around agriculture predated Bt cotton. What is different here 
however is the focus around one particular technology, and the emergence of new judicial and non-
judicial tools that were used by these movements to successfully disperse their risk framings to a 
general public.  As result, the state machinery had to react given the nature of political incentives, 
and the true face of regulation emerged – an iterative process based on the interface of the diverse 
risk framings of many.  Inside and outside the courts, different members of civil society have 
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asserted their own framings of risk as being crucial to consider by the state, as well as provoking a 
far wider swathe of society in general to also consider these framings.  In practice, the interface 
where these distinct framings of risk collide has rendered the entire process of regulation an 
entirely different affair to what the government may have imagined during the initial formation of 
the National Biotechnology Board in 1982.  
 
Civil society, perhaps more than any other party considered in this research, epitomizes the 
battlefield of regulation given their often opposing risk framings on all levels – technical, economic 
and political.  The groups I profile here operate in spaces where notions of identity, representation, 
and processes of inclusion and exclusion all forge a very complex battlefield landscape.  Contested 
forms of knowledge, power dynamics and trust, ways of performing ‘activism’, and the spaces 
where all of these factors play out characterize the landscape.  It is one rich with characters, 
different risk constructions, and direct implications on what the Indian government may have 
initially conceived as a technical space alone (Leach and Scoones 2007).  As this chapter will show, 
it clearly is not.  The battlefield of regulation is where ‘local’ and ‘global’ narratives surrounding 
transgenics collide and morph given local contexts, generating a form of ‘globalization from below’ 
(Falk 1993; Scoones 2008).  What emerges is a co-evolutionary process – and practice - of regulation 
(Millstone 2007, 2009).  But more importantly, driving that process are a multiplicity of ways of 
understanding the technical, economic, and political risks involved – a series of interfaces that 
characterize the battlefield of regulation.  This is what co-evolution means in practice.  This chapter, 
through a combination of my own interactions and what I have observed from a distance, will 
reveal these framings, and present a way of understanding how the ongoing battle, through the 
lens of civil society narratives and actions, forms a new way of looking at regulation. 
 
In what follows, I will first introduce the characters at play: who is ‘civil society’?  Given that, I 
move on to define the multiple framings of risk that this highly heterogeneous group ‘civil society’ 
adhere to.  I then map out the battlefield, which is where these framings are rendered explicit in 
action.  Finally, I ask, how does this all relates to regulation as I see it?  If it is a practice forged a 
series of interlinked, but more often opposing framings of risk, what does it really mean?   
 
4.1 Who is Civil Society? 
 
Civil society can refer to a wide group of actors, and in order to characterize exactly who I am 
referring to in the story that follows, a clarification is required.  Who are these people?  Where do 
they come from?  Who do they claim to represent?  What motivates their actions? While there may 
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be a unifying factor in terms of their concerns regarding Bt cotton, there are different ways in acting 
out these concerns.  The debates surrounding agriculture in India go back many, many years, but a 
consideration of all civil society mobilizations around these issues is far outside the mandate of this 
thesis.  Yet even within the timeframe I consider, there has been enough occurring to indicate 
evolution.  I limit my analysis to 1998 and onwards, and to four distinct groups within the broad 
term civil society: two types of NGOs, farmer leaders, and the media1.  
 
4.1.1 NGOs – The Old School 
 
The old school I refer to are two organizations, both very much based in Delhi as a capital city.  I 
state this not merely as a geographic distinction, but one based on strategy - they could not have 
come into being anywhere else given the advocacy efforts that characterize their work, and their 
proximity to the halls of central government.  While I have been fortunate to have a relatively long-
term relationship with one, I cannot say the same about the other.  The latter, however, cannot be 
ignored given their (or rather her) impact on the entire civil society discourse surrounding 
agriculture in India – particularly as understood outside India - and more recently, transgenics in 
agriculture.  The strategies that they pursue share a common focal point – concerns relating to the 
introduction of transgenics in India – but the modality differs.  One aims to affect change directly in 
a regulatory context by being directly involved in the process, while the other indirectly via forging 
narratives that have been disseminated worldwide.  Both implicate the government either from the 
inside or outside via interfacing with risk as biosafety or via a forceful narrative embedded in the 
economic risks of losing the biotech race.  
 
A geneticist by training, Suman Sahai has worked towards changing and affecting formal 
regulation, ether through her work on including farmers’ rights in the Protection of Plant Varieties 
and Farmers’ Rights Act (Sahai 2000, 2001, 2003), being a member of various government 
committees2, or by organizing fairly high profile public events that aim to bring together all the 
parties I consider in this research – regulators, the firm, civil society, and farmers themselves3.  
However, in recent times her stance has shifted from being more based on scientific precaution and 
lending her voice to regulatory reform as an expert to more focused legal actions.  And while she 
initially would distance herself from the bipolar ‘for or against’ biotechnology debates, she has 
recently come out as being ‘against’, but only due to what she perceives as an incompetent and 
ineffective regulatory system governing transgenics4.  Her oft-repeated argument is that unlike the 
publicly funded Green Revolution, the ‘Gene Revolution’ is privately funded, thereby raising 
concerns regarding accountability dynamics5.  Like the government, she also frames risk as 
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biosafety, but does not think the government is functionally capable of managing biosafety 
effectively (Sahai 1999: 85).  Her motivations have been primarily based on affecting regulatory 
change by working within the system, often by invitation given her expertise as a geneticist. 
 
On the other hand, Vandana Shiva chooses not to work within the system.  But that does not detract 
from her capacity to affect change.  Almost single handedly, and over the course of multiple books, 
articles, and public engagements both in India and abroad, she has formed a clear and rich 
narrative on plant genetic resources and the economic incentives that surround them within the 
context of globalization (Shiva 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002a, 2002b). One cannot easily deny her gifts of 
oratory and the sheer volume of work she has amassed over the years, a body that has seen her as 
the face of Indian resistance against a wide variety of parties – Monsanto in particular (Shiva and 
Crompton 1998; Shiva et al. 1999).  Her organization, the Research Foundation for Technology, 
Science, and the Environment (RFTSE)6, has worked on a variety of issues relating to intellectual 
property on plant genetic resources and access and benefit sharing of traditional knowledge, both 
via using legal tools as well as fostering public awareness.  Just as Sahai is the face of Gene 
Campaign, Shiva is basically the face of RFTSE; both are icon driven institutions.  And like Sahai, 
she has been active on the regulatory front, filing the first real litigation in the context of transgenics 
in India in 1999 and publishing numerous articles in the mainstream press.  But she is rarely – if 
ever - an invited party in regulatory construction.  Her framing of risk is similar to the economic 
risk framing of the government, but she flips it on its head.  Losing the race is a common thread, but 
her framing presents the objective as directly against the interests of the nation; the opposite of how 
the state frames it.   For better or for worse, she is, in many ways, the face of the debate 
internationally, and has extensive linkages with an international network of “resistance”, though 
her resonance in India may not be as pronounced. 
 
Interestingly, these two individuals do not really get along – there have been well-documented 
debates in the press (Visavanathan and Parmar 2002: 2723), and they are rarely associated together 
regardless of their common interests.  But they do share a common purpose – their pioneering work 
around regulatory reform as characterized by their own framings of risk set the bar for the newer 
school of NGO. 
 
4.1.2 NGOs – The New School 
 
The new school responds directly to the scientific and economic risk framings of the government, 
and aims to offer an alternative perspective.  They are represented by a number of organizations; 
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those with transnational advocacy linkages (i.e. Greenpeace), those who receive funding from 
foreign donors (i.e. YUVA Rural) and others who are locally based and funded (i.e. Kheti Virasat 
Mission).  Contrary to the old school, they are less driven by iconic figures, are more willing to 
cooperate with one another, and have been successful in working together to delay the process of 
further release, using judicial (Right To Information (RTI) Act and Public Interest Litigation 
submissions) and non-judicial (protests, arson, media events) means.  In terms of countering the 
technical risk assessments of the Indian government, they have compiled masses of scientific 
studies, based on liaisons with Indian and international experts to support their claims7. In terms of 
economic risk, they argue vociferously on conflicts of interest among regulators, hurried and 
inadequate biosafety assessment in the face of ‘winning the race’, and evidence of corruption.  And 
all of this is either contested in the courts, using the 2005 RTI Act as the primary tool, or in city 
streets, by way of gatherings, press conferences, or information drop in sessions.  They work in an 
urban context, as both that is where the courts are, but also as that is where their target group – the 
Indian middle class - resides.  
 
The Coalition for a GM Free India8 and the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, or “MEC9” are 
two active collations of new school NGOs that have been unprecedented in their unity in voicing 
their concerns regarding Bt cotton, and more recently, Bt brinjal.  They represent a ‘new’ social 
movement (Leach and Scoones 2007), one that finds solidarity in the face of social change (Ellison 
1997; Leach and Scoones 2005).  In this case, the emergence of Bt cotton and the uncertainty was the 
catalyst for this solidarity, forged on a perception of the ineffectiveness of the government to 
manage the technology in a disinterested manner.  They are relatively recent entrants into the civil 
society fray, though they have been adept at making the right connections with the right people – 
both the old school as well as others in the new school, and both in and outside India.  Cutting 
across state boundaries and employing linkages internationally, these NGOs are typically based in 
urban or peri-urban areas, and employ workers from similarly corresponding geographic 
backgrounds, as opposed to a smaller town or rural, farmer-centric base.  Divya Raghunandan of 
Greenpeace India traces her background by referring to her own unique reference points growing 
up, recalling that:  
 
I come from Kerala so OK, it’s mad; people are obsessed with politics and you 
know, student politics is like the most important thing in everyone’s life.  So it’s just 
there in your blood – you have to organize, you have to protest, you have to. And 
there is a space for it.  We’ve always had a good space for it.  And we are quite 
territorial about what we protest about, who else can join, [and] on what terms10! 
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The motivations are embedded in a struggle, but not a class struggle.  These new movements pick 
up the need to “protest” from the old, but have done so in the face of the uncertainties surrounding 
Bt cotton, and more recently, Bt brinjal.   
 
In my research, I focused on two types of new school NGO; first, the more urban based 
organizations involved in litigation and raising public awareness, and second, those with a more 
rural presence.  The first is represented here by Divya Raghunandan of Greenpeace India in 
Bangalore, Kavitha Kuruganti, who is difficult to pin down to one organization or locale given her 
multiple organizational affiliations, and Aruna Rodrigues, who seemed to come from nowhere in 
2005 and, as I detail later, ramped up the debate to an entirely whole new level in the span of four 
years.  The second type is represented by YUVA, based in Nagpur.  YUVA focuses more on 
attempts to shift farmers away from Bt cotton and into organics, as determined by a mandate that is 
often conditional on the funding resources they depend on from foreign and domestic donors.  
However, in this chapter, most of my analysis will focus on the former, and I consider YUVA in 
chapter six, where I discuss farm level realities.  
 
4.1.3 Farmer Leaders 
 
Though their overall strategies correlate, farmer leaders work on a different level than the NGOs, 
reflective of the geographic space in which they operate.  Similar to NGOs, the core modality of the 
strategy of farmers’ leaders is threefold - to agitate, or to protest; to use the media to alert the 
broader public about the agrarian crisis as linked to Bt cotton adoption; and to hold both the central 
and state governments accountable to the situation on the ground via the filing legal petitions. Yet 
they differ from NGOs as their demands are more responsive to the immediate needs of farmers, at 
least as they perceive them.  
 
There is a long history of farmers’ movements, both outside of Maharashtra (i.e. Nanjundaswamy 
and the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangh (KRRS) in Karnataka and the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) 
in Uttar Pradesh), but also in Maharashtra (i.e. Sharad Joshi and the Shetkari Sangathana) (Assadi 
2002; Brass 1994; Omvedt 1994). Though the focus of both has been similar post 1991 liberalization - 
the effects of globalization on the livelihood of farmers - the economic and political risk framings 
are distinct.  While Nanjundaswamy framed the economic risks of globalization as a threat to India, 
targeting multinationals as a focal point – to “Cremate Monsanto” in the name of “Gandhian 
Violence” (Featherstone 2003: 407) - Joshi argued that economic liberalization as an entry point for 
the processes of globalization was “(…) not an iniquitous import from the west.  Liberalization is in 
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fact a worldview of Vedanta11 (Assadi 2002: 45; Joshi 1994).”  However, Joshi would also argue for 
strong state support for farmers in the form of minimum support prices, something that would 
seem to contradict a view promoting the benefits of liberalization.  But this is the political reality of 
leading a farmers’ movement; short term financial concessions are what really drive the agenda, as 
this is what generates the support needed from farmers to sustain a movement. 
 
These examples of the roots of the farmer movement just prior and during the 1991 economic 
liberalization of India form the basis for the two leaders I profile and consider here.  There are two 
main examples I include here given my focus on Maharashtra – the Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti 
(VJAS, or Vidarbha People’s Revolution Committee), led by Kishore Tiwari and based in Nagpur 
and Pandharkawada, a small town in Yavatmal district, and Vijay Jawandhia, formerly aligned 
with Joshi but now based in Wardha, with a field office in Waifad village in Wardha district.  Like 
Shiva, but unlike Joshi, both see globalization, with Monsanto as a prime actor, as being directly 
linked with the crisis, due to the state succumbing to economic risk framings that place less 
importance on farmers and more on economic benefit.  The race has its victims, and the state is 
responsible for taking care of those injured on the battlefield.  As Tiwari asserts, 
 
[w]e look at the graphs and all these suicides – well, basically they are not suicides, 
it’s a mass genocide – they are being killed by the wrong policies of the state.  Some 
multinational companies are killing them. (…) [You may ask] how can Monsanto 
be blamed for killing cotton farmers in Vidarbha.  But if you look in deep 
penetration, it is true.  The chemical farming support to the green revolution, 
[government] support to the GM revolution, its just dragging the farmer in a 
vicious circle. The investment of the farmer in cultivation has increased a lot.  
[Granted], the return on investment has [also] increased a lot.  But when there is no 
return, the losses are huge. The debt and crop failure have been killing the farmers 
- that is the truth12. 
 
While on the one hand he does recognize the benefits of the technology, he also argues that the 
technical risks are not fully understood by farmers, something that the state should be addressing, 
but is not.  And this is where he is placed – a bridge between farmers and the state, though one less 
focused on mitigating technical risks, and more on the political risks.   
 
While he has been referred to as an “encyclopaedia on information on suicides in Vidarbha13”, 
Tiwari characterizes himself differently.  In his words, he works to ensure that “poor people should 
live with some kind of relief, some kind of respect, and we have been fighting for [the] survival of 
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our people - that’s the only thing14.” Qualified as an engineer and possessing an MBA from IIM 
Ahmedabad15, his perspective on his work strongly echoes a Gandhian outlook – a belief in 
transparency, the ‘truth’, non-violence, and regular fasting were all elements that came out of our 
interactions.  On his role as a leader, he reflected that “[a]ctivists like us, who are taking grant in aid 
and doing tamasha16 will have to pay the cost.  And people will kill first a fraudulent activist, then a 
politician.  Because they are most dangerous17.”  He is acutely aware of his position and the 
responsibility implicit within. 
 
In speaking to him, he alludes to his work as being something akin to spiritual enlightenment, 
though mixed with his own personal motives.  He refers his working with the “poorest of the poor” 
as  “(…) a process of meditation, a process of going towards soul satisfaction, of achieving 
awareness18.” However, upon further questioning he reveals a less divine path.  In 1999, Tiwari was 
involved is a protest demanding higher cotton minimum support prices.  The protest degenerated 
into violence, and he was arrested.  He recalls that “when we were bailed out from the court - after 
two or three months of jail – suddenly…we became farmers’ leaders19.”  He formed the VJAS soon 
after, to achieve “(…) more transparency in my life, [which] will lead to my further advancement in 
the field of revolution20.”  
 
And he has been busy ever since. He quips that “[m]y phone number is flashed in the local cable 
channel and every death is reported to me. Even the government goes by my figures21.” In looking 
at his blog postings since he began in early 200622, one will see a series of regular entries detailing 
the various writ petitions he has filed against the Maharashtra state court, suicide letters from 
farmers, press clippings both in Marathi and English about the crisis, and most often cited by the 
media, a series of press releases detailing who have committed suicide23.  His requests boil down to 
three core demands of the both the central, but mostly state, government: provide higher MSPs for 
cotton, ensure transparency in any sanction relief package so as to counter “babu raj in the 
government24”, and waive all loans.  And for the most part, the government has done precisely this.   
 
Vijay Jawandhia comes from a slightly different background.  Born into a wealthy family in Nagpur 
and trained as a chemist, his initial entry point into the movement was in the early 1970s, due to his 
dissatisfaction with Maharashtran state monopoly procurement of cotton.  In 1980, he 
 
(…) read about Sharad Joshi - an IAS officer who was in [the] foreign service [but] 
who came to India after resigning, and [who] started an agitation of onion farmers 
in Pune. And he formed Shetkari Sanghatana.  I was in the loop with the farmers 
movement [at that time, and] I thought that – [since] this country is ruled by IAS 
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officers only, not by the leaders - when an IAS officer is stating that something is 
wrong in the agricultural policies, I thought that was a good thing; I must go and 
meet him.   So I went to Pune and met him, and in 1980-81 we started Shetkari 
Sanghatana.  And we got such a response within two years we were all over 
Maharashtra, and all over India also25. 
 
While the two parted ways ideologically in the late 1980s due to opposing beliefs on free market 
pricing policies26 and the compatibility of liberalization and Vedantic tradition, Jawandhia has 
remained steadfast to his core beliefs – similar to Tiwari’s - that the government must intervene in 
the market and control prices for farmers.  Unlike Tiwari however, he is also on the international 
circuit as a farmers’ leader in fora where anti-globalization sentiments are shared27, characterized 
by observers as a “colourful” farmer leader28, speaking for Indian farmers in the face of 
globalization.  His argument links the emergence of the GATT with the agrarian crisis, and he holds 
post 1991 state policies promoting economic liberalization as directly responsible29.   
 
Tiwari and Jawandhia are acutely aware of how the political game works; they are well versed in 
the political risk framing that surrounds formal regulation, and they use it to their advantage.  In 
Jawandhia’s words, farmers comprise “(…) 60-65% of the country. If 1% are mobilized, it will be 
such a big strength that no political party will be able to ignore the demands made by this force30.”  
They have a stronger field presence, and, in contrast to NGOs, are typically highly regarded within 
the farmer community, reflective of a strong sense of representation that farmers attribute to their 
activities.  There is a both a class and geographic connect.  In the words of one farmer I interviewed 
in Chikhali, “[w]e feel Tiwari will help us to receive justice.  We remained silent up to this point, 
and the government has deceived us.  But Tiwari managed to provide justice and so we trust him.  
It’s our last chance31.”  This notion of trust characterizes how Jawandhia perceives his role as 
compared to that of NGOs. While he respects NGO efforts, he laments that Greenpeace is 
 
(…)  not going to the farmers.  What I say is always this: that is one way of fighting 
- that that is the modus operandi of fighting for the intelligentsia.  But unless you go 
to the farmers and speak in their language, [explain] how it is going to effect them, 
you cannot have mass support.  And that is very essential32. 
 
Tiwari goes a step further, and is fairly critical of NGOs like YUVA, who he sees as  
 
(…) doing all this tamasha. (…) [W]hen there is a crisis, these people flood.  The 
parachuting of NGOs is always there, because the grant in aid comes, the donor 
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comes. Where there is a crisis the parachuting of NGOs is always here. The tribal 
crisis, then floods, earthquakes, now farming is a crisis, no?  So they airlift 
themselves from Pune, from Mumbai.  They have a big stomach.  They eat 
everything.  In each they are there – AIDS, they are there.  Cancer, they are there.  
But they are big AIDS and cancer [wry smile and satisfied chuckle]33. 
 
Yet while there is this accountability dynamic between farmers and people like Tiwari and 
Jawandhia, there is also a disconnect between their efforts at convincing farmers to shun Bt cotton – 
a challenge also faced by YUVA. Though Tiwari and Jawandhia link Bt cotton adoption with the 
agrarian crisis, and though farmers look up to them as a means to address the challenges they face, 
farmers are still adopting Bt cotton in massive numbers.  Tiwari laments that, 
 
[n]ow, this year, the farmers are saying they survived due to Bt cotton. I don’t 
know what survival [they refer to].  When I asked them what was their expense, 
they say ‘expenses are 11 lakh (1.1 million) rupees’.  What is your income, they say 
‘80,000 rupees’.  Where is their survival?  But: the campaign is so high. ‘Bt Is 
Tremendous’…34. 
 
Farmer leaders operate in a unique space.  They know how the state frames political risk inside out, 
and they play the game well.  Though there may be little in the way of direct effects that their work 
has had on the technical risk assessment based regulatory procedure that surrounds Bt cotton, they 
are formidable political forces, framing the debate on their terms and generating real financial 
concessions for farmers. As their narratives are public, those who listen and read their statements 
may wonder why are farmers killing themselves, questioning the scientific risk framing of the 
government – is Bt cotton a faulty technology?  Politicians are forced to respond as framed by 
political risk – how can we capitalize on this distress to secure the valuable farmer vote?  And 
farmer leaders demand answers as to why economic risks overtook the welfare of farmers – was Bt 
cotton released even though it is not particularly suitable for non-irrigated areas like most of 
Vidarbha just to ‘win the race’?  The government framings of scientific, economic, and political risk 
all interface at the ground level, and farmer leaders counter the government framings on all three, 
but according to their own constructions of risk.  They occupy different spaces, but play by similar 
rules. 
 
4.1.4 The Media 
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Overarching all three of these groups are print and visual media channels.  As a “knowledge 
broker” (Scoones 2005: 37) they have the unique capacity to widely broadcast NGO and farmer 
leader risk framings to a wider public, thereby affecting public opinion.  The relevance of this is key 
here in the context of fomenting fear in the face of the unknown (Maeseele 2009; Scoones 2008: 318).  
Fear resonates, particularly when the architecture of the medium is predisposed to foment fear.  
These sentiments then translate into political capital that resonates among government actors.  
 
Unlike the other members of civil society I have discussed, the media can manufacture 
representation. They have the unique capacity to construct a section of society whose interests they 
could claim to represent by presenting the danger of the technology, the corrupt nature of the 
regulatory system, or the harm caused to farmers because of both.  I have observed two aspects of 
the media coverage of the Bt cotton story, and in two directions.  First is a more top down strategy: 
how journalists have presented the narrative to the public to catalyze opinion.  Second is bottom 
up: how NGOs and farmer leaders have created events that attract the media, furthering the 
dispersal of their risk framings to a wider public. 
 
While there have been a minority of reports indicating the benefits of Bt cotton, the common 
narrative focuses on a causal link between Bt cotton adoption by farmers and the agrarian crisis, 
with a particular focus on suicide, or the questionable safety of the technology itself.  From one 
particularly dramatic report: 
 
There were still marks in the dust where he had writhed in agony. Other villagers 
looked on - they knew from experience that any intervention was pointless - as he 
lay doubled up on the ground, crying out in pain and vomiting.  Moaning, he 
crawled on to a bench outside his simple home 100 miles from Nagpur in central 
India. An hour later, he stopped making any noise. Then he stopped breathing. At 
5pm on Sunday, the life of Shankara Mandaukar came to an end.  As neighbours 
gathered to pray outside the family home, Nirmala Mandaukar, 50, told how she 
rushed back from the fields to find her husband dead. ‘He was a loving and caring 
man,’ she said, weeping quietly. ‘But he couldn’t take any more. The mental 
anguish was too much. We have lost everything.’  Shankara’s crop had failed - 
twice. Of course, famine and pestilence are part of India’s ancient story.  But the 
death of this respected farmer has been blamed on something far more modern and 
sinister: genetically modified crops35. 
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Perhaps exploitative in terms of capitalizing on suffering, but such evocative narratives serve to 
frustrate both regulators and the private sector, as they are well aware of the importance of public 
sentiment.  In the opinion of C.K. Rao, who heads industry friendly Foundation for Biotechnology 
Awareness and Education (FBAE), the challenge the press presents is that,  
 
(…) in many countries – in the West it is also there – the public only gets to know 
the negative aspects of genetic engineering.  That is because the media projects only 
that.  That happens because the media gets their info from the anti-tech activists.  
So the product developer, the government, the scientists, they are not providing 
any information to the media to produce a positive picture. (…) All the time, it is ‘it 
is toxic, it is allergenic, it killed sheep’ - you can’t expect the public to have any 
favourable view of genetic engineering36. 
 
Regulators and scientists are aware of their lacking public relations strategy.  As Dr. S.R. Rao at the 
DBT laments, scientists “(…) are not bothered with this; according to them, ‘tomorrow it will all be 
forgotten37.’”  They do realize the importance of outreach and communications but are at a loss of 
how to go about doing it.  In the words of Dr. K.K. Sharma, a senior plant breeder at the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), “I can’t say ‘just trust 
me’.  I have to explain the technology. But how? Communication skills are key, and we need to 
have more media workshops38.” 
 
In the other direction, NGOs and farmer leaders are adept at using the media to expand their risk 
framings with a broader public.  On the one hand is the element of spectacle.  Be it the sight of 
NGOs dressing people up as a variety of symbolic caricatures - dead sheep39, giant aubergines, or 
instant soup40 - or in farmer leaders organizing massive rallies with speeches, slogans, and metres 
of homespun khadi41, unique photo opportunities for the print media and great backdrops for 
television interviews are constructed and used.  On the other hand are the spaces where stories are 
broken by NGOs and farmer leaders, with the media picking it up.  Blogs42 and discussion lists43 are 
two such examples in cyberspace, and formally attended events where the press is invited are 
another space.  The press enters both spaces freely, and capitalizes on that entry to inform their own 
narratives; for example, civil society breaking a story on links between regulators and firms, or on 
rushed approvals that dispose of protocol due to internal and external pressures.   In both cases, the 
end result is the same – public perceptions of transgenics and the regulation that surrounds it are 
forged.  It matters little if they are based on technical risk assessment or not, as I would argue that is 
not the aim of the media or those who present opportunities to the media to cover.  The end result 
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is scepticism and fear, which translates into informing the decisions that the public – as well as 
regulators - make.  In the words of two people interviewed on their perceptions of Bt brinjal, 
 
[i]f these crops can damage vital organs of rats that have fed on them, I am 
obviously very concerned. What’s worse, I would not even know if I was 
consuming genetically modified food. So if after some time I suffer from an 
incurable disease, who is to be blamed? (…) I am not against using technology or Bt 
brinjal, but the media coverage has helped me realize that it is not wise to introduce 
modified crops till the tests have proved them to be 100% safe for human 
consumption44. 
 
Or even more evident in terms of how such fear translates into political capital, in the words of a 
minister in Karnataka, “I am not aware about Bt brinjal or anything. I got information through the 
media that it is not safe. We’ll oppose anything that is harmful to health45.” 
 
The four types of civil society actors I have observed may differ in the modality of their action, but 
they are all working in a common context – the release of Bt cotton.  While the historical 
underpinnings of the old school of NGOs and farmer leaders are key to illustrate, as they provide a 
context and an evolutionary path to compare the new school and current trends to, my main focus 
in what follows is how this all played out post 2002 in the battlefield of regulation.  I have defined 
the actors and characterized the spaces in which they inhabit and work within, and now I want to 
move on the next crucial context – how they frame risk given these spaces.  The catalyst for much of 
what happened was Bt cotton, but there is a broader narrative that frames these actions.  It is about 
the future of agriculture and how the rules surrounding it are to be managed by the state.  But – 
and this is what is really the point – that process can never be managed by the state alone.  Spaces 
are formed, entry is not exclusive, knowledge is contested, and it all occurs in the face of the 
uncertainty surrounding the technology itself. 
 
Ideologies and finding others who share these ideologies in a performative sense – solidarity – 
prevents this process from being managed by the state alone.  Those who find common linkages 
amongst different parties, such as the four groups here working under a common interest in Bt 
cotton adoption – frame the debate in their own ways (Benford and Snow 2000).  But, the effects of 
these framings in an applied sense – the battlefield of regulation – become far more interesting 
when a focus is lent to one type of framing: risk. 
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4.2  Risk Framing: Spaces, Narratives, And Interfaces 
 
So, how do these parties frame risk?  Is it purely a response to government risk framings, or is it 
borne of a unique process?  Again, the story begins in the late nineties, when the first field trials 
began.  Prior to the release of Bt cotton in 2002, much of the strategy around opposition to 
transgenics was premised on a more generic anti-globalization narrative, with old school NGOs 
targeting multilateral trade agreements as the focus of their dissent.  A sketch of the predominant 
narrative is as follows: the prescriptive guidelines of the WTO jeopardize India’s regulatory 
sovereignty.  The agreements mandate new intellectual property rights regimes which will allow 
for large scale patents on life, which is both unethical and an affront to Indian traditional 
knowledge.  Outside of India, biotechnology firms were planning to release Terminator technology 
into India, and the lives for farmers – indeed an entire way of life as embedded in a nostalgic view 
of rural India – was being threatened as a result.  There were echoes of neo-colonialism, of gender 
violence (Shiva 1989), multinational corporate domination (i.e. Monsanto), and nationalism.   
 
Post 2002 however, this began to evolve into something far more interesting. The formal release of 
Bt cotton and the mobilization of both the old and new school of NGOs around was the catalyst for 
the mobilization of the old school, but more relevantly, the new school of NGOs, farmer leaders, 
and the mainstream media.  Unlike earlier, these groups now had a real focus and a reason to 
cooperate – a context for solidarity emerged.  This strategic evolution was motivated by two broad 
assertions.  First are concerns regarding the validity of the technology itself – whether or not Bt 
cotton has presented farmers with the benefits purported by both the firms and the state.  The 
assertion is that Bt cotton has not offered broad pest protection, or that is has resulted in higher 
costs to farmers due to increasing amounts of factor inputs in the face of pest resistance, fungal, or 
viral infections.   By extension, the argument follows that yields are low in the face of these 
stressors, and that claims of increased yields were false.  And among farmer leaders in particular, it 
is further argued that in tandem with low MSPs for raw cotton and the effects of globalization, 
there have been massive losses among farmers and unmanageable debt, with agrarian suicide as 
the result.  The connection is that Bt cotton is responsible for the agrarian crisis, suicides in 
particular46.  Such connections are bold to assert, but they were, and much of the public accepted 
these links, creating a fertile ground for doubt and uncertainty. 
 
Second are concerns relating to the lack of regulatory independence.  The assertion is that 
regulatory agents not only represent the state, but also have their own commercial interests – that 
they are “purchasable47”.  Given that some regulators have held, or hold, positions in industry 
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related contexts such as biotechnology lobby groups48; have been, or are, affiliated to institutions 
conducting research in transgenics for ultimate commercial release49; have been overly sympathetic 
to private sector incentives50; or have not used independently verified data in order to arrive at 
biosafety metrics51 or other concerns, their capacity to truly be representative of the public interest 
is suspect.  Risk as biosafety has to interface with a broader series of risk framings put forth by civil 
society agents, and they play out not only with regards to the technical concerns of the hazards of 
Bt cotton, but the political realities that are borne of representation, and the concerns that the 
economics of losing the biotech race do not overpower the implicit uncertainty of the technology.  
In effect, formal regulation has to respond to these concerns, like it or not.  As Kuruganti explains, 
 
the way that we are engaging with the regulators is not to take their mandate as 
[given].  We’re not saying that ‘Yes, you’re right, that’s exactly what your mandate 
is, let us help you with improving it’. That’s not where we are beginning.  We are 
saying.  ‘OK fine, if that’s what you take your mandate to be, we’ll show you where 
you need to improve immediately, because otherwise it has implications for 
livelihoods of farmers52.   
 
Or as Tiwari argues in a letter to the Prime Minister, 
 
I would like to repeat our arguments that babus working in the government and the 
banks are forcing farmers to commit suicide due to the sanctioned relief not 
reaching distressed farmers.  (…)  There is no alternative before the government 
but to raise MSPs this year in order to slow down the suicides53. 
 
In all cases, it is the state that is responsible for the crisis, and they must be held accountable.  This 
occurs in a context where the official state line lauds the potential benefits of Bt cotton and the 
massive potential of harnessing India’s talent and expertise in the “sunrise industry” (Jayaraman 
2005: 481).  As the Prime Minister has stated, 
 
[d]evelopments in biotechnology present us the prospect of greatly improving 
yields in our major crops by increasing resistance to pests and also to moisture 
stress.  Bt cotton has been well accepted in the country and has made a great 
difference to the production of cotton. (…) Subject to these [biosafety] caveats, we 
should pursue all possible leads that biotechnology provides that might increase 
our food security as we go through climate related stress54. 
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On the one hand, new school NGOs and farmer leaders do not trust the science and link it to a dire 
crisis. On the other, the government sees tremendous potential it what it can offer, both to farmers 
but also to the overall growth of Indian industry and prestige.   
 
This is where framings of risk of these two parties interface with one another.  These framings do 
not exist in entirely separate dimensions.  Indeed, common themes run through the framings of 
both parties – technical assessment, economic opportunity, and political balancing.  As I will show, 
the framings are often the mirror reflection of the other.  It is this duality that lies at the root of the 
battle between civil society and the state. Like the other four parties I profile in these four empirical 
chapters, civil society members frame risk in a particular manner, which leads to a particular form 
of regulatory practice.  The implications of this are very real; given these framings and the polarity 
of their relative placement, the battlefield is set.  And regulation as a practice begins to unfold. 
 
4.2.1 Three Framings: Risk Assessment, Precaution, and Representation 
 
The government framing of biosafety as risk is based on an awareness of the potential hazards 
implicit in these technologies.  As depicted in the preceding chapter, the only way to address this 
risk is via a rigorous, but efficient, process of scientific risk assessment.  Interestingly, NGOs and 
farmer leaders also frame risk as biosafety.  But with a difference - the burden of proof is placed 
squarely on the shoulders of the government.  Granted, the government as regulator relies on 
science for the technical side of risk assessment, but embedded within any proof the government 
can provide are political and economic risks that, in the view of civil society, cannot be separated 
from the technical risk. Whereas the government looks to science as being the only real indicator of 
biosafety, civil society considers the process of ensuring biosafety a far more complex process. It is 
one that includes science, but it is also inclusive of the distinct incentive structures that underpin 
the dynamics between the firm and the state.  Political and economic framings of risk cannot be 
ignored.   
 
In the context of NGOs, this burden of proof on characterizing risk entailed is based on the 
precautionary principle55.  By placing the burden of proof on the state to ensure safety, a dynamic 
arises, one where NGOs find their most pragmatic functionality.  From the perspective of those 
NGO members interviewed here, their role is to hold the state accountable for their actions. It is to 
firmly place – or force - the burden of proof within the mandate of the state.  Moreover, it is to 
provoke the state into action where there appears to be lacking evidence or awareness of empirical 
field realities.  It plays out in demanding transparent biosafety assessment as stipulated in the 
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regulations, but goes one step further in demanding the consideration of a richer set of assessment 
criteria not drawn upon by the state, and questioning the scientific capacity of the state to 
effectively gauge biosafety.  This framing is based on the assumption – whether based on scientific 
fact or otherwise - that transgenics in agriculture are an inherently hazardous proposition 
presenting real risks and incalculable uncertainties.  Kuruganti defines her take the incertitude of 
transgenics in agriculture as being rooted in not knowing 
 
(…) whether you’ll get a good crop or not [and] the fact that you don’t know 
whether this is safe to eat or not…I would say the sheer unpredictability of the 
technologies is one of the uncertainties.  For the simple reason that the genes that 
you have inserted seem to be settling themselves – even flowing from the 
technology itself. (…) So, civil society groups don’t just have a potential role to 
play, but I think they have a responsibility in engaging themselves with genetic 
engineering in farming56. 
 
Such a perspective may not be embedded in scientifically established fact, but it does not matter.  
What does matter is how someone like Kuruganti can assert the value of such a view of technical 
risk to a wider audience in order to affect regulatory reform.   
 
The second framing relates to how Bt cotton has been released.  As indicated by the assertions of 
conflicting interests, many civil society actions are focused on exposing linkages between regulators 
and industry.  This occurs in the face of government policy that aims to speed up the process of 
release, potentially at the cost of compromising on both probity and scientific rigour. Risk is framed 
in the context of the economic incentives of the government – it is the forfeiture of integrity.  The 
concerns of civil society are embedded in what the literature refers to as regulatory capture (Stigler 
1971; Posner 1974) and regulatory independence (Moran 2002).  It is reflected in assertions of 
aggressive lobbying, elements of corruption and bribery, conflicts of interest within regulatory 
bodies, and sacrificing regulatory rigour for fast track release. In essence it is a concern that the state 
cannot truly be independent in their assessment. Dr. Pushpa Bhargava, a Supreme Court appointed 
nominee to the GEAC and an eminent scientist in his own right57, recalls that, 
 
[m]any years ago, when the Bt cotton approval was being processed, the GEAC 
was about to approve a strain of Monsanto’s bovine somatotropin (rBST) to 
increase milk [production]. (…) It was approved by the RCGM deputy and then 
approved by the GEAC.  Soon after, an application was filed by LG for genetically 
engineered rBST. (…) However, LG somatotropin was not even approved by 
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RCGM.  And the reason was very clear. LG very clearly said - the correspondence 
was sent to me – they are not willing to pay anything to anyone.  We have copies of 
letters [from LG] saying ‘why aren’t they approving it?’  So you can arrive at your 
own conclusions on what basis approvals are given58. 
 
But, if the state cannot be truly independent in assessing and releasing Bt cotton, who can?  This is 
precisely the space where civil society enters.  And interestingly, their concerns regarding 
regulatory capture and independence mirrors the risk framing of the government in terms of losing 
the biotech race and cutting the red tape.  The difference is how the ultimate outcome is valued in 
terms of what the cost will be. 
 
The third framing of risk is embedded in notions of representation.  Politically, it becomes nearly 
impossible to ignore a public who are sensitized to the potential risks of these new technologies.  
While the battlefield that I will present in detail initially formed around Bt cotton, there was still a 
geographic divide between farmers are their urban counterparts that removed some the relevance 
of the crisis.  Simply put, you cannot eat cotton.  However, you can eat brinjal.  Once the risk 
framings of civil society – the old school, the new school, farmers’ leaders, and perhaps most 
effectively, the media – were more widely projected in the context of Bt brinjal, a once dormant 
urban public began to also question what has happening in the halls of the DBT and MoEF.  
Bolstered by scientific expertise – technical risk assessment as voiced by Bhargava and others who 
appeared to have the credentials to discuss such matters with some authority – civil society began 
to successfully transpose their concerns to a wider public.  The government had to respond. 
 
When a minister takes the initiative to travel around the country to hold public debates, it becomes 
obvious that the issue is no longer in the hands of an expert minority.  Technical risks become 
political capital.  This applies on the one hand to a newly sensitized public, but it is also a function 
of farmers’ leaders also capitalizing on what is happening on the ground as a means to hold the 
government accountable to those they claim to represent.  Just as the media acts as knowledge 
brokers, farmer leaders take on the role of accountability brokers.  They represent the needs of 
farmers to the government and work towards ensuring that these needs are addressed.  And the 
government responds politically by offering concessions to farmers, or by including an anti-biotech 
agenda in their political platforms during election time as a response to a sceptical public.  Yet 
again, this all occurs in a context where farmers have adopted Bt cotton in massive numbers.   
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The risk then is embedded in a political context - that of leverage loss. There is a balancing act at 
play.  Ministers have to appear sensitive to the needs of a growingly concerned public, and farmer 
leaders have to fulfil farmer expectations by generating concessions. But as Tiwari laments, 
 
[t]housands of vehicles of Monsanto are moving around.  Each village has one 
campaigner – they have put a man on salary there.  What can I, Kishor Tiwari, do?  
No one even listens to me. (…)  What can we say; ‘Go to organic farming, go to 
hell?  Do that jowari [millet] farming?’ They’ll say, ‘he’s a chootia man, he’s a mad 
man59. 
 
On the one hand, Tiwari risks losing the support of farmers, and on the other he risks losing the 
attention of the government.  Similarly, someone like Jairam Ramesh, the current minister of the 
MoEF and someone whose relevance in this battlefield will be discussed in much more detail in 
what follows, has to satisfy his electorate for the sake of the political party he is affiliated with.  But, 
he also has to ensure that he does not alienate the rest of the ministry.  There is a large section of the 
MoEF – the current director Ranjini Warier included – that is in favour of transgenics in agriculture.  
A balance needs to be struck, and this is the job of a broker. 
  
These framings of risk are based on a series of very traceable events.  In what follows I will detail 
exactly how these framings have both been applied and have gained currency among wider 
networks, thereby affecting regulatory evolution in the ongoing story of Bt cotton.  The next section 
sketches the battlefield, a fascinating account of how a multitude of parties who often might never 
engage with one another found themselves addressing new issues and navigating new risks.  Over 
the course of the battlefield description, a series of questions will arise.  How have civil society risk 
framings been made manifest in action to hold the government accountable? How have they 
projected their risk framings to the broader public as a means to broaden who demands 
accountability?  How does the projection of this framings characterize and catalyze the iterative 
process of formal regulation as policy?  And ultimately, is regulation policy, or something far more 
complex and inclusive? 
 
4.3 The Battlefield 
 
After three years of working in Greenpeace, it suddenly dawned on me that the 
best strategy to stop something in this country is to make it more complicated. 
Because that is exactly what happens anyway. (…) [S]ome third person with a new 
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angle [enters], and actually confuses the entire debate a little more - stirs it out of 
proportion.  So, actually, if you really want to delay something, stop something, 
ensure public participation before it moves ahead, what you really need to do is 
make it murkier, make it dirtier, make it more difficult for people to wade through, 
bring in more people so its impossible to get consensus, things like that.   It’s just a 
statement of the way things happen around you and its part of how we live - I’m 
not saying it’s a bad thing.  We’ve seen it as something that we need to use60. 
 
Divya characterizes the strategy that has driven formal regulatory reform to date quite succinctly.  
The aim is to frustrate the process of release by using judicial means of accountability to force the 
government to react.  There are three phases that best characterize how NGOs and farmer leaders 
have pursued this aim, delineated by three distinct events.  First is the release of Bt cotton itself in 
2002, but more importantly the two to three years after release.  This post release period allowed 
NGOs and farmer leaders to collect empirical data on the performance of Bt cotton to strengthen 
their future arguments. Second is the introduction of the RTI Act in 2005. This piece of legislation 
radically changed what kind of information NGOs, farmer leaders, and the media had access to, 
further buttressing their arguments.  Third is the 2009 GEAC approval of Bt brinjal and the 
subsequent - and ongoing - debates that have surrounded its release.  As a food crop, it has 
significantly changed the level at which all four parties I consider operate.  But civil society in 
particular have capitalized on the uncertainty that surrounds its release, among both the general 
public, but with scientists and a number of regulators as well.   
 
A direct quote from a Court order written by Rodrigues sums up the overarching sentiment from 
an economic risk perspective well.  She argues that caution is required, given that: 
 
(…) India is faced in the present, with an unprecedented, full scale onslaught of GE 
crops thrust on our nation by a deeply errant, irresponsible Regulator. (…) [I]f the 
GEAC is allowed to continue in its current course of an implacable determination 
to approve GM crops no matter the consequences, without a proper assessment of 
the unique hazards that the GE process presents, India’s food chain and the 
environment will be irreversibly contaminated (…) [T]he concerns with Genetic 
Engineering and its handling in India have reached such a crisis that it can no 
longer be entrusted to a Regulator that is betraying the national trust61. 
 
Strong words indeed.  However, impassioned pleas aside, a countering framing of risk from a 
farmer perspective is impossible to ignore: Bt cotton has been adopted in large numbers.  Though 
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the uncertainty of long term pest resistance and the incorrect deployment of the technology at the 
farmer level are concerns, high adoption rates would seem to indicate success rather than failure.  
As C.K. Rao, head of the industry friendly Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education 
argues, "[NGOs] have already lost the battle over Bt cotton - the only GM crop grown in India - and 
they know if they lose over Bt brinjal they lose the war62."  There is an urgency that surrounds these 
activities, borne of ideological construction, of risk framings, of a whole narrative that places Bt 
cotton as a threat to sovereignty, identity, and a whole way of life.  In effect, the only way to 
safeguard these concerns are to stop release. 
 
Yet in my view, the question is not whether or not civil society can stop the release of Bt cotton or 
any other transgenic crop technology, as I would argue they cannot.  The incentives for firms to 
capitalize on massive demand from farmers are too alluring, and the government – though with its 
share of detractors and sceptics – is very much in favour of transgenics in agriculture.  Rather, the 
question is twofold.  First, how have civil society used formal, judicial instruments as enshrined in 
their legal rights to ensure that the government is doing their job - the business of releasing 
transgenics - and addressing the crisis?  Second, how has civil society captured the imagination of 
the broader public via non-judicial means to forge preferences that the state and firms are forced to 
respond to?  It is the interface of risk framings – biosafety as scientific evidence vs. biosafety as the 
lack of scientific evidence, regulatory efficiency vs. regulatory capture, and the political risks of 
alienating an electorate - that characterize the conflict that arises when these risk framings collide.  
Regulation emerges as the overarching process of these interfaces. 
 
4.3.1 1998-2005: Catalysts and Consolidation 
 
The story begins in 1998 with a new partnership: Monsanto purchases a 26% stake in Mahyco, and 
Bt cotton field trials conducted in forty locations over nine states.  This is the standard entry point 
into any historical discussion on Bt cotton in India.  However, running in parallel with this is 
another series of pivotal events revolving around NGO and farmer leader mobilization against Bt 
cotton.  1998 is the year that sees these organizations rallying for Monsanto to quit India and to 
‘cremate’ them, and where activists from the Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha (KRRS) set a trial plot 
of Bt cotton in Karnataka ablaze.  Another partnership is struck in different, but no less pressing, 
mutually shared interests – Vandana Shiva finds an ideological connection with Nanjundaswamy 
of the KRRS (Madsen 2001: 3738).  In light of the trial plots and concerns regarding whether or not 
they have been undertaken according to the rules, the RFSTE publishes a report based on data on Bt 
cotton trial plots across five states, concluding that the RCGM should not gave given permission as 
 101 
the trial sites were large scale and required GEAC approval, that SLCCs and DLCCs were not 
functioning, and that Mahyco did not follow the guidelines in terms of formal biosafety guidelines.  
Already a distinction is formed between NGOs and farmer leaders, and the distinct tools they use 
to address their concerns – one in the courts and the other in farmers’ fields.  It is the urban and 
rural divide made manifest, characterized via a modality to oppose.  These differences render the 
partnership between RFTSE and KRRS a short one63. 
 
In 1999, the RFSTE formalizes the conclusions of the 1998 report on “experimental“ trial plot 
violations by submitting a writ petition to the Supreme Court64.  This is the first legal petition filed 
in the context of transgenics in India, and the Court decides that Mahyco has indeed violated the 
1989 Rules.  Trial plots cease for the time being, but the regulations are amended to allow the 
RCGM to certain authorize experimental trial plots in the future (MST 1998)65.  This appears to be a 
concrete response to the RFTSE petition (Ghosh 2000; Gupta 2002), the first instance of an technical 
risk interface unfolding in a judicial arena and affecting policy.  However, it is short lived; one year 
after the RFTSE petition, ICAR seeks permission for limited trial plots of domestically produced Bt 
cotton66, which is granted, though in line with the new amendments. Trials recommence for the 
2000-01 growing season67.   
 
On the non-judicial front, another spate of trial plot arsons occur in 200168.  In Maharashtra, Kishore 
Tiwari finds his future calling and forms the VJAS, and back in Delhi, the DBT announces that Bt 
cotton should be commercially available by March 200269.  Meanwhile, farmers in the state of 
Gujarat have quietly sowed over 10,000 hectares of illegal Bt cotton70.  Inquiries are launched with 
both the DBT and civil society demanding answers as to why, though at its core are economic risk 
framings; farmers want to capitalize on a new technology, and formal regulations based on 
technical risk assessment have absolutely no relevance to that calculus.  
 
In March 2002, the GEAC formally releases the first transgenic technology in India - three varieties 
of Bt cotton (ISAAA 2005). The mobilization against Bt cotton begins in earnest.  Six months later, 
India decides to ratify the Cartegena Biosafety Protocol71, and soon after RFTSE files a new appeal 
to the government and Mahyco in the context of the release72.  The appeal, which built on their 1999 
petition, argues that the precautionary principle was violated; that the decision was “not based on 
any direct information or data collected from the ground level through testing or evaluation by any 
independent authority”, and that field trials were conducted in an “unscientific and unsafe 
manner”.  The MoEF responds by arguing all tests have been conducted according to the existing 
regulatory framework.  Technical framings of risk assessment do not mesh as the state argues the 
rules were followed.  The courts agree, and the RFTSE appeal is rejected after eight months73.   
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In farmers’ fields however, economic risk framings rule.  The technology is in high demand; 
farmers have been crossing state lines to get their hands on the technology74, though reports begin 
to emerge regarding the varieties not being “up to the mark” and subject to leaf-curl virus75.  A 
body of farm level experiences are documented by NGOs, an exercise that will inform much of the 
debate in the years to come.  2003 continues with claims and counter-claims of the ongoing 
experiences with Bt cotton by both NGOs and firms, based on the growing empirical evidence of 
farm application.  Articles are published arguing that Bt cotton allows for 43% to 80% yield 
increases and a 72% to 83% reduction of pesticide use (Qaim and Zilberman 2003; Bennet et al. 
2004). The Qaim and Zilberman article is widely contested both by NGOs and other scientists in 
terms of the methodology and the fact that Mahyco data was used in the analysis76.  New forms of 
knowledge begin to enter the realm of debate, enriching the scale of contestation and forging new 
spaces of battle; NGOs release their own studies, concluding on between 15% to 35% lower yields 
in Bt cotton compared to non Bt cotton (Sahai and Rehman 2003; Qayum and Sakhari 2002: 32). 
 
In late 2003, Suman Sahai organizes a conference that brings together industry representatives, 
regulators, and civil society members to discuss the relevance of transgenics in Indian agriculture, a 
unique and unprecedented event given the breadth and diversity of the participants.  Twenty 
recommendations are submitted to the DBT; however, they are essentially ignored77.  The state has 
their own view of the future as framed by their own economic risk constructions, and what Sahai 
compiles just does not mesh.  Gene Campaign changes tack.  Changing the interface from economic 
to technical framings of risk, and using judicial means to force accountability out of the state, the 
organization files their first writ petition challenging the 1989 Rules on the basis of lacking technical 
competence among regulators, lacking transparency of the regulatory process; lacking public 
participation in decision making processes; and lacking accountability and liability stipulations 
should transgenic technologies cause accidental harm78.  The petition bases the call for transparency 
on a 2003 court ruling to an earlier RFTSE submission, which argues that 
 
(…) the Right to Information and Community Participation necessary for 
Protection of Environment and Human Health is an inalienable part of Article 21 
[of the constitution]. (…) The government and the authorities have to motivate the 
public participation by formulating the necessary programmes79. 
 
The Gene Campaign petition remains in the courts to this day, though it has since been clubbed 
together by the Supreme Court with later petitions that I will discuss in what follows.  
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Meanwhile, the situation on farmers fields still remains unclear - there are a series of seemingly 
conflicting reports, and it is very difficult to gauge how Bt cotton is really performing. On one hand, 
Bt cotton seed sales are up 500% from 2003 to 200480, the government states cotton yields have 
increased 23% since the release81, and more zonal areas are approved for Bt cotton cultivation.  
Mahyco reports that demand for the technology has risen 660% across six states, publishing a peer 
reviewed study concluding that Bt cotton increases yields by 60% and reduces pesticide 
applications from three to one spray82.  On the other hand, a district manager of Mahyco and eight 
government officials are held hostage in exchange for compensation of INR 15000 an acre due to the 
poor performance of Bt cotton83, NGOs argue that pesticide costs have increased 690% due to Bt 
cotton adoption84, and in Andhra Pradesh, farmers attack and vandalize seed stalls demanding 
compensation for low yields85.  A paper in Current Science published by CICR scientists states that 
the protection offered against the bollworm are “ (…) inadequate to confer full protection” (Kranthi 
et al 2005: 291), which is capitalized on by Gene Campaign86 and prompts a series of questions to 
the MoEF regarding why Bt cotton was released in light of the CICR study87.  Yet it the face of these 
contested realms of knowledge, the rollout continues.  Fourteen transgenic vegetable varieties are 
approved for field trials88, and CICR works with an agricultural university, the University of 
Agricultural Sciences (UAS) Dharwad, towards the commercial release of the first domestically 
engineered Cry1Ac expression event.  The first Indian Bt cotton variety to be developed in India is 
on its way89.   
 
Up to this point, the evolution of the Indian story of transgenics is both impressive and confusing.  
In a seven year period – between 1998 and 2005 - India had evolved from a country with nascent, 
untested regulatory frameworks and no commercialized technologies, to a country boasting 
multiple commercially available varieties of Bt cotton, a wealth of new technologies in the pipeline, 
and a plan to completely reconsider how these technologies should be regulated based on the 
Mashelkar and Swaminathan reports90.  But it is not really clear how the technology is truly faring 
on the ground.  The battlefield is framed by NGOs reporting wide scale failure, while the firm and 
government trumpet fantastic successes.   
 
Performance aside however, with the exception of the RFTSE petitions and the resultant 
modification of the Guidelines, one aspect of the story is clear: NGO actions are limited for the most 
part to producing their own reports, and voicing their concerns of lacking transparency in the 
regulatory process91. As the courts are considering petitions, there is little in the way of any action 
that commands a more explicit response from the state, and for the most part the state and industry 
considers the opposition as more annoying than anything of any real concern.  As K.R. Kranthi, 
senior scientist at the CICR puts it, “I earnestly hope that the meaningless hullabaloo raised over Bt 
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cotton by the NGOs comes to an end soon and that a brilliant technology such as Bt cotton, which is 
state-of-the-art in eco-friendly cotton pest management, will be improved further and stabilized in 
good varieties and hybrids so as to ensure a pesticide-free, profitable, and sustainable cotton pest 
management [strategy] in India92.”  Non-experts are deemed clueless and a nuisance.  However, 
this perception is forced to change when a piece of legislation is introduced that dramatically alters 
the entire scope of what civil society can be capable of in terms of how relevant scientific expertise 
really is in matters of policy. 
 
4.3.2  2005-2009: The RTI and the First Wave of Litigation 
 
There was Vandana Shiva who put the broad debate out there, (…) then there was 
KRRS who had burnt down fields and stuff like that – they’d done a lot of it.  But a 
lot of it was anti globalization, anti Monsanto, that kind of thing. (…) In that sense I 
thought it was a bit difficult for us, because we had to say that ‘no we are not 
saying its Terminator, we agree its not, but it’s still transgenic, these are the 
concerns’.  So in fact some of the NGO and activist propaganda about what’s 
wrong with GM - a lot of it we didn’t want to share.  We thought a lot of it was 
black and white; it is a lot more nuanced than that.  So in that sense we had a tough 
time saying ‘no, we want to debate with you on this point, and that point, and that 
point’93. 
 
Raghunandan’s perspective renders explicit how she sets the new school apart from the old.  
Moving away from class based politics, the new school is focused on direct engagement, on fighting 
fire with fire.  If the state is focused on technical risk assessment, then the only way to counter that 
is to speak their language; to contract out scientific expertise and to force it to be recognized, and 
most relevant here, to use judicial means of accountability to force that recognition.  Up to 2005, the 
story can be summarized as follows: firms claim massive sales, the central government claim yield 
increases, farmers – depending who and how you ask – are either ecstatic or infuriated with it, and 
NGOs and farmer leaders uniformly claim the technology ineffective and the government incapable 
of performing the duties as stipulated in the regulations themselves.  But to date, there is little in 
the way of concrete milestones that civil society could claim.  Regulation was evolving along the 
lines of the Mashelkar and Swaminathan reports, more and more Bt cotton and other transgenic 
technologies were being released and tested, and firms were entering the market, eager to capitalize 
on the demand of farmers.  However, the next few years present a number of significant milestones, 
premised on newly enshrined legal rights.  
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In tandem with the evolution of the regulation surrounding transgenics, a draft bill on freedom of 
information is introduced in 1996, which evolves towards the Freedom of Information bill in 200094. 
The rationale is premised on a constitutional right: 
 
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights to free 
speech and expression. The prerequisite for enjoying this right is knowledge and 
information. (…) Therefore, the Right to Information becomes a constitutional 
right, being an aspect of the right to free speech and expression, which includes the 
right to receive and collect information. This will also help the citizens perform 
their fundamental duties as set out in Article 51A of the Constitution. A fully 
informed citizen will certainly be better equipped for the performance of these 
duties (MoIB 2000: 2). 
 
In June 2005, the Right to Information Act is introduced, and new government bodies are formed to 
manage it – the Central Information Commission (CIC) in Delhi and State Information 
Commissions at the state level95.  To date, it is the cornerstone of how civil society has addressed 
their concerns with transgenics. While farmer leaders make a call for a ban on Bt cotton and a 
moratorium on any further approval of transgenics96, echoing pre-2005 strategies, NGOs take the 
call an entirely new level.   
 
First, Aruna Rodrigues97 files a writ petition towards the Supreme Court three months after the Act 
takes effect.  Building on the writ petition submitted by Gene Campaign in 2004, the petition 
highlights a number of concerns; that regulators used data provided by firms and these firms were 
conducting the biosafety assessments themselves, creating a clear conflict of interest; that test 
results were not publicly available; and that without a transparent, independent, credible and 
publicly accessible system of testing for biosafety and environmental hazard, the precautionary 
principle was being violated. This last assertion was argued in the context of India’s recent 
ratification of the Cartegena Biosafety Protocol.  A number or RTI submissions are sent and 
responded to, providing a basis for her arguments.  Economic risks as framed by the new school of 
NGO begin to force their way into formal policy spaces. 
 
Second, their framings of technical risks also begin to make their way in. In February 2006, Divya 
Raghunandan of Greenpeace files a request under the RTI to the DBT with the aim of seeking 
information on three accounts: a list of 2005 farm field trial locations; toxicity, allergenicity and any 
other relevant data on transgenic brinjal, rice, mustard and okra; and RCGM meeting minutes98. 
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This RTI submission proves to be a key factor in the years to come in the context of Bt brinjal. One 
month later, the DBT releases field trial data, but withholds the biosafety data and minutes, citing a 
section within the Act that allows for confidentiality in cases where information might compromise 
“the competitive position of the third party99.”  Raghunandan appeals twice over the next four 
months interpreting the same section in the Act a having an exception in cases where the “public 
interest” may be compromised100.  Third, Gene Campaign files four RTI submissions seeking 
information with regards to, among other things, the status of SBCCs and DLCCs and all copies of 
all government correspondence leading to the approval of Bt cotton101.  Within six weeks, most of 
the information requested by Gene Campaign is released102.  At this point, the similarities between 
all three petitions are not lost on the courts, and over time they are often addressed together, with 
the petitioners sharing strategies and results103.  All three petitions are premised on technical risk as 
framed by the precautionary principle and the economic risks of vested interests overtaking 
regulatory efficiency. 
 
Meanwhile at a more local level, in Maharashtra, Tiwari files a petition against the state 
government arguing that the farmer suicides are the result of an infringement on Article 21 of the 
constitution relating to the right to life and liberty.  He argues that, while the state government 
promoted Bt cotton in 2005, the technology had failed to protect against pest attacks; that the 
Maharashtran government had not regulated the proliferation of "bogus" Bt cotton seed and that 
Monsanto is liable for compensation under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission; and that the negligent firms selling spurious seed are being given protection by the 
state due to mutual financial interests104.  Six months later, the first Prime Minister’s relief package 
is released105.  Political risk framings also begin to force entry, though not by judicial means – it is a 
function of political pragmatism and opportunity.  Bolstered by this success – though clearly due to 
a number of combined factors – Tiwari surges ahead.  He succeeds in getting a state High Court 
decision mandating full disclosure of who exactly was to receive package benefits from the 
government of Maharashtra, based on a petition he filed earlier106.  Soon after, he sends a letter to 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demanding a complete loan waiver and a fixed MSP of INR 2700 
per 100kg107, and another letter to Sonia Gandhi requesting a 30 billion rupee “mobilization fund” 
to be given to the Maharashtra government; a rise in the cotton MSP to INR 3000 per 100kg; a hike 
in cotton import levies to 60%; and a subsidy to farmers who grow food crops as a substitute for 
cotton of INR 1000 per acre.  He closes the letter by requesting Gandhi to “change the Prime 
Minister of India and Chief Minister of Maharashtra, as both are too hostile to continue in office in 
order to save the farmers of Vidarbha108.”  Tiwari is a busy man. 
 
Back in Delhi, the scene is similar.  The Supreme Court presents an interim order in mandating all 
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ongoing field trials to be approved by the GEAC, and not the RCGM as in the past109.  Not one to 
rest after an initial achievement, Rodrigues immediately files another interim application - upping 
the ante considerably - and demands that all field trials should cease.  She passionately states that 
while the court “deliberates on the PIL before it, if the GEAC is allowed to continue in its current 
course of an implacable determination to approve GM crops no matter the consequences, without a 
proper assessment of the unique hazards that the GE process presents, India’s food chain and the 
environment will be irreversibly contaminated and in perpetuity (…) by a whole range of GM foods 
(as opposed to animal feed like Bt cotton), which are planned and are in the ‘pipeline’, a situation 
not faced by any other country110.” 
 
The urgent tone of her submission to the courts was not entirely rhetoric; between May and 
September, the GEAC approves field trials for 24 new transgenic technologies111.  In September, the 
Court meets her halfway.  While not inclined to stop field trials, the court considered it “(…) 
appropriate to direct the GEAC to withhold the approvals [of further field trials] till further 
directions are issued by this Court on hearing all concerned112.”   Science still is in charge from the 
courts perspective, as it is seen as the most objective means to address these contested realms of 
knowledge.  On May 8 2007, the Court allows the GEAC to conduct field trials again, but only for Bt 
cotton, and with particular stipulations to counter concerns of pollen flow, contamination, and a 
very low metric for acceptable detection of transgenes in the context of export, contamination, and 
labelling113.  In response to this limitation, a subcommittee constituted by the MoEF to review the 
implications of the Court directions considered the stipulations and recommended that “they may 
be dispensed with114”.  This reflects a certain arrogance, one that is based on economic need – 
research cannot just stop – but also a sense that the courts, in the view of the MoEF, are incapable of 
grasping the technical limitations of what they propose.  A space emerges, and Rodrigues responds 
quickly – she files a contempt of court order115.  She argues that: 
 
[t]he GEAC is well aware that its approvals in the 78th and 79th GEAC Meetings of 
LSTs of Bt brinjal, field trials of [other] GM food crops and [additional trials of] Bt 
cotton [all] contravene this Hon’ble Court’s Orders, [and] that its pre-determined 
stance that GM crops benefit society is inappropriate in a Regulator that must be 
properly sceptical of a technology that is recognized in science to be hazardous116. 
 
It is a unique situation. The trials are technically illegal, yet they continue.  Meanwhile, nearly a 
year after Raghunandan’s RTI submission, the CIC decides in favour of her arguments and 
mandates the DBT to release the RCGM minutes and biosafety data (CIC 2007), a landmark 
judgment.  Though it takes time; the DBT, after much reluctance and resistance from Mahyco, takes 
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two years to release the Mahyco dossier.  In August, frustrated by the limits placed on further 
research and development, the GEAC files a request to the Court to modify the May order on the 
Rodrigues submission and allow further trials given the challenges in meeting the court mandated 
requirements117.  The Court deliberates.  
 
Meanwhile in Vidarbha, Tiwari remains busy.  He is nominated for CNN-IBN’s Man Of The Year 
award on the basis that “(…) he ensured that the Prime Minister stepped in to help Vidarbha’s 
farmers118.”  The crisis begins to get both domestic and worldwide attention.  A political bank of 
capital accumulates.  Former President A.P.J. Kalam visits a number of suicide widows in Yavatmal 
district in June, accompanied by Tiwari who had sent him correspondence on the crisis.  He spends 
twenty five minutes with them, and when he asks the women if they have benefited from the PM 
package, they say no.  Kalam states he is “(…) disturbed and will raise the matter with the officers 
concerned at the Centre and the State119.”  Later that year, Tiwari files a petition toward the 
Maharashtra high court demanding a higher MSP for cotton120. The High Court responds to his 
petition, stating that “(…) existing schemes, including the special relief package, had actually ‘failed 
to stem the farmers’ suicide’121.”   
 
Behind all of this, political parties see an opportunity.  While a number of separate studies have 
been commissioned since 2004 by the government to try to understand the crisis, the leader of the 
state opposition says “[t]his Congress-NCP government is only buying time with another study 
panel”, with Tiwari concurring “[w]hat’s the use of setting up more committees when the state 
government is not even half serious about implementing any of the earlier recommendations122?” 
Five months later the central government releases a massive INR 600 billion as a loan waiver 
package for farmer owning less than five acres and having formal bank loans, seen by some 
observers as a pre-emptive strategy to the national elections that will occur in a year.  It is 
unprecedented - a “new deal” for farmers as termed by Prime Minister Singh – and one that 
accounts for 1.7% of India’s GDP at the time123.  Tiwari criticizes the move, citing that 40 million 
farmers will not benefit given they source credit from informal moneylenders or own more than 
five acres.  He concludes that “[i]t’s a lose-lose proposition. This will not relieve farmers’ 
distress124,” as “[m]ost of the Vidarbha region is rain fed and the farmers here hold more than two 
hectares of land, which makes them ineligible to benefit for the loan waiver125.”  He frames the 
waiver as a political tool reflective of the Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar’s home base – 
western Maharashtra – where more farmers will be eligible for relief under the package terms.  The 
political nature of the risks involved begin to become paramount at the local level, but they 
resonate along all levels of governance given state and centre linkages.  The government reacts with 
formal policy, but the urgency is borne of political risk, something far removed from the technical 
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risks that were the catalyst.  The interfaces begin to have their effect across these spaces, and the 
battlefield becomes populated on a variety of sides.    
 
Meanwhile, back in Delhi, the Court passes a verdict that finds a middle ground of sorts.  On the 
one hand, it requests the GEAC to include two prominent scientists, P.M. Bhargava and M.S. 
Swaminathan as the special invitees to the committee, interesting choices to say the least126.  On the 
other hand, it also relaxed the earlier verdict and allowed the GEAC to undertake new field trials, 
stating “it was very difficult for the Court to entertain PILs in high-stake technical issues as [the 
Court] had no expertise in the field, more so because the government had put in place an expert 
body like GEAC127”. While Swaminathan chooses not to attend the meetings128, Bhargava takes full 
advantage of the opportunity, much to the chagrin of the GEAC who, after six months, file a 
request to the court to get Bhargava off the GEAC.  They cite his “(…) giving a distorted picture of 
the regulatory system which has been evolving during the last two decades as a dynamic process 
keeping in view the developments taking place worldwide in the regulatory process and products 
in pipeline”; his reporting to the media on “(…) sheep deaths rather than on the scientific evidence 
and reports submitted by the scientific institutions on the issue129,” and his unwillingness to 
maintain any element of confidentiality130.  Political and technical risks mesh, and the courts are 
forced into new spaces where they have little expertise.  The delay tactics championed by the new 
school of NGO are working well indeed. 
 
At the time of this writing, Bhargava is still a court mandated invited expert, though without a vote. 
“[H]e is welcome to make his observations on the cases that come up in subsequent meetings. The 
committee will take his views into consideration but the law that is laid down will be followed131."  
The Court ordered inclusion of Bhargava raises the stakes of the game higher, and also raises 
Bhargava’s profile in the ongoing debate.  Over the years that follow his tenure at the GEAC, 
Bhargava continues to raise significant concerns regarding the efficacy of the regulatory system 
given his unique perspective as a trained and recognized professional scientist familiar with formal 
scientific risk assessment procedures.  He argues loudly that studies are not being completed or are 
based on private sector data and not verified independently132; that the institutions mandated for 
the testing are not equipped for the required tests133; and that the GEAC has selectively 
summarized conclusions for the public and not the actually test data134.  But he uses his technical 
risk assessment capacities politically as well, and he will play a crucial role in the next two years. 
 
In mid June 2008, the DBT drafts the NBRA Bill135 and welcomes feedback until the end of the 
month136.  Concerns begin to arise within the both schools of NGOs regarding how it will interface 
with existing laws137, in particular state sovereignty over agriculture138; and whether or not the 
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reallocation of certain articles in the existing framework will jeopardize their applicability139.  
Additionally, they argue that no liability system is referred to in case of accidental release and 
harm, and that elements of public participation as referred to in the Cartegena Biosafety Protocol 
are missing140.  The NBRA remains in gestation. 
 
In Vidarbha, the situation escalates. Tiwari takes an “I told you so” stance – he notes that with 
regards to the waiver package, INR 57 billion is disbursed to farmers in western Maharashtra, while 
farmers Vidharba have only received 5 billion, claiming “(...) it is a mockery of the dying farmers of 
Vidarbha, as only ten per cent of the total debt of Rs. 5876 crore (58 billion) is waived and 80 per 
cent of the distressed farmers are excluded from the waiver scheme141.” He stages a rally 
demanding “fresh crop loans” in light of his assertion142.   Echoing Tiwari’s earlier demands, the 
centre raises the cotton MSP to INR 3000 per quintal for the 2008-9 season, yet this proves difficult 
to maintain in practice143.  Continuing on his 2006 petition seeking information on the nature 
package disbursement, he returns to the High Court arguing that the website set up by the state as 
a response to his demand for transparency does not contain the relevant information.  Adding to 
the original petition, he further demands among other prayers, that “guilty officials for the offences 
[be punished under Section 306, 409, 420 & 120 (B) of Indian Penal Code” given their culpability in 
agrarian suicide; that INR 50,000 be given to each suicide effected family “without any disparity or 
choose & pick policy”; and that “the State [takes] appropriate action against the Bt cotton Seeds 
companies” for not providing compensation directly to farmers themselves144.   
 
His political acumen is hard to ignore.  Tiwari travels to Mumbai to hold a rally with a number of 
suicide widows aimed to coincide with the Prime Ministers visit to the city145, and leads a massive 
rally in Pandharkawada attended by 10,000 farmers146. Prior to the state elections, the government 
of Maharashtra releases a new bailout package of INR 62 billion and mandates much of the use in 
line with Jadhav’s report.  Tiwari remains unimpressed, and states that “[i]nstead of targeting most 
distressed farmers of Vidarbha, the new package once again is inclusive for all regions [in the state], 
even areas which deserve no government largesse147,” namely western Maharashtra. By the end of 
2008, Tiwari notes that “(…) as many as 4,850 farmers have committed suicide during the four year 
tenure of the Congress-NCP Democratic Front (DF) government in Maharashtra from 2004 to 
2008148,” the highest in the country. Despite over 800 billion rupees being sanctioned to date, the 
crisis remains149.   
 
And yet, in the face of all this, the state tops another list.  It has highest acreage sown with Bt cotton 
in the country.  By the end of 2008, Bt cotton – now in its second iteration as BGII - remains wildly 
popular150.  While NGOs, farmer leaders, and the media begin to fight it out in earnest, it appears 
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that farmers are not terribly concerned with any of this, as long as those concerned with political 
capital continue to offer them financial concessions, and as the adoption rates indicate, new 
varieties of Bt cotton.  
 
4.3.3  2009-Present: From Cotton to Brinjal 
 
Unlike Vidarbha, in urban India the debate to date has taken place more in the courts than in the 
public realm.  The stakes are different.  The litigation makes the papers, but it is unclear who 
among the public, outside of civil society and an interested minority, feels any impact of the debate 
on their daily lives.  This soon changes. Almost two years after Raghundnan files her 2006 RTI 
application, the Supreme Court orders the GEAC to comply with the CIC directive.  In April, the 
Court demands that all biosafety data on Bt brinjal is to be released to the public151, and in four 
months, the Mahyco dossier is released152.  This flusters Mahyco; they argue release of the data 
compromises their commercial interests as stated as a qualification for withholding information in 
the RTI itself, but the CIC disagrees153.  The decision and the data are both welcomed by 
Greenpeace India.  Over the next two years, the technical data – all 1,100 pages of it154 – is digested, 
shared, and deliberated upon by a wide variety of scientists, both within India and outside.  It will 
play a crucial role in the years to come as a context for contested technical realms of knowledge and 
risk framings to play out and interface with political and economic framings. 
 
Urban, middle class residents begin to get more involved.  The Coalition for a GM Free India begins 
their ‘I Am No Lab Rat’ campaign on Bt brinjal in New Delhi, which begins with a mass protest in 
Delhi, a candlelight vigil in Chandigarh, and a petition of 2,000 names addressed to the prime 
minister indicating peoples concerns with Bt brinjal155. Similar protests begin to sprout up in other 
areas156, and two Mumbai based filmmakers release a documentary called “Poison on the Platter157” 
which has extensive interviews with Bhargava “(…) about loopholes in the approval process and 
faulty safety data submitted by MNCs158.”  The documentary receives mixed reviews and but 
provokes strong reactions among the many people who view it159.  Public opinion on the issue is 
further catalyzed. In the face of all this however, firms are unmoved.  Mahyco and industry lobby 
group the National Seed Association of India report they are “(…) hopeful of getting approval for 
the commercial release of Bt brinjal seeds from the GEAC by end of the next financial year160”.  It is 
business as usual; the firms have faith in the economic risk framings of farmers, citing the figures 
surrounding the massive adoption of BGII among farmers as evidence. 
 
Back in the Court, two rejoinders are filed by Gene Campaign on a September 2008 petition on field 
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trials and a moratorium seeking more information from the MoA, MoEF, and DBT161; two months 
later Gene Campaign files a new RTI submission on the import of LMOs, complementing the earlier 
RFTSE petition.  The issue is a recent iteration of the 1989 Rules allowing the import of “processed 
food items derived from Living Modified Organisms”162. The RTI application sought clarity on why 
the MOEF did not “publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing 
the decisions which affect public [health]163” before amending the Rules, along with a request for all 
relevant information that led up to the special order164.  Later, Greenpeace India discover 
unauthorized transgenic corn in “Doritos” brand corn chips.  The chips are sold at a south Delhi 
upscale grocery store in an area frequented by wealthier, middle class urban consumers.  After 
filing numerous RTI applications, they argue that official permission was not granted for the 
import, and that the sale violates the Rules165. 
 
Outside the courts, the scene evolves further.  The broader public begins to get more involved and 
is subject to more stimuli, further catalyzing opinion.  150 protesters are arrested during a rally in 
front of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU), an agricultural college where field trials for 
Bt corn and brinjal are occurring166, a brinjal festival is organized in Bangalore167, and another rally 
is organized by Greenpeace under the theme Monsanto Quit India at an agricultural college in 
Maharashtra where additional Bt corn trials are in progress.  The university states, “transgenic trials 
will no longer be conducted on its land168.”  As catalysed by the new school of NGOs, public 
sentiment begins to affect the capacity to conduct the technical risk assessment that the formal 
regulators require, further delaying the process. 
 
At the same time, and after four years of development, India’s first domestically developed Bt 
cotton OPV is formally released – Bt Bikaneri Nerma169.  Tiwari pans it, stating that the “white 
elephant research institute” ICAR and “paper tiger baby” CICR should not be trusted in light of 
“(…) our experience with Monsanto’s Bt cotton [being] too bad to believe in any more desi Bt 
cotton170.”  In May, the court again addresses the Gene Campaign and Rodrigues petitions, now 
considered together. The court remains sceptical, and states “GM seeds could possibly be a means 
to eradicate hunger and poverty. Poverty is probably more dangerous than the side-effects of GM 
seeds”. Still, it asks the government to submit a response to the NGO call for an independent 
authority – The National Centre for Assessment of GMOs – with regards to testing171.  In the courts, 
deliberation is still premised on technical risk, though the impetus for the assessments are very 
much premised on the new school of NGO asserting their own technical risk framings in judicial 
spaces. 
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As national elections loom, the political realm of risk framing emerges more strongly.  The 
historically right and left parties also enter the debate, sharing a common platform.  The BJP and 
the Communist Party both issue statements indicating an opposition platform towards transgenics, 
unless “full scientific data on long-term effects on soil, production, and biological impact on 
consumers” is provided, along with promising incentives for organic cultivation and a strict 
labelling regime172, something that the current Congress coalition is wary of in light of concerted 
lobby efforts to counter labelling.  Political opportunities are forming in the context of the polarized 
debate, and corresponding political risk framings present an obvious means to further political 
ambition. 
 
At this point, another key event occurs.  The MoEF gets a new minister, Jairam Ramesh.  Ramesh 
has a history of being more sceptical of transgenics in agriculture than some of his peers seem to 
be173.  In his first press conference, he states that he  
 
(…) is not gung ho on GM foods. Should we promote Bt brinjal? [The] jury is still 
on and I am not sure. (…) I do not see a great urgency for Bt brinjal [but] I see a 
very strong case for Bt cotton174. (…) In fact, I would treat Bt cotton different from 
Bt foods. For Bt cotton, we should have a statutory comprehensive assessment to 
recollect our experience with it.  Its success and its impacts need to be studied175. 
 
He straddles the line between the classic technical framing of risk as biosafety on the one hand, but 
as time passes, he begins to capitalize on public sentiment and fear as fomented by media reports.  
Ramesh’s scepticism becomes critical in ten months time, though some parties involved are initially 
sceptical of his capacity to do the job176.  His cautious approach appeals to NGOs177, but also mirrors 
a recent admission by the Planning Commission that transgenics in food may hurt India’s capacity 
to supply export markets preferring non-transgenic products, though Bt cotton still holds 
promise178.  Ramesh, at this point, is just doing his job; he is a politician, balancing technical, 
economic, and political risk framings and ensuring to the best of his ability that he satisfies all 
relevant stakeholders.  Though he is often championed as a ‘green’ by the new school of NGOs and 
others in the ‘movement’, it is worth noting that he also was a key player in India’s move to a 
liberalized economy in the early 1990s.  His a master of balancing political priorities, and it would 
be naïve to characterize him as necessarily partial to any ‘movement’. 
 
Meanwhile, the CSA organizes a conference entitled "GM Crops/Food and Health Implications" 
that includes international scientists who have conducted studies revealing potentially negative 
outcomes of transgenics, including Bt brinjal.  Based on their analysis of the Mahyco dossier, a 
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number of scientists - both Indian and foreign - and a number of government representatives, plead 
for caution in introducing Bt brinjal in India179.  Greenpeace polls 4,000 people and concludes 98% 
of those polled are averse to consuming food containing transgenic technologies180, and organizes a 
protest in Andhra Pradesh against a Bt rice field trial.  The protest results in the arrest of 35 
members of the public and the press, but protestors feel that “it was an honour to be part of the 
battle”, and that 
 
[t]he father of our nation, Mahatma Gandhi led by example and showed that some 
citizen rights are not to be negotiated. (…) The right to safe food is one of them. We 
must demand from our government to be responsible and be on the side of citizens. 
I don’t think anyone in Hyderabad wants GM biriyani181.   
 
A stronger sense of solidarity within the movement emerges.  And as long as the views of the 
public are made clear to those in power in the context of technical risk as voiced by local and 
international experts, political risk framings will ensure compliance to their end objective; to 
frustrate and delay release.  More mobilizations occur.  On the eve of World Food Day, a number of 
citizens meet in Delhi under the aegis of the ‘I Am No Lab Rat’ campaign.  The organizer urges 
“(…) all Indians and especially Delhi’ites to assert their right to safe food and write to the Prime 
Minister of India through the website www.iamnolabrat.com to ensure the government takes a 
policy decision against such hazardous technologies in our food systems182.”   
 
However, as all of this occurs, the situation in laboratories and the GEAC seems far removed; at this 
stage, there are 238 varieties of 56 transgenic crops at different stages of trials in India183. The MoA 
states in July in parliament that transgenic tomato, brinjal, and cauliflower will be released within 
the next three years184, with Swaminathan characteristically saying the right things at the right time 
to the right audience. He states that “[t]here is no scientific evidence to prove any [biosafety] 
concerns as real [given] commercialization of transgenic crops over the past ten years in the 
world185.”  
 
Finally, after six years of research, TNAU announces it has successfully developed Bt brinjal186.  
One month after the TNAU announcement, the GEAC approves its commercial release - India’s 
first transgenic food crop187.  Crucially however, and in a departure from recent approval events, 
Ramesh overrules the decision the next day, stating that the government “will have a series of 
consultations with scientists, agriculture experts, farmers’ organizations, consumer groups and 
NGOs” in early 2010188.  It is a bold move, but one that seems to reflect both a clear sentiment of a 
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growing section of society, but more pointedly, Ramesh utilizing framing of risk and adopting this 
contested realm of knowledge strategically in policy form.   
 
A number of NGOs oppose the GEAC release189, farmer leaders seek a meeting with the prime 
minister and plan to “launch a country-wide agitation to create awareness about transgenic food 
crops190”, former union ministers urge the prime minister to not allow the release191, and the state 
governments of Orissa192, Kerala193, Tamil Nadu194, Chhattisgarh195, and Madhya Pradesh196 issue 
statements indicating either their opposition or desire to ban it outright, though subject to the 
political manoeuvres that accompany any agriculturally related policy decision at the state level.  
One minister goes as far to argue that “GM crops are the latest version of the way East India 
Company colonized India197”, echoing the nationalist neo-colonial sentiments that framed the 
narratives of older social movements, though adopted and adapted for new technologies.  
 
Conversely, pro-industry representatives such as C.S. Prakash pledge their support towards Bt 
brinjal, asking people to write to Ramesh urging him to release it198, and TNAU199 and UAS 
Dharwad200 report that Bt brinjal “ (….) offers agricultural produce free from pesticide residues. We 
believe that the success story of cotton will repeat in Bt brinjal as well201.”  It is a clear response to 
growing public scepticism about the “toxins” in Bt brinjal and their effects on human health.  
However, such admissions from scientists of what appear to be fact - depending what one reads of 
course - seem to fall on mostly deaf ears amongst an increasingly sceptical public202. The firm 
responds to a successful transposition of civil society risk framings to a broader public by lobbying 
Ramesh.   
 
Public opinion has been fully catalyzed, and a battle ensues for all to see.  There are two clear 
camps; scientists and central regulators who are in favour of release, and NGOs, farmer leaders, 
some state governments, and other scientists who oppose it.  The press captures the entire debate 
with glee, with Bhargava as both scientific expert and new school NGO pin-up being an oft-quoted 
source of scepticism.  He states that 
 
[t]he reports and statements put out by GEAC have been, many times, factually 
incorrect and full of inconsistencies. (…) [I]t will not stand independent scientific 
scrutiny anywhere203. (…) I got the [second Expert Commission (EC2) report on Bt 
brinjal] in hand on Monday, October 12, and the very next day [the GEAC] met in 
Delhi. Hurriedly after that, they went public before we could properly go through 
it and raise any objection. (…) [I]t carried out the entire procedure in favour of the 
multi-national companies involved204. 
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Bhargava capitalizes on his unique position, with the media only too happy to quote him, and the 
new school of NGO rub their hands together in delight.  Meanwhile, the battlefield gets more and 
more populated, and more soldiers emerge.  More farmer organizations205 and a new entrant, the 
church206, state their concern and opposition to Bt brinjal.  A letter writing campaign for citizens to 
write Ramesh, the Prime Minister, and Sonia Gandhi begins207.  The Deccan Development Society 
organizes a community meeting with a number of stakeholders, including Rodrigues, T.M. 
Manjunath, who has had various links to industry208, and M. Pimbert, programme director of 
London-based research NGO, IIED and former principal entomologist at ICRISAT209 in Karnataka.  
The Kerala Biotechnology Commission organizes a similar meeting with both local and 
international civil society representatives, along with a representative of the private sector210.  
 
Yet while a broader public become increasingly interested in the debate, both the firm and the 
government continue full steam ahead with research on transgenics.  In November, Monsanto India 
announces plans to release Bt corn in India by 2012-13211.  The central government announces an 
intention to improve the productivity of pulses given the large amount currently imported and the 
yield benefits that transgenic pulses can provide212.  It argues “India cannot oppose the use of 
technology if it wants to increase yields and manage the present agricultural crisis. The crop 
shortage of key food grains had led to a rise in prices of some food commodities such as sugar and 
tur [pigeon pea] dal this year. (…) The country needs to take scientific and practical steps to 
improve productivity and bring down cost of production. The GM technology is one way to 
achieve this213.”   
 
All throughout the story up to this point, the risk framings of the government - to do the science, 
cut the red tape, manage opposition – and most important at the end of the day, to win the race – 
have not changed that much.  The NBRA and its formulation is a clear reflection of this.  The 
industry is not terribly bothered with anything but the bottom line, and they know the government 
is on their side.  But this is only because, to this point, those who make the decisions have toed the 
same line.  There has not been any real, effective opposition to ensuring a future where the 
promises of the sunrise industry remain intact, apart from the delay tactics employed by the new 
school NGOs.  Risk framings to this point have been fairly static within the halls of the MoEF and 
MST.  The reason is that there has been no real political incentive to shift away from these risk 
framings as reflected in policy narratives.  The public, while increasingly sensitized to the debate, 
have no reason to doubt the efficacy of the capacity of the state – aside from the status quo of babu 
raj – to manage these risks.  Moreover, no one apart from livestock eats cotton.  And cows do not 
vote.  As a result, no minister would put his or her career at risk to divert from the stated objective 
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of bringing Indian agriculture into the future in the name of progress, science, and pride.  But, this 
is all about to change.  
 
First, reports emerge that the chair of the EC2 commission on Bt brinjal succumbed to pressure 
from the "(…) Agriculture Minister, GEAC and the industry" to approve Bt brinjal, and did not 
conduct eight of the required tests, as narrated over a phone call to Bhargava214.  It is covered 
extensively by the press, and NGOs claim they finally have the basis to bolster their claims of 
corruption and conflicting interests within the regulatory hierarchy – the economic risk of forfeiting 
integrity in the context of “winning the race”215.  Second, and immediately after this story leaks, 
Ramesh announces his plans to visit seven cities to hold stakeholder meetings on Bt brinjal between 
January 13 and February 15, 2010216.  It is yet another unprecedented event – a union minister 
personally going on a country wide tour to gauge the reactions and perspectives from a wide range 
of citizens on a hotly debated topic.  His rationale, however, is elegantly simple.  He states that, 
 
[s]trong views have been expressed on the Bt brinjal issue, both for and against. My 
objective is to arrive at a careful, considered decision in the public and national 
interest. This decision will be made only after the consultations process is complete 
and all stakeholders are satisfied that they have been heard to their satisfaction 
(MoEF 2010: 2). 
 
It is the political risk of losing leverage made manifest.  Suddenly, what once were static risk 
framings on the part of the government seem to be shifting, reflecting a wider cache of framings. 
 
Over the next month, the entire debate on Bt brinjal - and transgenics in general - ramps up to yet 
an entirely new level.  The consultations are characterized by protests outside the minister’s tour 
venues against Bt brinjal, with firms occasionally bussing in landless labourers acting as farmers to 
counter these voices by loudly singing the praises of it.  The strategy backfires, and seems specious 
to begin with given that Bt brinjal is not being commercially grown in the first place217.  Inside, 
some attendees claim that Ramesh is “an agent of Monsanto218”, prompting Ramesh to nearly leave 
on several occasions219.  In Hyderabad, Ramesh does not even get a chance to speak as massive 
protests surrounding the visit make it impossible220.  In Bangalore, a consultation attendee alleges 
that Ramesh has commercial interests in his capacity to authorize release, to which Ramesh 
responds with uncharacteristic frustration; “I want to talk to people from the health sector. I’m 
sorry, I don’t want to talk to [mental] health patients. Please leave221.”  In Bangalore, a former 
Managing Director of Monsanto India states his position on Bt brinjal during the consultation; a 
firm no, qualified by his assertion that “private companies only have profit in their mind when 
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introducing new technologies222.”  He adds later that the problem lies with the GEAC, and their 
being “completely bogged down by Monsanto223”, and that in the past, 
 
the Central Insecticide Board was supposed to give approvals based on the location 
and crop-specific data from India (…) [b]ut simply accepted foreign data supplied 
by Monsanto (…) and, at times, the data itself was faked. (…) I retired from the 
company as I felt the management of Monsanto, USA, was exploiting our 
country224. 
 
The lines between scientist and civil society seem to be getting blurred as risk framings are being 
both transferred and challenged in public spaces.  Contested realms of knowledge are driving new 
processes and outcomes that, due to the very public interfaces that a minister has initiated, are 
changing the direction that policy was meant to go.  All of this makes for great copy.   
 
On the periphery of the tour, the scene is somewhere between chaos and creative inspiration.  NGO 
representatives and the Kerala Minister of Agriculture fast in protest225, rallies, marches, and 
speeches are conducted in the lead up to the debates in most cities226, effigies of the GEAC are 
burnt227, 10,000 aubergines are cooked towards making the world’s biggest baingan bharta228, 
activists visit markets in cities where the tour visits dressed as giant aubergines229, the leader of the 
RSS - between stating how Christians should stop converting Hindus and how young RSS cadres 
should promote nationalism - states his opposition230, and a Tamil ‘Tollywood’ docudrama on Bt 
brinjal is scripted, shot, and released231.  Farmer leaders are involved as well given the profile of the 
event; Jawandhia claims farmers are now “on the warpath232”, and Tiwari writes to the 
Maharashtra Chief Minister, pleading that “(…) the genocide after [the] introduction of Bt cotton in 
this region is very important and one can’t ignore this serious aspect when we talk about food 
security and food safety. Hence opposition to Bt brinjal from Maharashtra is a must and the state 
government should not work under pressure from the agriculture minister Sharad Pawar, who is 
very close to Monsanto233.”  The industry responds as well; Kiran Mazumder-Shaw – silent until 
this point - declares her support for Bt brinjal234, and the FBAE and Shantaram organize counter 
“protests” where they present information regarding the safety of Bt brinjal235 and submit a series 
of 21 recommendations to the central government on why it is safe for release236.  Conversely, 
another former US government official questioned the need for Bt brinjal in the first place, and cites 
India’s lacking capacity for proper testing237.  Even spiritual leaders238 and yoga gurus239 have a go.   
 
The stakes seem high, and everyone has an opinion.  The battlefield is at its height of activity, and 
on the sidelines, the view depicts regulation - as a process.  Technical risk assessment is a concern of 
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everyone involved, but there is no consensus on it, and if anything, the stated objective of the new 
school of NGO has always been to complicate matters to ensure consensus can never be attained.  
That has worked.  Regulatory efficiency is similarly compromised, as it appears that the GEAC has 
been colluding with Monsanto all along, thus throwing the balance of regulatory efficiency vs. 
capture off.  And of course politically, Ramesh has either derived major benefits from it, or serious 
doubts from his tour, depending who you ask.  According to Bhargava,  
 
[t]he minister knows very well that Bt brinjal will have harmful effects on people’s 
health. Either he can be a hero in the eyes of those opposing launch of Bt brinjal by 
stopping its launch, which, in all probability will lead to his ministerial portfolio 
being taken away from him, or he can overrule his conscience and allow Bt brinjal 
and then probably he could gain a promotion to Cabinet’s ministerial berth. Now, 
it is left entirely to him what decision he takes240. 
 
Swaminathan on the other hand speaks of the situation with reference to scientific and economic 
risk.  He recognizes the regulatory challenges and alludes to the limited data that regulators have 
shared with the public, stating that “[e]very technology has its benefits and risks. But it all depends 
on our capacity to analyze risks and benefits. We must analyze whether risks are more or benefits 
are more. There should be an authority to analyze the risks and benefits in a transparent way. 
Unfortunately, we don’t have an authority like that241.”  Clearly, the risk framings of civil society 
have pushed their way into official narratives, and beyond narratives, actual precedence.  This 
reality of regulation as a practice, as a battlefield, as a consequence of contested realms of 
knowledge. 
 
The Court still hums with activity.  The Rodrigues and Gene Campaign petitions are heard again 
over the course of the tour, and the Court mandates the legal counsel for the government to come 
back in four weeks with additional information on the adequacy of GEAC field trial biosafety 
procedures.   The bench opines that 
 
[i]n other parts of the world, when they frame a rule or regulation, it is strictly 
adhered to. They are very, very strict against those who breach it. But, here [in 
India] we are generally slack. The rules are only in the book. Hence, [I want to 
know] (…) how these safeguards and the protection mechanism are being 
implemented242. 
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There is an overarching theme here that reflects a certain acceptance of how India cannot be seen as 
inept relative to “other parts of the world” that drives the opinion of the bench, but this runs 
concurrently with a desire to ensure accountability as enshrined in legal stipulations is met.  From 
his perspective, there has to be scientific evidence to justify release – he is reading the regulations, 
and is bound to them as a legal arbiter, but is torn between contested and contradictory risk 
assessments, most written in a language he cannot understand.  Outside the courts, a similar 
strategy is used.  To further bolster their case, seventeen foreign scientists and twenty-four NGO 
representatives submit two letters to the PMO – similar to the letters that now form annexes to the 
NGO petitions in front of the Court - countering a previous letter that Prithviraj Chavan, Minister 
of Science and Technology, had sent to the Prime Minister earlier.  Chavan’s letter quotes 
paragraphs of reports authored by the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA), a biotech industry promotion group, funded and supported verbatim and 
presents a wholly positive outlook for transgenics in India243.  The NGO letters provide an 
alternative framing of the science, referring extensively to articles concluding potentially negative 
outcomes of the technology244.  Finally, at the state level, the political risks begin to trickle down 
from the centre.  The debate begins to take on a politically strategic tack in these spaces as well245, 
and by the end of the tour, thirteen states voice their opposition to Bt brinjal246. 
 
What happens next was something that not only those in India, but outside India, were waiting for.  
On February 9, Ramesh holds a press conference.  He declares a moratorium on Bt brinjal. 
 
[W]hen there is no clear consensus within the scientific community itself, when 
there is so much opposition from the state governments, when responsible civil 
society organizations and eminent scientists have raised many serious questions 
that have not been answered satisfactorily, when the public sentiment is negative, 
and when Bt brinjal will be the very first genetically modified vegetable to be 
introduced anywhere in the world and when there is no overriding urgency to 
introduce it here, it is my duty to adopt a cautious, precautionary principle-based 
approach and impose a moratorium on the release of Bt brinjal till such time 
independent scientific studies establish, to the satisfaction of both the public and 
professionals, the safety of the product from the point of view of its long-term 
impact on human health and environment, including the rich genetic wealth 
existing of brinjal in our country (MoEF 2010: 16)247. 
 
Ramesh’s words are almost a mirror image of the Raghunandan quote that this section began with.  
If her aim was to “make it more complicated”, she certainly succeeded.  Consensus on the science – 
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which was framed by DBT officials interviewed here as having the capacity to generate bipolar ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ conclusions – was impossible to achieve.  The multiple framings of risk that were at the core 
of this battle rendered consensus a pipe dream.  However, while the delay she sought was 
achieved, immediately after the conclusion, scientists at the National Research Centre on Plant 
Biotechnology express their interest in releasing Bt brinjal with expressing Cry1F as opposed to 
Cry1Ac, and pursue licensing arrangements with five domestic firms248.  And, in May, the GEAC 
approves 17 new proposals249, the highest in over a year250.  It is not that the biotech train has 
stopped, it’s just been delayed by a red flag a few stations up. 
 
Ramesh still puts his faith in science, but at the same time, he has adopted the precautionary 
principle as a guiding narrative.  His conclusion reads like a classic political statement meant to 
appease all.  This is the result; political risks dictate outcomes.  The science is vague, the economics 
are mirror images of one another, but politics resonate when it really comes down to it.  And the 
kind of politics that emerged could only have happened in the context of a technology with no clear 
value of what technical risk assessment really means.  The uncertainty generated processes that 
were the result of contested spheres of knowledge in the face of multiple risk framings.  These 
processes, more than any single technical risk assessment or even management, are the hallmarks 
of co-evolutionary processes of regulation. 
 
4.4 Unity, Urgency, And Uncertainty: Regulation In Practice 
 
The first war was in 1857 which we lost; the second one we won and got 
independence. We would have had to fight the third war of independence if Bt 
brinjal cultivation was given the go-ahead. We needn’t fight it now. (…) The 
biggest lesson is that we showed up the people who are trying to sell our country.  
Another lesson is that in the end, truth always wins251. 
 
Bhargava’s battlefield pits national independence against the introduction of a new technology, 
ostensibly developed to assist Indian farmers.  This is a strong sentiment, but it is also confusing in 
light of how successful Bt cotton has been, both in terms of the numbers, but also the sentiments of 
farmers that I have lived with.  Where did this come from?  Why would Bhargava say this?  And 
what truth is he referring to?  It seems to reflect a certain nostalgia for the old school of NGO 
campaigning.  But that is no longer as relevant.  I would argue that rather than  
‘truth’, what always ‘wins’ is uncertainty.  If no one really knows what will happen when 
something like Bt cotton or brinjal or any transgenic technology for that matter is introduced, then a 
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co-evolutionary process where no one really agrees but political realities dictate policies that reflect 
pragmatic needs is what takes over.  But, this can only occur when there is a unified social 
movement underlying and promoting the scale of the uncertainty, framing the risk in terms of 
urgency.  There has to be space where solidarity can articulate these assertions using judicial and 
non-judicial tools.  This is what has happened in India to date.  
 
If regulation is forced to account for the preferences and risk framings of civil society, then what 
role do the original risk framings of the government play?  Do they become irrelevant?  Or are they 
merely adapted?  I would argue that by virtue of the democratic rights that citizens have, they have 
to adapt.  They are responsive, iterative concepts that, given the underlying uncertainty of Bt cotton 
and other transgenic products, have to adapt to a wider cache of risk framings if they are to be 
considered legitimate.  But this is only true if there are underlying legal frameworks that can 
support the assertion of these other risk framings, and only if the public becomes sufficiently 
motivated to voice their concerns.  Civil society is capable of both, but only in spaces where such 
voices are constitutionally protected and valued.  India is one such space.  Almost as a mirror to 
this however, the current evolution of the NBRA seems to have utilized all civil society efforts to 
date as signals, as cues. Regulators seem to have merely observed what civil society did, took notes, 
and drafted new legislation ensuring such barriers do not occur again. Though independent risk 
assessment is demanded by civil society, the final formulation of the NBRA – or its analogue - 
remains to be seen at the time of this writing. 
 
However, civil society is not alone in asserting their risk framings and negotiating the interface with 
government risk framings. Throughout the battle, firms have essentially remained aloof, distant, as 
observers to the chaos of the battlefield.  But that is only because they fight the battle in a different, 
less public space.  Just as civil society has forged links with parties outside of India to further their 
agenda, the same can be said for the private sector.  The difference, however, is in the direction of 
the linkage.  While civil society sought out international experts to assert their framing of risk and 
hold the government accountable, the firm has welcomed international actors asserting their risk 
framings onto Indian firms and regulators, with policy – as influenced by these risk framings - 
taking root.  The next chapter will address this in detail. 
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Endnotes: Chapter 4
                                                
1 There is a fifth that I have not included here – industry friendly organizations like the CII, FICCI, AIBA, FBAE, and ABLE.  
I relegate my more critical discussion of these entities in the next chapter where I discuss the private sector. 
2 In 2006, Sahai chaired the Planning Commission sanctioned “Task Force on Biodiversity & Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs)”  The mandate of the task force was to “[r]eview the current laws, policies, procedures and practices related to 
conservation and sustainable use of agro-biodiversity and proper management of GMOs and recommend correctives,” and 
to “review the institution and individual capacities available to address issues related to conservation and sustainable use of 
agro-biodiversity and proper management of GMOs and recommend how they may be adequately strengthened.”  Refer to 
“Recommendations of the Task Force on Biodiversity & GMOs: Assessment in the Environment and Forest Sector for the XI 
Five Year Plan (2007-2012)”, Planning Commission, November 2006. 
3 Refer to http://www.genecampaign.org.  Sahai occupies a somewhat special place in my evolution as a researcher.  When I 
went to meet her for the first time in 2002, she encouraged me in my shifting interests at the time – away from economics 
and more into regulation, into farm realities. She gave me office space, read my proposals, and was highly influential in 
shaping my post graduate interests.  She straddled an interesting line; when I first met her, she would scoff at those who 
reduced the ‘debate’ to being ‘for’ or ‘against’ transgenics in agriculture.  I thought it was fantastic; she seemed so pragmatic 
and grounded.  But more recently, she has pledged allegiance to being ‘against’, something I found personally quite 
surprising, and actually kind of depressing.  I had always admired her for being somehow above the simplistic divisions that 
a hotly debated subject like transgenics presented.  Perhaps it is a consequence of the broader debates that have evolved over 
time.  I am not really sure.  She’s complicated. 
4 Interview, S. Sahai, Convener, Gene Campaign, New Delhi, 12 May 2007. 
5 “Nukes in favour, crops downgraded”, India Together, 8 April 2006. 
6 Refer to http://www.navdanya.org and http://www.vandanashiva.org. 
7 There are a large number of scientific studies cited within these submissions.  Some of the most common have been Aysun 
and Akaya (2007); de Vendômois et al (2009); Gurian-Sherman (2006); Pusztai et al (1990, 1995, 1999), Seralini et al (2009); 
Tabashnik et al (2010). 
8 The Coalition for a GM Free India is a group of 45 NGOs and individuals (including Shiva and Sahai) that formed in 2007 
around a common concern regarding the nature of transgenic field trials in India.  Refer to 
http://www.indiagminfo.org/contacts.htm for a full membership list, and http://www.gmfree.org for additional 
information on their activities. 
9 This is not to be confused with the government mandated MEC, but the civil society “MEC” consisting of Adivasi Ekta 
Sangathan, AKRSP, CEAD, Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, Grameen Vikas Trust, Greenpeace India, Jan Saahas, Kheti 
Virasat Mission, Krishnadevaraya Rythu Sankshema Sangam, Krushi, MARI, Navajyothi, Pasumai Tayagam, Prasun, 
Rashtriya Satyagrah Dal, Sampark, Sarvodaya Youth Organisation, SECURE, VASPS and YUVA.  The choice of the same 
acronym as the RCGM governed MEC is perhaps strategic.  In her rejoinder to the response to her initial Writ Petition, 
Rodrigues argues “…[t]hat on 4th March 2005, GEAC held its 52nd meeting where it was agreed that until an alternate 
mechanism for monitoring large-scale trials is established; these Bt trials could be monitored by the MEC.”  The GEAC 
minutes she refers to are clearly referring to the RCGM governed MEC, not the civil society “MEC” coalition. It’s unclear if 
this confusion was deliberate to further confuse lawyers and cause additional delays or whether it was a sincere error.  Refer 
to Rejoinder Affadavit on Behalf of Petitioners, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 260/2005, p.39 and “Decisions taken in the 52nd 
Meeting of the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) held on 4th March 2005.”, MoEF, p. 3. 
10 Interview, D. Raghunandan, Greenpeace India, Bangalore, 22 May 2007. 
11 Vedanta refers broadly to the philosophies contained in the Upanishads, which, over the course of 200 texts, discusses the 
interplay between atman (the self) and the universal spirit (Brahman).   
12 Interview, K. Tiwari, Pandarkhawada, 15 March 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/4-1. 
13 “Kishore Tiwari: An Encyclopaedia on information on suicides in Vidarbha”, Times Of India, 23 December 2008. 
14 Interview, K. Tiwari, VJAS, Pandarkhawada, 15 March 2009. 
15 “‘Farmers have no hope from this Budget too’”, Business Standard, 9 February 2007. 
16 Tamasha is Hindi for an act, or a play. 
17 Interview, K. Tiwari, VJAS, Pandarkhawada, 15 March 2009. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “‘Farmers have no hope from this Budget too’”, Business Standard, 9 February 2007. 
22 Tiwari has been blogging actively since July 2006.  Refer to http://vidarbhajanandolansamiti.blogspot.com, 
http://vidarbhacrisis.blogspot.com, http://kishortiwari.blogspot.com, and http://andolan.blogspot.com. 
23 Many mainstream press articles are often published within days of Tiwari publishing a blog article.  In one example, 
Tiwari writes 74 words on a reduction of the cattle population in Vidarbha, and another the following week quoting the Gita 
on the importance of cows.  Two weeks later, the Times Of India runs an article on how the cattle shortage is linked to the 
crisis and quotes Tiwari heavily.  His blogs are influential. Refer to “Save Cow - Save Vidarbha”, http:// 
vidarbhacrisis.blogspot.com/2009/06/save-cow-save-vidarbha.html, “Why protect cows?”, 
http://vidarbhajanandolansamiti.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-protect-cows-srimad-bhagavatam.html, and “No water & fodder forcing 
farmers to sell cattle”, Times Of India, 25 June 2009.   A similar pattern emerges from Tiwari’s press releases on agrarian 
suicide.  There are a wealth of articles published both in India and abroad that refer to his blogged statistics; I have only 
followed those over the course of the fieldwork that informed this research.  See for instance, “4 more funds-starved farmers 
die”, Times Of India, 3 August 2006; “105 farmer suicides in August”, Times Of India, 31 August 2006; “Hope has withered for 
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India’s farmers” Los Angeles Times, 11 August 2006; “Aid group: 105 Indian farmers committed suicide in August after failing 
to repay loans”, Associated Press, 3 September 2006; “India farm suicides hit new high”, BBC News, 4 September 2006; “One 
farmer committing suicide every five hours”, Hindu, 7 September 2006; “Indian farmer suicides ‘touch record”, Reuters, 3 
September 2006; “When death comes first in vidarbha farm sector”, DNA India, 23 September 2006; “10 more Vidarbha 
farmers commit suicide”, Hindustan Times, 17 October 2006; “Farmers suicides in Vidarbha touch 1,000”, Hindustan Times, 
22 October 2006; “Nine more Vidarbha farmers commit suicide”, Hindustan Times, 7 October 2006; “ 8 Vidarbha farmers 
commit suicide in two days”; Deccan Herald, 3 November 2006; “10 more farmers commit suicide in Vidarbha”, Hindustan 
Times, 17 December 2006; “Dark side in India’s economic boom”, Chicago Tribune, 11 December 2006; “Farm activists call for 
emergency measures”, Times Of India, 30 December 2006; “3 farmers commit suicide in Vidarbha”, PTI, 1 November 2007; 
“Vidarbha farm crisis claims 1,016th life this year”, Hindustan Times, 12 November 2007; “‘Relief for farmers virtually 
stopped’“, Times Of India, 18 December 2007; “Seven Vidarbha farmers commit suicide in new year”, Hindustan Times, 5 
January 2007; “13 more farmers commit suicide”, Times Of India, 10 January 2007; “Five more farmers commit suicide in 
Vidarbha”, Hindustan Times, 18 January 2007; “Free trade to blame for farmer suicides: Activist”, Times Of India, 30 January 
2007; “Nine farmers end lives in Vidarbha”; Hindu, February 4, 2007; “`Farmers have no hope from this Budget too`”, 
Business Standard, 9 February 2007; “One more farmer kills self in Vidarbha”, Times Of India, 15 February 2007; “11 more 
Vidarbha farmers commit suicide”; Outlook India, 27 February 2007; “Vidarbha package is a sham: VJAS”, Deccan Herald, 11 
February 2007; “64 suicides in Feb. ‘07 alone”, Asian Age, 23 February 2007; “Vidarbha sits on a suicide volcano”, Times Of 
India, 25 February 2007; “Chidambaram neglects suicide belt”, Hindustan Times, 28 February 2007; “How many deaths will it 
take till the state government knows?”, DNA India, 20 March 2007; “The reality behind the relief”, DNA India, 29 March 2007; 
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CHAPTER 5  
ROBIN HOOD AND THE LOBBYIST GO TO MARKET: THE FIRM AND 
REGULATORY PRACTICE 
 
The industry has had its head in the sand for the past ten years, ignoring the anti-
GM industry.  They thought it would all blow over.  But if we are not willing as an 
industry to go to the stage where this battle is being fought, how are we going to 
win?  The industry thinks there is too much at stake, there is too much invested in 
the technology, and they don’t want to rouse public suspicion.  Already the public 
doesn’t like multinational companies and profiteering, and we can’t win a fight 
against those who are fighting in the name of patriotism.  But what is the 
alternative1? 
 
A battle that has to be won; this is where the narrative on how the private sector looks at Bt cotton 
stands in a post Bt brinjal moratorium context.  Just as there was an urgency that framed civil 
society movements and forced entry into spaces of contested knowledge, there emerges a 
consequential urgency from the private sector.  The above quote from Shantu Shantaram, the 
current head of the Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE), a biotech industry lobby 
group, is telling.  He could not have imagined how the process that he helped facilitate – the 
adoption and adaptation of Indian policy from USDA frameworks - would have evolved into 
something far different from the technical risk assessment and management strategies contained 
within those initial directives. As he alludes to, it is only now – post Bt brinjal and the moratorium – 
that it has become impossible to ignore how successful civil society has been in transposing their 
risk framings to a wider electorate. 
 
However, it was not always like this.  There is a deeper narrative at play here, and an evolutionary 
trajectory that has historically linked state and firm together given their often shared risk framings.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the environment was conducive to this partnership as it was a strategic 
objective of the Indira Gandhi Congress administration.  More recently, the National Biotechnology 
Development Strategy envisioned a future where regulatory efficiency is paramount.  As this 
chapter will illustrate, private sector actors – both Indian and foreign - had much to do with making 
that narrative operational.  As invitees into that deliberative space – often due to lacking technical 
expertise on the part of the government, but also given a pro-business climate within this space – 
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they were able to craft a policy environment conducive to their own framings of risk.  However, an 
unexpected fork in the road emerged.  The risk framings of the firm and state – while still in sync at 
a basic level – have diverged due to the political capitalization of the state on a broader cache of 
civil society risk framings.  The Ramesh moratorium clearly indicates this.  Civil society narratives 
and framings have forced their way in given the dynamic of political risks, and the status quo has 
changed, perhaps forever.  This is the consequence of technologies burdened with uncertainty, 
played out in a battlefield where risk framings oppose each other.   
 
At what point did the private sector begin to respond to a wider public outside those who purchase 
their the technologies they invest in and develop?  There was – and is - a risk of alienating an 
already suspicious Indian public who historically has been sceptical of big business (Kochanek 
1971: 867), and anyone who enters the battlefield promoting foreign technology runs the risk of 
being labelled as anti-Indian, particularly given the nationalist sentiment that is linked to the civil 
society narratives I discussed in the preceding chapter.  However – and this characterizes the risk 
balance that is to be struck – there is just too much money to be made.  The illegal release of the 
Navbharat 151 variety of Bt cotton before the official 2002 GEAC release is a clear indicator of this 
incentive, but that incident also depicts how the actions of one (small) firm can render formal risk 
assessment and management completely irrelevant.  In the face of these very real incentives and the 
massive adoption rates that Bt cotton has presented, how could the private sector just wait on the 
sidelines until it all, as Shantharam puts it, “blows over”?   
 
5.1 The Stage 
 
Short answer: they could not, and they cannot.  The market is too lucrative.  The numbers speak for 
themselves, with one observer noting that the “7,000 crore (70 billion) rupee Indian market for 
agricultural seeds is the fifth largest in the world.  Of that, roughly Rs. 2,000 crore is the market for 
cotton seeds2,” and another arguing that India is poised to become the world’s largest producer of 
cotton by 20153.  This all occurs in a global marketplace worth USD 7.8 billion4.  Incentives to ensure 
that an environment is firm friendly applies to all the different types of players in the industry; 
multinational companies (MNCs) like Monsanto and Syngenta, their partners in the public and 
private sector such as Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, the major Indian players such as Rasi, 
Metahelix, and Avesthagen, and the many smaller firms, like Navbharat. It is a diverse sector, rich 
with dynamics that reflect influence, capacity, but most importantly, the interfaces all these actors 
have with a broader public.  And these interfaces apply not only to the other actors I detail in this 
story, but within the industry as well.  
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To begin with, and as dealt with in much detail in the literature, the economic liberalization 
programmes of the Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao administrations of the early 1990s set the 
scene for major changes in terms of how the private sector can conduct business.  If the time 
immediately post independence saw policy embedded in a pro-science Nehruvian vision that was 
“anti-business” (Timberg 2004: 4324), followed by a shift in the 1970s towards a more pro-business 
agenda, the 1980s was where the environment really began to change.  There was a shift in how the 
state and the firm could collude and share a common goal, forged on meshing framings of risk 
based on an explicitly crafted space for the firm and the state to collude, though mostly behind 
closed doors.  This formed the basis for a particular culture that emerged in the early 2000s – ‘India 
Shining’ - that is relevant here.  However, contrary to the oft repeated causal linkage between 1991 
economic liberalization and India’s growth, a more rigorous economic analysis has shown (Basu 
and Maertens 2007; DeLong 2001) that growth was more a consequence of the policies and 
corresponding business environment that emerged out of Indira Gandhi’s tenure in the 1980s. 
During her tenure, there were efforts to ensure that business and government elites were working 
in tandem.  A number of observers have argued that rather than a “promarket strategy”, what 
really was the catalyst for India’s growth post 1991 was a “probusiness strategy” (Kohli 2006; 
Rodrik and Subramanian 2004:4; Timberg 2004) – an informal contract between the firm and state - 
as opposed to market liberalization alone. As the chairman of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), a long established lobby group frames it, their was (and is) 
ambition for “public-private partnerships” forged on the belief that industry and the private sector 
should both “be part of the decision making”5.  
 
The stage was set for a very lobby friendly environment, something that the story that will unfold 
in this chapter will further develop as a context.  Collusion between the state and the firm created a 
fertile environment for industry friendly policy formulation in the early days of biotech regulation, 
and, up to a point, firms were quite content with the situation.  Yet, this all began to change in the 
face of what the previous chapter discussed.  When civil society framings began to seep into the 
halls of governance, many firms were forced to react.  The same applies when the central 
government became aware of the massive illegal sowing of Navbharat 151 in Gujarat, a process 
facilitated by what has been termed the “Robin Hood of biotechnology” (Shah 2005: 4634), 
Navbharat Seeds. But what did the firms do, and how did it effect regulation?  What were these 
reactions by firms, and how do they relate to the incentives and risk framings of both the firm and 
the government? 
 
This chapter will explain in more detail what firms did in the context of a co-evolutionary path of 
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regulatory evolution rooted in risk interfaces.  As in the preceding two chapters, the analytical 
framework is one of risk framings as the basis for the interface.  The incentives to capitalize on 
farmer demand; the effects of globalization characterized by that initial import of Bt cotton by 
Monsanto, but also bilateral trade agreements; a certain nationalist fervour to lead and be 
recognized; and the changing policy and political landscape that both civil society groups and 
Ramesh fomented all characterize this evolution.  Yet, at the same time, the long-term strategy of 
the firm remained intact.  India still presents a huge market for farm inputs and new technologies, 
and everyone involved in the business of regulation – domestic and multinational firms, scientific 
experts who look at transgenics as the holy grail of poverty alleviation and food security, policy 
makers aiming to modernize Indian agriculture, and, as I will discuss in more detail in the next 
chapter, farmers themselves - know this.  However, the battlefield here is forged in a space where 
other parties not traditionally included in the biotech industry and those it supplies and end users 
have entered.  And as a result, strategies have changed in the face of the corresponding clashing of 
risk framings when other parties contesting these spheres of knowledge enter the battlefield of 
regulation.   
 
I what follows, I will present a sketch of who the players are.  The ‘firm’ is certainly not a 
homogenous entity; there are different types of private sector agents, all entering the market at 
different levels depending on their capacity.  With the players characterized, I then move to risk 
framings and the battlefield that emerged.  Finally, I conclude with an analysis of how these 
dynamics have characterized co-evolutionary, co-constructed process of regulation. 
 
5.2 The Actors 
 
Just as civil society cannot be considered as one homogenous entity, the private sector consists of 
different actors, though all unified with similar framings of risk and a series of entrepreneurial 
incentives that motivate their actions. Over the course of this research, I have observed three main 
categories.  In what follows I will describe whom they are, along with an analysis of where they 
come from, the kinds of ambitions that are at the root of their current involvement in this story, and 
what they have been doing about it. 
 
5.2.1 Domestic Seed Companies 
 
Well, Monsanto is a 26% partner in Mahyco.  I mean every partner comes with 
assets, which [both of us] had - Mahyco were leaders at that time [here in India].  
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But as Monsanto was not in the seed business [in India], they needed help.  They 
had the experience in the U.S., so together we were well suited to actually 
introduce [Bt Cotton] due to our respective advantages.  Though there were 
definitely certain issues that came up in to the process6. 
 
The 1995 entry of Monsanto into the Indian market via the partnership with Mahyco seems like a 
long time ago, and I suppose in the context of the story of Bt Cotton in India, it actually is.  That 
partnership set the stage for a number of similar partnerships, both public-private and private-
private.  This is not an industry mired in stasis.  The progress is either remarkably impressive or 
somewhat shocking depending on your predisposition.  At the time of this writing, there are 
currently 38 firms selling around 840 varieties of Bt Cotton in India, all based on one of the six Bt 
expression events approved by the GEAC7, with about 430 varieties currently available in the 
Maharashtra market alone8.  But, as the Managing Director of Mahyco alludes to above, this 
progress was not an entirely smooth process.  It was a sustained process of negotiation based 
around meshing - and in the face of lacking technical capacity among regulators or simple 
economic incentives outside the purview of regulatory reach - sometimes clashing, risk framings. 
 
Among domestic firms, there are two types; those that have the capacity for in-house research and 
development and can produce proof of concept prototypes, and those that focus more on 
sublicensing events from others.  In the words of DBT regulator S.R. Rao, there are: 
 
[t]hose who do their own R&D, those who have links to multinationals, like Rasi.  
There are five or six.  The other dirty dozen are just businessmen. All this 
regulation means nothing to them.  Mahyco first developed Bt cotton using their 
own in-house R&D, then Rasi copied them, then Vibha, then Advanta and so on.  
But the rest are all sellers.  I mean, I could do it - quit my job here, and I’d make 
more money actually9!   
 
The two are distinct not only in their business models, but also in how they influence regulation.  
As Shantaram argues,  
 
[t]hose small seed companies are the ones who have influence with local MPs.  
Look at the Seed Bill!  (…)  The local companies can speak that language, talk to 
[regulators] whenever, buy them off.  It’s so easy.  Bt cotton sellers in India over the 
last eight years have increased their revenues by 2000%.  A company that used to 
make 50-60 crores turnover now makes 500-600 crores (5-6 billion).  These guys have 
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become the new rich.  If they make 500 crores profit, what’s the big deal in giving 
one crore (10 million) to a local MP?  They can mobilize half a dozen MPs and make 
arrangements to meet the Prime Minister and Agricultural Minister and insert all 
kinds of amendments10. 
 
Or more generally, as C.K. Rao of the industry friendly Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness 
and Education puts it, “[f]irms have their own practices to get things done in the government.  I 
can’t comment about bribes, but sure, that is there.  They know how to manipulate the government 
agencies.  When things come to a boil, they know what to do11.” 
 
But there are other, less suspect means by which the domestic seed industry has initiated regulatory 
reform.  While the number of varieties released nearly doubled every year from 2002 to 200812, 2009 
saw a shift in the approval regime, fostering a more rapid approval timeframe.  As reflected in the 
Swaminathan report13, rather than assessing every variety submitted to the GEAC for approval, a 
new event based approval mechanism (EBAM) regime was recommended, and ultimately 
established14.  This resulted in a new surge of approvals, given that release was now based on one 
of the four EBAM approved events as opposed to the particular variety itself.  The post EBAM 
regime has seen 280 varieties released within a month of the policy shift in 2009, while to date, 2010 
has seen the release of 310 varieties.  Without a doubt, many more will follow.   
 
The movement to an EBAM regime is perhaps the most obvious example of how firms have 
successfully lobbied for a sustainable policy climate that is more conducive to their business 
interests.  While the Swaminathan report formally stated the case for such a regime, the 
negotiations for such an approach took place well before the report.  As one regulatory affairs 
manager of a multinational firm who declined to be named stated, 
 
(…) we have to know a bit about how the Swaminathan report itself was 
commissioned.  There was a need felt in general by the public sector, but only 
based on an initial push from the private sector.  That’s how the task force was set 
up.  Industry had made a number of presentations to the task force, on the draft 
and all that.  And considering Swaminathan’s knowledge of agriculture and the 
science-based facts behind it, he saw the merits in our calls for an EBAM.  After it 
was approved by the government, they had to find a way to institutionalize it - 
that’s where industry came in.  I myself remember three committees at different 
levels where we were invited to make presentations15.   
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Using the U.S. notification regime as a template16, the role of industry in facilitating such a regime 
was key. 
 
All of this has facilitated an environment very conducive to investment and collaborative 
partnerships between Indian and international firms, something that the DBT itself has been keen 
on fostering as well, though at varying levels of success.  In 1990, it formed the Biotech Consortium 
India Ltd (BCIL) as a public limited company in order to promote, transfer and commercialize of 
technologies (Chaturvedi 2005: 18). Representing a combination of financial institutions, corporate, 
and multilateral, national, and state bodies of governance17, and envisioned as a consortium that 
could link start-ups with funding opportunities, it “(…) work[ed] for accelerated development and 
commercialization of biotechnology18”, and acted as a clearing house of sorts for new public-private 
partnership opportunities in research that are of interest to the DBT via providing research funding 
via the Small Business Innovative Research Initiative (SBIRI)19.  Like the EBAM and many aspects of 
the current regulatory framework, the model was based on similar state mandated partnership 
facilitation as seen in the U.S.20.”  But most of the beneficiaries of this scheme have not been 
engaging with transgenics in agriculture; rather, the focus has been bio fuel and pharmaceutical 
applications, mirroring the current DBT director’s driving interest in medical applications of 
biotechnology21.  
 
In the face of the growth of domestic industry, the number of partnerships, mergers, and 
acquisitions of these firms with foreign firms have also grown, with a corresponding increase in 
their R&D capacity and access to transferred technology. Mahyco did almost single-handedly pave 
the way for regulatory reform via applied implementation, but that was only possible with a 
technology transfer from Monsanto.  This partnership presents a template of sorts, both in terms of 
where industry is going, but also how individual firms can and have affected regulation.  The only 
way they can wield true influence is via domestic firms meshing their incentives with the incentives 
of multinational firms looking to partner with them.  Judging by the interest of multinational 
companies (MNCs) and the flurry of lobby activities in Delhi, the desire to gain a foothold in the 
Indian market is huge, and such partnerships are becoming more and more common.  
 
5.2.2 Multinational Companies 
 
I never tell people come to India because it’s cheap, I tell them to come here 
because of the opportunities for success22. 
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The lucrative nature of the Indian market is characterized by the captive market that lies both 
within - but more beguiling, beyond - urban India.  “Unlocking India’s Rural Sector23” is a theme.  
The stakes are high, the potential benefits impossible to ignore, and the time is now.  This is a fact 
that is clearly not lost on both international investors as well as the Indian government, as the above 
quote from the secretary of the DBT, M.K. Bhan, serves to indicate.  While some observers earlier on 
had questioned the hype surrounding the emerging biotechnology industry in the beginning of the 
last decade in the context of addressing poverty alleviation and sustainable development, those two 
pretexts were never part of the equation to begin with (Scoones 2002: 2728).  Biotechnology as seen 
by potential private sector investors in India is a business opportunity – pure and simple – and 
these parties do not take poverty alleviation or sustainable development into their decision making 
calculus, though their promotional materials may state otherwise.  Entry is urgent.  There are two 
doors to unlock in order to enter this market, and the keys are held by both India as well as foreign 
multinational investors.   
 
First, India has to sell “India Inc.”, which they do aggressively.  While Bhan would argue that cost 
savings may not be the primary selling point, an analysis of the kind of information presented by 
industry bodies in presentations worldwide certainly trumpet the “competitive edge” of doing 
business in India, often in comparison to China24.  The ‘win the race’ narrative runs through these 
sentiments, as does a certain nationalistic pride in the rise of India.  Under the banner “Business is 
moving from west to east25”, these narratives are all forged on how investors and indeed countries 
can derive “(…) benefits from economic engagement with India26”, given how it “(…) is poised to 
become a global hub for transgenic crops given the positive mindset of farmers and globally 
competitive seed production costs27”.  In such a context, it is imperative that economies should 
work “(…) together to stimulate a global economic revival, to strengthen global economic and 
financial institutions, to work toward a balanced and ambitious outcome in the Doha Round 
negotiations, and to promote global food security28.”  Within this narrative, the role of ministries, 
lobby groups, and industry associations are key here in attracting multinational investment across a 
wide variety of sectors, invariably including biotechnology. 
 
Second, the governments of other countries are aggressively pursuing bilateral negotiations that are 
often outside the purview of multilateral frameworks, to ensure favourable terms of engagement 
for both Indian as well as international firms (Newell and Glover 2003; Newell 2008). Holtbrugge 
and Berg (2004: 304) have argued that MNCs working in India see success in their business 
initiatives as being most dependent on interacting with the central government, which is certainly 
reflected in recent developments.  This is fostered by cultivating mutually beneficial relationships 
with the Indian government itself; something that, for the most part, the Indian administration is 
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more than happy to facilitate, but only on the terms of the administration.  This insistence on 
playing by Indian rules sets India apart from a number of developing economies (Newell 2008: 
134).  
 
The future is based on public-private partnerships (PPP) and bilateral trade negotiations, with the 
aim of operating in an environment that is, as much as is legally possible, free of the constraints of 
multilateral prescriptive measures.  This is echoed both in the opinions of the regulators 
themselves29 as well as private sector actors.  One representative from Avesthagen, a Bangalore 
based “life science”30 company, argues that,  
 
[t]here has to be some support from the government to industry, and if we come 
together, it becomes much easier for each other.   One can complement the others 
deficiencies.  (...)  [We have] to face the challenge together - strength is success.  A 
lot of the regulations that have been put forward to the government are the result 
of tremendous pressure from both the scientific community as well as the general 
public - or sections of it - who may or may not accept that technologies are being 
introduced, like what is happening with [Bt brinjal].  So if industry and the public 
sector can come together, then maybe that part of the battle can be addressed31. 
 
But this sentiment does not come from the mere benefits of partnership for partnerships sake.  
There is an underlying perception that the public sector is essentially incapable of conducting 
professional, market viable research.  As Shantharam observes,  
 
 (…) there is [the public sector Bt cotton OPV] Bikaneri Nerma, but it was a 
disaster.  No one even talks about it.  If you were in a company and you came out 
with such a poor product, you’d be fired.  But not in the public sector. In the public 
sector, they can’t get out of their mindset, they’re frozen in time.  They don’t 
understand what commercialization means.  It’s not just about selling seeds, there 
are a whole slew of things, groundwork hat you need to do to bring it to market.  
And it all takes money - money that isn’t there.  The ICAR budget for biotech is 20 
million, compared to one million for Monsanto.  There is no comparison.  If you 
have a dynamic public sector that tries to partner with a dormant public sector, you 
will have PPP on paper.  But how will they deliver?  I mean, the public sector is a 
huge drag - the private sector is sceptical of this32.   
 
In his view, the need for PPP is premised on two points.  First, the culture within the public sector is 
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not capable of generating successful technologies, and second, that the financial resources that can 
sustain the R&D needed is not there.  Regardless of his scepticism of the tenability of PPP in 
practice, recent trends within the last five years paint a picture where the future is based heavily on 
PPP, due both in part to the benefits of collaboration, but also the possibility of the public sector 
becoming more familiar with what it takes to succeed in the industry.  As the deputy U.S. trade 
representative to India suggests, 
 
(…)  what is hurting India’s agricultural sector now is not liberalization, but its 
absence, including a lack of effective domestic reforms in areas of agricultural 
marketing, price policy, infrastructure, food processing, subsidies, and agricultural 
research, education, and extension. (…) The fact is that economic reform and 
liberalization works.  It works for India and it works to strengthen the bilateral 
economic ties that tie our two great countries together33. 
 
In practice, this sentiment became a reality via the 2005 US-India Knowledge Initiative on 
Agriculture (AKI).  Though the dialogue in its present manifestation began in 2001 during the 
Vajpayee administration34, the current Singh administration took that initial discussion to a 
completely new level. As a bilateral agreement, it exists outside of any multilateral framework, and 
aims to be outside the purview of international law35.  The primary objective of the initiative is to 
promote “(…) teaching, research, service and commercial linkages to address contemporary 
challenges” and to facilitate “(…) public-private partnership[s] (PPPs) where the private sector can 
help identify research areas that have the potential for rapid commercialization, with a view to 
develop new and commercially viable technologies for agricultural advancement in both 
countries36.”  
 
The 2005 AKI mirrors the official mandate of the Indian government as read in both the 2005 
National Biotechnology Development Strategy and the still ongoing formulation of the NBRA bill37.  
There is recognition within the AKI board of how the post 2005 wave of civil society actions rooted 
in the 2005 RTI Act “(…) will make it harder for both public and private sectors to deliver beneficial 
biotechnology products to farmers and markets38.”  Yet at the same, the overall sentiment within 
the AKI Board is that “(…) regulatory and IPR issues will be worked out appropriately over time, 
while respecting the rules, regulations and agreements of both countries39.”  This is all welcome 
news to both U.S. and other firms keen to capitalize on a market where they know they can exert 
influence in a regulatory context.  In the words of Dr. Sachin Chaturvedi, a senior fellow at the 
Research and Information System for the Developing Countries (RIS), an organization that has 
facilitated many spaces for the AKI process to unfold in terms of meetings and seminars, 
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 [i]f we look at the way PPP has come through, there is more and more investment 
in vegetables and less and less in staple and cash crops.  That’s where the effort for 
getting approvals is going.  Mustard is almost done, and as such, the push is to get 
public sector organizations involved.  Because in involving the public sector - I 
mean there are 22 products in the pipeline now - that kind of partnership is like a 
green card for regulatory approvals40. 
 
India Inc. and the AKI present a clear means to witness how technical, economic, and political risks 
all frame a regulatory ambition in terms of industry friendly policy.  The framings of the 
government, MNCs, and domestic firms all meshed, and the policy followed suit.  Yet, while PPP, 
lobbying, and bilateral agreements do characterize much of the formal processes in terms of policy 
from the perspective of MNCs, there are other events outside the direct control of both the firms 
who own or legally license the technologies, or the state as a manager of business conduct. There is 
another element of risk framings that did mesh, but resulted in a contested space in terms of 
economic risk framings given the nature of who capitalized, and how.  
 
As briefly discussed in the preceding chapter, prior to the official release of Bt cotton in 2002, 
massive amounts of unauthorized Bt cotton – 10,000 hectares or 10,000 acres, no one really knows - 
was sown in the state of Gujarat in 2001 (Carl, Bengali, and Ramaswami 2005: 278; Herring 2007a: 
132).  The expression event was the same as that owned by Monsanto and licensed by Mahyco; 
somehow (no one is really sure how exactly) someone managed to gain access to the then 
unauthorized event and pass it on to a small seed company in Ahmedabad, Navbharat Seeds, who 
then crossbred it with local varieties and capitalized on the technology.  While the story of how and 
why has been addressed at length in the literature41, I want to limit my focus to illustrate how the 
firm and state interacted in the context of risk framing interfaces, as a way to look at regulation as a 
process.  
 
Here is a local firm having absolutely no regard whatsoever for any kind of formal regulation 
taking advantage of the R&D of an MNC and reacting purely to economic risk incentives.  
Navbharat knew that the variety would be a huge success in the market, and they released it 
arguably three years before official release (Shah 2003), though the Gujarat government approved it 
in 2000 (Carl, Bengali, and Ramaswami 2005).  Moreover, the grand irony being that though the 
technology they somehow acquired – or stole - from Monsanto was, the same as the official first 
three varieties approved in 2002 in terms of the event, Navbharat got the crossings with local 
varieties right, and for half the price (Sadashivappa 2009).  A number of observers have concluded 
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(David and Sai 2002; Sahai and Rehman 2003, 2004; Shah 2003) that in practice, the illegal 
Navbharat 151 variety outperformed their legally approved counterparts in terms of both resistance 
and yield.   
 
Farmers used the technology, validated its benefits, and word got out quickly.  This all occurred 
completely independently of any formal regulation or policy – it was an informal contract framed 
on meshing economic risks between the firm and farmers.  Both saw a lucrative opportunity and 
grabbed it.  The technical risk framings so cherished by the GEAC meant nothing in the face of 
these economic risk framings.  In the end, all the centre could do was punish Navbharat for not 
adhering to the formal regulations and order the illegal cotton to be destroyed, though the Gujarati 
government was reluctant to do so given their own political dynamic with farmers (Lianchawii 
2005: 4285).  However, this post regulatory violation damage control mattered little.  A cottage 
industry was born, other firms were nearly put out of business, and by 2003, some 600,000 acres of 
cotton in Gujarati fields were awash with variants of the Navbharat variety (Carl, Bengali, and 
Ramaswami 2005: 278). 
 
5.2.3 Lobbyists, Industry Representation, and Regulatory Affairs Managers 
 
In years to come, Indian biotechnology will add to your country’s prosperity, create 
new career opportunities for India’s young people, and improve the quality of life 
for all Indians. BIO and its members look forward to a lasting partnership with our 
Indian colleagues, as we work together to heal, fuel and feed this world we all 
share42. 
 
As I have depicted, multinationals and domestic seed companies can go about their business, and 
do, but if you want to play by the rules, it certainly helps to have someone on the inside making 
sure that the government is sufficiently malleable to agree with you.  Bilateral agreements like the 
AKI aim to provide mutually beneficial platforms by which investment can cross borders.  But 
what happens inside the borders of India is equally key - as the Navbharat episode clearly 
illustrates – but also in terms of the domestic lobby industry. Organizations like the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)43 and the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII) work hard to sell ‘India Inc.’ both abroad, but also domestically.  The sentiment of the director 
of BIO as quoted above echoes Bhan’s assertion in the preceding subsection.  But the difference lies 
in who acts out these ambitions – from agents of government to lobbyists. There are a series of 
events both international and local that are worth noting here. 
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The starting point in discussing how lobbying has affected multilateral regulatory instruments 
surrounding transgenics in agriculture is the early 1990s.  As early as 1986, the OECD Blue Book 
recommended the minimization of barriers to trade, (OECD 1986: 7), but it was really the 1992 
Earth Summit that provided an impetus for the private sector to get more directly involved in the 
process, which they did in a then unprecedented manner (Clapp 2003: 6-8; Prakash and Kollman 
2003: 632)44. This trend continued in how the precautionary principle was negotiated in both the 
WTO and CBD in the late nineties, with the result being a dilution of the principle, and a stronger 
reliance on scientific proof as a basis for risk assessment, namely the SPS and TBT agreements of the 
WTO (Newell and Glover 2003: 9).  The starting points on which India based her regulatory 
frameworks were already tailored for private sector benefit through a concerted and successful 
lobby effort.  This was the starting point for the domestic lobby industry. 
 
The nature of the Indian lobby industry has changed significantly post 1991, and then again post Bt 
Cotton45.  Established lobby groups such as FICCI and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (Assocham) are still active, but the dismantling of the ‘license-quota raj’ has fostered a 
change at the level in which they operate, reflective of the changing patterns of investment that 
characterize much of the rise of ‘India Inc’. Newer lobby groups such as the CII and the Association 
of Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE) operate in a different milieu, embedded in a distinct 
environment where liberalization, bilateral agreements, and PPP have opened the floodgates to a 
completely new group of investors46.  There are two main types of lobby groups domestically:  
regulatory affairs managers (RAM) who work primarily with multinationals, and groupings of 
firms who collectively lobby the government with one voice. 
 
RAMs work the Delhi scene hard, and play a key role.  Their interactions go in both directions.  On 
the one hand, regulators may call them for clarifications on applications, and on the other, they are 
in regular touch with regulators.  Concerning the first direction, an example provided by one RAM 
is illustrative. 
 
I got a call yesterday that I am working on today.  We had filed an application for a 
stacked event.  The assistant to the member secretary of the GEAC doesn’t have 
any scientific background.  So she can’t differentiate between a single and stacked 
event.  In fact, we had an application a month before for GM tomatoes, but given 
that we applied again for the stacked event, she got confused between the two – 
‘why are you applying again?’  So basically I had to explain from scratch; this is 
this, this is that.  (…) [S]ay [we] have an application coming up at the next GEAC 
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meeting.  There is an option for anyone who is a competent representative from 
[our company] to field queries based on the application.  We do get a chance.  We 
won’t be present for the whole meeting, we’ll be there in another room, but we can 
add clarifications that way.  I think that’s better than nothing.  But still, ideally, the 
company would be there in the GEAC itself, but we don’t have that kind of a 
system now.  It’s so nice of the assistant to the member secretary of the GEAC to 
call me at least, otherwise there is no way to get those issues where she lacked 
clarity addressed.  Otherwise, it goes for a toss47. 
 
This was a common complaint among many I spoke to; in the face of lacking scientific expertise 
among the regulators themselves, the RAM’s role is to fill that gap.  Which of course may seem 
suspect to an observer given their stake in the technology itself.  This counsel also applies in 
countering the influence of civil society efforts pointed towards regulators.  The same RAM argues 
that regulators often  
 
[c]an’t decide if an activist or a green says, ‘oh, Europe has not approved GM 
crops’, but that’s not true, there are EU countries growing GM crops, and they are 
using it for food and feed purposes.  So if an NGO or an activist gives information 
to the government saying ‘why are you following the US, look at the EU, they are 
GM free, so why are you in such a rush’, that particular government official may 
not have enough of an awareness to make an informed decision. 
 
This is where the RAM comes in; this is the other direction.  They are in regular contact with DBT 
and MoEF regulators, and their job is to ensure that a conducive environment is created for their 
business interests; to mediate technical risks in a way that is tractable for regulators not versed in 
the science.  As Shantharam characterizes them,  
 
[t]heir only duty is to get licenses cleared to do business.  Monsanto has a team of 
them, some have one; they are all based in Delhi, and they are in touch with 
regulators on a regular basis to find out where the government is going, what the 
pulse is.  The moment the government thinks of doing something they feel might 
hurt company interests, they all gang up.  They call on their contacts.  But I mean, 
why shouldn’t they?  They want to ensure they get what they want, and they want 
to ensure the government wants the right thing.  It’s the same as how NGOs do it 
through public campaigning48. 
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However, in working independently, there is the risk of being seen as getting too cosy with the 
government.  As the same RAM puts it, 
 
even if we have the best intentions, it’s always assumed that you are trying to 
influence matters.  (...) When an individual company approaches them, it’s always 
taken like ‘oh, you have some vested interest in this.  [That said, the situation now 
has changed compared to five years ago, where] (…) even though industry wanted 
to [make contact], it would have been in a kind of in a hide and seek manner as 
opposed to [the] more transparent manner [we have now], where you can write a 
letter and get a response.  But still, I think there is a lot of room for improvement49. 
 
Lobby groups work at a more coordinated level; their aim is to collectively represent the interests of 
the firms, in a consolidated, unified manner.  Unlike FICCI or CII, newer lobby groups have 
tailored their focus on transgenics in agriculture.  There are two main players, reflective of the 
distinction made by observers of firms capable of generating proof of concept research and the 
“dirty dozen”.  While the first iteration of ABLE was formed in 2003 and led by India’s ‘biotech 
queen’, Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw, there were sentiments that, by 2006, too much focus was being lent 
to the pharmaceutical side of the industry, reflective of their dominance in the industry.  As a result, 
in 2010 ABLE-AG was established, to allow for the interests of the agriculture side of the industry to 
be addressed. 
 
ABLE-AG represents technology developers.  It is split between Indian firms such as Metahelix, 
Global Transgenes (formerly Nath Seeds), JK Seeds, and Mahyco, but also include multinationals 
such as Pioneer, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, BASF, and of course “(…) the target company [of public 
hatred towards biotechnology], a company called ‘M’50.”  The National Seeds Association of India 
(NSAI) on the other hand focuses more on traditional breeders and those who sublicense the events 
from larger domestic firms.  Because of these distinct memberships, the strategic relevance of these 
two groups differ.  I have not discussed the role of the NSAI here, and for the following reason: 
according to observers, they do not have a long term strategy in terms of regulatory reform.  In the 
words of a K.K. Narayanan, former director of ABLE and the current director of Metahelix,  
 
(…) seed companies are more focused on the short term – getting state approvals, 
things like that – where ABLE-AG is more interested in streamlining the 
regulations and getting them more science based.  Getting good IP protection is 
another example51. 
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ABLE-AG was formed in early 2010 in the midst of the Ramesh tour, taking over the mantle from 
the now defunct All India Crop Biotechnology Association (AICBA), with the mandate of fostering 
“(…) a comprehensive dialogue with different stakeholders, particularly the Government (…) [to 
create] an enabling environment for the development and introduction of superior biotech traits in 
India52.”  AICBA did have earlier successes, such as lobbying for an EBAM regime and being 
consulted for the Swaminathan task force, but their prominence waned in the context of 
representing technology adopters as opposed to developers.  AICBA teamed with the NSAI during 
the Rodrigues hearings to represent industry interests, but “(…) got subsumed by the NSAI, given 
that technology developers and seed companies [licensing technologies as opposed to developing 
them] were not aligned53.” In practice, most of ABLE-AG’s successes to date have been with 
lobbying chief ministers at the state level as opposed to the centre54, with the centre less than 
impressed with their interactions to date.  In the words C.K. Rao at the FBAE, “ABLE just isn’t that 
organized.  They seem mostly happy if they get funds for PPP collaborations55.”  But this reflects 
their recent entry into the fray.  The space for a group like ABLE is open, and the timing is based on 
what has been happening, the Bt brinjal moratorium in particular.  As Shantharam puts it,  
 
I haven’t seen much interaction in terms of CII and FICCI in the context of 
biotechnology.  I mean, they dabble in it, but they won’t take a public stand.  See, 
biotechnology in medicine is doing really well, but agriculture is really small.  I 
mean you can make money, but not like in pharmaceuticals, aircraft, automobiles56. 
 
Similarly, C.K. Rao argues that “CII is different, there are too many influences there.  It’s not just 
biotech.  They are powerful, but their interest in agriculture is marginal57.”  But the future will tell 
how effective ABLE becomes; they certainly have a presence, with Jairam Ramesh presiding over 
their official opening in August 2010.   
 
What is particularly interesting about ABLE is how the director refers to the formation of the group 
as a sort of response to civil society mobilization.  While on the one hand, there was a gap after the 
dissolution of the AICBA that needed to be filled in the context of a focus on transgenics in 
agriculture, on the other, there was a perception that if industry did not act, the battle might be lost.  
In the words of Shantharam, civil society 
 
(…) wants to raise the bar, and they have clearly understood that one way to stop 
and kill the technology is to increase regulation to such an extent that you can tie it 
up in knots, with firms quitting in frustration.  So I am trying to tell the 
government not to fall for that.  Sit down and do proper risk assessment; determine 
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what level of risk is presented to society, and see how those risks can be managed - 
see if there is an overwhelming benefit to be had, and then see whether the benefits 
outweigh the risks.  We can manage the associated risks via institutions and 
policies, as opposed to throwing the baby out with the bathwater approach. 
 
He refers almost verbatim to Divya Raghunandan’s quote from the preceding chapter regarding 
their strategy of making consensus impossible, thereby delaying release.  ABLE recognizes that 
strategy borne of a new school NGO risk framing, and aims to respond to it pragmatically.  He 
continues:  
 
[t]o use a term from American football, it’s more than halftime, and your team is 
not on the ground.  And the whole framing of the debate has been built by the anti-
GM lobby. (...) We should [counter that] and explain our view.  I’ve met [former] 
President Kalam, many Chief Ministers, MPs, and guess what.  They all say ‘uhhh, 
hmmm, I see...well, we are not against technology, it’s not about money.’  But I will 
tell you - it is about money.  Saying you are not against technology is an excuse - 
you are against technology.  Especially if it is from the outside, if it’s peddled by 
the multinational companies.  That’s what’s going on in Jairam’s head.  ‘Everything 
has to be indigenous, we are a proud race, we have so much intellectual capacity, 
we are everywhere, most institutions can’t run without an Indian - labs, 
universities, companies - they’ve all taken over slowly.  We have such intellectual 
power here and we should harness and create an Indian revolution.  We should not 
let foreigners come in.’  That’s the psyche.  But we can’t fight every battle alone.  
We need to form a coalition of like minded people58. 
 
Nationalist sentiments run through this discourse of transgenic research and ambition, and in 
Shantharam’s view, it threatens to delay the industry.  It is a political and economic risk that needs 
to be mitigated.   
 
To counter this, and unlike the CII or FICCI, ABLE-AG forges a direct relationship with firms in 
order to speak with one voice. These new lobbyists reflect an evolution towards a specific focus on 
biotechnology, reflective of the massive growth of the industry as observed by both Indian and 
international observers as framed by the Bt Cotton experience.  The primary rationale of organizing 
is premised on strategic tack: 
 
[i]f you form a coalition of people and slowly assert your position in a diplomatic, 
 148 
dignified, and professional manner, your decibel level rises, and people will hear 
you.  Public policy framing as it happens now is influenced by many people, but I 
think basically those who have money to pay off politicians and influence bills are 
the ones who make the biggest difference.  But we will never resort to corrupt 
practices.  We are not going to bribe anyone.  Though, if you don’t do that, well, 
they’ll receive you for ten minutes, and you’ll get two, but still...59 
 
Shantharam asserts what I have been arguing throughout this research.  The “public policy 
framing” he refers to is analogous to how civil society has transferred their risk framings to a 
broader public – both the state as well as the general public.  The strategies of what firms do in 
response to such a context – lobbying as well as “Robin Hood” varieties with no regards for formal 
regulation - set the scene for the battlefield. 
 
5.3 The Rules Of The Game: Civil Society Risk Framings And Politics 
 
You have to play by the rules of the game.  And those rules [to date] have been set 
by NGOs. (…) I have to hand it to them, they really did a number on this.  They are 
doing a great job in projecting their image [of risk].  They say it’s not about biotech, 
it’s about Monsanto.  But if you take Monsanto out of this, there is no biotech60. 
 
The private sector has always been involved in the development of transgenics in agriculture to 
capitalize on farmer demand.  More than any other actor in this story, their ambition is clear and 
unified.  But this relates more to economic risk framings, which are at the centre of decision making 
calculus, but not the only factor.  There are other factors at play that render this ambition far more 
complicated to achieve due to the interface of the risk framings of the firm with those of a broader 
public.  It is not as though the firm and the state see eye to eye all the time; though both have a 
vision for Indian agriculture broadly premised on technological innovation and adoption.  It is the 
interface of economic risks with political and technical risks that more accurately characterize the 
core of regulation in practice, as considered in the context of the firm.  But what are these other 
risks?   
 
5.3.1 Technical Risk: Resistance and Stress 
 
The first two variants of Bt cotton both were engineered for pest resistance.  The next iteration will 
see herbicide tolerant double stacked Bt cotton in the market, most likely for the 2011 season. In this 
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context, there lies a technical risk: the risk of biotic stressor resistance.  This risk plays out on two 
levels.  First are within laboratories that argue long term resistance is inevitable, forthcoming, and 
already occurring, and second are based on applied observation in farmers fields.   
 
While a number of scientific observers have argued that Cry1Ac resistance is possible, it was more 
recently that these studies began to have a more pronounced affect on regulatory deliberation.  As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the petitions filed by NGOs provided reams of evidence 
sourced of international studies regarding, among other factors, resistance.  The release of a study 
by Tabashnik (2008) however was remarkably well timed.  While Mahyco responded to the 
Tabashnik study arguing there is nothing of the sort in India61, two years later, evidence emerged of 
resistance in Gujarat.  Mahyco was forced to respond.  They conclude that while “(…) pink 
bollworm resistance to Cry1Ac was confirmed in four districts in Gujarat (…) [t]o date, no insect 
resistance to Cry1Ac has been confirmed outside the four districts (…)62.”  However, some 
observers note that this was likely known by Monsanto all along.  They argue that inbuilt resistance 
was a technical switch to capitalize on economic incentives - for the projected massive demand for 
future technologies such as BGII63, and in the near future, herbicide resistant Roundup Ready BGII 
as developed by Monsanto.  And if the significant adoption of BGII can be viewed as any indication 
of this assertion, there certainly seems to be empirical evidence to verify such a strategy. 
 
I would argue that developers are very aware that resistance is imminent, as it meshes with their 
framing of economic risk.  There is massive demand from farmers, and while there may be hurdles 
to overcome within government to ensure the regulations are suitable for expansion at minimal 
delay, as long as farmers have access to newer technologies, their bottom line will continue to grow.  
It is, in a sense, a form of planned obsolescence.  Taking the focus away from the Indian experience 
for a moment, similar trends have emerged among farmers who have been noticing glyphosate 
resistance among weeds in the fields of herbicide tolerant cotton in the US64.  Recent studies have 
argued that the amount of resistance has increased more than four times from 2007 to 201065.  Since 
the introduction of herbicide tolerant cotton in 199766, farming practice has taken herbicide 
tolerance as a given in the form of Roundup Ready crops.  From the perspective of both the firm 
and farmers, there is little option in the face of glyphosate resistance, but to either rely on the firm 
to provide a next generation solution, or to revert to more costly and labour intensive means of 
weed control.  In essence, resistance is a sound business strategy, and the technical risk of resistance 
is less a technical risk, but more an economic risk as framed by longer term strategies that ensure 
continued demand for other weed control technologies, either in the form of engineered crops or in 
new sprays. 
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5.3.2 Economic Risks: “Cut The Red Tape” 
 
But more firmly in the realm of how the regulations were framed by economic risks is the narrative 
of excessive regulation as a burden.  As with civil society and the government, biosafety frames 
much of how risk is understood by private sector actors.  In complying with government 
regulations, technical risk assessment has to be undertaken by firms.  But this dynamic curiously 
goes in two directions.  In one direction, the RCGM formally, but in practice, the GEAC, is 
mandated to undertake formal biosafety assessment.  Yet that capacity is simply not there – recall 
the RAM who had to explain the science to a regulator who could not speak that language.  In the 
other direction, biosafety assessment data is often provided to the GEAC by firms themselves.  In 
the words of C.K. Rao, founder of the FBAE,  
 
[p]resently, the GEAC has no facilities to verify data from the product developer.  
Moreover, the developer might not present all the data.  The expertise for proper 
assessment is not much, about two hundred scientists in various public sector 
institutes.  For India to invest that money and hire more people, as suggested in the 
NBRA, is a stupid idea.  Swaminathan also said that.  Simply because it is coming 
from the developer shouldn’t make the data suspect67. 
 
But that is a somewhat contradictory assertion, given that there is a tacit acceptance that the firm 
may not present all the data required.  Though some regulators may have known about this all 
along, why would a firm state that the technology does have inbuilt obsolescence?  The framing of 
risk mirrors the biosafety risk framing of the government, but it relates more to the economic as 
opposed to technical manifestation of this risk framing.  Time is money, and money is constrained.  
If too much time is spent on deliberating on the biosafety assessment of a new technology, 
opportunity costs accumulate – it would be strategic to be selective with information to minimize 
delays.   
 
The movement to an EBAM regime and the domestic lobby pressing for the ‘single window 
clearance’ NBRA also presents another means to mitigate economic risk.  The aim is to minimize 
the accumulation of opportunity costs by making biosafety assessment more efficient.  Thus, the 
risk is framed as an economic risk - the delays due to excessive technical assessment and the 
opportunity costs of these delays.  The risk is that too much red tape will render private sector 
efforts at commercializing products to be mired in red tape.  In tracing the ongoing story of how 
regulation evolves in practice, the Bt cotton story is rich with examples, both of how excessive red 
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tape has deterred entry, but also how regulations have been lobbied to be more business friendly.  
As always, the story begins with Mahyco, Monsanto, and those 100g of seed.  
 
While Monsanto did apply as early as 1990 for the import of the 100g of seed for backcrossing, it 
was in 1993 that the application was formally rejected on the basis of excessive technology transfer 
fees (Newell 2007: 187).  That is the official story.  In reality, it had more to do with the state of the 
regulatory system in 1993, which was still in its early days.  In the words of M.K. Sharma, 
managing director of Mahyco,  
 
[o]nce we started talking to Monsanto, there was a DBT in place, and when [we at 
Mahyco] started in 1994 – well I guess 1992-93 is when we started - and in 1994 we 
finalized…anyway, we did meet with DBT before that, as a heads up, to tell them, 
‘Well, if it is us, how will it be introduced?’  We knew there were the Guidelines, so 
we started the technology in 1995 with the 100g import, and based on the first 
trials, things had to change.  But this isn’t new, this always happens here. This all 
happened with regards to our experience in using the Guidelines, but it was 
somewhat ambiguous68.  
 
In speaking with S.R. Rao at the DBT, the basis for those initial steps in regulatory evolution became 
clear69.  In his view, the “1994 Guidelines were not sufficient.  But you know, the whole basis of our 
changing the Guidelines was due to that 100g import. (…) The emergence of Bt Cotton is what 
really shaped the regulations.”  1996 saw the first real push of Monsanto into India, given their 
interest in engaging with India as an “emerging market”, and the recognition that Mahyco was 
“quite aggressive in the past” among regulators.  At the same time, Mahyco was trying to engineer 
the Cry1Ac event in India, but without success.   
 
It appears to have been a mutually beneficial situation to capitalize upon, and one which forms the 
basis for regulatory evolution.  However, there is an additional perspective, one not fully proven, 
but alluded to by other observers.  Perhaps the delay in the release was not only due to lacking 
regulatory capacity, but either the pesticide industry negotiating delays behind closed doors to 
protect their market against pest resistant varieties of cotton, or a “nationalistic competition” 
(Scoones 2005: 253) between MNCs and domestic firms.  The argument is that in fostering delays, 
the state bought time in the hopes that Indian industry could develop their own solutions.  
However, if Bt Bikaneri Nerma is any indication of what the public sector can do – it has by all 
accounts been a failure technically, economically, and politically70 - perhaps such a strategy 
reflected pride more than practical capacity.   
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5.3.3 Political Risk: Regulatory Capture 
 
Just as civil society has raised concerns regarding the independence of the government in forming 
regulation, arguably within the context of the efforts of firms as noted in the preceding subsection, 
firms share an analogous concern.  The notion of regulatory capture is a two way street. Recent 
words enunciated by Ramesh might depress even the most hardcore lobbyist; he argues that the 
current draft of the NBRA bill presents a conflict of interest, given that the DBT should not be the 
nodal authority given their interest in promoting biotechnology.  He also cites the bill articles that 
overrule the RTI Act as representative of a “deeply flawed” piece of legislation71.  While civil 
society may frame an economic risk as where the government is no longer independent and is 
sidetracked by the risk of missing the boat, the private sector has concerns relating to political risks.  
Namely, the government may not be able to objectively maintain scientifically based rigour as the 
basis for biosafety assessment given the influence of civil society.  Evidence of this is most recently 
seen in the current Bt brinjal moratorium. This is not welcome news to industry.  Shantharam 
argues that 
 
[b]asically, [Ramesh] didn’t have the courage to support the GEAC, as it was the 
easy and popular thing to do.  He’s now hailed as the most courageous politician.  
He changed the name [of the GEAC from approval to appraisal committee] but the 
mandate is the same as designed [in the 1989 Rules].  It’s kind of hoodwinking the 
public – ‘I promised to change it, and I did’72. 
 
This risk of capture also applies to states intervening in the market and using instruments such as 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) to set the price of Bt cotton at 
a lower rate than what the firm would wish for. Such price interventions are often based on the 
political risk of potentially alienating a vote base, which translates into a disincentive for further 
entry by firms. In 2006, evidence of how states can intervene in the market emerged, much to the 
frustration of private sector firms. In May, the MRTPC ruled that Mahyco must reduce the price of 
Bt Cotton to no more than INR600 for 450g73.  Mahyco appealed five days later74 but lost the case at 
the Supreme Court75.  Soon after, Maharashtra and two other states capped the maximum price for 
450g at INR75076.  Yet, the MRTPC remained vigilant; three months later they ordered a probe 
questioning why Mahyco is getting more money than they should from Monsanto77, which 
escalates in the months to come78.  
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This all serves to frustrate the private sector, and shows how state level political risk framings can 
render the regulatory machinery a complex process. One observer characterized the difference 
between working with state governments as “tougher. (…) We don’t like the constraints on pricing 
in terms of new technologies; it scares away firms79.”  This is evident in Monsanto expressing an 
interest in entering the India soybean market, but remaining reluctant given evidence regarding 
how individual states can manipulate prices, thereby rendering their return on investment lower 
than they would like80.   
 
Political risks dictate and narrate how susceptible the government, as a democratic, responsive 
institution of governance, and how civil society (inclusive of the media), given their role as detailed 
in the preceding chapter, can deviate objective scientific and economic deliberation into the 
subjective realm.  It is the risk of subjective regulation, and it mirrors the regulatory capture 
concerns of civil society.  Though in the context of the firm, the roles are reversed. Though what is 
to be captured remains the same – the objective, deliberative processes enshrined in government 
regulation – the party that is doing the capturing switches, and with it the direction of who is 
responsible. 
 
5.4 Science vs. Money: Regulation In Practice 
 
In effect, regulation as a practice from the perspective of the firm diverges from economic incentive 
pursuit alone.  What emerges from the experience to date via the Bt cotton story is a rich series of 
technical and political interfaces that create new spaces for engagement, and ultimately policy 
formulation.  Given the stated lack of technical expertise within the MoEF and DBT, firms have a 
certain advantage – they can portray technologies as having certain risks, but can also tailor this 
portrayal to suit their economic incentives.  This all occurs in spaces ripe for such leverage.  As K.K. 
Narayanan of Metahelix recalls, “(…) a firm can apply, but there is no real consolidated set of 
guidelines.  They’ll say ‘OK, refer to this, refer to that study, give us this…I mean, it’s all ad hoc81.” 
In adapting regulation to be less cumbersome and more streamlined, the firm has lent great efforts 
towards facilitating such a space among regulators.  And while this effort was complementary to 
where the government wanted to go in the first place, there was a space that was vacant – a space 
where firms could enter and fill in gaps where regulators in these ministries did not have the 
immediate capacity to fully comprehend the technical risks involved.  This is not to say that such 
capacity is not present in the government, but given the rigid timeframes in which approval is 
warranted and the overarching climate of pressures from the firm, civil society, and perceived 
demand from farmers, there is an urgency.  Again, ‘time is money’. 
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And money speaks.  Whether it is small firms paying off MPs to meet with regulators to ensure 
business friendly policy, the Indian government luring foreign investors in the name of cost 
savings, or bilateral agreements like the AKI that assist local capacity, but embedded with an 
automatic and well placed position in the Indian market post product release, the incentives are 
massive.  And regulation responds.  This applies to foreign firms, but also to domestic firms.  
Navbharat is a relatively small player in the Indian seed industry – more akin to the “dirty dozen” 
that S.R. Rao characterized earlier relative to the six major domestic licensees.  And yet, this firm 
alone forced the government to react, given the massive adoption of their “stealth seed” (Herring 
2007a) by farmers.  Though Mahyco applied for release in 2001 and was refused on the grounds of 
insufficient technical risk assessment, the illegal release made a mockery of technical risk 
assessment as a precondition for release.  Just ten months after this initial request, and clearly as a 
political consequence of the Gujarat state government allowing farmers in that state to grow it 
regardless of central directives (Roy, Herring, and Geisler 2007: 160), the GEAC released the first 
three varieties.  The link is impossible to ignore.  No matter what the GEAC may have wanted in 
terms of technical risk assessment, economic risks – farmers sowing the Navbharat varieties in huge 
numbers, and political risks – looking like fools in light of states ignoring the centre – framed the 
(hurried) 2002 official release. 
 
But post release, another form of political risk framing began to emerge.  Contrary to any formal 
regulatory regime, many of the rules of engagement of late have been determined by civil society.  
An organization like ABLE-AG exists not only to lobby the government, but also to counter similar 
“lobbying” by civil society.  The effects of the brinjal moratorium forced the private sector to 
acknowledge this fact, and they have by organizing more effectively to counter any further delays.  
It was a wake up call of sorts.  No longer was the status quo of a “pro-business” policy environment 
something that could be taken for granted.  As Narayanan of Metahelix puts it, “(…) we are 
accountable to civil society whether we like it or not, but the government has to be held accountable 
politically.  This has all been the consequence of Ramesh and his being so media savvy82.”   
 
All the manoeuvres within and outside of India by the private sector have resulted in spaces where 
regulation changes, adapts and is enforced in light of the risk framings of the private sector.  These 
manoeuvres are tempered and overseen by the other three agents involved, and the accountability 
dynamics that result do affect formal regulation.  But to date, most of the discussion has focused on 
the government, civil society, and the firm.  At the core of the entire basis for regulating the 
technology is a demand.  This demand is sourced from farmers.   
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But this cannot imply that it is market incentives alone that mesh with technical, political, and 
economic risks to include farmers in the process of regulatory deliberation.  All of these factors 
results in different market epistemologies.  But in looking at farming communities, one has to move 
from this triangle of risk framings.  The farm presents a radically different arena in which 
incentives, risks, decisions, and accountability is sought.  Regulation on the farm in the context of Bt 
Cotton presents a very different view of how these factors come together to both present a practice 
of regulation, but also an interface with the other three parties I have considered.  The next chapter 
will address how and why.  
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CHAPTER 6  
ON THE FARM: DESTINY, (IN)DECISION, INFORMATION AND RISK 
 
I knew the bulk of my time conducting the fieldwork that informs this research would be in a farm 
setting.  It was where I felt I would derive the most profound elements of my analysis – where I 
could really gain an understanding of why farmers are using Bt cotton.  On the one hand, I could 
not get a sense from the extant literature of what was really going on with Bt cotton.  Though the 
performance of the technology was never really an element of this research, I was personally 
curious as to how it was doing.  Were farmers happy with it?  Was it performing as badly or as well 
as some observers were claiming?  What was going on? 
 
Of course, the answer to that is complicated and depends on a variety of factors – landholding 
sizes, access to irrigation, the existence of extension services (both state mandated that the proxies 
provided by agrodealers), new insects like the army bollworm and new viruses like red leaf curl, 
and of course, the rains.  And the more I understood the sheer number of factors that determined 
whether or not a farmer had a positive or negative experience with Bt cotton, the less importance 
and interest I had in such bipolar dynamics as success or failure.  Though there are a wealth of 
studies that claim to present a clear picture, the truth seems to be that it really depends, and in any 
case, all parties publishing their findings have their own vested interests in presenting the truth.  To 
me, the only really interesting questions are in the context of decision making.  It was not so much 
“is Bt cotton doing well or poorly”, but rather, “why are farmers using Bt cotton in the first place, 
and how do they understand risk and respond to it”?  It was the underlying decisions that 
propelled the adoption of Bt cotton that were really interesting.  And it was that decision making 
process that lay at the core of what I wanted to understand.   
 
As with all the other actors I have considered up to this point, the driving factor behind decision 
making processes are risk framings.  I needed to understand how exactly risk was constructed by 
farmers.  And what I found was far, far different from what I have detailed up to this point.  While 
the state, civil society, and the firm can frame risk according to political, economic, and technical 
dynamics, there is something else entirely going on at the farm level.  Given the fact that farmers do 
interact with all of these parties, there is an element of overlap.  But at the same time, there are 
other factors – notions of destiny, multiple references to the Mah bh rata and the Gita, the role of 
faith and fate, trust in agricultural “experts”, notions of representation, and of course quantitative 
factors such as landholding sizes, incomes, and observed yields – all which render these three 
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broad groups of framings inadequate to fully capture the complexities of the interfaces between 
new technologies like Bt cotton, the variety of parties who have a stake in the adoption and use of 
them, and how farmers ultimately decide whether or not to adopt. 
 
For these reasons, I spent six months in Chikhali; almost a third of my fieldwork.  It was conscious, 
a culmination of both personal and professional ambition.  In retrospect, perhaps I spent too much 
time there, and perhaps I could have acquired the insights I gained in less time.  I’ll never know.  
But what I do know, both then and now, was that beyond just gathering information, I wanted to 
live there.  I wanted to spend time there, to build relationships, to observe, to speak and listen, and 
to try to reallocate who asks questions. Of course, such an ambition will always be framed with the 
challenges of being the outsider, something addressed at length in the anthropological literature 
(Geertz 1973; Clifford & Marcus 1986; Rosaldo 1986; Scheper-Hughes 1995).  My attempt to address 
these challenges and mitigate the burden of positionality was via using digital video as 
participatory research tool as I discussed in Chapter 2, but also via actually growing Bt cotton 
myself. 
 
       
Participatory Video: Scripting and Shooting. 
 
In Chikhali, I stayed with the Chikhalkar family.  Manoj is four years younger than me; his wife, 
Chaaya, is four years younger than he.  They live with Manoj’s parents and two young daughters.  
Manoj’s best friend is Kiran Raut.  The two families go back a long way; Kiran was born in the same 
house that Manoj lives in how, the same place where I stayed.  I met Kiran and Manoj in July 2007 
when I was with Arati Pankharaj from YUVA.  At that time, Kiran and Manoj were on a “tour” 
organized by YUVA – they were cast in the role of organic model farmers.  I initially assumed that 
to be the case, and it was only in the days soon after our first meeting that I realized they also grew 
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Bt cotton.  Over the course of the next two years, I spent most of my time with Kiran, Manoj, and 
his family.  They stand out in many ways from their peers.  Manoj works the land that has been 
passed on to him over generations, but he doesn’t see that bright a future in farming, especially 
since his family has only four acres.  When he was 21, he went to Ahmedabad, the capital of the 
neighbouring state of Gujarat, to get training as an electrical repairperson.  Two years back, after 
working out of his home in Chikhali, he managed to rent shop space in the neighbouring village of 
Adegaon – where Kiran lives – and he does everything from repairing TV sets to selling gas 
cylinders.  And he’s always had an interest in photography, so he freelances as such for the local 
paper, as well as for weddings and other events where the moment is to captured.  He keeps 
himself busy, is resourceful, and above all else, wants to ensure that his family is well taken care of.  
He sees the inherent risk of farming and has trained himself to ensure that he is never depending 
on one source of income alone. 
 
        
Kiran Raut (left) and Manoj Chikhalkar (right). 
 
Kiran, on the other hand, sticks to farming entirely as a source of income.  His family has six acres, 
which his younger brother primarily tends to.  Which is not to say that Kiran does not work it as 
well, but he has other things that keep him busy.  His cousin Gajanand in Yavatmal, about a three 
hour bus ride away from Chikhali and the capital of the neighbouring district, sells laptops and 
computers for a living, and gave Kiran an older computer four years ago.  Kiran has a natural talent 
and a lot of interest in learning new software packages, and since he had the infrastructure, he 
managed to forge a link with the land revenue department to provide records to farmers when they 
need it.  Which they do for any wide number of administrative hurdles; bank loans, proof of assets, 
and so on.  But aside from his work, Kiran has an amazing knack to get along with most everyone.  
He has no allegiances to anyone – politically or otherwise – and he is well liked by everyone.  Both 
Kiran and Manoj were my immediate sources of feedback for ideas I may have had, people I 
wanted to meet, and throughout, a source of support when things were not going the way I had 
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planned or hoped.  Without them, this research would not have been the same.  They allowed 
insights into the people, practices, and politics of Chikhali that would have been impossible 
otherwise. 
 
For these reasons, this chapter is a kind of departure from the others.  The underlying themes are 
the same as the preceding chapters – how understandings of risk create and facilitate decision-
making spaces that characterize regulation – but the modality of my analysis differs.  This chapter 
is based on a number of case studies that will aim to portray not only these risk constructions, but 
also the characters of the people themselves who provided a basis for my understanding; characters 
that without the help and support of Kiran and Manoj may have proved less willing to spend the 
amount of time with me that they did.  In doing so, a more embedded picture of risk framings will 
emerge out of these characters.  It is based on interactions between farmers – resource rich, income 
poor, male, female, and so on – and those parties that also have a vested interested in farming as a 
practice.   
 
The real story of regulation, as I have argued previously, is never based on top down biosafety 
assessment alone.  It is based on how different parties negotiate the battlefield of regulation, each 
armed with their own distinct framings of risk.  There are environmental risks, borne of 
environmental learning, but there are also social risks borne of social learning.  One farmer who 
took to the stage during a post screening “talk show” had this to say about the kinds of risks he 
faces. 
 
There is no security in farming; there are so many potential threats.  Pigs and cows 
damage the crops.  There are snakes, fixes, tigers and mice that threaten us in the 
field as well as the crops.  And these migratory people who come and go damage 
and even rob our crops.  Then there’s the rain.  It will rain either too much, or not 
enough.  Right now, there’s too much!  The bolls are rotting on the plant.  What can 
we do?  This all depends on nature.  I mean before we’d borrow money from a 
moneylender, and he’d charge one and a half percent.  But now the government 
banned that!  If someone gets sick at home and you have no money, that person 
might die!  I went to the bank so many times to get a loan, but they always turn me 
away, saying I defaulted before.  It’s crazy, I have twenty five acres!  I mean, I do 
think about suicide sometimes.  Other farmers have just given up; they sell booze 
instead.  All of this leads me to consider suicide1.  
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And while this sketch captures many of the environmental risks, it is also the more social 
constructions of risk that are what this chapter will depict.  There is a balance between the two, and 
in depicting this, a more holistic picture of risk framings, as a root of farming practice given the 
emergence of Bt cotton – regulation at the level of the farm – will emerge.  At the level of the farm, 
regulation becomes even more distinct from biosafety.  It is more a matter of deeply entrenched 
historical practices of farming, of the interface between that and new technologies loaded with 
notions of progress, of getting the right information and of knowing the right people at the right 
time, of faith based systems of decision making, of notions of order in the universe, and perhaps 
most of all, of trust.  And whom exactly one can trust is never clear. 
 
6.1 The Setting 
 
Chikhali is home to just under 700 people; there are 153 households.  It is relatively remote.  The 
nearest state bus stand is about 10km down recently paved roads, and there is no way to get to 
Chikhali aside from getting in a shared rickshaw, on a motorcycle or bicycle, or walking there.  That 
said, the remoteness of the village does not relate to such spaces where Bt cotton is out of the reach 
of farmers.  Since 2005, farmers here have been using Bt cotton, and judging by my observations of 
trends over three growing seasons, it is becoming increasingly popular.   
 
 
Chikhali, Wardha district, Deoli taluka, Maharashtra.  The Chikhalkar residence is located by the black dot near the middle. 
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Seeds are purchased from the nearest town where the state buses run regularly – the taluka 
administrative centre of Deoli.  Though the nearest agrodealer is in the next village down the road, 
Adegaon, this shop just stocks basic inputs of a limited range.  Deoli is home to almost all the 
administrative services that are relevant to farmers – land records, the agricultural extension offices, 
and the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) – the state sanctioned purchasing yard 
for raw cotton.  But beyond that, it is also home to four major agrodealers, and one in particular 
who has been around for ages.  Aside from the district capital of Wardha, Deoli serves as the first 
link to the broader state machinery that links farmers to both the Maharashtran government 
machine as well as the private sector.  And both compete for farmers’ attention. 
 
According to my the data I collected in Chikhali between August 2007 and July 2009, just under 
two-thirds of those in Chikhali are engaged as farmers, while one-third engage as labourers, both 
on and off farm, and about 3% own shops or drive rickshaws.  Of those who own farmland, the 
average size of landholdings is five acres, and half of the land is devoted to soybean cultivation and 
half devoted to cotton.  Of the half devoted to cotton, 40% is Bt cotton, with the remainder non-Bt. 
The decision of what to grow post monsoon is divided between soybean and cotton – two crops 
with guaranteed rates set by the government.  Soybean is the other major crop, and depending, it 
actually comprises most of what is grown, along with millets, vegetables, sugarcane, and pulses.  
The choice primarily hinges on the time between sowing and harvest – soybean and cotton are both 
planted in July during the onset of the monsoon, but soybean is ready for harvest by October, while 
cotton continues to produces “flashes” until January.  Cultivating soybean allows for an additional 
sowing opportunity of vegetables, pulses, or grains, but there are other factors, which depend on a 
seasonal basis. For example, minimum support prices, election schedules (which invariably affect 
the MSP), and what other farmers are doing in a particular year.  In such a small community, 
everyone knows what everyone is planting, and decisions made by individuals are nearly 
impossible to hide. 
 
But everyone has an interest in cotton.  There are caravans that come to the village prior to the 
monsoons when farmers are buying seeds extolling the virtues of Bt cotton, posters plastered on the 
walls, even plays put on by seed companies where actors depict the horrors of not using Bt cotton 
amid much pathos.  Conversely, NGOs visit the village, loaded with literature, LCD projectors 
screening videos depicting the benefits of “organics” as opposed to Bt cotton, and bring (hire) 
“model farmers” to proselytize on the evils of Bt cotton.  Everyone competes for the attention of 
farmers, depending on their respective framings of risk.  Bt cotton does represent a technology, 
true, but beyond that it serves to represent something else.  Many I have spoken do not refer to it 
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merely as a pest resistant variety, but rather as an indicator of progress, of the efforts of an altruistic 
state that has authorized Bt cotton in the best interests of farmers, as a vehicle for firms to capitalize 
on demand and make their money – just as farmers wish to capitalize on the purported benefits and 
make their money.  It is the future.  This view of what Bt cotton can present is precisely where the 
interfaces I consider here lie, and it depicts the battlefield of regulation at the level of the farm. 
 
Generations have been planting cotton here, and yet here is a new variety, sold on the premise of 
doing something that no other variety has done before; lessening the amount of pesticides that need 
to be applied.  While perhaps in 2005 some farmers simply did not spray pesticides, they quickly 
found out that Bt cotton does need pesticides.  Not only that, there are viruses that need to be 
controlled, fungal infestations, new spacings between plants, and soil compositions that have to be 
considered.  These are not necessarily new concerns for any cotton farmer, but this sudden leap – 
first from OPVs saved and reused by farmers, to heavily subsidized local varieties offered by the 
government, to hybrid varieties offered by the private sector, and now Bt event hybrids primarily 
licensed from Monsanto, the rapidity at which farming practice has changed – or at least has ought 
to have changed – has been unique and unprecedented.  And herein lies the challenge of using Bt 
cotton: how do you use it?  No one farmer appears to be really sure.   
 
But everybody is paying attention.  Farmers either check out what other farmers are doing, they 
seek out information from agrodealers, they try, make mistakes, learn, and try again – whatever 
they do, the fact remains that they are using Bt cotton.  Of course, some choose not to, and the 
reasons why are firmly embedded in their own framings of risk, but overall, there is a greater risk 
at stake – that of being left behind.  In adopting Bt cotton, a number of different risks are 
encountered, internalized, and navigated between interfacing parties.  This chapter will explain 
what, why, and how. 
 
6.2  The Practice 
 
Given the nature of the community, I wanted to ensure as much as possible that I engaged with 
farmers on a day to day level, both as someone who was also growing Bt cotton, but more 
generally, as a fixture in the village.  It was the only way I could gain the insights that I have; by 
spending as much time as possible with people, and by ultimately using these understandings to 
characterize better how risk is understood in practice.  There are a diversity of elements of decision 
making practice that are distinct from those that the others I have profiled here adhere to; there are 
elements of faith, notions of destiny, and a much more intimately known series of individuals who 
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have distinct impacts on how new technologies are to be used, understood, and applied.  But all 
these parties have an impact on what farmers do.  In this way, regulation at the level of the village 
is quite a different process than what I have detailed earlier in the context of the government, civil 
society, and the firm.   
 
As a result, the nature of how this chapter will unfold reflects these interactions; both those I did 
informally - over (many) cups of chai2, bowls of poha3, in mornings, afternoons, or evenings – and 
those where I formally recorded the interaction on video.  I used video to record all those I 
interacted with, where possible, though most government officials were wary of being recorded.  
But in Chikhali, it was different.  If anything, it allowed for insights that I never would have got 
otherwise, and for one main reason: I not only shot the interviews, but I also forged a space where 
farmers would also use the camera.  Farmers scripted their own narratives regarding Bt cotton and 
what it meant to them, and as I was not involved in the scriptwriting process aside from explaining 
a six to ten pane storyboard format, something quite unique occurred.  In screening these pieces to 
Chikhali at night, more discussion would occur, and more insights were gained.  Elements of these 
interactions weave their way into the case studies I present here.  The case studies are all linked to 
video content, and can be accessed by the hyperlinks embedded in the text.   
 
6.3 Characters: Growing Bt Cotton – Or Not 
 
Over the course of eight profiles, a picture will emerge where risk is linked to factors wholly unique 
to the rural, farming context.  This is key to establish. Although Chikhali may appear 
geographically removed from the administrative centres of Nagpur, Pune, Mumbai, or Delhi, all of 
the deliberations that take place in these spaces resonate in Chikhali, and for one simple reason: this 
is where Bt cotton is used, tested, validated, and accepted.  And these deliberations do affect what 
happens in these centres – not only from an administrative perspective, but also in terms of the 
firms that supply seeds, as well as the civil society groups that are closely watching (and trying to 
influence) what farmers do.  This is the interface (Long and Long 1992).  But to better understand 
the underlying context of the interface, and then by extension what is at stake in the battlefield of 
regulation, a picture of risk needs to be painted.  Chosen based on personal connections, income 
distribution, and Bt cotton adoption (or not), these case studies are here to achieve precisely this. 
 
6.3.1 More Land Means More Choices: Risk, Assets, and Adoption   
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Walk out of the main entrance to Chikhali.  Take a left.  Keep on the road for about ten minutes, 
and you’ll soon see a pathway to your right, leading to a large cow-shed.  That’s the way to 
Gajanand Patankar’s land, and chances are you will see him there if the sun is out.  If he’s not there, 
he might be in Deoli talking to the extension officer, or maybe at home; but the latter is rare.  
Gajanand’s rather high-pitched voice is in contrast with his rather large physical stature.  Usually 
wearing a flash of vermillion on his forehead, he mostly keeps to himself, his wife, and his two 
daughters.  He lives in one of the bigger homes in Chikhali, just off the main stretch; a relatively 
newly constructed home with his own well in the front, a thresher usually parked outside, and his 
black and blue Hero Honda Super Splendor motorcycle parked inside.   
 
Gajanand is somewhat unique as a farmer in Chikhali, and for two reasons.  First, he has the 
capacity to farm on far more land than most – eighteen acres based on a combination of sixteen that 
he owns, and two that he leases.  Second, unlike most farmers in Chikhali at the end of my 
fieldwork in mid 2009, he does not use Bt cotton, and refuses to use chemical fertilizers.  While the 
former is a personal choice based on the seed costing more than non-Bt hybrids, the latter is 
embedded in a somewhat different economic reality – the fact that he owns more land than others 
in Chikhali, and has a relatively larger space to experiment.  In short, his owning more assets 
affords him more pathways to mitigate risk in the face of new decisions on new processes.  The 
catalyst for these experiments is rooted primarily in his larger asset portfolio.  And everyone knows 
this.  As Sureshrao Chikhalkar, Manoj’s father, puts it: 
 
[h]e has a lot of land.  So he can take many crops.  He can bear the loss, as he’ll 
make up for it in other crops.  He can gain it in soybean - he does well with it - and 
the same with pulses and wheat, so he can grow non-Bt cotton.  But it’s not 
affordable for those farmers who have few acres of land.  How can a farmer afford 
it if he only has four acres?  He can’t take the risk.  I mean, I can’t because I don’t 
have enough land4. 
 
Gajanand strives to ensure that he gets the most out of his investment, while minimizing the facets 
of what may present unwanted outcomes – in his case, ensuring that his land remains as fertile as 
possible by avoiding chemical fertilizers, and educating himself about non-chemical methods as 
suggested by a government extension officer.  As he proudly states,  
 
[y]ou see, those farmers who are using chemical fertilizers are getting less income 
than those who use organic fertilizers.  Most people get three quintals per acre on 
soybean, but I get five.  And because I don’t use chemical fertilizers, my land is 
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really soft.  When the guy I hire with the tractor plows it, he’s amazed how soft it 
is.  It’s the same with Bt cotton; some of these guys get only five or six quintals per 
acre, but I get seven easy using non-Bt.  So what’s the problem?  Look at 
[Janardhan] Kakde [another larger landowner in Chikhali] – he sowed Bt last year 
and did OK at first, but then it all fell apart.  Even I tried it once, but then I left it.  I 
don’t need it5. 
 
But apart from his assets, there is another less quantifiable parameter – the kind of person Gajanand 
is.  The way in which Gajanand has made decisions in the face of new technologies is rooted in two 
complementary facets of his personality, something that no model of rational decision-making 
could really capture.  While risk can be stylized within a decision-making model, it is illustrative to 
understand exactly how these risks are constructed, and who interfaces with him in the context of 
decision-making and trust.  There are two dimensions that I will consider, based on two interfaces 
that Ganajand has in the context of Bt cotton adoption and two parties who purport to offer their 
expertise – the agrodealer and the government extension officer.  While one lies at a point of 
conflict due to clashing framings of risk, the other forges a more welcome space, the result of more 
matching risk framings. 
 
First, Gajanand has a very particular worldview, one that differs from most of the farmers I 
encountered in Chikhali.  He is wary of the advice of the agrodealer, and goes as far as to say, “you 
can’t trust anyone”. In his words, 
 
Farming is our responsibility, not [the agrodealer’s].  Your soil may deteriorate, 
you might get the income you expect or you might not – but no one really cares.  
Look, we just have to make money.  That’s our responsibility.  [Agrodealers] will 
say anything; ‘give this much fertilizer per acre’.  But see, that’s how they get paid.  
Meanwhile, our land gets destroyed forever, along with the cash we earn.  Getting 
decent yields is our job, those guys will say anything, so forget them.  Dealers can’t 
tell us what these chemicals might do to the land.  I mean, if a dealer did, how 
could he make money6? 
 
In this way, he is wary of allowing the incentive structures of an input dealer to interfere with his 
own decision-making processes.  Both the farmer and the input dealer are entrepreneurs, and both 
are most concerned with the bottom line – turning a healthy profit.  The difference lies in what 
happens post decision and outcome, and who is ultimately responsible for the outcome.  In his 
view, an agrodealer has little interest in whether suggested inputs are effective or not. Farmers are 
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ultimately accountable to themselves, and themselves alone.  This is further illustrated by his 
response to a query regarding the existence of a guarantee.  When asked if he felt that there was 
such a thing, he opined that:  
 
[t]here is no guarantee on anything.  Nothing.  If we buy something today, what 
will happen to it tomorrow?  No guarantee.  If we plant seeds today, we have no 
idea how much we will get tomorrow.  I mean, life has no guarantees.  I might die 
tomorrow.  Some people want a guarantee.  Some people say, ‘I’ll do well this year 
for sure’.  But if you ask them why things didn’t work out they’ll say, ‘oh, there 
was poor rain’, or ‘I should have sprayed one more time, that’s why it didn’t go so 
well.’  But you know, really, there are no guarantees.  And you can’t believe in 
anyone either, especially in this current age of Kali Yuga7. 
 
Gajanand presents a picture of a farmer who has internalized the risks of farming as much as he 
can, but does so given his richer asset portfolio.  While he recognizes that there are certain risks that 
he cannot account for – “I mean, this year I had to sow cotton twice because the rains were bad.  But 
whatever I spent is spent – it’s not coming back” – when it comes to those elements of his enterprise 
that he can control, he places the responsibility of steering it effectively squarely on his shoulders, 
and his alone.  As he further argues, “who drowns, the farmer or the dealer?  If you owe money to 
the dealer, will he forgive that?  No. You have to pay it back, today, tomorrow, sometime8.”  
 
However, and unlike his distrust of the agrodealer, Gajanand does place trust in government 
extension officers, based on his observations of how the advice that the officer gave him has been of 
benefit to him, but also due to how he perceives the role of government.  Again, this sets him apart 
from most other farmers I encountered in Chikhali, who have a fairly sceptical view of how useful 
and relevant information shared by these agents are.  Unlike most other farmers, he has been using 
non-chemical methods for five years, as based on an interaction he has had with a state official.  It is 
here that his understanding of risk take a detour.  In his view, the state does have valuable 
information to share, and in this way, it also serves to mitigate his risk burden.  In his words: 
 
“I started using cow dung for fertilizer about five years ago.  I mean, it’s cheaper 
than chemical fertilizers, but it’s also better for the soil.  I never used a lot of 
chemical fertilizers anyway, but the real change happened after speaking with Mr. 
Parathe (the district agricultural officer).  He gave me a book on organic 
agriculture9, and I read it.  So the first year I tried it as an experiment, and for the 
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past four years I’ve kept doing it.  But, that kind of experiment is only possible 
because I have a fair bit of land – I can diversify my risk10.  
 
While this is, he argues, reflective of his own asset portfolio, it is also reflective of a somewhat 
contradictory relationship between himself and those who can provide advice, mandated or 
otherwise.  While he is wary of the agrodealer given what he perceives as his self-serving incentive 
structure, the same does not hold true for a government official.  When pressed as to why this 
seeming contradiction exists, he responded: 
 
Well, OK, but the government is working for the welfare of farmers.  It’s doing 
good work.  But you know, only some people will get benefits.  That’s the way it 
works – the government is trying their best and some things will work out, others 
won’t.  But I trust them.  As far as corruption, well, it’s kind of our own fault.  If we 
pay them bribes, we just make them greedy.  If we give them 2000 or 5000 rupees 
for something to be done, it becomes a habit.  So they take liberties with us, stop 
the work until we pay them.  So we pay them; ‘here take this 4000, do it fast’.  I 
mean, who wouldn’t take the money?  These guys can’t work against the 
government, but they possess power, so they will use it.   But still, we have to have 
some faith in them.  I mean, we should.  Right now, I’m building a shed on my land 
that will cost one lakh, and I am counting on getting a 30,000 rupee subsidy.  I will 
get it.  Maybe in one month, maybe two, but I filled out all the paperwork, and I 
have faith.  Some people are in far worse shape than me.  They really need 
subsidies. Poor people have expectations, but sure, they’re not all the same.  Say 
today you are not doing well financially, and I am.  But if you get assurance from 
the government, you have to have hope.  We’re not all the same in terms of 
opinions and assets.  If someone borrowed cash and did his best, well, he has to be 
concerned about it.  I mean, what else can he do?  He has to have these 
expectations11.   
 
This all serves to illustrate one thing – in owning more land, a farmer like Gajanand can afford to 
take more risks, and most crucially, to avoid Bt cotton.  In his view, Bt cotton not only implies a 
higher cost burden, but also presents the risk of damaging his primary asset – his land.  But at the 
same time, it is coupled with a distinct relationship between those that are in a position to give 
advice; the agrodealer and the extension officer.  While he recognizes the entrepreneurial drive of 
the dealer – in many ways it is quite similar to his own – he also recognizes that the dealer can 
never be held accountable to anything he suggests.  Conversely, the extension officer, as a 
 171 
representative of the state, is accountable.  And though he is aware of the corrupt nature of many of 
these state agents, he again places the burden of how and who generates such perverse incentive 
structures on farmers themselves.  
 
In this way, Gajanand constructs risk as a function of his relatively higher asset holdings, which 
allows more room to experiment, just as he has done with the advice of Mr. Parathe.  But, the 
underlying theme is that higher asset holdings allow for not only a greater capacity to experiment, 
but also perhaps a more agreeable interface between a farmer and an extension officer.  In terms of 
regulation, this is the consequence of his particular framings of risk – his decisions are affected by 
his asset holdings and his view of two sources of expertise – the agrodealer and the government 
extension officer).  In short, regulation here is a function of how much risk one can take based the 
amount of assets you own, which interfaces with a source of expertise that has been validated due 
to a measure of trust.  But, there are more places to place trust in that a person alone.  
 
6.3.2 Decisions and Faith: Destiny, Decisions, and Dharma 
 
There is one Hindu temple in Chikhali, located at the opposite end of the main entrance.  It serves 
not only as a place of worship, but also a meeting point, a source of shade on hot afternoons, a place 
to sit, chat, and call those passing by to join you in a cooler place.  But it is not the singular focal 
point for faith based worship.  All Hindu households in Chikhali have their own shrines within 
their homes, where food is offered on a daily basis, framed prints of Ganesh and local saints are 
hung and adorned with flowers, coloured lights are turned on at night to illuminate them in the 
absence of sunlight. There are similar points of worship in farmers’ fields, particularly after the 
onset of the summer monsoon, when seeds are first sown.  The first thing that farmers do before 
beginning the day’s work during the July sowing season are to break a coconut, offer a piece and a 
spoonful of coarse sugar to everyone present as prasad12, and to then apply a mix of vermillion 
powder and rice to ones forehead.  
 
But this is not merely about adhering to historical-religious practices.  In the context of risk, such 
practices are a window into how farmers here locate duty and faith into farming practice.  
Performing such activities prior to sowing allows a means to ensure – from the perspective of faith - 
that the season’s crop will be a good one.  As Sharadrao Chikhalkar, a close family friend of Manoj 
and his father in particular, puts it, “if we don’t perform our duties, if we don’t worship God, then 
God will not do anything.  If we do, then whatever God has written will unfold.  And we can just 
relax, be secure in that knowledge13.”  There may be order in the universe, but the only way to 
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ensure that the future unfolds in a predictable, manageable way is not based on ones current action 
alone.  There is a deeper design at play, and there are roles that are to be adhered to if one wishes to 
acknowledge this design and allow it to guide ones path.   
 
As the quote in the introduction makes clear, farmers look at the notion of risk as being central in 
farming regardless, and such practices are borne not only of tradition and nostalgia, but a keen 
awareness of the uncertainty that farming presents.  While Gajanand represents someone who 
holds himself entirely responsible for his own decisions and frames risk accordingly, other farmers 
in Chikhali work around these parameters in different ways.  Risk means something distinct to 
someone who believes that future outcomes have a predetermined trajectory.  This is particularly 
relevant when a means to manifest these future outcomes is perceived as presented in a particular 
text – in this case, the Mahabharata and the Bhagavad Gita.  In a similar way that the government 
frames risk according to losing the biotech race, faith based risk framings establish that the 
interfaces that characterize the battlefield of regulation are not merely between individuals, but also 
with practices, beliefs, and as a vehicle, ambition.  In this context, decisions are framed by doing the 
‘right’ thing now to manifest the ‘right’ outcome later.  This certainly applies to all the parties 
detailed here.  But the departure on the farm is that what is ‘right’ is often based on what these texts 
dictate.   
 
The interface this case study will illustrate is between new technologies and faith based systems of 
decision making.  If there is perceived order, then the established narrative of expected utility 
theory in the context of the microeconomic “rational agent” becomes less tenable.  Risk averse 
behaviour becomes more difficult to assume when faith dictates actions that may appear to counter 
the decisions that risk averse, rational agent is supposed to make. In particular are how decisions 
are to be made in the context of duty, or dharma.  An older farmer, one of the oldest residents of 
Chikhali argues, 
 
[f]armers must work in his field whether he faces a loss or a profit from it.  God 
says that man must not have any expectations while performing his duty.  Farmers 
must do his work even if he plunges into the pond of debt.  If one enters the field of 
agriculture, he can’t divert from that path. It is the kind of web in which we are 
caught.  Just like Abhimanyu14 was caught in a maze and died there, we are in the 
same situation15. 
 
While an ideal that many aspire towards, forgoing expectations is far more difficult to manifest in 
practice.  However, the level of faith one has in sticking to the “path” can offer a sort of insurance 
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against undesired outcomes.  One can internalize the potential of harm by concluding in the face of 
an unwanted outcome that “it was God’s will”.  In the end, if the farmer has performed all of his or 
her duties to the best of his or her ability, then observed outcomes are, a consequence of these 
actions.  In this way, the risk present within farming becomes something that is reflective of two 
dimensions.  On the one hand, how past observations are used as a means to project future 
consequences.  Farmers are acutely aware of the experiences of their peers in using Bt cotton, and 
they base their decisions on these cues.  This mirrors the rational agent of conventional economics 
of  risk.  But on the other – and this is what distinguishes the farmers I have met from the rational 
agent, and why this case study is key in the larger picture of rethinking regulation – future 
consequences are not always determined by past and current action alone.  Destiny complicates 
matters.  As Sharadrao further argues, 
 
[l]ook, God won’t tell you to do anything.  It’s our responsibility to think and act 
for ourselves. But at the same time, whatever does happen is God’s will.  I 
wouldn’t want to know the future.  If you came to know, it would just disturb you.  
But the future is written in the scriptures, in the Gita.  It doesn’t matter if you are 
Hindu of Buddhist; if you read what Ambedkar says and follow it, your life will 
unfold smoothly16. 
 
In such a framework, the emergence of Bt cotton presents a conundrum. How does faith based 
practice interface with technology adoption?  If farming is a duty, and the future is predetermined 
and manageable based on doing the “right” thing now, where does Bt cotton fit in the decision 
making process?  Does it offer a way out of the maze?  And if it does, then would it not be in the 
interests of a farmer to capitalize on it in order to take care of themselves?   
 
In explaining why Bt cotton has been so widely adopted, another farmer, Gopal Virpate, links the 
emergence of the technology to the current age of Kali Yuga, something Gajanand also referred to.  
In his words: 
 
This is the age of science – Krishna told this to Arjuna.  It’s written in the scriptures 
– in these times, everything will be hybridized, and nothing pure will remain.  
Look around – what’s original now?  This all started 20 years ago.  We used to 
grow our own cotton, but not anymore.  We’re losing our traditions, and nature is 
not pleased.  And if we upset that balance, everything will be lost.  We aren’t 
controlling our own temptations, and that’s why we are suffering.  If we took 
control of our temptations, we wouldn’t use Bt cotton.  It costs more, and though 
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we get higher yields from it, it’s destroying our soil.  But people don’t think about 
the future.  They just want to get by today.  But the thing is, we can’t really predict 
the future anyway, because tomorrow is out of our hands.  There are no 
guarantees.  But: if you want to change this situation, you’ll have to put your faith 
in God.  Though you’ll suffer along the way17. 
 
Gopal argues that tradition withers in the face of the promise of higher yields, but with 
consequences – the balance of nature will be upset.  This notion of “nature” appears here rooted in 
religious belief, but also meshes with how NGOs such as YUVA frame the adoption of Bt cotton as 
being “unnatural”.  Yet at the same time, this is not merely a product of decisions made by farmers; 
it is reflective of the current age.  Rather than Bt cotton being a product of intensive research and 
development, of a deliberative process of technical risk assessment, political risk manoeuvring, or 
economic risk mitigation, it is merely a predetermined fact of life – it is reflected in a broader plan.  
And according to that plan, it will be successful as both a marketed good as well as a technology.  
Gopal recognizes the technical benefits that Bt cotton can offer, but also recognizes the power of 
temptation; after all, farmers in this current age are prone to avarice and vice.  Given that, any 
decision-making time horizon is bound by immediate needs, with little consideration for future 
gains.  While some would argue this is reflective of income limitations and asset portfolios, Gopal 
would disagree – this is not about what farmers can or cannot do, but rather the fact that such 
behaviour is reflected in what the scriptures have indicated.  Bt cotton and the rapid adoption of it 
are less a consequence of market dynamics and risk assessment.  It is more a consequence of the 
time that farmers like him find themselves within. 
 
The nature of regulation on the farm is firmly bounded by notions of risk, but this particular 
construction is wholly unique to any of the other constructions that have preceded or will follow.  
This is something no formal system of regulation can capture, and yet it significantly propels the 
decision making calculus of farmers like Gopal and Sharadrao.  The interface here is between faith 
and new technology adoption, and it does not exist in a vacuum.  Demand in such a context is not 
merely a parameter that can be estimated – it is a function of something far less quantifiable. The 
emergence of Bt cotton fits in the wider scheme of things.  Adoption is merely a matter of following 
the cues – cues that are either accepted as being part of a larger, predetermined picture, or cues that 
are observed empirically in the present. 
 
6.3.3 Everybody Likes To Watch: Intra-farmer Exchange, Progress, and Risk Mitigation 
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While the previous two cases addressed assets and faith respectively, the next three cases will 
consider a more instrumental basis for making decisions under uncertainty; the actual information 
that farmers have access to, either via watching other farmers, word of mouth, or technical 
information gleaned from agrodealers and agricultural extension officers.  While on the surface, it 
might seem that these elements of information would be the most obvious place to look in 
characterizing the complex web of risk framings that farmers weave in the context of regulatory 
practice.  But as these cases all point out, there are far from simple characterizations that render this 
picture clear.  This first case study will address something that others have considered in some 
detail.  For instance, in Stone’s study on Bt cotton in Andhra Pradesh (2007a: 72-73, 2007b: 208), he 
refers to a process of agricultural deskilling; where farmers do not simply observe outcomes and 
decide, but rather develop new methods on how best to use the technology under variable 
conditions – it is, as he puts it, “the disruption of an ongoing process of skilling”, a “disruption of 
the balance between social and environmental learning that is instrumental in farm production”, 
and ultimately, a “degradation of the farmers’ ability to perform”.  But while the arguments of 
these studies are recognizable in this work, there are other elements that these studies have not 
captured.  Aside from the “fads” that Stone (2007a: 78) has observed, there are more embedded 
means that farmers I have observed use to navigate the new farming landscape that Bt cotton 
presents.  And unlike Stone, I have observed farmers being quite critical, evaluative, and observant 
of the agro ecological realities of what they observe around them. 
 
First and foremost, farmers are keenly aware of what everyone else is doing.  This either happens 
by way of conversations, or by way of stealth.  In such a small community like Chikhali, it’s hard – 
indeed impossible – to not know the details of what is going on in the next house.  This applies to 
marital troubles, drug abuse, extramarital affairs, earnings, and all the elements that make up for 
juicy gossip anywhere in the world.  But along with this is farming practice.  It is central as a means 
of livelihood, and if someone is doing something well – especially if they are doing it differently – 
others will get to know about it.  As Bhimrao Wasekar is another rather unique farmer in Chikhali – 
he is utterly convinced of the benefit of Bt cotton, and frames its adoption on the premise of 
progress.  His wife, someone who sells her services as labour during the growing season, depicts 
the following picture of how information spreads: 
 
[w]hen we go to work in the fields we ask farmers, which variety is this?  Where 
did you get it?  What is the name of it?  I collect all that information from them.  
Whether it is wheat, gram, or any other type of crop.  And then when I go to meet 
women, I also tell them, ‘this variety is grown in that farmers field’.  We have 
discussions like this.  I also tell these things to my husband at home, that we went 
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to that farmer’s land and the cotton is doing really well over there, each plant has a 
lot of bolls.  It has become my habit now, when I go to any field, I count the bolls 
and ask about the variety.  I always take such information, because I’m interested 
in farming. Sure, some farmers are reluctant to share information; they think that 
other farmers should not get income like that, so they keep quiet.  But see, we can 
bring the labels [of that which we planted] home.  Once there was a wheat crop in a 
farmers’ field, a new variety, and it looked good.  But no one was prepared to tell 
us when we asked.  We asked both men and women, but no one was ready to tell, 
until finally a third partner came and told us that this variety is called “Baliram”.  
So we got the information anyway18. 
 
You can’t really keep secrets.  But the desire to know what is going on in the fields of other farmers 
is not just for the sake of curiosity alone; farmers compete with one another.  There are elements of 
pride, of outdoing the other, of showing the other farmer up.  And this is especially the case with Bt 
cotton.  As Dilip Taywade, a former sarpanch and someone who has close political links notes, 
 
look, farming is what we do.  And since everyone knows each other here, sure, 
there is an element of competition.  Everyone wants to be successful, and if you are, 
people want to know why and how.  So we do compete.  The thing is, some people 
are willing to share their secrets, and others are less willing.  But that depends on 
the kind of person you are19. 
 
Or, as Prashant Raut, a relatively successful farmer who uses his political contacts as well as 
possessing a strong work ethic observes, “sure, many farmers ask me how I do what I do, and I 
have no problem in telling them what they want to know.  But others don’t share that information 
because they are selfish.”   
 
Farmers know that there is something special about Bt cotton – they know that it has been very 
successful for some farmers, based on a combination of what they have observed when firms invite 
them to see trial plots, of news articles they may have seen or read, and of course word of mouth.  
And beyond word of mouth is something more applied; it is the capacity to observe first hand how 
Bt cotton has performed in the fields of other farmers in Chikhali.  As Ravi Thool, a recent convert 
to Bt cotton, recalls,  
 
I had visited a trial plot of cotton once [outside of Chikhali].  It had large branches, 
two to three feet in width, and it was as taller than a man and with around one or 
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two hundred bolls to each plant.  I went there myself to visit.  I’m not lying.  And 
the quality of cotton was very good.  Generally cotton doesn’t get bolls until it is 
mature, and usually, after twenty-five bolls, the cotton plant dries out.  But there 
was something special about this variety.  And it’s not like it was a limited plot, it 
was eleven or twelve acres of it.  So if the question is whether or not there some 
farmers who are doing that well: yes, there are - it’s true.  But the thing is, farmers 
here will select it based on their experience, not just because they have faith in what 
others have done.  An illiterate person or a person like me will purchase it as an 
experiment, not as a belief or trust at very first - because it’s a private good.  
Thinking like this, people will use it for the experience.  Then next time we will 
come to know what really it is. In this case, I will not trust it at once – it’s still 
something sold by a private company. I’ll let someone else buy it and then I will 
see what the result is.  That way I can observe his experience and see what 
happens20. 
 
But this does not occur without a bit of soul searching.  While Bt cotton does present the possibility 
of something new and exciting, there is also an embedded conflict between Bt cotton as a new 
technology burdened with what many have previously argued as detrimental effects on the soil, 
and then observed experience where empirical evidence seems to counter that.  Again, from Ravi: 
 
[w]ell, I used to think that our land is our mother, and that we can’t spoil it. But 
now everyone is growing Bt Cotton, saying that there are no side effects of it.  
Those people that used to say it was bad are now growing it.  I figured if they were 
doing so well, why shouldn’t I?  So even I have been growing Bt and I haven’t seen 
any side effects.  Sure, we have to make some changes while growing it, like the 
agrodealer said.  I heard 95% of all the cotton in India now is Bt. Anyway, here, so 
far, it seems to be doing well.  Farmers are getting good income from Bt. Maybe 
here in Chikhali the cultivation of cotton is less [compared to soybean], but those 
that do seem to getting more income from it.  And if we are getting more benefit 
from changing our practice and using Bt cotton, there should be no objections.  If 
we try it, then we can get to know what the problems might be.  And we can then 
change our practice in the future, or keep on using it in the same way.  This is the 
decision I have made21. 
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Risk here is mitigated by direct observations on the one hand – environmental learning as Stone 
would characterize it - but it is also tempered by social learning, underpinned by a desire to 
succeed and to achieve progress.  And progress means something fairly explicit. 
 
During one exercise where a number of farmers scripted a video storyboard on what progress 
means, the following picture emerged over fourteen “scenes”.  Historically, farmers were indebted 
to crooked moneylenders, and due to illiteracy, were not able to gauge who is truly effective and 
trustworthy in terms of information.  The main problem was illiteracy – it led to not using birth 
control, large families, and due to income constraints and the inability to send children to school, 
and more illiteracy among the younger generation.  This illiteracy also plagued farming practice, 
with farmers not realizing how to use new inputs, and wasting resources in the face of this lacking 
awareness.  As a result, farmers would resort to theft and other illicit means to make ends meet.  
Fifty years ago, farmers were embedded in tradition, and due to lacking technological innovations, 
would only get a quintal per acre.  They would have to borrow money from moneylenders – not 
only for farming, but also for their other needs; namely a desire for status.  But often, this money 
would be wasted on alcohol, gambling, or marriages instead.  The farmer would default on the 
loan, and would lose his land.  But through it all, the farmer did (and does) possess the skills 
needed – the issue is literacy. Farmers want to become educated, but society “pulls you down” – 
education is freedom, and others discriminate against those who seem poised to progress, 
especially based on caste lines.  However, the 1970s saw the emergence of the Green Revolution, 
which allowed many farmers to prosper.  And that was progress – economic freedom.  Now, 
however, things seem to be getting worse again.  Illiteracy is still rampant, and Bt cotton requires a 
particular way of doing things, something most farmers are not doing.  It seems costs are going up, 
yields are going down, and the soil is suffering.  As a result of all this, there is less and less interest 
in farming, and more quarrels among farmers; history seems to be repeating itself. 
 
Social learning and environmental learning are thus complementary, and both are occurring, but 
behind it all are constraints, primarily access to information on how to use new technologies.  And 
this is what characterizes the relatively slow rate of progress as stated by the preceding storyboard.  
The risk here is thus an analogue to the economic risks faced by the government – to “win the race”.  
The difference here is that the “race” is more localized; winning in Chikhali means doing better 
than your neighbour, being informed, and achieving “progress” in the face of real challenges.  
Regulatory practice in this sense is based on what farmers observe – environmental learning – but is 
equally tempered by the localized factors that emerge out of intra farmer dynamics – the desire to 
progress and to show it to others.  The environmental leaning aspect addresses how information is 
shared, and the social learning aspect addresses how (and why) it is used.  The risks are not only 
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borne of encountering a new technology like Bt cotton, but also that of proving that you, as a 
farmer, can keep up.  And if you have the right connections and the right information, then your 
chances of doing so increase.  This is something that the next two cases will illustrate. 
 
6.3.4 The Agrodealer: Expertise, Entrepreneurship, and Incentives 
 
The town of Deoli is centred around the state bus terminal, and is home to about 16,000 people.  
Directly opposite the bus stand is a “T” junction.  If you stand with the bus stand behind you, to the 
left is the road to Wardha, the district capital, and on the way you will pass the taluka 
administrative offices, then the APMC yard, and finally the district KVK before a 20 kilometre 
stretch to Wardha.  To the right is the road to Yavatmal, and if you take the first left down that 
road, you’ll eventually get to Chikhali, though not after a few more lefts, rights, newly installed cell 
phone towers, temples, and field after field of cotton and soybean. 
 
One can get most things in Deoli; shoes, clothes, rope, farming tools, and sweets.  But most 
importantly in the context of this research, Deoli is home to four agrodealers.  Out of the four, one 
in particular stands out – the shop owned by Sushil Umre.  I came to know of Sushil early during 
my time in Chikhali, as he is the most trusted agrodealer in the area.  Many farmers in Chikhali 
referred me to him.  He has been there for twenty years, and he is both respected and quite 
successful as a farmer himself.  His shop serves as a combination of a retail outlet, a walk-in crop 
clinic, and to a lesser degree, a meeting place.  He’s usually there, a man in his mid fifties, either on 
the phone, considering the leaves of disease affected cotton or soybean that farmers from around 
the taluka bring to him for his diagnosis and remedy, or tending to customers, visitors, and fellow 
agrodealers.  When we initially met and I explained to him what I was doing, he seemed to wonder 
what I could possibly want to know; clearly, Bt cotton has been a success, so what more does one 
really need to know?  But over the months to come, he took a keener interest in what I was trying to 
do.  Especially when I decided to grow Bt cotton myself.  But I will address that aspect of this story 
later. 
 
Sushil is both a successful farmer as well as a savvy businessman.  He has been abroad on the ticket 
of Bayer to visit agro business trade fairs, he can recite the names of pesticides and fungicides like 
poetry, and he does know what he is talking about.  He is genuinely excited about these new 
products, and he does want to help farmers.  These are all factors that locate where his success lies.  
But one does not become a successful businessman on being an altruist alone.  He has his own 
 180 
incentives – as Gajanand has clearly indicated – that propel his enterprise on distinct parameters.   
On one hand, he sees himself as a source of information.  In his words, 
 
[f]armers come here to get more information and to get guidance.  Whatever it 
might be – on cultivation methods, pest infestations, or fertilizers.  We discuss it, 
and I provide proper guidance.  So I’ve forged relationships with many farmers.  
Extension workers on the other hand neglect their problems, because they only 
know about the older methods.  We all know private sector companies are doing 
research towards new ways of dealing with diseases.  So farmers come to me for 
good on proper guidance on that, because someone has to.  They need it22. 
 
In this way, he sees himself as filling a gap of sorts.  When farmers are faced with the novel 
challenges that arise from the adoption of new technologies, he is there to address and mitigate 
their risk – in this case, the technical risks of the efficacy of the technology in the face of a paucity of 
information on how to use it.  In this way, he is a risk broker; he provides information to farmers 
who face new, previously unforeseen challenges in their craft.  But, he also possesses a desire to 
capitalize on an information gap that the government should be filling.  As he sees it, he bridges a 
gap that the government is mandated to fill in theory, but is unable to given their parallel mandate 
of only providing assistance on government sanctioned varieties. And aside from the CICR 
developed Bikaneri Nerma variety of Bt cotton – which by all accounts has been a failure – there are 
no government varieties of Bt cotton.  So someone like Sushil is, in many ways, the only channel 
farmers have to get up to date information on how to use Bt cotton.  But at the same time, he has his 
own frustrations about how farmers look to him to mitigate their risk. 
 
Look, the soil needs fertilizer.  If a farmer doesn’t apply it, how can he succeed?  
But these farmers only know about the give and take – they don’t really pay 
attention to what you have to do in between.  And as long as they don’t understand 
what you have to do between planting and harvesting, they’ll think that Bt cotton 
is defective.  If a farmer makes the right decision at the right time in terms of when 
to apply these inputs, they will earn more money.  But of course all that said, it 
only really works if nature works with us.  That’s the first thing, and the second is 
assuming the government system works with us.  But so far, the government is 
really guilty – all their programs have failed23. 
 
And while there is also the information included the packets itself, farmers are wary of following 
those directions given the assumed cost burden that such instructions imply.  As Sharadrao 
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Chikhalkar puts it, “look, I don’t have that kind of money today, so I can’t go by the book.  I’d have 
to borrow money from a moneylender, but then what happens if I can’t pay it back?  He’d make my 
life miserable.  I just do my work according to my own methods.” But interestingly, asking Suresh 
for what essentially amounts to the same advice does not pose the same problem, partially perhaps 
due to the face that Sushil lends money in the form of inputs against future yields.  Though, when 
Sushil was asked how often he does this, he appeared somewhat uncomfortable and stated he only 
did that with “friends”.   
 
And this presents the other side of his personality, or his role of an actor in this story.  While on the 
one hand he does serve as an effective source of information in light of the challenges faced by 
farmers noted here, he is also a businessman on the other; one who is ultimately propelled by the 
incentives present in any entrepreneurial activity.  He sells farm inputs to assist farmers, true, but 
he also does it to earn money.  Vittalrao Sarvakar, one farmer who ran in the panchayat elections but 
lost, had this to say about his activities and the nature of his incentives. 
 
Those private seed sellers, those shops, they’ll say ‘this is the best variety, use this.’  
So we do, and later he’ll ask, ‘how did it go?’  Basically, he’s collecting information 
from us, and then he can sell it not only to ten, but a hundred farmers.  But at the 
same time, those shops provide the most accurate information regarding all these 
varieties24. 
 
Vittalrao’s comment points to the other dimension of his service – the explicit and accepted fact 
that, as Gajanand pointed out earlier, Sushil wants to make money, bottom line.  And this points to 
a more instrumental facet of his role.  While he is there as a trusted source of information, this is 
underpinned by an awareness that he also stands to gain a lot from farmers as a source of not only 
income, but of market information.  But all of this is known – this is not something that is kept 
under wraps.  It is accepted, because ultimately, his services are known to be of value.  It is a 
mutual exchange of information based on an interface of risks; Sushil mitigating the risks involved 
in maximizing profit subject to both cost but also, less tangibly, his desire to help farmers, and 
farmers mitigating the risk of using a wealth of new technologies with a source of advice that 
appears to be most feasible and up to date.  
 
The battlefield here is one of knowledge, and the terms of engagement is information on how to 
deal with new problems in the field.  Sushil possesses the expertise, and farmers have the resources 
to propel his enterprise forward.  It is a mutually beneficial arrangement in many ways, with both 
sides benefiting from the interface that arises when new technologies loaded with new risks 
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emerge.  But, underpinning this is one factor that can tip the balance to Sushil’s favour – he can 
prescribe whatever he wants.  New products, new varieties of Bt cotton, and new biotic stressors 
enter the realm of farming every season.  The only person who can really offer guidance is the 
agrodealer, someone like Sushil.  And he knows it.  There are many products that essentially do the 
same thing; for instance, domestically produced varieties of pesticides licensed from Japan, the EU, 
or the US.  But how can a farmer distinguish between them all?   
 
He can if he has a guide.  Enter Sushil.  It’s a great spot to be in.  Regulation in the context of private 
sector expertise is thus forged on decisions that are made under information asymmetries.  In such 
a context, the agrodealer maintains a particular bargaining advantage – he holds the cards, so to 
speak, and can lead a farmer who is facing new and unprecedented diseases down any road he 
pleases.  I have seen farmers come to his shop with soybean leaves that look like mosquito netting, 
the consequence of the army bollworm infestation that hit the region in 2008.  In such a situation, 
what can a farmer do?  He hasn’t seen this before, he does not know how to deal with it, and he 
needs to salvage what he can immediately.  And he’ll pay.  So he does.  Because there is no one else, 
apart from the government extension officers, who can help.  Regulation in the face of information 
asymmetries thus relates to who appears to have the most viable and effective means of navigating 
the uncertainty that new products and both abiotic and biotic stressors presents, and selecting this 
source of information based on the value of this information versus the explicit cost of it, tempered 
with an awareness that yes, Sushil does profit on such an enterprise, but the information is worth it.  
But what of the extension officers who have been mandated by the state to provide such advice?   
 
6.3.5 The Right Person at the Right Time: Government Extension, Schemes, and Contacts 
 
Girish Nagargoje is 27.  In 2007, he took the posting as the Taluka Agricultural Officer (TAO) for the 
circle of villages that Chikhali belongs to. He’s new at it, and though he studied for the posting, he 
does not, by his own admission, have years of experience to draw upon.  Moreover, he never really 
had aspirations to work as an extension officer – he comes from a television broadcast background, 
and his true (or at least earlier) ambitions reflected a desire to work in the broadcast industry.  But, 
as he says, “I am married now, and I needed a job.  A regular source of income was attractive – I get 
9000 rupees a month - and so I took this job.”  He hails from the Marathwada area of central 
Maharashtra – an area not known primarily for cotton, but more for soybean and pulses.  It 
possesses a different agro climactic profile, a different dialect (which was the source of much mirth 
for many farmers listening to Girish speak), and a different history. Wardha district is not his home 
turf, and everyone knows it; he is starting from this handicap.  But that is not the only one. 
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Girish is considered young, and as a result is perceived to be inexperienced.  As one particularly 
inquisitive farmer, Babarao Thool, puts it, “[w]ell, Nagargoje’s appointment hasn’t been so 
effective.  I mean, he comes here but no one even says ‘hi’ to him.  No one knows him25.”  Babarao 
discussed how, in the past, he and the prior TAO had a working relationship, one based on mutual 
admiration.  And it’s not as though government extension is not valued by farmers.  As Bhimrao 
stated that “if [the government] organize programmes and spreads information to farmers, then our 
economic benefits will increase due to more income.  People won’t accept new technology 
immediately.  And it’s not easy to accept new technology.  But it is necessary to inspire farmers26.”  
It is not that farmers have no faith in the government – quite the opposite.  In the words of 
Sharadrao, “the government is king.  It wants the best for us, and it’s trying to solve our problems – 
I mean what’s better than Bt cotton?  Why else did they authorize it?  They give us benefits, like 
direct grants with 75% up front.  Why?  Because they want development27!”  But then, there are 
frustrations as well.  As Babarao says, “besides from just ‘eating their breakfast’ [earning a steady 
income], they should improve our lot – I mean, that’s their job, right?  This PM package was 
supposed to get us goats, nothing happened.  Cows, same thing – nothing28.”   
 
These sketches of how the government is perceived presents a picture of farmers having 
expectations of the state, but ultimately being let down.  And this also translates to how Girish is 
perceived.  The problem is that Girish is new, and judging by the reaction he gleans from farmers in 
Chikhali, he is not particularly inspiring.  He is not considered on the same level as Mr. Parathe, the 
previous TAO that Babarao refers to.  The issue here is legitimacy – most farmers do not see him as 
a source of potential information that could be used to mitigate risk.  But that’s not due to his not 
trying.  I’ve seen him come to the three villages in his circle early in the morning - Chikhali would 
usually be the second - going from house to house, trying to round up people for an in field 
training session.  And, sadly somehow, based on the clear signs of disappointment on his face, 
hardly anyone would turn up, or they would make him wait, he would have to leave, and the end 
result would be him leaving increasingly jaded and frustrated.  In his words, “look, these farmers 
are lazy.  They don’t come to the farmers’ field schools I arrange, they just come for the free food.  I 
try, but no one comes!29” But as Ravi Thool, a farmer who during the last season I was in Chikhali 
finally changed his mind and decided to give Bt cotton a try observes, it’s a bit more complicated 
than that.  It’s not that farmers are lazy, but more that they know of the limitations that Girish faces.  
He opines: 
 
the information can’t get to everybody.  [Girish] will know you, and he’ll give 
information to you only.  If he doesn’t get into contact with others – if they are 
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unknown to him – well, they won’t get it.  But he has to try to reach everyone.  I 
mean, you could tell people ten times the same thing, but really if you focus on 
those who really are interested, you only have to tell them once.  And you know 
how it is; if that information is useful, and if others see that it works, the word 
spreads amongst everyone then everyone will benefit.  The government is trying to 
provide this information but it has not reached everyone.  Because farmers can’t go 
here and there, leaving their present work.  Someone will get proper information, 
but not everyone will get the same information. If the government employees will 
come here then two or three farmers will get proper information.  And more and 
more people will get to know about it30. 
 
On a similar theme, Babarao continues: 
 
He should give that information to farmers of course, but I just don’t think he’s 
particularly effective.  They should train at least ten farmers, and then those ten can 
educate others.  I mean, one person can’t teach the whole village.  That’s how he 
can be effective.  But you know, that last TAO was great; this new guy is just not as 
cooperative31. 
 
So Girish tries his best, and while Ravi might argue that he can’t get through to everyone and that’s 
not entirely his fault, and Babarao actually values the information but feels it’s not being shared 
effectively, it also appears that few seem really interested in what he has to say, at least when it is 
not backed up by empirical evidence on the farm.  So what role does he really play?   
 
Girish knows what schemes have been mandated by the state for his provision to farmers in his 
circle of three villages, of which Chikhali is one.  Girish and I spent a fair bit of time informally with 
one another, as I often was with Kiran, and Kiran and Girish became fairly close friends.  While on 
the one hand, Kiran is not above making connections with the right people (he would often tell me 
“I want to make friends with him as he knows what schemes are available”), the relationship was 
not purely strategic.  They were peers, and Kiran being his usual gregarious self would just pay him 
visits in the evening.  It was in the evenings that we would usually meet.  I had asked him how he 
actually decides who gets access to the schemes that he is in charge of managing.  It was clear that 
not everyone could – many wanted to, but there just was not and are not enough resources to go 
around.  That said, farmers navigate this reality in their own ways, something the next case study 
on political connections will detail.  But from his perspective, how could he choose one farmer over 
the other?  Was it a matter of playing “favourites”? 
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Well, yes, I have to have favourites.  In the sense that I can’t just allocate these 
schemes to every farmer.  I have boundaries I have to adhere to.  Believe me, I 
would if I could, but it just doesn’t work that way.  So the only way I can do this is 
to make relationships with particular farmers.  Some approach me and have an 
interest, and others don’t.  I mean, some just want to talk to me because they know 
I have access to schemes.  But those people aren’t the ones I select.  I select those 
that seem capable of doing these things.  People like Gajanand for instance, and 
others as well, like Babarao Thool.  I think there are about five or six that I can 
select here in Chikhali.  Is that fair?  Well, it’s all I can do.  How else could I choose 
who gets the benefits32? 
 
As Ravi has observed, Girish holds the key to government schemes.  And this presents a potential 
way to mitigate uncertainty via gaining access to short-term concessions – subsidies or grants – that 
take an economic burden off those farmers that seek to court him.  In this way, his presence relates 
to economic risks as perceived by farmers, and so when they get wind of such an emergent scheme 
– well allocations, seed subsidies, or other more infrastructure related elements as opposed to 
practice based – he is sought out.  But the response to his seeking out the attention of farmers is far 
less successful, which relates to the second role he plays – that of providing pragmatic solutions to 
the challenges of farming; new means of pest control such as integrated pest management, 
vermiculture, and so on.   
 
Although there are a handful of farmers who have faith in his advice, it is the first role that really 
characterizes the interface between what his expertise means in pragmatic terms between himself 
and farmers in Chikhali.  And given the preference that most farmers have of seeking information 
from someone like Sushil Umre, Girish has a hard time competing as a knowledge broker.  The 
information he is mandated to share just does not offer the same capacity to mitigate on farm risks 
in the eyes of most farmers, and though he is sincere, his efforts – and by extension, those of the 
state extension machinery that forms the basis for his work – are not particularly effective. 
 
In this way, the presence of Girish and the interactions that occur between him and Chikhali 
farmers in the context of risk mitigation are based less on what he could offer in terms of potential 
advice, and more on quick access to short term financial concessions.  This reflects a trend – voiced 
by Gopal in the second case study – that short term and long term planning horizons are 
dramatically difference arenas.  Moreover, it presents the basis for how farmers interact with those 
agents that are in a position to offer these concessions.  Mitigating risk is as much about what you 
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know as it is about whom you know.  And this presents a different angle to the practice of 
regulation in the context of farming practice.   
 
With all the uncertainties present in farming, a strategic farmer will make sure he knows who holds 
the keys to making that effort less risky by offering financial concessions.  It is less about what 
someone like Girish can provide in terms of information to counter these new risks – that’s 
something that Sushil offers.  It’s more about knowing the right person at the right time.  And 
Girish knows this; he also has favourites, and he knows who is more apt to listen to what he has to 
say and the opportunities that he has access to.  The interface here is based less on technical 
information on farming as a means to mitigate risk, but more on the economic incentives offered by 
the state to lessen the risk burden of farmers.  But there isn’t enough for everyone.  And the only 
way to make sure that a farmer gets a piece of it is to make friends with the right people.  Girish is 
one such person, but as the next case study will illustrate, there are other interfaces where risk is 
mitigated via personal connections. 
 
6.3.6 “Corruption is Social Etiquette33”: Politics, Bribes, Booze, and Benefits  
 
The panchayat elections occurred in Chikhali just after the summer monsoon ended in 2009.  The 
stakes were high.  Whoever was elected was guaranteed access to the schemes – the sarpanch 
represents a direct connection to central and state government sanction schemes, and if you get in 
with the sarpanch, you potentially get a fast track to these schemes.  As Girish argued, there isn’t 
enough to go around, and it comes down to who you know.  But beyond this, it’s also how you 
know, as it presents a means to mitigate the inherent risk of farming, and the risk of adopting Bt 
cotton in particular.  Political connections come to the forefront during an election, and there is a lot 
at stake.  The election frames risk in a way similar to the means by which it is mitigated via being in 
Girish’s good books, but it differs in the nature of how these connections are made.  Though in 
theory, panchayat elections are not based on political party affiliation, in practice it is what really 
distinguishes one candidate from another.  The political allegiances of farmers in Chikhali - either 
BJP or Congress – are known to all.  Again, it’s a small place, and nothing remains a secret for long.  
During a panchayat election, these allegiances are often what link votes to candidates.  The risk here 
is also about who you know, but beyond that, it is about how you know them in the context of 
political party affiliation.  And one has to choose if one wants access.     
 
In a similar way as the previous interface was about mitigating risk via personal connections to 
those who have access to schemes, in this case study, a different dimension on a related theme 
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emerges.  The interface is again primarily about material concessions as the sarpanch is the link to 
village politics and the broader taluka, district, and state machinery; he or she knows about the 
schemes and the value of what they may purport to offer.  But, he or she is again constrained by 
limits, because in the face of scarcity, not everyone can access the schemes.  The most immediate 
means by which connections are made here are via political support.  As a result of such a dynamic, 
the election I witnessed was an intense time.  There were fights, people were drunk on illegal 
alcohol given by either candidate to potential voters to woo their support, and no one really wanted 
to venture too far; the police were out in force and had little patience for drunken behaviour.  All of 
this at ten in the morning. 
 
The nights before saw serious campaigning; from house to house, the two candidates and their 
cadre of close supporters passed leaflets, urged each household to vote for them, and continued 
until ten in the evening.  The reactions were mixed, but for the most part, it was very much along 
the lines of “oh, this again…sure, I’ll vote for you.  Or him.  What difference does it make?  Are you 
really going to do the things you say you will?”  Everyone seemed conscious of the fact that, yes, 
whoever does get elected is going be that conduit to these schemes.  But the general sentiment was 
“are they really going to help me, or just their close knit groups of supporters?”  They had seen it all 
before.  But this is the process.  You campaign hard, do whatever you have to do to get as money 
votes – give people money, get them horribly drunk, or both – and hope it all works out.  Sharadrao 
was particularly descriptive of his perspective on the nature of the stakes. 
 
In any village, there are going to be two different parties.  And if one votes for one 
party and not the other, the word gets out.  Even if they used to be friends, those 
connections may be severed.  Because, whatever new schemes may arise, the 
sarpanch is the first to know.  But, he doesn’t tell everyone, and the government 
doesn’t tell farmers directly.  If anything, they can just take the money themselves, 
and we’ll never know about it34. 
 
Again, the decision to adopt Bt cotton or not hinges on a number of variables, but they all serve to 
shelter farmers, in as much as possible, against the new risks that technologies like Bt cotton 
present.  In the face of these new risks, mitigations strategies arise, and to this point, I have depicted 
asset holdings, the role of faith in decision making, access to valid technical knowledge, and access 
to monetary concessions as elements of the playing field.  But the political dimension is distinct.  
The risk here is to not align yourself with the right party in the face of the introduction of new 
technologies, uncertain weather patterns (i.e. access to well subsidy allocations), and new pest 
attacks.  Financial incentives offer a buffer against these uncertainties by mitigating cost burdens, 
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but as access to these schemes is not universal, there is an element of ensuring the right connections 
are made, and with the right people.  As another farmer who did manage to get a well sanctioned 
for his land, Prashant Raut, puts it: 
 
I applied to the irrigation office, after which I got the letter to sanction it from the 
district office in Wardha.  The officer is the husband of my wife’s sister.  It’s how 
things get done – you can’t get these things sorted yourself.  He’s also a Congress 
party member like me.  So it all came together.  I’m happy about it, I’ll get water 
this year.  You have to schmooze with these leaders; work for their party.  That’s 
the only way.  I don’t really see any problem with it. It’s better than being on some 
waiting list.  It’s all politics – corruption is social etiquette.  At the end of the day, 
these schemes are really only meant for rich people, political leaders, and their 
relatives.  So you need to make those connections.  Just make sure that after you get 
them on your side, you don’t cross their path35. 
 
 
Prashant Raut. 
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Again, access to political connections is useful for anyone, arguably anywhere in the world – no 
society is immune to back door negotiations and “fast tracking”.  But this example is distinct, 
because of the underlying context – Bt cotton is not suited for rain fed land.  Ask any farmer in 
Chikhali what their biggest challenge might be, and the answer will more than likely be “water”.  
Clearly, access to irrigation is valuable indeed.  Add to this the uncertainty that surrounds Bt 
cotton, and water becomes even more valuable.  And extend that to any of the other schemes that 
the government provides in limited amounts – credit facilities, grants, and so on – and the risks of 
not making that effort to link yourself to the right person at the right time becomes quite clear. 
Moreover, in the face of lacking information on how to best use Bt cotton, these connections become 
even more important.  As Sharadrao further argues, 
 
I don’t really know where to get this information.  I mean, one farmer says ‘go 
here’, the other says ‘go there’.  The only sure bet is to align yourself with the 
leaders; they have contact with the government officials.  And they know where to 
go and what works.  Remember, farmers won’t get anywhere acting alone, that just 
wastes your time.  People like Dilip Taywade, they know what’s up and have the 
contacts36. 
 
 Dilip, the former sarpanch of Chikhali puts it another way, 
 
Look, everyone wants the ability to exert political pressure and have power.  I had 
influence not only here in Chikhali but also at the taluka level.  I also had influence 
over who became MLA and MP, because they all need village level support.  But 
look; the main reason why village level elections are so important is because it is 
the only way people can get access to those schemes.  So everyone wants to be a 
leader37. 
 
Politics in Chikhali has little to do with anything outside the immediate area of Chikhali.  National 
elections mean little – “those guys never come here anyway”, and state level politics only matter in 
the context of MSPs for cotton.  But when it comes to representation and the more direct material 
benefits of what it can offer, politics mean everything.  Add to the mix a new technology like Bt 
cotton that is loaded with not only a lacking awareness about how to use it, but the threat of 
hitherto unknown diseases and pest attacks, and a farmer is going to do all he can to address these 
new uncertainties.  This includes ensuring that someone who is both capable of passing on the 
schemes and a “close friend” gets into the coveted sarpanch circle.  Because, as Sharadrao says, 
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“whatever new schemes are available will be first known by the sarpanch, and he’s not going to tell 
everyone.” 
 
This is the interface between local political processes and new technologies like Bt cotton.  As in the 
other cases, risk is mitigated by capitalizing on opportunities.  In this case, political allegiances offer 
a risk buffer against the uncertainties of farming in general, and given the emergence of Bt cotton 
and the corresponding uncertainties of how best to use it, a means to insure against future losses.  
What you know is key in understanding these regulatory processes, but who you know – be it 
Girish or the sarpanch – is equally as important. 
 
6.3.7 Civil Society: What Have You Done For Me Lately? 
 
Aside from government extension, the firm as locally represented by the agrodealer, and other 
farmers, there is one additional party to consider in the context of interfaces, in line with the parties 
I have identified in this research: civil society.  In July 2007, I first made contact with YUVA (Youth 
for Voluntary Action) Rural38, based on a recommendation from Divya Raghunandan of 
Greenpeace.  Affiliated with the Coalition for GM Free India (as discussed in Chapter 4), YUVA 
Rural works primarily under a mandate to provide alternatives to Bt cotton and input intensive 
farming.  They are supported by a wide variety of funders – both Indian and international – and 
their mandate is focused on sustainable agriculture, tradition knowledge preservation, alternative 
livelihoods, and gender issues.  This is a fairly wide mandate, but all of it fits nicely in the types of 
activities that donors are likely to support.  Their annual report boasts of anywhere between five 
hundred and one thousand villages that have been successfully targeted for their initiatives, with 
over 240,000 thousand farmers directly affected by their work39.  These are impressive numbers no 
doubt.  Of course, the reality of their outreach is somewhat less impressive.   
 
I explained to Divya that I was looking for an organization that was open to the use of digital video 
in their work, and she suggested them.  I first met the director, Datta Patil, and soon after one of 
their field workers, Arati Pankharaj. We met in Nagpur, I trained their staff in digital video 
production over a few days, and the following week I and Arati went to visit three villages in 
Wardha district.  Chikhali was one of these villages.  The context was to “educate” farmers about 
the benefits of “organic” cultivation.  With Arati were three model farmers: Kiran, Manoj, and 
Sharadrao.  It was my first time meeting these three.  We went to two villages, Arati did most of the 
talking to sparsely attended “information sessions” in farmers’ fields, and Kiran, Manoj, and 
Sharadrao (though for the most part Sharadrao didn’t say much, but he rarely does anyway) would 
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narrate how their experience in avoiding Bt Cotton has been a positive experience for them.  That 
night, we all slept at Manoj’s house.  And the next day, after discussing it with Manoj, I was given 
an invitation to stay. 
 
Over the next few days, I quickly came to realize that the “model farmers” tag was a sham.  All 
three of them grew Bt cotton, happily.  I found this somewhat confusing initially, then highly 
entertaining, and finally quite interesting indeed.  All three farmers got a meagre stipend for 
working with YUVA in the capacity they did.  This became apparent as the primary motivation for 
their wanting to work with YUVA.  In terms of YUVA’s objectives, no farmer I spoke to really took 
it seriously at all.  Which is not to say that there are no farmers that pursue “organic” methods, as 
Gajanand and initially Ravi have indicated.  And there are benefits that are potentially accrued.  As 
one farmer says, 
 
Non chemical farming is profitable because we wouldn’t have to buy seed – we 
could just use our own.  And organic fertilizers can be obtained easily.  Essentially, 
there are no real expenses, just hard work40. 
 
However, at the same time, others look to the kinds of suggestions that someone like Arati as being 
old and outdated.  As someone convinced that Bt cotton is the future, Bhimrao recalls that: 
 
in the old days, we used to do that kind of agriculture – what they call ‘organic’.  
We know all about that.  It’s not that I don’t trust NGOs, it’s just that I can’t really 
take them seriously. I mean if there was popular support – in the sense that farmers 
were really adopting what they are saying on a larger scale, then maybe I could 
take what they say more seriously.  But as no one really does, it just strikes me as 
kind of silly.  Besides, I’m not going to listen to some NGO type tell me about 
farming unless I can validate it myself.  They’re not farmers, so why should I trust 
what they say41? 
 
A farmer taking advice from an NGO worker like Arati is akin to a car mechanic taking advice on 
how to fix a transmission from a paan-wallah.  In the opinion of those interviewed here, they just do 
not possess valuable information based on real experience.  There is a major disconnect; the risk 
framings just don’t mesh, and moreover, there are often undercurrents of an almost condescending 
attitude among some NGO workers that does not help.  As one NGO worker not affiliated with 
YUVA mentioned,  
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First of all, farmers don’t know much about Bt Cotton.  They don’t know about 
chemical farming.  They basically don’t know how to farm on their own land, 
though as farmers they are their own boss.  When they sow seed, they consult with 
shopkeepers.  They get pesticides according to the opinions of the shopkeeper.  
They’ll ask for any kind of chemical fertilizer.  They are essentially ignorant about 
farming, and they don’t think they should be aware of these things.  They don’t 
know about Bt Cotton or its side effects.  Today’s farmer is different from the 
earlier farmer.  Therefore, it is the work of NGOs to disseminate the truth of Bt 
Cotton among farmers, and by doing so, they will stop using Bt Cotton. 
 
But this appears naïve in the face of the evidence I present here. As he further states, “I don’t think 
farmers really want development.  They are not interested in new technologies.  So we need to 
change their minds – we have to facilitate a change in mindset.”  But this focus on changing 
mindsets neglects a fundamental parameter of on farm decision-making - the fact that the time 
horizons and resource constraints of farmers in Chikhali just don’t match up with the requirements 
that the kind of farming someone like Arati promotes.  No farmer holding four to five acres of land 
can afford to leave an acre or more fallow for the two seasons required to allow the soil to 
regenerate.  Although farmers do appreciate the long term benefits that these methods can present, 
current needs outweigh long term benefits.  A model organic farmer might see the potential of the 
technique, but at the end of the day, that farmer is more than likely going to grow Bt Cotton.  It 
makes sense in the short term. 
 
In essence, the role the NGO on the ground is minimal.  They do not hold enough perceived 
expertise to be taken seriously, and as such, do not really figure into the regulatory practice of a 
farmer faced with the opportunity to adopt Bt cotton.  Their strategies of risk mitigation do not 
register with farmers who are faced with resource constraints, the fact that everyone seems to be 
growing Bt cotton, and the perception among many that Bt cotton represents progress – the future – 
as opposed to dated and old ways of farming.  This is interesting given how effective civil society 
has been on a national level, as Chapter 4 has detailed at length.  However, at a local level, they do 
not hold merit.  Yet this does not apply to civil society as a whole.  As discussed in chapter 4, the 
role of the farmers’ leader is taken far more seriously. 
 
When the first PM relief packages started to come through to farmers in Vidharba, it was big news.  
Here was the central government actually trying to directly help farmers by giving them direct 
material concessions.  While of course there were the underlying political benefits of doing so, 
farmers welcomed access to fresh grants, subsidies, and other short-term material concessions.  But 
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as I have discussed in Chapter 4, this did not come out of nowhere.  It was both a response to what 
was perceived as a crisis, but it was sustained by the actions of others – notably Kishor Tiwari. 
 
Tiwari is well respected by farmers not only in Chikhali, but all over Vidharba.  When I first went to 
his office, I found him speaking to a number of women regarding a challenge they were having 
with the forestry officials in the context of timber collection for their fuel purposes.  There were 
three other farmers from the surrounding area waiting in his office.  One farmer, Tatranji Bhagate, 
had this to say about Tiwari: 
 
My problem is that I didn’t get reimbursed by the government for the land - my 
land - that came under the dam they built.  Others did, but the government has 
been playing with my life by not giving me the money.  Because of this, we are 
really in a mess. I came here to get justice.  No one can do an injustice to me and get 
away with it.  I came here to find out what is going on, why the government has 
not paid me.  Other’s have, why not me?  If I don’t get a fair price, I’ll commit 
suicide.  I don’t have a choice.  The government should think about it.  They should 
pay me.  Tiwari can help me, I can only hope he’ll see this through for me.  I trust 
him – he’s the messiah of the poor.  If I don’t have my land, how can I get access to 
those relief packages?  I can’t.  And then my only option is to drink that poison or 
tie the rope around my neck42.  
  
And this is the distinction.  While NGOs like YUVA are not seen as offering viable information – or 
more specifically, a viable strategy to mitigate the risks of farming broadly in the face of Bt cotton as 
a vehicle of progress and wealth - someone like Tiwari does present such solutions.  They are 
admittedly short-term financial concessions, but as with all short-term concessions – coupled with 
how farmers make decisions across time horizons – this is of pragmatic use.  Civil society has 
relevance not so much with regards to farming practice, as their prescriptive measures are 
interpreted as belonging to the past.  The relevance relates to representation.   
 
Again, in the face of the novel challenges that Bt cotton presents the context of performance and 
use, someone like Kishore Tiwari can navigate the often tricky political terrain and ensure that 
farmers get material concessions.  As such, he is revered and trusted; farmers have seen what he 
can do, and in effect, the concessions he has generated serve to mitigate on farm risk.  It is a 
successful interface because Kishore is keenly aware of the nature of the time horizons that farmers 
frame risk by.  This is unlike what YUVA, whose suggestions are not based on empirical evidence 
per se, but rather a suggested means to combat the uncertainty of Bt cotton.  Unfortunately, the 
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strategy fails, because the framings of risk do not match.  It is a matter of trust, and simply put, a 
farmer will trust someone who can deliver, not someone who is politely suggesting going back in 
time.  
 
6.3.8  The Outsider: Risk And Starting From Scratch 
 
While all of these case studies illustrate dynamics that I have observed, this final case will focus on 
a somewhat unique character in this research: myself.  In the 2008-9 season, I leased two acres of 
land to try to grow Bt cotton, much to the interest and support of farmers in Chikhali.  I did this for 
two reasons.  First, I wanted to know what implications growing Bt cotton had, and I wanted to 
capitalize on both what I did and did not possess.  I had never grown anything – let alone cotton 
– and I saw the effort as a way to come to grips with what kind of information was available to 
someone who wished to do so.  As a novice, I would be starting from scratch, a position that 
would present me with the chance to “figure it out”, and, along the way, gain an understanding 
of exactly what other farmers do when faced with new, attractive technologies.  In many ways, it 
was an exercise in exploring my capacity to grapple with the wealth of information sourcs that 
are available to farmers, and to better understand by way of action what sources were 
trustworthy, relevant, and applicable in practice.  And while I did not possess prior experience 
in growing cotton, I did (and do) possess a theoretical training in the principles of action 
research (Greenwood and Levin 1988, Carson and Sumara 1997, Reason and Bradbury 2001).  
This is what lies at the core of the second reason; I wanted to involve those living in Chikhali 
with my research.  Not merely as observers, and not to merely allow for the record of my 
research – this thesis - to be the only artefact of the work we did together.  I wanted to allow the 
insights of farmers in Chikhali to become as much a component of my research as the 
observations I was making.  While the use of video addressed that in one form, the act and 
process of my taking two acres on lease provided a more pragmatic and enticing way for those in 
Chikhali to offer additional insights on what I was doing.  They were as curious as I was in 
seeing what I did, whether it could allow new insights into their own practice, and how I would 
fare in the end – both as an “outsider” but as well as someone who, after one year, was now a 
familiar fixture in the community.    
 
I think my deciding to try it myself somehow validated my time in Chikhali in the eyes of some 
farmers.  It made my role there more interesting, and I know from discussions that I had with 
farmers informally they all wondered – as they wonder about any other farmer in Chikhali – how 
my enterprise was going to unfold.  I had to ask around for land; I was not initially sure how I was 
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going to do this.  But Manoj and Kiran also helped me out, and eventually, the husband of the 
current sarpanch, Janardhan Kakde – who had 18 acres – decided to lease me two, under the 
condition that I pay for all the inputs, he collects all the produce and sells it, and whatever is 
leftover in terms of income derived from selling the yield would be his.  I would just get my cost 
back.  So it was a pretty good deal for Janardhan.  I just wanted to break even and see what would 
happen and was not aiming to make any cash. 
 
Of course, what happened was characteristic of many of the challenges that farmers face.  I had two 
acres divided in four squares – two of Bt cotton and two of non-Bt.  One of each – Bt and on-Bt - 
was meant to be irrigated, and the other two not.  Initially, all seemed to be going well. I hired 
labour to sow the seeds, and everything seemed to be fine.  Until the pump broke.  And then my 
non-Bt got infested will bollworms.  And I could not find labour to spray because everyone was 
having the same problem.  And then the rains did not come.  Compounding these uncertainties 
that I could not account for were those that I could account for, but was bound to for my own 
financial security; I was not always present in Chikhali over the 2008-9 season.  I had 
outstanding contractual work obligatons which took me back to Bombay.  I imagine this may 
have caused some farmers to question my sincerity, but then on the other hand, those I spoke to 
about it mentioned that it was normal – many in Chikhali have other obligations that take them 
out of the village for extended periods of time.  Ultimately, Kiran assured me he would make 
sure things were going smoothly on my behalf.  But of course, he had his own land to tend to. 
 
But in the end, I still broke even.  Unlike farmers in Chikhali, I never had any ambition of turning a 
profit; my ambition was more to talk to farmers to see what they would say in terms of providing 
“expert” advice, and also, who they would refer me to.  Unsurprisingly, most queries led to Sushil.  
When I told Sushil what I had set out to do, he was also very interested.  I had done a combination 
of asking farmers in Chikhali what inputs and seeds were best suited for the kind of soil of the land 
I leased as well as my own research on the internet, and so I came prepared with a shopping list of 
sorts.  Sushil read the list, considered it, and then began to suggest alternatives.  And more 
specifically, more costly alternatives.   
 
Granted, there is a particular dynamic at play here – perhaps Sushil assumed that as a Canadian, I 
would either have more income at my disposal on the one hand, but more pressingly - as it was 
clear that I was doing this for the first time without any prior experience - perhaps he thought he 
could take advantage of me.  We joked about this, but I held firm and pressed for lower cost 
options.  I knew there were domestic alternatives to BASF, Bayer, and other technologies imported 
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and distributed in India by foreign multinationals.  He relented, gave me what I wanted, but not 
without a certain element of “you’ll be sorry”.   
 
My experience in attempting to grow Bt cotton was never about the end result.  I was not concerned 
with the performance of the crop per se.  The exercise was all about information gathering – how 
would I manage to figure it out?  Who would I speak to?  How would I account for the risks of 
growing Bt cotton?  All roads lead to Sushil’s shop.  Everyone I spoke to suggested I seek out his 
advice.  It was not that farmers were wary of helping me, but more that they all agreed that Sushil 
was better placed.  Granted, as Gajanand mentioned earlier, there is his own incentive structure at 
play, something I also noticed and navigated, but no one would or did deny his capacity to share 
his knowledge.  And neither does he. 
 
Ultimately, I found myself also trusting Sushil, and placing less trust in Girish, though I respected 
both a lot for their respective skills.  Perhaps it was because I also noted that more farmers trusted 
Sushil.  Perhaps it was because I also wondered about Girish’s cache of personal experience.  The 
whole experience was fascinating and challenging, but one thing seemed to occur that I cannot help 
but notice – in spending enough time with farmers in Chikhali, I also began to adopt their framings 
of risk and regulatory practice.  I found myself speaking to someone like Dilip, because he had the 
right connections.  I also started to ask Manoj and Kiran what other farmers were planting to get a 
sense of what was the best option.  I shopped around for the cheapest source of labour, and found 
myself hiring not the cheapest, but rather someone who was close to Manoj’s family.   
 
Regulation seems contagious.  In the face of uncertainty – in my case an even deeper uncertainty as 
I was essentially making it up as I went along – I had to find out what varieties were best suited for 
the land I leased, which pesticides were appropriate, who I could trust in terms of their 
commitment to show up the next day to do the weeding, how much was a fair price for that labour, 
and so on.  But this is what every farmer in Chikhali does.  No one knows what pests will attack, 
how much and when it will rain, and how much the MSP will be come harvest time.  But everyone 
accepts that.  I know I did.   
 
6.4  Farmers In The Drivers Seat: Regulation In Practice 
 
What I experienced and saw in Chikhali - the localized nature of the terrain, the belief systems that 
dictate so much of day to day life, the girth of what is at stake (life or death in the words of some 
noted here) are so very different to what a bureaucrat in Delhi, an NGO representative in Nagpur, 
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or a firm executive in Bangalore encounters.  No doubt they also encounter and frame risks and 
interact with one another, but the arena in which they do so is often removed from the farm.  But, 
the farm is the epicentre of all this.  This is why regulatory practice as framed by distinct 
understandings of risk is so key to unpack.  The literature I reviewed in chapter two addresses 
some aspects of this, but again, there is a lack of a focus on the how farmers engage with the state, 
as opposed to the more common focus on civil society and the firm.  Yet I would argue that farmers 
are at the centre of the entire enterprise – they are what drive the market, the research, and 
ultimately, the formal regulatory process of evolution.  This is why a co-evolutionary, co-
constructed model of regulation is central to this thesis. 
 
Ultimately, all the decisions that farmers make are what propels a booming domestic biotechnology 
industry.  Someone has to buy these products, and of course, that someone is a farmer.  But what of 
the greater interface between farmers and these other three parties?  They are there, but given the 
locality, they again differ.  Civil society occupies two worlds; that of urban spaces, courtrooms, and 
television reports on one hand, but also spaces linked to the farm.  And the grand irony is that 
while what happens in the former space has a direct effect on formal, government regulation, it has 
little effect on farming practice – that regulatory system that farmers base their decisions on as 
reflected by their own unique risk framings.  The state is omnipresent, but the relationship between 
farmers is seemingly contradictory.  This is what sets the co-evolutionary process somewhat apart 
at the level of the farm; it is distinct in its direction, but at the same time, is completely premised on 
market demand. 
 
While on the one hand, farmers look to the government to ensure their welfare and characterize Bt 
cotton as something that only a benevolent state would sanction, they also are wary of the advice 
the state provides.  That role is best left to the private sector, who, though characterized as being 
profiteering, are also easy to relate to – after all, farmers are also entrepreneurs.   It is quite different 
in Chikhali in terms of regulatory practice, something that this chapter has illustrated at length.  In 
effect, this all feeds back into formal regulatory practice as conducted by the state and tempered by 
the firm and civil society, because everyone is watching farmers.  It is the true testing ground for all 
the deliberations that the other three parties engage in. 
 
Regulation as a process is characterized by spaces where the other actors detailed in this research 
may force their way in, premised on contested realms of knowledge and distinct framings of risk.  
This still applies at the farm.  Yet, farmers, by virtue of the urgency of their livelihood, enter these 
spaces automatically.  There is an urgency at hand, just as with firms and civil society, but it is 
localized in terms of the stakes of farming under uncertainty.  That urgency is at the basis of 
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farmers’ demand, and that is how they enter the spaces.  Save for farmers’ leaders who claim to 
represent farmers and are more forceful in interfacing with the government, farmers co-construct 
regulatory processes by virtue of their market preferences.  Granted, their framings of risk are much 
richer than the welfare optimizing agent of economics.  However, it is precisely these more locally 
embedded framings of risk that serve as the basis for their decision making.   
 
Ultimately, regulation as a process incorporates all of the different dynamics and interfaces that all 
the actors detailed and discussed here engage in.  It can never be about policy alone; it is the 
process, one forged on the battlefield of regulation. 
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Endnotes:  Chapter 6
                                                
1 “Talk Show” guest, 18 September 2007. 
2 Chai  is the ubiquitous sweetened milky tea found all over India.  In Chikhali it was often served in very small cups, and 
was offered generally when entering someone’s home.  I easily drank at least five to six cups daily. 
3 Poha is a preparation of flattened rice, cooked in the region I was living usually with peas, potatoes, and chillies, often 
served with a bit of mango pickle.  It is usually served for breakfast or as a snack.   
4 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 7 April 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-1. 
5 Interview, G. Patankar, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 March 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-2. 
6 Ibid. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-3a. 
7 Interview, G. Patankar, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 March 2009.  Kali Yuga is the last of the four stages that the world goes through 
as part of the cycle of yugas as described in the Indian scriptures.  It is referred to as the Dark Age because in it people are as 
far removed as possible from God, with notions of dharma deteriorating. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-3b. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The book was published by the Maharashtra Organic Farming Federation, an umbrella organization supported by a 
number of NGOs and the DBT.  Refer to http://www.moffindia.org. 
10 Interview, G. Patankar, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 September 2008. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-4. 
11 Ibid. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-5. 
12 Prasad is food offered to a deity or to a spiritual teacher, and is also distributed to devotees as a blessing.  Refer to 
http://www.miraura.org/lit/skgl/skgl-16.html. 
13 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 25 September 2007. 
14 Abhhimanyu is a character in the Mahābhārata.  Relatively young at the age of sixteen, he was chosen to fight a battle that 
was to be fought by Krishna and Arjuna, but they were otherwise engaged in battle on another front.  Moreover, he was 
chosen as this particular battle was to be fought in a labyrinth like structure, the Chakravyuha, which Abhimanyu was 
familiar with; he knew how to break into it, but not how to break out.  Ultimately, he fought bravely and alone, and killed 
most of his opponents. He was finally killed himself when a number of his opponents, in full defiance of the rules of war as 
presented in the Mahābhārata, attacked simultaneously, ultimately dying when he was literally stabbed in the back, another 
violation of the rules of war. 
15 Interview, Farmer, Chikhali, 24 February 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-6. 
16 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 25 September 2007. 
17 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 7 April 2009. 
18 Interview, B. Wasekar’s Wife, 21 March 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-7. 
19 Interview, D. Taywade, Farmer Chikhali, 12 March 2009. 
20 Interview, R. Thool, Farmer, Chikhali, 2 May 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-8. 
21 Ibid. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-9. 
22 Interview, S. Umre, Agrodealer, Deoli, 10 November 2008. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-10. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Interview, V. Shivarkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 10 May 2009. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-11. 
25 Interview, B. Thool, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 February 2009. 
26 Interview. B. Wasekar, Farmer, Chikhali, 3 October 2007. 
27 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 25 September 2007. 
28 Interview, B. Thool, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 February 2009. 
29 Interview, G. Nagargoje, TAO, Chikhali, 8 September 2008. 
30 Interview, B. Thool, Farmer, Chikhali, 12 February 2009. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview, G. Nagargoje, TAO, Chikhali, 19 March 2009. 
33 Interview, P. Raut, Farmer, Chikhali, 20 September 2008. 
34 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 25 September 2007. 
35 Interview, P. Raut, Farmer, Chikhali, 20 September 2008. Refer to http://ranaghose.com/thesisvideo/6-12. 
36 Interview, S. Chikhalkar, Farmer, Chikhali, 25 September 2007. 
37 Interview, D. Taywade, Farmer Chikhali, 12 March 2009. 
38 Refer to http://www.yuvaindia.org/subrural for more information on YUVA Rural. 
39 Refer to http://bit.ly/eLPRrf. 
40 Interview, Farmer, Chikhali, September 2007. 
41 Interview. B. Wasekar, Farmer, Chikhali, 20 September 2008. 
42 Interview, T. Bhagate, Farmer, Pandarkhawada, 9 March 2009. 
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CHAPTER 7  
RETHINKING REGULATION: PRACTICE AS A PROCESS 
Co-evolution and co-construction.  These are two themes that others working within the realm of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Jasanoff et al 2001; Scoones 2003; Millstone 2007, 2009;) 
have used to describe the process of regulation.  There is no realm of knowledge that exists in a 
vacuum, and there is correspondingly no way that policy – as a necessary reflection of these 
contested realms of knowledge - can be formed without inputs from a wide variety of actors, of 
stakeholders, of risk framings.  As these framings of risk co-evolve given the interfaces between 
these actors – whether versed in the science that generated the technology or not – policies change. 
This is why regulation as a process co-evolves according to events, and is co-constructed by actors 
who have a stake in the technology and the policy that surrounds it.   
 
While this holds true with regards to all aspects of governance in a democratic form of government, 
this argument is amplified when the technologies enter the public sphere embedded with 
incalculable uncertainties.  Perhaps more than any other example in recent memory, transgenically 
derived products – genetically modified food, crops, pharmaceuticals, the list goes on – provide real 
evidence of why.  This thesis has used the story of Bt cotton since 2002 as a case study – a uniquely 
Indian experience - and it aims to present a different way of looking at how policy is formed in 
practice.  By doing so, it presents a rethinking of regulation – that process that unfolds on a 
battlefield where multiple risk framings interface, clash, dominate, and change policy. 
 
This thesis showed, by carefully pulling apart spaces, events, characters, and most importantly, 
constructions of risk, the process of regulation is not just about formal policy. Policy and regulation 
are distinct; where policy may be a set of guidelines, regulation is that process of how policy 
actually crystallizes.  As I stated at the outset, the policies that India developed in the early stages of 
the evolution of the regulatory process certainly were premised on the assessment of scientific, 
technical risk.  But – and this is a point that I have repeated throughout this thesis – biosafety is just 
one aspect of the risk assessment and management of transgenics in agriculture.  This is what lies at 
the core of the co-construction that I argue in this research.  Scientific representations of risk co-
evolved on the battlefield, regardless of whether or not those parties involved possessed scientific 
expertise. The still ongoing battle has changed and will continue to change policy.  Some warriors 
were – and are - more adept on the battlefield than others, and the process of policy change – 
regulation – was and will continue on the basis of this dominance.  Risk management in the form of 
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policy changed given the nature of risk interfaces, and regulation is what this process of change 
encapsulates.   
 
This is the distinction between policy and regulation.  Policy may be what is on paper, but the 
process of how that policy forms - co-constructed and co-evolutionary on the basis of the 
interface of risk framings - is regulation.  Of course, if policy does not change, I am not arguing 
that regulation does not exist.  Rather, I argue that within democratic systems of governance, 
policy inevitably does change in the face of contested realms of knowledge, as premised on 
multiple framings of risk – here the uncertainty of Bt cotton - and that the battlefield of 
regulation characterizes that process.  And while this is the story in many jurisdictions, this 
thesis is about the Indian experience, something that no one has considered through this lens to 
date.  The Indian experience shows how civil society dominated the battlefield, transferring 
their framings of technical, economic, and political risks to an accepting public and a 
government that had to comply given political risks and newly enshrined legal tools used by a 
civil society claiming to represent farmers and the general public.  Politically, this presented a 
context where policy had to change.  And while the firm certainly was successful in presenting 
their framings of risk to a formal regulator that was eager to comply, given a successful meshing 
of these risk framings, the still ongoing battle has seen a evolution of these policies given the 
actions of civil society.  
 
Constructions of risk are deep and ingrained in all of us.  It is what allows us to place value on 
unknown outcomes, and it is the only way by which we can navigate the constantly changing 
world around us.  Whether our constructions are based on past events as a basis for projecting a 
future, as the standard economics literature and practice argues, or based on some notion of order 
in the universe, as farmers interviewed here alluded to, we all are faced with decisions at every 
moment in our lives.  Our capacity as humans to be analytical hinges on our capacity to make these 
decisions, and it sets us apart from all other living things on this planet.  This thesis looked 
carefully at how these constructions of risk are formed, and more specifically, how they co-evolved 
and were co-constructed.  At the core may have been science, but in practice, the nature of co-
construction put scientific expertise against non-scientific considerations.  The battlefield was rife 
with interfaces of multiple framings of risk, and scientific expertise was not a precondition to enter 
the battlefield.  What happened was more based on dominance, on particular risk framings gaining 
traction via the complex interplay between political, economic, and technical risks, and with the still 
very much ongoing story framed by these dynamics.  The years to come will see the Indian 
experience further develop, especially with the inevitable onset of transgenic food crops. And the 
 202 
framework I adopted here will still apply as a means to pull apart and better understand these 
dynamics.   
 
I arrived at this conclusion via my interactions with the four parties I profiled, but the means by 
which I interacted with them were unorthodox methodologically speaking.  I merged two 
passions into one applied trajectory – my desire for analytical rigour on one hand, and my desire 
to use the moving image on the other.  Cameras present a unique tool – as a disinterested and 
inanimate third eye, they create a very different dynamic in how people respond to queries.  
Cameras are mute observers devoid of an ego, and as such, I have found that those I spoke with 
were more forthcoming with their responses.  The tool presented an air of permanence to the 
interactions; thereby fostering what I felt was a more involved series of interactions. The use of 
video in the classic sense – documenting realities by way of an outsider entering a space and 
interacting with people on camera – may have influenced what was documented in the video 
footnotes embedded within this text.  But I would argue no more than if the camera was not 
present.  Any interaction is based on trust, and trust takes time to forge – any “outsider” doing 
ethnographic research out of his or her element is prone to this dynamic, as the anthropological 
literature on positionality has discussed at length.  Granted, the third eye of a camera lens 
creates new dynamics that may generate responses that those I interviewed would expect I 
“want” to hear.  But my methodology was precisely a response to that potential bias. I trained 
people to document their own realities themselves.  That was the point; to minimize that bias, 
that influence, that outsider perspective. 
 
In this research, members of the community – familiar to all – scripted, shot, and shared their 
own content, thereby minimizing that bias and placing what I have termed the purity of 
perspective at the core of the effort. While those I spoke to knew the documentation was for “the 
record” - that my capturing those moments, expressions, and remarks could and would be shared 
to a wider audience - they also knew that they possessed authorial agency.  In training farmers in 
Chikhali how to use video and tell their own stories, thereby allowing new spaces for their own 
narratives to emerge, I gained distinct insights. And in attempting to grow Bt cotton myself, I 
entered a new space as a researcher in Chikhali.  I was no longer merely an observer, but a 
participant.  Farmers were not merely subjects in my research, whose sentiments would filter 
into my writing via my own interpretation of their meaning, but they were given tools to 
actually author their own sentiments, on their own terms. 
 
This combination of methodological innovation and a focus on how risk fosters the co-
evolutionary and co-constructed process that embodies regulation is what sets this research both 
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firmly embedded within, but also apart, from the extant literature. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis draws from an interdisciplinary palette of references and 
frameworks.  Drawing from the STS literature, I have considered how social, political, and 
cultural contexts affect innovation.  The introduction of Bt cotton is as much a response to a 
perceived demand by farmers for a material innovation as it is a function of a desire within the 
halls of the Indian bureaucracy to be taken seriously on a global stage.  And this is of course 
forged on a far wider series of incentives than economic ones alone.  Moreover, I have 
considered how these material innovations – once released into the market, either legally or 
illegally – have acted as a catalyst for a range of social, political, and cultural engagements.  
 
For an urban middle class to become sensitized to transgenics in agriculture; for political parties 
to capitalize on their newly framed understanding of risk as a political tool; for civil society to 
carefully forge a culture of uncertainty and arguably fear among a newly sensitized public – all 
of these aspects of how the introduction of a material good borne of a rigorous scientific 
procedure resonates with a wider public are aspects I considered in detail. In an STS context, I 
wanted to address how new technologies that come loaded with the capacity to affect these 
social, political, and cultural changes, and how policy evolution responds to these changes.  That 
is, can regulation still be considered a top down process of enforcing policy based on scientific 
fact alone?   
  
Clearly, it cannot, and I have argued throughout this research that the answer is no.  Rather than 
a top down process, regulation evolves according to the multiple risk framings that those parties 
I have considered here possess.  Their framings of risk contribute to the construction of the 
process, and their actions forge new evolutionary paths of regulatory change, development, and 
application.  While STS does consider risk in great detail in the context of new innovations,  and 
how these risks interface between the multitudes of parties whom all frame risk differently, this 
research stands as unique given the nature of my carefully tracing the evolution of these 
interfaces in a developing country context.  India has presented an ideal case study to 
historically detail how regulation has evolved on the battlefield.  While others have focused on 
these collisions in the context of science and governance, precaution, participation, and risk 
framings (Jasanoff 1987; Wynne 1991, 2001; Levidow 1998; Levidow, Carr, and Wield 2000; 
Levidow and Marris 2001; Collins and Evans 2002; Wolf, Ibarreta, and Sørup 2004; Millstone et al 
2008), there is a lacking focus on the experience of the battlefield in a developing country 
context.  
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Drawing from STS, this thesis has considered in detail what “expertise” really means in the 
context of how new technologies burdened with uncertainties emerges; the story of how civil 
society risk framings asserted dominance on the battlefield, rendering the notion of scientific 
risk as the crux of formal regulation less convincing.  It has addressed how “science” relates to a 
broad public in terms of how the parties I have profiled here frame risk, and how policy has 
been affected given the nature of how this public has responded to the introduction of these 
technologies.  But as this thesis argues, it is exactly how policy is affected that actually 
represents regulation in practice – co-evolution and co-construction.  By delineating what I mean 
by a “public”, and by pulling apart how each of the four parties I consider have constructed risk, 
a clearer picture emerges as how regulation as a process evolves and is constructed.  The 
collision of risk framings on the battlefield changed formal policy, and as I have argued here, 
those battle manoeuvres and the ways in which certain framings dominated characterize the 
process of regulation.  While this is not necessarily novel in the context of the STS literature 
(Thompson and Scoones 2009), the still evolving case of Bt cotton in India has not been 
considered at this level of detail, and I would argue, not with the attention to detail in terms of 
the interfaces between the parties I have delineated and deconstructed. 
  
Similarly, the biotech literature focuses mainly on performance studies (Weaver and Morris 
2004; Chand and Raju 2008; Sarkar et al 2009).  Where the literature addresses risk, it is through 
the lens of framing of risk as biosafety; either consumer preferences based on notions of safety 
(Chen 2008; Costa-Font, Gil, and Traill 2008; Knight and Paradkar 2008), the costs and efficacy of 
maintaining biosafety regulations (Pray and Bengali 2005; Bagavathiannan, Spok, and Van 
Acker 2011; Kothamasi and Vermeylen 2011), or how farmers characterize technical and 
economic risk in the context of adoption (Ho, Zhao, and Xue 2009; Zhao, Ho, and Azadi 2011). 
Yet, as I have argued throughout, risk in the context of regulation is not biosafety alone.  Such a 
limited perspective is just not reflected in practice.   
 
Granted, the starting point of regulation in India looked at risk through a biosafety lens, but as 
soon as that process of regulation began as an applied exercise – the introduction of Bt cotton - 
other framings of risk entered the equation.  Risk could no longer be accepted to be biosafety 
alone – the notion of what it meant evolved given the risk framings of other parties; that is, their 
constructions of risk.  While some observers have considered the role of political risks, the 
precautionary principle, public opposition to transgenics, and the resultant limitations of 
reductionist approaches to risk assessment in the US and the EU (Wynne 1995, 2001; Wrubel, 
Krimsky, and Anderson 1997; Levidow and Carr 2000; Krimsky 2000; Levidow 2001; Krimsky and 
Murphy 2002) they have not lent a focus on the Indian experience from the perspective of 
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unpacking co-constructions of risk and the co-evolution of regulation based on empirical 
evidence, and the forceful entry of non-scientific risk framings into the battlefield.  This 
research does. 
 
The effects of a scientifically derived marketable good like Bt cotton left the halls of science as 
soon as it left the lab.  And while the technocratic process of managing the risks of Bt cotton may 
have been at the core of the policy that surrounded it, new risks emerged when others outside 
the realm of biosafety experts began to engage with the technology.  As the literature I have 
reviewed has indicated, there was certainly a wealth of often conflicting quantitative studies on 
whether or not Bt cotton was a success, and indeed, much of the criticism against it was forged 
on an argument that the technology is not ‘safe’.  But again, in the limited worldview that 
presents risk as biosafety alone, safety can only be defined on these correspondingly limited 
terms.  As this research has pointed out, there are many ways of framing risk.  And given the 
nature of the technologies at hand, these other framings force their way in, forging the 
battlefield of regulation.  The battle rages in India, but the process will remain one where the 
process is co-evolutionary and co-constructed by those with enter the battlefield. 
 
While the vast amount of literature on regulation that I have reviewed in Chapter 2 certainly 
offers a firm bedrock on which to base any deep consideration of what regulation really means, 
there are some areas within that canonical literature that have not address the elements that I 
have. As discussed at length in chapter 2, the economics literature has considered regulation 
from the perspective of relationships between the firm and state.  However, there are other 
parties that have relationships with the firm and state;  more than two sides populate the 
battlefield, and public-private partnerships (Kinde 2008) – though a key trend in the ongoing 
Indian story – is not the only lens through which to consider these interfaces.  Armed with 
distinct and opposing risk framings, the state has a far more complicated role in governance than 
the economic literature I have reviewed here presents.  The formal policies it administers co-
evolve with the risk framings asserted by parties outside the halls of the Indian government 
given the diversity of market epistemologies that mirror the different framings of risk.   
 
This is a distinct take on the Bt cotton story in India from the perspective of the economics 
literature. Some observers of this technology have concluded that regulation is still forming in a 
developing country context (Raney 2006), while others have noted the political risks implicit in 
implementing policy (Qaim 2005).  But there little that encapsulates the interfaces between all 
four parties systematically via deconstructing risk framings. And while quantitative risk is 
addressed in the literature, the vast amount of culturally embedded reference points renders 
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probabilistic calculus insufficient to better understand the framings of risk involved.  The 
economics literature is dominated by such assessments of economic risks (Chen and Tseng 2006; 
Shankar, Bennett, and Morse 2007; Bryant et al 2008; Crost and Shankar 2008; Shankar, Bennetta, 
and Morse 2008; Morse and Mannion 2009; Lybbert and Bell 2010; Eggert and Greaker 2011).  
Those that do address non-quantitative risk may consider technical, economic, and political 
dimensions (Guehlstorf 2008), but not the interfaces between the four parties I have considered 
here, and how these interfaces trigger regulatory evolution.  
 
While governance has been addressed in the political science literature in the context of 
metaregulation, much of this discussion has focused on the role of civil society.  Of course, this 
cannot be ignored – in the story that this research presents it has been key, and their framings of 
risk have often dominated the battle.  The reasons why the notion of metaregulation ring true 
here is made more tractable – the Indian experience as I have detailed it offers a basis to apply 
this notion in an applied fashion; again, something that has not been done previously. While 
some observers have considered risk in the context of governance (Chataway 2005) or along the 
lines of the role of civil society and political and technical risks (Ramaswami 2007) they have not 
pulled apart the story in India along the lines of interfaces, have not identified the three streams 
that I have, and have not focused on the Indian experience.  
 
Political risks often trump all others. There are many more who enter the arena of battle, and 
their involvement forges far more complex evolutionary pathways.  Given this, while the 
international relations literature certainly presents a way to see how the international 
frameworks that govern transgenics found their catalyst and eventual structure, there is a heavy 
bias towards the US/EU experience (Gonzalez 2006; Falkner 2007; Sheldon 2007; Disdier and 
Fontagné 2009) as opposed to a tracing of how India had adopted, adapted, and enforced these 
guidelines.  Some observers may have (Scoones 2005; Falkner and Gupta 2009), but not through 
the lens of risk interfaces as I have. 
 
This is the novelty of this thesis with regards to the economic, political science, and international 
relations literature.  The Indian experience is so unique, so rich with players, and so constantly 
evolving, that tracing it in detail and through the lens that Millstone has argued was timely, 
engaging, and perhaps most crucial, previously not done.  Millstone’s model holds, but in this 
research, there is a sharp focus on applying it through the observed experiences of risk 
interfaces.  India certainly had and has those formal policy prescriptions on paper, as guided by 
a series of internationally recognized frameworks, but again, these took a backseat to the 
ongoing battles; battles premised on opposing ways of understanding the risk of technology.  
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This research is certainly inspired and guided by an understanding of the work on STS, 
biotechnology, and regulation, but it goes one step further: it presents risk interfaces as a means 
to consider how regulation co-evolved and is co-constructed, and what that really means in 
practice in India given the Bt cotton experience.  And that is why it is distinct.   
 
Bt cotton was a perfect case study of how these risk constructions play out in practice given the 
nature of the uncertainty embedded in the technology and the incentives at the root of its release.  
As I stated earlier, any scientist who argues that they can characterize the risks involved with 
transgenics is lying.  No one can.  But, these technologies are loaded with massive economic 
incentives.  So what can the government as a manager of economic conduct – the classic 
formulation of regulation from the political science literature – do?  According to that body of work, 
they have to let the reigns slacken somewhat.  Not that it is a choice they have control over 
however; the nature of the technology, as one that moves into the public sphere, forces the 
government to let some control go.  They have no choice, because, and as I have shown, other 
parties enter that space of regulatory deliberation, based on their asserting their own constructions 
and framings of risk.  In a context where no realm of knowledge is sacrosanct, the contested nature 
of these technologies creates interfaces where other parties force their way into processes premised 
on these realms of knowledge.  They contest the knowledge, enrich it, and policy evolves.  This is 
why regulation is a co-evolutionary and co-constructed process. 
 
7.1 Diverse Regulatory Practices 
This process has been driven by the government, firms, civil society, and farmers, though each in 
their different ways.  Of course the diversity of actions reflect the diverse risk framings that each 
actor possesses.  While the government may premise the risk framings on doing the science, 
winning the race, and controlling descent, it was forced to react to a far wider series of inputs, 
whether they liked it or not.  Even within the government, there is not one common stance, as the 
Ramesh moratorium and current state of play indicates.  Given the technical risks being held 
hostage by economic, and ultimately political risks, the mirage of biosafety as the guiding principle 
for policy formulation appeared.  It did not last long.   
 
Civil society had much to do with this, but not because they do not frame technical risks in the 
same way the government did and does.  The difference lies in the contested knowledge that 
informed these technical risks.  Civil society did not agree, and using the courts, forced the state to 
recognize their distinct technical risk framings.  In the end, the courts were not sure how to handle 
this onslaught of technical information, but politically the information was capitalized upon.  Just 
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as the economic risks of winning the race were inverted so as to present the risk as a liability as 
opposed to an asset, political risks were reassigned to entice a full scale moratorium on a 
technology that seemed to have passed science, but failed politics. 
 
In a similar manner, the firm also had real effects on policy, but only because their risk framings 
meshed with those of the state.  In a post 1980s pro-business environment, there were spaces ripe 
for interactions between the government and firms that created a policy and series of interfaces that 
were mutually beneficial.  If the Indian government wanted to win the race, they needed help, and 
firms were more than willing to assist in the drafting of the Swaminathan and Mashelkar reports, 
the catalysts for the still yet to be finalized NBRA regime.  Yet, the battlefield changed post 2005 
with the introduction of the RTI Act, and the more recent actions by ABLE to counter civil society 
‘lobbying’ are a testament to truly how much it has changed.  Even if these technologies are 
developed with planned obsolescence in mind, the risk framings of civil society can no longer be 
ignored.  Economic risks have to take a backseat to political risks, because civil society has proven 
how effective they can be in terms of influencing which direction the government goes. 
 
And of course, it is farmers who still remain at the core of why the government wants to go 
somewhere to begin with.  They buy the technologies, sow them, and sell them, and any effort at 
assessing technical risk pales in comparison to the millions of acres under Bt cotton in India today.  
But underlying this process of adoption is a detailed series of risk framings, distinct from the 
technical, economic, and political realms alone.  Knowledge is also contested in this space, but it 
interfaces with a far richer set of cultural practice and cues.  These risk framings are locally derived, 
but find their influence among the three other actors because they propel an entire industry.     
 
A co-evolutionary model of regulation (Millstone 2007, 2009) is what best characterizes elements of 
this story.  Beyond that however, risk framings pin down the trajectory that this evolution occurs 
within.  That is where this research departs from the extant literature, and offers something novel.  
The battlefield of regulation is premised on risk framings.  Because we all look at risk in different 
ways, consensus about how effective Bt cotton may be as a pest management strategy or whether it 
has helped or harmed farmers is impossible.  Because other parties can enter these deliberative 
spaces armed with contrasting technical views – either borne of their unique incentives to frame it 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or as based on contrasting technical risk assessment, assumed knowledge is 
contested.  The battlefield is premised on this conflict.  Anyone who still argues that Bt cotton is a 
‘success’ or ‘failure’ misses the point entirely.  There are just too many factors on farmers’ fields that 
render such bipolar conclusions cursory and ultimately irrelevant.  What I argue is that rather than 
succumbing to such simplistic parameters, the real parameters to consider are how all these actors 
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actually frame risk.  It is the interface of technical, economic, and political framings of risk that 
characterize this dynamic, and that is what drives the co-evolutionary, co-constructed process of 
regulation.  And again, this is only because Bt cotton was a technology that no one could accurately 
characterize the risks it came with. 
 
7.2 The Balancing Act 
 
But given that the government is ultimately manager and arbiter of these technologies, they still 
have to enact policy.  It is their mandate, constitutionally enacted, and premised on a wealth of 
policy instruments.  They are held accountable to these polices by judicial institutions and 
instruments, and nonjudicial techniques of forcing accountability to occur.  Because the technical 
risks are contested, event interfaces such as using the RTI act on the one hand, or burning trial plots 
on the other have forced the government to incorporate the technical, but more importantly, the 
economic and political risk framings of civil society.  Similarly, though the Mashelkar and 
Swaminathan reports set the scene for the current  - and yet still unreleased – NBRA act, those 
recommendations did not come out of technical risks alone.  The private sector – both Indian and 
international - ensured that those recommendations fit their economic risk framings, which meshed 
with that of the government.  While the government may have framed it according to their own 
nationalist ambitions - not wanting to ‘miss the biotech boat’ parallel with a desire to be regional 
leaders – the firm just wanted to make sure there was not too much red tape.  So, it was mutually 
beneficial to have such policies enacted, and it came from a meshing of these economic risks. 
 
But, the economic risks of civil society forced their way in.  In their view, missing the boat should 
never take precedence over what they saw as incalculable risk premised on immeasurable hazard.  
There was (and is) an urgency forged on nationalist pride (just like the government), of a battle that 
has to be won (just like the private sector), all bolstered by an unprecedented display of solidarity 
within a movement that was forged around Bt cotton.  Politically, they forced the government to 
respond to their framings.  Which the government did – why else was Bt brinjal stopped dead in its 
tracks?  And similarly, why else would the NBRA have clauses to limit how effective civil society 
can be in the future in forcing their way in?  However, the economic risk meshings of firm and state 
are quite resilient.  I personally think it is just a matter of time before Bt brinjal comes out.  Again, 
the economic incentives are just too significant; the economic risks too pressing to ignore.   
 
Which brings us to farmers as those actors that provide the basis for these incentives.  At the core of 
the entire regulatory framework is one thing: the demand of farmers themselves.  Again, there is a 
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real political risk at play here.  Farmer leaders act as accountability brokers in this space and know 
the political game; they know that in terms of electoral power, both the dominant political party in 
power or the opposition cannot ignore farmers.  They can play both off each other, with the end 
result being that farmers get short term financial concessions, which serves to mitigate their 
economic risk on the ground.  But away from these brokers, and closer to the fields themselves, 
there is something entirely different going on.  It may appear to be unique – and it is in many ways 
given the lacking capacity of the literature I have reviewed here to explain it in detail – but actually, 
it is what really drives the entire story.  Their framings of risk reflect a different decision-making 
time horizon, forged not only on very pressing economic realities and environmental risks, but also 
something no model of risk here can really effectively capture.  How can one argue with a farmer 
who sees Bt cotton as a function of a cosmological prediction?  If the age of kali yuga is premised on 
avarice and a neglect of nature, then Bt cotton fits right in.  Besides, so many other farmers are 
prospering from it, and it is impossible to ignore these observable realities in a community where 
everyone knows what everyone else is doing.  And, if farming is indeed like the chakravyuha – the 
maze that Abhimanyu had to break in the Mahabharata - what choice do farmers have?  Is it not 
merely their destiny?  From such a perspective, regulation as policy means very little to a farmer.  
This applies both as result of their worldview, but also as a result of firms who just release 
technologies with little regard to the formal policy like Navbharat seeds.  In doing so, policies are 
forced out of the government.  
 
7.3 The Process Of Regulation 
 
But this is the point.  It is shortsighted and false to view regulation as policy alone.  It is not.  
Regulation is always negotiated between different parties, each with different constructions of risk, 
different views of what is safe, what is not, and what technologies are useful. Knowledge and so 
risk is thus always contested.  And when knowledge is contested, spaces are forged and entered 
where the premises of this contested knowledge are countered - sometimes enriched, sometimes as 
a basis for capitalization, but constantly interacting.  This is due to the uncertainty embedded in 
technologies like Bt cotton.  Ultimately, regulation has to incorporate the views of many armed with 
multiple framings of risk.  And that process is regulation. 
 
Yet, this ambition to not miss the biotech boat drives the country forwards.  It still presents the 
overarching theme. Win the race.  Do the science.  Manage opposition.  But it hits speed bumps.  
And unlike my hitting speed bumps fast, slow, by accident and accountable only to myself, alone, 
India has to respond to a wider series of people who have a stake in making sure that transmission 
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does not fall out.  It has to react, manage, assuage, cajole, force, and demand.  There are political 
risks that have to be accounted for.  Ask Jairam Ramesh or Kishore Tiwari.  There are economic 
risks that have to be checked.  Ask Divya Raghunandan, or ask anyone in Chikhali.  There are 
technical risks that are seen in very different ways.  Ask S.R. Rao or Pushpa Bhargava.   
 
Though my focus over the course of this research was on India, the framework of analysis and 
the conclusions of this research are applicable to a wide variety of countries and contexts, as the 
nature of the implicit uncertainty of these technologies is universal.  While agro climatic, 
geographic, and biotic and abiotic stress factors will differ across regions, the uncertainty of the 
long-term effects of using transgenics in agriculture will remain uniform.  Of course, the precise 
nature of these uncertainties is diversified given contextual realities – the nature of the 
technology authorized, the absence or presence of democratic representation, and the strength of 
civil society being some parameters that this research considered.  But that does not detract from 
the framework of analysis that I have deployed here.  Risk framings will always remain diverse, 
they will clash, and science may not be at the core of any co-constructed policy.  The battlefield 
can emerge anywhere..   
 
The diversity of those who have a vested interest in the technology generates a multiplicity of 
risk framings, regardless of geography.  Maharashtra may have been unique given the history of 
growing cotton in Vidharba and the nature and scale of central and state level financial 
concessions in the face of the agrarian crisis.  And from a wider lens, India is unique given the 
remarkable rate of economic growth that has changed so much of the landscape – urban, rural, 
and in between.  Yet many emerging markets have seen similar changes.  Brazil (Pelaez and 
Albergoni 2004; Campini, Sampaio, and Avila 2005; Da Silveira and De Carvalho Borges 2005; 
Cardarellia et al 2006; Zepeda 2006; Hall, Matos, and Langford 2008), South Africa (Freidberg and 
Horowitz 2004; Aerni and Bernauer 2006; Gupta and Faulkner 2006; Viljoen, Dajee, and Botha 
2006,), and China (Marchant, Fang, and Song 2002; Chen and Qu 2002; Pray et al 2006) have all 
adopted transgenics in agriculture along similar timeframes, and are all facing similar 
evolutionary paths (Scoones 2005, 2008).  Even in established markets like the US and the EU, 
regulation changes, evolves, and responds to the framings of risk as held and asserted by a wide 
variety of parties (Levidow et al 1997; McLean and Charest 2000; Lynch and Vogel 2001; Vogel 
2001; Vogt and Parish 2001; Wiener 2002; Wiener and Rogers 2002; Löfstedt and Vogel 2002; 
Skogstad 2003; Sheldon 2004; Guehlstorf and Hallstrom 2005).  Risk knows no geographic 
boundaries, and though the particular context and nature of these challenges may differ, the 
interplay between technical, economic, and political risks will remain.   
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Yet again, it must be stressed that much of what has happened in India in terms of evolution 
does find its catalyst in a very vibrant – and from 2005 onwards – a very unified civil society.  
While this is not necessarily unique to India, whether or not this framework is applicable to 
those countries where such a vibrant civil society does not exist, or more pointedly, is 
discouraged, is perhaps unlikely.  Entry within regulatory spaces is not always by invitation, as 
the Indian experience has shown.  But in the absence of legal culpability and mechanisms open 
to all, or coercive action against civil society organization, the interfaces I have explored and 
documented here may not be as tenable. Regardless, the consequences of these interfaces do 
provide remarkable insight into co-evolutionary regulatory reform, excepting those countries 
that do not allow for such evolutionary trajectories to occur.   
 
But this research has focused on India.  And that experience has presented a unique story where 
such trajectories have been fostered, championed, and forged, with civil society risk framings 
dominating and being a primary catalyst for regulatory evolution. In such a context, it does not 
matter what a centralized plan may be on paper.   Because that is not what is going to propel the 
decision making calculus that characterizes formal policy.  It is not the underlying science of Bt 
cotton.  The overarching risks that surround that science remove the focus from science.  The only 
thing that really makes a difference is the unexpected things that are going to happen on the way. 
 Add a technology like Bt cotton that had, at the time of its introduction, uncertain consequences, 
and any effort of science based regulation is even more compromised.  Place India in a global 
context where rules were adopted from other countries, where rules had to be made quickly, where 
rules outstripped capacity, and you get…the story of Bt cotton in India.  This was and is a battle. 
 
No one – farmers, firms, the government, or civil society – could predict the future.  But they all had 
an idea of where they wanted things to go.  They all looked at the risks in their own way.  As an 
aggregate, you end up with a very complex system of interfacing dynamics that makes a mockery 
of some semblance of predictive regulatory rule making frameworks.  That just did not happen. 
 
And this is fantastic.  Because, this is the way it should be.  Yet, at the same time, the NBRA is being 
discussed in Parliament.  I think it will be passed.  But, then civil society will file a slew of new PILs. 
 The NBRA will be amended.  Farmers will plant BGII Roundup Ready cotton next year.  It will be a 
resounding success.  More startups will go public; IPOs will be massively oversubscribed and they 
will all be thrilled.  Bt brinjal will be approved, along with mustard, potatoes, and any wide 
number of transgenic technologies.  The public and private sector will cooperate to make this 
happen.  There will probably be more bailouts, more agrarian suicide, and more and more young 
farmers getting out of farming.  What will the government do? 
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I think they will just adapt.  Yes, they will keep the focus on biosafety.  They will continue to want 
to win the race.  And they will respond to the surges of political incentives that such risks present 
and exacerbate.  But they will not be alone in being in charge.  They will have to adapt.  And I think 
they accept this. 
 
S.R. Rao at the DBT told me the last time I saw him,  
 
[y]ou know I’m really glad you came by today.  All these idiots have been calling 
me to some meeting or another, some perspective, I can’t keep track.  But I just 
wanted to relax a bit you know. This whole NBRA thing is making my life 
miserable.  Everyone has a stake, and it’s all turf wars now.  But I have to say, it’s 
been very interesting to me.  So it was perfect that you came today.  I just wanted 
to talk about all this.  There’s all these people making my life difficult, but you 
know, that’s the story.  Meanwhile I’m waiting for the Ministry of Health to call 
me.  They said they had some issues with some clause or the other…(sighs)…ah, 
who knows.  I hardly sleep nowadays.  My wife is getting impatient with my 
always coming home at 10 at night and going to bed soon after. But it’s still a 
great job. 
 
For the most part, one person has written the NBRA bill.  He has.  This is the bill, the piece of 
regulation that is going to oversee the entire biotech industry for the years to come.  One person.  
Granted, there have been consultations, but really, it is him.  He loves it.  It is “his baby”.  Of course, 
once it is leaked to the public again, a custody battle will ensue in the courts.  Yet, I do not think he 
is that possessive about the baby.  He is ready to see it go out into the world.  He knows about the 
co-evolutionary and co-constructed processes that characterize regulation.  He accepts it.  Though it 
creates a lot of late nights and foments impatience within his wife. 
 
Dr. Rao sits in this small office in the eighth floor of the CGO Complex in Delhi.  He smokes a lot in 
there.  Wills Navy Cut.  I smoke a lot.  Chhoti Gold Flake.  We smoked a lot.  No one else was 
allowed to.  Well, I suppose rules are meant to be broken.  I always liked Dr. Rao. 
 214 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abbott, K.W. and D. Snidal (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International 
Organization (54) 421. 
 
Adams, J.A. (1982). “The Emptiness of Peasant ‘Rationality’: ‘Demirationality’ as an Alternative.” 
Journal of Economic Issues (16:3) 663-672. 
 
Aerni, P. and T. Bernauer (2006). “Stakeholder attitudes toward GMOs in the Philippines, Mexico, 
and South Africa: The issue of public trust.” World Development (34:3) 557-575. 
 
Aglietta, M. (1976). Regulation et crises du capitalisme. Paris: Calmann-Luvy. (English translation 
by NLB, 1978.) 
 
Ahuja, S.L. (2007). “Effect of Bt gene in intra hirsutum Bt hybrids of cotton.” Research Journal of 
Biotechnology (2:2) 36-40. 
 
Ahuja V. and G. Jotwani (Undated) “The regulation of genetically modified organisms in India.”  
AgBios.org. 
 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics (84:3) 488-500.  
 
Arrow, K.J. (1951). “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations.” 
Econometrica (19:4) 404-437. 
 
Arunachalam, V and S. Bala Ravi, (2003). “Conceived Conclusions In Favour Of GM cotton? A 
Reposte To A Paper In Science.” Current Science (85) 1117-1119. 
 
Assadi, M. (2002). “Globalisation and the State: Interrogating the Farmers’ Movement in India.” 
Journal of Social and Economic Development (4:1) 42-54. 
 
Aysun K., and M.T. Akaya (2007). “A three generation study with genetically modified Bt corn in 
rats: Biochemical and histopathological investigation.” Food and Chemical Toxicology (46:3) 1164-
1170. 
 
Bagavathiannan, M.V., A. Spok, and R.C. Van Acker (2011). “Commercialization of Perennial GE 
Crops: Looming Challenges for Regulatory Frameworks.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics (24) 227-242. 
 
Balazs, E. (2006). “The OECD Blue Book has become a citation classic.” Environmental Biosafety 
Research (5) 211–212. 
 
Bambawale, O.M. (2010). “Impact of refugia and integrated pest management on the performance 
of transgenic (Bacillus thuringiensis) cotton (Gossypium hirsutum).” Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Sciences (80:8) 730-736. 
 
Bambawale, O.M, A. Singh, O.P. Sharma1, B.B. Bhosle, R.C. Lavekar,  A. Dhandapani, V. Kanwar, 
R. K. Tanwar, K.S. Rathod, N.R. Patange and V.M. Pawar (2004). “Performance of Bt cotton 
(MECH-162) under Integrated Pest Management in farmers’ participatory field trial in Nanded 
district, Central India.” Current Science (86) 1628-1633. 
 
Barwale, R.B., V.R. Gadwal,  U. Zehr, and B. Zehr, (2004). “Prospects For Bt Cotton Technology In 
 215 
India.” AgBioForum 7(1&2) 23-26. 
 
Basu, K. and A. Maertens (2007). “The pattern and causes of economic growth in India.” Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (23:2) 143–167. 
 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: towards a new modernity. New Delhi: Sage. 
 
Benford, R.D. and D.A. Snow (2000). “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology (26) 611-639. 
 
Bennett, R.M., Y. Ismael, U. Kambhampatti, and S. Morse, (2004) “Economic impact of genetically 
modified cotton in India.” AgBioForum (7) 96-100. 
 
Bennett, R., Y. Ismael, S. Morse and B. Shankar (2004). “Reductions in Insecticide Use from 
Adoption of Bt Cotton in South Africa: Impacts on Economic Performance and Toxic Load to the 
Environment.” Journal of Agricultural Science (142:6) 665-674.  
 
Bennett, R., Y. Ismael and S. Morse (2005). “Explaining Contradictory Evidence Regarding Impacts 
of Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries. Varietal Performance of Transgenic Cotton 
in India.” Journal of Agricultural Science (143:1) 35-41.  
 
Bennett, R., U. Kambhampati, S. Morse and Y. Ismael (2006). “Farm-level Economic Performance of 
Genetically Modified Cotton in Maharashtra, India.” Review of Agricultural Economics (28:1) 59-71.  
 
Berg, P. (2004). “Asilomar and Recombinant DNA”. Nobelprize.org. 
 
Bharathan, G. (2000) “Bt-cotton in India: Anatomy of a Controversy.” Current Science (79:8) 1067-
1075. 
 
Bhargava, P.M. (2002) “GMOs: Need for Appropriate Risk Assessment System.” Economic and 
Political Weekly (37:15) 1402-1406. 
 
Binswanger, H.P. (1980). “Attitudes Towards Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (62) 395-407. 
 
_____ (1981). “Attitudes Towards Risk: Theoretical Implications of an Experiment in Rural India.” 
Economic Journal (91) 867-890. 
 
Boan, J.A. (1955) “A Study of Farmers’ Reactions to Uncertain Price Expectations.” Journal of Farm 
Economics (37:1) 90-95.  
 
Boyer, R. (1979). “Wage formation in historical perspective: The French experience.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (3) 99-118. 
 
Braithwaite, J., Coglianese, C. and Levi-Faur, D. (2007). “Can Regulation and Governance Make a 
Difference?” Regulation & Governance (1:1) 1-7. 
 
Brass, T. (1994). “The politics of gender, nature and nation in the discourse of the new farmers' 
movements.” Journal of Peasant Studies (21:3) 27—71. 
 
Brink, L. and B. McCarl (1978). “The Tradeoff between Expected Return and Risk among Cornbelt 
Farmers.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (60:2) 259-263. 
 
 216 
Bryant, K.J., J.M. Reeves, R.L. Nichols, J.K. Greene, C.H. Tingle, G.E. Studebaker, F.M. Bourland, 
C.D. Capps, Jr., and F.E. Groves (2008). “Valuing Transgenic Cotton Technologies Using a 
Risk/Return Framework.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics (40:3) 767–775. 
 
Bunsha, D. (2006). “Confronting agrarian crisis.” Frontline (23:3). 
 
Cardarellia, P., M.R. Branquinhoa, R.T.B. Ferreira, F.P. da Cruzb, A.L. Gemalb (2004). “Detection of 
GMO in food products in Brazil: the INCQS experience.” Food Control (16:10) 859-866. 
 
Castells, M. (1997). The Power of Identity (The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, 
Volume II). Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Central Information Commission (CIC), Government of India. (2007)  “Appeal No. 
CIC/WB/A/2006/00548 dated April 13, 2007.”  
 
Chambers, R. (1983) Rural Development: Putting the Last First. New York: Longman. 
 
_____ (1994). “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Analysis of Experience.” World Development 
22(9) 1253-1268. 
 
Chand, R. and S.S, Raju (2008). “Instability in Indian Agriculture during. Different Phases of 
Technology and Policy.” National Centre for Agricultural Economics and  Policy Research 
Discussion Paper NPP 01/2008. 
 
Chang, H. (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Regulation”. Cambridge Journal of Economics (21) 703-
728. 
 
Chataway, J. (2005). “Introduction: Is it possible to create pro-poor agriculture-related 
biotechnology?” Journal of International Development (17:5) 597–610. 
 
Chaturvedi, S. (2002). “GEAC and Biotech Policy.” Economic and Political Weekly (38:15) 1459-1460. 
 
_____ (2004). “Biosafety Regulation: Need for Fine Balancing.” Economic and Political Weekly (39:33) 
3693-3697. 
 
_____ (2005). “Dynamics of Biotechnology Research and Industry in India: Statistics, Perspectives, 
and Key Policy Issues.” OECD STI Working Paper 2005/6. 
 
Chavas, J-P., and M.T. Holt (1990). “Acreage Decisions under Risk: The Case of Corn and 
Soybeans.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (72:3) 529-538. 
 
Chen, C. and W. Tseng (2006). “Do Humans Need GMOs?—A View from a Global Trade Market.” 
The Journal of American Academy of Business (8:1) 147-155. 
 
Chen, M. (2008). “An integrated research framework to understand consumer attitudes and 
purchase intentions toward genetically modified foods.” British Food Journal  
(110:6) 559-579. 
 
Chen, Z. and L. Qu (2002). “The status of agriculture biotechnology in China”, Paper Presented at 
The 7th International Symposium on the Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms, Beijing, 
China, October 10-16, 2002. 
 
 217 
CII (1994), “India –Knowledge Powerhouse. Presentation on the Biotechnology Industry.” 
Slideshow prepared for New Business Opportunities in the Indian Biotechnology Sector, Zurich, 22 
October 2004. 
 
Clapp, J. (2003). “Transnational corporate interests and global environmental governance: 
negotiating rules for agricultural biotechnology and chemicals.” Environmental Politics (12:4) 1—23. 
 
Clifford, J. & G. Marcus (eds.) (1986). Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Los 
Angeles & Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Collins, H.M. and R. Evans (2002). “The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and 
Experience.” Social Studies of Science (32:2) 235-296. 
 
Contini, E, M.J.A. Sampaio, A.F.D.S. Avila (2005). “The lack of clear GMO regulation: its impact on 
researchers and farmers in Brazil.” International Journal of Biotechnology (7:1-2) 29-45. 
 
Costa-Font, M., J.M. Gil and W.B. Traill (2008). “Consumer acceptance, valuation of and attitudes 
towards genetically modified food: Review and implications for food policy.” Food Policy (33) 99–
111. 
 
Crawford, I.M (1997). Marketing Research and Information Systems. Rome: FAO. 
 
Crost, B. and B. Shankar (2008). “Bt-cotton and production risk: panel data estimates.” International 
Journal of Biotechnology (10:2/3) 122-131. 
 
Crost, B., B. Shankar, R. Bennett and S. Morse (2007). “Bias from Farmer Self-selection in Genetically 
Modified Crop Productivity Estimates: Evidence from Indian Data.” Journal of Agricultural 
Economics (58:1) 24-36. 
 
Damodaran, A. (1999) “Regulating Transgenic Plants in India.” Economic and Political Weekly (34:13) 
34-42. 
 
Damodaran, A. (2005). “Re-engineering Biosafety Regulations in India: Towards a Critique of 
Policy, Law, and Prescriptions.” Law Environment and Development Journal (1:1) 3-16. 
 
Da Silveira, J.M. and I. De Carvalho Borges (2005). “An Overview of the Current State of 
Agricultural Biotechnology in Brazil.” Paper presented at Science, Technology and Globalization 
Project, Agricultural Biotechnology for Development – Socioeconomic Issues and Institutional 
Challenges, Bella Villagio, Bellagio Italy, May–June 2005. Belfer Center, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard. 
 
David, G.S. and  Y.V.S.T. Sai. (2002). “Bt Cotton: Farmers’ Reactions.” Economic and Political Weekly 
(37:46) 4601-4602. 
 
DeLong, J.B. (2001). “India Since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative.” Unpublished 
paper, Berkeley School of Economics. 
 
de Senarclens, P. (1998). “Governance and the Crisis in the International Mechanisms of Regulation.” 
International Social Science Journal. (50:155) 91-104. 
 
Deshpande, R.S., and S. Arora (eds) (2010). Agrarian Crisis and Farmer Suicides. New Delhi: Sage. 
 
de Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path. New York: Harper & Row. 
 218 
 
Department of Biotechnology, Government of India (1989). “Rules For The Manufacture, Use, 
Import, Export, And Storage of Hazardous Microorganisms, Genetically Engineers Organisms, or 
Cells.”  
 
_____ (2006). “About DBT”. Retrieved May 24, 2006 from 
<http://dbtindia.nic.in/aboutdbt/overviewmain.html>. 
 
_____ (2009) “Yearwise List Of Commercially Released Varieties Of Bt Cotton Hybrids By GEAC”. 
Retrieved October 14, 2009 from 
http://igmoris.nic.in/files/commercially%20released%20varieties%20of%20Bt%20cotton%20hybri
ds_31.07.08.pdf. 
 
de Vendômois, J.S., F. Roullier, D. Cellier, and G.E. Séralini (2009). “A Comparison of the Effects of 
Three GM Corn Varieties on Mammalian Health.” International Journal of Biological Sciences (5:7) 
706–726. 
 
Dillon, J.L. and J. R. Anderson (1971). “Allocative Efficiency, Traditional Agriculture, and Risk.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (53:1) 26-32. 
 
Dillon, J.L. and P.L. Scandizzo (1978). “Risk Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers in Northeast Brazil: A 
Sampling Approach.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (60:3) 425-435. 
 
Disdier, A and L. Fontagné (2009). “Trade Impact of European Measures on GMOs Condemned by 
the WTO Panel.” CEPII Working Paper 2009-16. 
 
Douglas, M. and A. Wildavsky (1983)  Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological 
and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Druckman, J.N. (2003). “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the 
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects.” Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Summer Political Methodology 
Meeting, University of Minnesota, July 17-19 2003. 
 
Eggert, H. and M. Greaker (2011). “Trade, GMOs and Environmental Risk: Are Current Policies 
Likely to Improve Welfare?” Environmental and Resource Economics (48) 587-608. 
 
Ellison, N. (1997) “Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity.” 
Sociology (31:4) 697–717. 
 
Evers, T. (1985), “Identity: The Hidden Side of New Social Movements in Latin America.”, in D. 
Slater, New Social Movements and the State in Latin America, Dordrecht: CEDLA, Foris Publishers: 
43–72. 
 
Falk, R. (1994). “The Making of Global Citizenship.” in T, ed. B. van Steenbergen (ed.) The Condition 
of Citizenship. London: Sage Publications, 127-39. 
 
Falkner, R. (2007). “The Global Biotech Food Fight: Why the United States Got It So Wrong.” The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs (14:1) 99-110. 
 
Falkner, R. and A. Gupta (2009). “The limits of regulatory convergence: globalization and GMO 
politics in the south.” International Environmental Agreements (9) 113-133. 
 
 219 
Featherstone, D. (2003). “Spatialities of Transnational Resistance to Globalization: The Maps of 
Grievance of the Inter-Continental Caravan.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (28:4) 
404-421. 
 
Feder, G. (1980). “Farm Size, Risk Aversion and the Adoption of New Technology under 
Uncertainty.” Oxford Economic Papers (32:2) 263-283. 
 
Feder, G. and D.L. Umali (1993). “The adoption of agricultural innovations: A review.” Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change (43:3-4) 215-239. 
 
Fischer, F. and J. Forester (eds.) (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Fischer, F. (1999) “Technological Deliberation in a Democratic Society: The Case for Participatory 
Inquiry.” Science and Public Policy (26:5) 294-302. 
 
Fontes, E.M.G (2003). “Legal and regulatory concerns about transgenic plants in Brazil.” Journal of 
Invertebrate Pathology (83:2) 100-103. 
 
Foster, W.E. and G.C. Rausser (1991). “Farmer Behavior under Risk of Failure.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (73:2) 276-288. 
 
Freidberg, S. and L. Horowitz. (2004). “Converging Networks and Clashing Stories: South Africa's 
Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Africa Today (51:1) 3-25. 
 
Friedman, M. and L.J. Savage (1948). “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk.” The Journal of 
Political Economy (56:4) 279-304.  
 
Friere, P. (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  New York: Continuum. 
 
Geertz, C. (1973). “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture.” in The 
Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
 
_____ (1990). Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Ghose, J.R. (2007). “The Purity Of Perspective: Using Digital Video In An Applied Research 
Context.“  I4D Magazine, December 2007: 18-19. 
 
Ghosh, P.K. (2000). “Evaluation of the Transgenic Organisms: An Overview of Risks and 
Procedures in India.”, RIS Biotechnology and Development Review (3:2) 39-60. 
 
_____. (2008). “Indian Efforts for Developing Biotechnology.” Asian Biotechnology and Development 
Review (11:1) 35-56. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Glover, D. (2002). “Transnational Corporate Science and Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology.” 
Economic and Political Weekly (37:27) 2734-2740. 
 
 220 
_____. (2010). “Is Bt Cotton a Pro-Poor Technology? A Review and Critique of the Empirical 
Record.” Journal of Agrarian Change (10:4) 482–509. 
 
Godbole, M. (1999). “Maharashtra Cotton Monopoly Procurement Scheme: What Has It Achieved?” 
Economic and Political Weekly (34:5) 250-253.  
 
Goetz, A.-M. (2005). Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for Human 
Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Gonzalez, C.G. (2006). “Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International 
Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology.” Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review (19) 583-642. 
 
Greenwood, D.J. and M. Levin (1998). Introduction to Action Research. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
 
Gruère, G.P., P, Mehta-Bhatt, and D. Sengupta (2008). “Bt Cotton and Farmer Suicides in India: 
Reviewing the Evidence.” IFPRI Discussion Paper 00808. 
 
Guehlstorf, N.P. and L.K. Hallstrom (2005). “The role of culture in risk regulations: a comparative 
case study of genetically modified corn in the United States of America and European Union.” 
Environmental Science & Policy (8) 327–342. 
 
Gujar, G.T., R. Naira, B.P. Singha, A. Kumaria and V. Kaliaa (2008). “Toxicity to the cotton 
bollworm, Helicoverpa armigera, of some Cry1Ac toxins expressed in cotton in India.” Crop 
Protection (27:3-5) 537-544. 
 
Gujar, G.T., V. Kalia, A. Kumari, B.P. Singh, A. Mittal, R. Nair, and M. Mohan (2007). “Helicoverpa 
armigera baseline susceptibility to Bacillus thuringiensis Cry toxins and resistance management for 
Bt cotton in India.” Journal of Invertebrate Pathology (95:3) 214-219. 
 
Gujar, G.T., V. Kalia, G.K. Bunker, and S. Dhurua (2010). “Impact of different levels of non-Bt cotton 
refuges on pest populations, bollworm damage, and Bt cotton production.”  Journal of Asia-Pacific 
Entomology (13:4) 249-253. 
 
Gupta, A. (2002). “Ensuring ‘Safe Use’ of Biotechnology in India: Key Challenges.” Economic and 
Political Weekly (37:27) 2762-2769. 
 
_____ (2003). “The Role of Knowledge Flows in Bridging North-South Technological Divides: A 
Case Analysis of Biotechnology in Indian Agriculture.” Washington: Centre for Science, Policy, and 
Outcomes. 
 
Gupta, A. and R. Falkner (2006). “The Infuence of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Comparing 
Mexico, China and South Africa.” Global Environmental Politics (6:4) 23-55. 
 
Gupta, A.K. and V. Chandak (2005). “Agricultural Biotechnology in India: Ethics, Business and 
Politics.” International Journal of Biotechnology (7:1/2/3) 212–227.  
 
Gurian-Sherman, D. (2006). “Contaminating the Wild? Gene Flow from Experimental Field Trials of 
Genetically Engineered Crops to Related Wild Plants.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Food Safety. 
 
Habermas, J. (1996). “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” in S. Behnabib (ed.) Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
 221 
Hahn, R. (1998). “Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (12:4) 201-210. 
 
Hall, J., S. Matos, and C.H. Langford (2008). “Social Exclusion and Transgenic Technology: The Case 
of Brazilian Agriculture.” Journal of Business Ethics (77:1) 45-63. 
 
Hamal, K.B, and J.R. Anderson (1982). “A Note On Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion Among 
Farmers In Nepal.” Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics (26:3) 220-225. 
 
Herring, R. (2005). “Is There a Case for Growing Cotton in India?” Draft conference paper for 
Indian Cotton: Biology and Utility, Meanings and Histories. Cornell University, April 29-30, 2005. 
 
_____ (2006). “Understanding the Bt Cotton maze.” India Together, 1 June 2006. 
 
_____ (2007a). “Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics.” Journal of Development Studies 
(43:1) 130–157. 
 
_____ (2007b). “The Genomics Revolution and Development Studies: Science, Poverty and Politics.” 
Journal of Development Studies (43:1) 1–30. 
 
_____ (2008). “Whose Numbers Count? Probing Discrepant Evidence on Transgenic Cotton in the 
Warangal District of India.” International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches (2:2) 145-159. 
 
_____ (2009a). “Illicit Seeds: Epistemic Brokers and the Politics of Property in Genetic Engineering.”  
Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Toronto, August 
26, 2009. 
 
_____ (2009b). “Persistent Narratives: Why is the “Failure of Bt Cotton in India” Story Still with 
Us?” AgBioForum (12:1) 14-22. 
 
Hicks, J.R. (1931). “The Theory of Uncertainty and Profit.” Economica (32) 170-189. 
  
Ho, M. (2010). “Farmer Suicides and Bt Cotton Nightmare Unfolding in India.”, ISIS Report, 6 
January 2010. 
 
Ho, P., J.H. Zhao, and D. Xue (2009). “Access and control of agro-biotechnology: Bt cotton, 
ecological change and risk in China.” Journal of Peasant Studies (36:2) 345-364. 
 
Holmes, P. and A. Young (2001). “Emerging Regulatory Challenges to the EU’s External Economic 
Relations.” SEI Briefing Paper Number 7.  Sussex European Institute. 
 
Hood, C. et al. (2001). The Government of Risk. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hoppe, R. (1999). “Policy analysis, science and politics: from 'speaking truth to power' to 'making 
sense together'.” Science and Public Policy (26:3) 201-210. 
 
Iannaccone, L.R. (1995). “Risk, Rationality, and Religious Portfolios.” Economic Inquiry (33:2) 285-
295. 
 
James, C. (2006). “Global Status Of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2007.” Ithaca, NY: 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. 
 
 222 
_____ (2007). “Global Status Of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2007.” Ithaca, NY: 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. 
 
_____ (2008). “Global Status Of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2008.” Ithaca, NY: 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. 
 
_____ (2009). “ISAAA Brief 41-2009: Executive Summary”. Ithaca, NY: International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (1987). “Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science.” Social Studies of Science (17:2) 
195-230. 
 
_____ (1999). “The songlines of risk.” Environmental Values (8:2) 135-152. 
 
_____ (2000). “Between Risk and Precaution – Reassessing the Future of GM Crops.” Journal of Risk 
Research (3:3) 277-282. 
 
Jasanoff, S. and B. Wynne (1998). “Science and Decision-Making”, in Rayner, S. and Malone, E. L. 
(eds) Human Choices and Climate Change: Volume 1 – The Societal Framework. Ohio: Battelle 
Press. 
 
Jasanoff, S., G.E. Markle, J.C. Petersen, and T. Pinch (1995). Handbook Of Science And 
Technology Studies. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
 
Jayaraman, K.S. (2001). “Illegal Bt cotton in India haunts regulators.” Nature Biotechnology (19:12) 
1090. 
 
_____ (2005). “Outlook: Biotech Boom.” Nature (436) 480-483. 
 
_____ (2009). “Transgenic Aubergines Put On Ice.” Nature  (461:1041). 
 
Jenkins, R and A.M. Goetz, (1999). “Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the 
Right-to-Information Movement in India.” Third World Quarterly (20:3) 603-622. 
 
Jessop, B. (1997). “Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance.” 
Review of International Political Economy (4:3) 561–581.  
 
Johansson, L. (1999). “Participatory Video and PRA: Acknowledging the politics of Empowerment.” 
Forests, Trees and People (40/41) 21-23. 
 
Jones, M. (1998). “Restructuring the Local State: Economic Governance or Social Regulation?” Political 
Geography (17:8) 959–988. 
 
Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (eds.) (2004). The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance. 
Manchester: CRC. 
 
Joshi, S. (1994). Selection from Sharad Joshi’s Writings on Agriculture and Economic Freedom. 
Pune: Shetkari Sangathana. 
 
Just, R.E. (1974). “An Investigation of the Importance of Risk in Farmers' Decisions.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics (56:1) 14-25. 
 
Kahn, A.E. (1988). The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. Boston: MIT Press. 
 223 
 
Kameswara Rao, C. (2010). Moratorium on Bt Brinjal: A Review of the order of the Minister of 
Environment and Forests, Government of India. Bangalore: FBAE. 
 
Karihaloo, J.L. and P.A. Kumar (2009). “Bt Cotton In India – A Status Report (Second Edition).” 
Asia-Pacific Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology (APCoAB). 
 
Kathuria, V. (2003). “Does Informal Regulation of Pollution Work? Empirical evidence From 
Gujarat.” 39th Annual Conference of The Indian Econometric Society Working Paper. 
 
Knight, J. and A. Paradkar (2008). “Acceptance of genetically modified food in India: perspectives 
of gatekeepers genetically modified food.” British Food Journal (110:10) 1019-1033. 
 
Kochanek, S.A. (1971). “The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Indian 
Politics.” Asian Survey (11:9) 866-885. 
 
Kohli, A. (2006) “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005, Part II: The 1990s and Beyond.” 
Economic and Political Weekly (41:14) 1361-1370. 
 
Konde, V. (2008). “Biotechnology in India: Public–private partnerships.” Journal of Commercial 
Biotechnology (14:1) 43–55. 
 
Kothamasi, D. and S. Vermeylen (2011). “Genetically modified organisms in agriculture: can 
regulations work?” Environment, Development and Sustainability (13) 535-546. 
 
Kranthi, K.R. and N.R. Kranthi (2004). “Modeling adaptability of the cotton bollworm, Helicoverpa 
armigera (Hübner) to Bt-cotton in India.” Current Science (87) 1096-1107. 
 
Kranthi, K.R., S. Naidu, C. S. Dhawad, A. Tatwawadi, K. Mate, E. Patil,  A. A. Bharose, G. T. Behere, 
R. M. Wadaskar and S. Kranthi (2005). “Temporal and intra-plant variability of Cry1Ac expression 
in Bt-cotton and its influence on the survival of the cotton bollworm, Helicoverpa  armigera (Hübner) 
(Noctuidae: Lepidoptera).” Current Science (89:2) 291-298. 
 
Krimsky, S. (2000). “Risk Assessment and Regulation of Bioengineered Food Products.” 
International Journal of Biotechnology (2:1/2/3) 231-238. 
 
Krimsky, S. and N.K. Murphy (2002). “Biotechnology at the dinner table: FDA oversight of 
transgenic food.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (584) 80-96. 
 
Kulkarni, M.N. (2002). “Bt Cotton in Karnataka.” Economic and Political Weekly (37:36) 3767-3768. 
 
Kuruganti, K. (2005). “This Seeds Bill Must Go.” India Together, 16 August 2005. 
 
_____ (2006) “Biosafety and Beyond: GM Crops in India.” Economic and Political Weekly (41:40) 4245-
4247. 
 
_____ (2008). “Targeting Regulation in Indian Agriculture.” Economic and Political Weekly (43:48) 19-
22. 
 
_____ (2009). “Bt Cotton and the Myth of Enhanced Yields.” Economic and Political Weekly (44:22) 29-
33. 
 
 224 
_____ (2010). “Is This What Indians Should Be Trusting? The story of the Expert Committee that 
recommended Bt Brinjal for commercial cultivation in India.” Press Release. 
 
Kuruganti, K. and G.V. Ramanjaneyulu (2006). “Bt Cotton in India: Sustainable Pest Management?” 
Economic and Political Weekly (41:7) 561-562. 
 
Lake, D. (2003). “The New Sovereignty in International Relations”. International Studies Review. (5) 
303-323. 
 
Leach, M. and I. Scoones (2005). “Science and Citizenship in a Global Context”, in M. Leach, I. 
Scoones and B. Wynne (eds), Science and Citizens: Globalisation and the Challenge of Engagement. 
London: Zed, 15-38. 
 
Leach M., I. Scoones, and A. Stirling (2007). “Pathways to Sustainability: An Overview Of The 
STEPS Centre Approach.” STEPS Approach Paper. Brighton: STEPS Centre.  
 
Leach, M., I. Scoones and B. Wynne. (2005). Science and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenge of 
Engagement. London: Zed. 
 
Leach, M., G. Bloom, A. Ely, P. Nightingale, I. Scoones, E. Shah, and A. Smith (2007) 
“Understanding Governance: Pathways to Sustainability.” STEPS Working Paper 2, Brighton: 
STEPS Centre. 
 
Levidow, L. (1998). “Democratizing technology—or technologizing democracy? Regulating 
agricultural biotechnology in Europe.” Technology In Society (20) 211–226. 
 
_____ (2001). “Precautionary Uncertainty: Regulating GM Crops in Europe.” Social Studies of Science 
(31:6) 842-874. 
 
Levidow, L. and S. Carr (2000). "Unsound Science? Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Disputes over GM 
Crops." International Journal of Biotechnnology (2) 257-73. 
 
Levidow, L., S. Carr, D. Wield (2000). “Genetically modified crops in the European Union: 
regulatory conflicts as precautionary opportunities.” Journal of Risk Research (3:3) 189–208. 
 
Levidow, L., S. Carr, D. Wield, and R. von Schomberg (1997). “Assessment of a Herbicide-Tolerant 
Crop European Biotechnology Regulation: Framing the Risk.” Science, Technology, and Human Values 
(22:4) 472-505. 
 
Levidow, L. and C. Marris (2001). “Science and governance in Europe: lessons from the case of 
agricultural biotechnology.” Science and Public Policy (28:5) 345-360. 
 
Levi-Faur, D. (2005). “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (598) 12-32. 
 
Lianchawii (2005). “Biosafety in India.” Economic and Political Weekly (40:39) 4284-4289. 
 
Löfstedt, R.E. and  D. Vogel (2002). “The Changing Character of Regulation: A Comparison of 
Europe and the United States.” Risk Analysis (21:3) 399-416. 
 
Long, N. and A. Long (1992). Battlefields Of Knowledge: Interlocking Of Theory And Practice In 
Social Research And Development. New York: Routledge. 
 
 225 
Lybbert, T.J. and A. Bell (2010). “Stochastic Benefit Streams, Learning, and Technology Diffusion: 
Why Drought Tolerance is Not the New Bt.” AgBioForum (13:1) 13-24. 
 
Lynch, D., and D. Vogel (2001). “The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A Case-
Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics.” New York:Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 
 
MacLeod, G. (1997). “Globalizing Parisian Thought-Waves: Recent Advances in the Study of Social 
Regulation, Politics, Discourse and Space.” Progress in Human Geography. (21:4) 530-553. 
 
Madsen, S.T. (2001). “The View From Vevey.” Economic and Political Weekly (36:39) 3733-3742. 
 
Maeseele, P. (2009) “On Media and Science in late modern societies: the GM case study.” 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universiteit Gent. 
 
Malanczuk, P. (1997). Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. Routlege: New York. 
 
 
Mann, M. (1997). “Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?” Review of 
International Political Economy (4:3) 472–496. 
 
Marchant, M.A., C. Fang, and B. Song (2002). “Issues on Adoption, Import Regulations, and Policies 
for Biotech Commodities in China with a Focus on Soybeans.” AgBioForum (5:4) 167-174. 
 
Marsh, D. and M. Smith (2000) “Understanding Policy Networks: towards a Dialectical Approach.” 
Political Studies (48:1) 4-21. 
 
McAfee, K. (2004) “Geographies of Risk and Difference in Crop Genetic Engineering.” Geographical 
Review (94:1) 80-106. 
 
McLean, M.A. and P.J. Charest (2000). “The Regulation of Transgenic Trees in North America.” Silvae 
Genetica 49:6 (233-239). 
 
Miller, A.S. (2000). “Going to Hell in Asia: The Relationship between Risk and Religion in a Cross 
Cultural Setting.” Review of Religious Research (42:1) 5-18.  
 
Millstone, E. (2007). “Can food safety policy-making be both scientifically and democratically 
legitimated? If so, how?” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (20) 483–508. 
 
_____ (2009). “Science, risk and governance: Radical rhetorics and the realities of reform in food 
safety governance.” Research Policy (38) 624–636. 
 
Millstone, E. and Van Zwanenberg, P. (2003). “Food and Agricultural Biotechnology Policy: How 
Much Autonomy Can Developing Countries Exercise?” Development Policy Review (21:5) 655-667.  
 
Millstone, E., P. van Zwanenberg, L. Levidow, A. Spök, H. Hirakawa, and  M. Matsuo (2008). “Risk-
assessment Policies: Differences Across Jurisdictions.” JRC Scientific and Technical Reports, 
European Commission. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Government of India (2004). “Report of the Task Force on 
Application of Agricultural Biotechnology by: M. S. Swaminathan Chairman, Task Force on 
Agricultural Biotechnology.” May 2004. 
 
 226 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Governement of India (1986). “The Environment 
(Protection) Act”. 
 
_____ (2005). “Report of the Task Force on Recombinant Pharma: Recommendations for 
Streamlining the Current Regulatory Framework.  Chaired by Dr. R.A. Mashelkar, BG, CSIR.” 
August 2005. 
 
_____ (2006a). “Capacity Building on Biosafety: Training Needs Assessment.” Project Coordinating 
and Monitoring Unit Report, January 2006.  Retrieved May 24, 2006 from 
<http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/csurv/biosafety/default.htm>. 
 
_____ (2006b). “GEAC Approves Proposals”. Press Release, May 25, 2006. 
 
_____ (2010). “Decision on Commercialization of Bt Brinjal”. Press Release, 9 February 2010. 
 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. (2000). “Right To Information”.  
Retrieved July 16, 2010 from <http://rrtd.nic.in/RIGHT%20TO%20INFORMATION.html>. 
 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST), Government of India. (1998). “Revised Guidelines for 
Research in Transgenic Plants & Guidelines for Toxicity and Allergenicity Evaluation of Transgenic 
Seeds, Plants and Plant Parts.” 
 
_____ (2005). “National Biotechnology Development Strategy: Key Elements.” 
 
_____ (2008). “Draft Establishment Plan for the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority.” 28 
May 2008. 
 
Mishra, S. (2008). “Risks, farmers' suicides and agrarian crisis in India: Is there a way out?” Indian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics (63:1) 38-54.  
 
Mishra, S., S. Shroff, D. Shah, V. Deshpande, A.P. Kulkarni, V.S. Deshpande, and P.R. Bhatkule (eds) 
(2006) Suicide of Farmers in Maharashtra Background Papers. Mumbai: Indira Gandhi Institute of 
Development Research. 
 
Monitoring And Evaluation Committee (“MEC”) (2005). “Field Trials of GM Crops in India: Illegal 
and Unscientific.” Press Release. 
 
Moran, M. (2002). “Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State.” British Journal of Political 
Science. (32) 391-413. 
 
Morgen, B. (2003). “The Economization of Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial 
Legality.” Social & Legal Studies. (12:4) 489-523. 
 
Morse, S. (2006). “Environmental Impact of Genetically Modified Cotton in South Africa.” 
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment (117:4) 277-289.  
 
_____. (2007a). “Inequality and GM Crops: A Case-Study of Bt Cotton in India.” AgBioForum (10:1) 
44-50.  
 
_____. (2007b). “Isolating the ‘Farmer’ Effect as a Component of the Advantage of Growing 
Genetically Modified Varieties in Developing Countries: A Bt Cotton Case Study from Jalgaon, 
India.” Journal of Agricultural Science (145:5) 491-500.  
 
 227 
Morse, S., R. Bennett and Y. Ismael (2005a). “Comparing the Performance of Official and Unofficial 
Genetically Modified Cotton in India.” AgBioForum (8:1) 1-6.  
 
_____ (2005b). “Genetically modified insect resistance in cotton: some farm level economic impacts 
in India.” Crop Protection (24) 433–440. 
 
Morse, S. and  A.M. Mannion (2009). “Can genetically modified cotton contribute to sustainable 
development in Africa?” Progress in Development Studies (9:3) 225–247. 
 
Narayanamoorthy, A., and S.S. Kalamkar (2006). “Is Bt Cotton Cultivation Economically Viable for 
Indian Farmers?” Economic and Political Weekly (41:26) 2716-2724. 
 
Newell, P. (2002). “Biotechnology and the Politics of Regulation” Institute of Development Studies 
Working Paper 146, Brighton: IDS. 
 
_____ (2003a). “Globalization and the Governance of Biotechnology.” Global Environmental Politics 
(3:2) 56-71. 
 
_____(2003b). “Biotech Firms, Biotech Politics: Negotiating GMOs in India.” Institute of 
Development Studies Working Paper 201, Brighton:IDS. 
 
_____ (2007). “Biotech Firms, Biotech Politics: Negotiating GMOs in India.” The Journal of 
Environment & Development (16:2) 183-206. 
 
_____ (2008). “Lost in Translation? Domesticating Global Policy on Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparing India and China.” Global Society (22:1) 115-136. 
 
Newell, P. and D. Glover (2003). “Business and biotechnology: regulation and the politics of 
influence.” Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 192, Brighton: IDS. 
 
Nichols, L.M. (2000). “State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?” Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law (25:1) 175-196. 
 
OECD (1986). Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations. Paris: OECD. 
 
Omvendt, G. (1994). “'We want the return for our sweat': The new peasant movement in India and 
the formation of a national agricultural policy.” Journal of Peasant Studies (21:3) 126—164. 
 
Pelaez, V. and L. Albergoni (2004). “External and internal trade barriers to GMOs in Brazil.” 
International Journal of Biotechnology (6:2-3) 219-242. 
 
Pargal, S., H. Hettig, M. Singh, and D. Wheeler (1997). “Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial 
Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States.” World Bank Economic Review. 
(11:3) 433-450. 
 
Parker, D. (2002). “Economic Regulation: A Preliminary Literature Review and Summary of 
Research Questions Arising.” Centre on Regulation and Competition, Working Paper 6, University 
of Aston. 
 
Pemsl, D., H. Waibel and J. Orphal (2004). “A Methodology to Assess the Profitability of Bt Cotton: 
Case-study Results from the State of Karnataka, India.” Crop Protection (23:12) 1249-1257.  
 
 228 
Peters, G. (2005). “Forms of Informal Governance: Searching for Efficiency and Democracy.” XIV 
Nordic Political Science Association Conference Paper. 
 
Pierre, J. and B.G. Peters (2000).  Governance, Politics, and State.: London: Macmillan. 
 
Pierson, C. (1996). The Modern State. London: Routledge. 
 
Portes, A. and L.A. Benton (1989). The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less 
Developed Countries. Boston: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Posner, R.A. (1974). “Theories of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics (5:2) 335-358. 
 
Prakash, A. and K.L. Kollman (2003) “Biopolitics in the EU and the U.S.: A Race to the Bottom or 
Convergence to the Top?” International Studies Quarterly (47:4) 617-641. 
 
Pray, C.E. and P. Bengali (2005). “The cost of biosafety regulations: the Indian experience.” 
Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture (44:3) 267-289. 
 
Pray, C.E., B. Ramaswami, J. Huang, R. Hu, P. Bengali, and H. Zhang (2006). “Costs and 
enforcement of biosafety regulations in India and China.” International Journal of Technology and 
Globalisation, (2:1-2) 137-157. 
 
Purcell, M. (2002). “The state, Regulation, and Global Restructuring: Reasserting the Political in 
Political Economy.” Review of International Political Economy (9:2) 298–332. 
 
Pusztai, A., Ewen, S.W.B., Grant. G., Peumans, W.J., van Damme, E.J.M., Rubio, L., Bardocz, S. 
(1990). “Relationship between survival and binding of plant lectins during small intestinal passage 
and their effectiveness as growth factors.” Digestion (46:2) 308-316. 
 
Pusztai, A., Grant, G., Duguid, T., Brown, D.S., Peumans, W.J., Van Damme, E.J.M., Bardocz, S. 
(1995). “Inhibition of starch digestion by amylase inhibitor reduces the efficiency of utilization of 
dietary proteins and lipids and retards the growth of rats.” Journal of Nutrition (125) 1554-1562. 
 
Pusztai, A., Grant, G., Bardocz, S., Alonso, R., Chrispeels, M.J., Schroeder, H.E., Tabe, L.M. and 
Higgins, T.J.V. (1999). “Expression of the insecticidal bean alpha-amylase inhibitor transgene has 
minimal detrimental effect on the nutritional value of peas fed to rats at 30% of the diet.” Journal of 
Nutrition (129) 1597-1603. 
 
Qaim, M. (2003). “Bt Cotton in India: Field Trial Results and Economic Projections.” World 
Development. (31:12) 2115-2127. 
 
_____ (2005).  “Agricultural Biotechnology Adoption in Developing Countries”. The American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics (87:5) 1317–1324. 
 
Qaim, M. and D. Zilberman (2003). “Yield Effects of Genetically Modified Crops in Developing 
Countries.” Science (299:5608) 900–902.  
 
Qaim, M., A. Subramanian, G.  Naik, & D. Zilberman. (2006). “Adoption Of Bt Cotton And Impact 
Variability: Insights From India.” Review of Agricultural Economics, (28:1) 48-58. 
 
Qayum, A and K. Sakhari (2002). “Did Bt Cotton Save Farmers in Warangal? A season long impact 
study of Bt Cotton - Kharif 2002 in Warangal District of Andhra Pradesh.” Hyderabad: Deccan 
Development Society. 
 229 
 
_____ (2005). “Bt-cotton in Andhra Pradesh. A three year assessment.” Hyderabad: Deccan 
Development Society. 
 
Ramamurthy, V. (2009). “Performance of Bt cotton (Gossypium hirsutum) hybrid on shrink-swell 
soils of central India.”  Indian Journal of Agricultural Sciences (79:12) 1026-1029. 
 
Ramanjaneyulu, G.V and K. Kuruganti (2006). “Bt Cotton in India.” Economic and Political Weekly 
(41:7) 561-563. 
 
Ramanna, A (2005). “Bt Cotton And India’s Policy on IPRs.” Asian Biotechnology And Development 
Review (7:2) 43-51. 
 
Ramasundaram, P., S. Vennila and R.K. Ingle (2007). “Bt Cotton Performance and Constraints in 
Central India.” Outlook on Agriculture (36:3) 175–180.  
 
Ramaswami, B. (2007). “Biofortified Crops and Biotechnology: A Political Economy Landscape for 
India.” AgBioForum (10:3) 170-177. 
 
Raney, T. (2006). “Economic impact of transgenic crops in developing countries.” Current Opinion in 
Biotechnology (17) 1–5. 
 
Rao, S.R. (2002). “Indian Biotechnology Developments in Public and Private Sectors - Status and 
Opportunities.” Asian Biotechnology and Development Review, November 2003. 
 
Reason, P., and H. Bradbury (2001). “Inquiry and Participation in Search of a World Worthy of 
Human Aspiration.” in Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice. Edited 
by Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury. London: Sage Publications, 1-14. 
 
Reddy, D.N. and S. Mishra (eds.) (2009). Agrarian Crisis in India. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997). Understanding Governance. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Rodrik, D. and A. Subramanian (2004). “From ‘Hindu Growth’ to Productivity Surge: The Mystery 
of the Indian Growth Transition”. NBER Working Paper No. 10376. 
 
Rosaldo, R. (1986) “From the Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and the Inquisitor.” in Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. edited by James Clifford and George Marcus. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 77-97. 
 
Roy, D., R. Herring, and C.C. Geisler (2007). “Naturalising Transgenics: Official Seeds, Loose Seeds 
and Risk in the Decision Matrix of Gujarati Cotton Farmers.” Journal of Development Studies (43:1) 
158–176. 
 
Sadashivappa , P. (2009) “Bt Cotton in India: Development of Benefits and the Role of Government 
Seed Price Interventions.” AgBioForum (12:2) 172-183. 
 
Sahai, S. (1999). “What Is Bt and What Is Terminator?” Economic and Political Weekly (34:3/4), 84-86.
  
_____ (2003). “The Bt-cotton story. The ethics of science and its reportage.” Current Science (84) 974-
975. 
 
 230 
_____ (2000). “GATT/ WTO and the Trips Agreement: a South Asian Perspective.” South Asia 
Economic Journal (1:2) 25-41.  
 
_____ (2001). “Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Law.” Economic and Political Weekly 
(36:35) 3338-3342. 
 
_____ (2002). “Bt Cotton: Confusion Prevails.” Economic and Political Weekly (37:21) 1973-1974. 
 
_____ (2003a). “India’s plant variety protection and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001.” Current Science 
(84:3) 407-412. 
 
_____ (2003b). “The Bt-cotton story. The ethics of science and its reportage.” Current Science (84) 
974-975.  
 
_____ (2005). “The National Biotechnology Development Strategy: Present Version Unacceptable.” 
Gene Campaign Press Release, 12 May 2006.  
 
Sahai, S., and S. Rehman. (2003). “Performance of Bt cotton. Data from first commercial crop.” 
Economic and Political Weekly (38:30) 3139-3141. 
 
_____ (2004). “Bt-Cotton, 2003-2004.” Economic and Political Weekly (39:26) 2673-2674. 
 
Sainath, P. (2005). “Chor Bt aur Bt chor.” India Together, 29 September 2005. 
 
_____ (2006a). “‘The relief package is a bureaucratic sham’.” Tehelka, 9 September 2006. 
 
_____ (2006b). “What The Heart Does Not Feel.” India Together, September 10, 2006.  
 
Samuelson, P.A. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics (36:4) 387-389. 
 
Sarkar, B., A.K. Patra, T.J. Purakayastha, and M. Megharaj (2009). “Assessment of biological and 
biochemical indicators in soil under transgenic Bt and non-Bt cotton crop in a sub-tropical 
environment.” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment (156) 595-604. 
 
Scheper-Hughes, N. (1995). “The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology.” 
Current Anthropology (36) 409–440. 
 
Scitovsky, T. (1954). “Two Concepts of External Economies.” The Journal of Political Economy (62:2) 143-
151. 
 
Scoones, I. (2002). “Science, Policy and Regulation: Challenges for Agricultural Biotechnology in 
Less Developed Countries.” Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 146, Brighton: IDS. 
 
_____ (2003). “Regulatory Manoeuvres: The Bt Cotton Controversy In India.” Institute of 
Development Studies Working Paper 197.  Brighton: IDS. 
 
_____ (2005). “Contentious politics, contentious knowledges: mobilising against GM crops in India, 
South Africa and Brazil.” Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 256, Brighton: IDS. 
 
_____ (2008). “Mobilizing Against GM Crops in India, South Africa and Brazil.” Journal of Agrarian 
Change (8:2/3) 315-344. 
 
 231 
Scoones, I., M. Leach, A. Smith, S. Stagl, A. Stirling, and J. Thompson (2007). “Dynamic Systems and 
the Challenge of Sustainability.” STEPS Working Paper 1, Brighton: STEPS Centre. 
 
Scott, C. (2003). “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State.” 
National Europe Centre Paper No. 100, Australian National University. 
 
Séralini, G.E, J.S. de Vendômois, D. Cellier, C. Sultan, M. Buiatti, L. Gallagher, M. Antoniou, M., R. 
Krishna, and K.R. Dronamraju (2009). “How Subchronic and Chronic Health Effects can be Neglected 
for GMOs, Pesticides or Chemicals.” International Journal of Biological Sciences (5:5) 438–443. 
 
Shah, E. (2005). “Local and Global Elites Join Hands Development and Diffusion of Bt Cotton 
Technology in Gujarat.” Economic and Political Weekly (40) 4629–39. 
 
Shahabudeen, M. (1996). Precedent in the World Court. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
 
Shankar, B., R. Bennett, and S. Morse (2007). “Output Risk Aspects of Genetically Modified Crop 
Technology in South Africa.” Economics of Innovation and New Technology (16:4) 277–291. 
 
____ (2008). "Production risk, pesticide use and GM crop technology in South Africa." Applied 
Economics (40) 2489–2500. 
 
Sharma, A. (2005). “New Amendments to Patents Act, 1970 to Affect Farm Sector in India.”  
Financial Express, 3 January 2005. 
 
Sharma, D. (2001). “The introduction of transgenic cotton in India.” Biotechnology and Development 
Monitor (44) 10-13. 
 
Sheldon, I. (2004). “Europe’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: Precaution or Trade 
Distortion?” Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization (2) 1-25. 
 
_____ (2007). "Food Principles: Regulating Genetically Modified Crops after the 2006 WTO Ruling." 
The Brown Journal of World Affairs (14:1) 121-134. 
 
Shiva, V. (1989). Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development. London: Zed Books.  
 
_____ (1993). Monocultures of the mind: perspectives on biodiversity and biotechnology. London: 
Zed Books. 
 
_____ (1997). Biopiracy: the plunder of nature and knowledge. Boston: South End Press. 
 
_____ (2002a). Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights. London and New 
York: Zed Books. 
 
_____ (2002b). Water wars: privatization, pollution and profit. Boston: South End Press. 
 
_____ (2004a). “The Suicide Economy Of Corporate Globalisation.” ZSpace, 19 February 2004. 
 
_____ (2004b). “India's Agrarian Crisis.” ZNet, 28 June 2004. 
 
_____ (2005a). “The Indian Seed Act And Patent Act: Sowing The Seeds Of Dictatorship.” ZNet, 14 
February 2005.  
 
_____ (2005b). “India’s New Seed Bill.”  Seedling, July 2005. 
 232 
 
Shiva, V. and T. Crompton (1998). “Monopoly and Monoculture: Trends in Indian Seed Industry.” 
(33:39) A137-A141+A144-A151. 
 
Shiva, V., A. Emani, and A.H. Jafri (1999). “Globalisation and Threat to Seed Security: Case of 
Transgenic cotton trials in India.” Economic and Political Weekly (34:10) 601-613. 
 
Skogstad, G. (2003). “Legitimacy and/or policy effectiveness?: network governance and GMO 
regulation in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy (10:3) 321-338. 
 
Smale, M., P. Zambrano, J. Falck-Zepeda, G. Gruere, and I. Matuschke (2008) “The economic impact 
of transgenic crops in developing countries: a note on the methods.” International Journal of 
Biotechnology (10:6) 519-551.  
 
Smith, M. (1991). “From Policy Community to Issue Network: Salmonella in Eggs and the New 
Politics of Food.” Public Administration (69) 235-55. 
 
Snowden, D (1984). “Eyes See; Ears Hear”, Memorial University.  Retrieved November 5, 2007 from 
http://www.insightshare.org/pdfs/Eyes%20See%3b%20Ears%20Hear.pdf 
 
Stewart, R. (1988).”Regulation and the Crisis of Legalisation in the United States”, in Terence 
Daintith, ed., Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches. 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 97–133. 
 
Stigler, G.J. (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science (2:1) 3-21. 
 
Stirling, A. (ed.) (2001). “On Science and Precaution in the Management of Technological Risk.” ESTO 
Project Report Prepared for the European Commission - JRC Institute Prospective Technological 
Studies Seville, November 2001. 
 
Stone, G.D. (2007a). “Agricultural Deskilling and the Spread of Genetically Modified Cotton in 
Warangal.” Current Anthropology (48:1) 67-103. 
 
_____ (2007b). "The Birth and Death of Traditional Knowledge: Paradoxical Effects of Biotechnology 
in India." in C. McManis (ed.) Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and 
Traditional Knowledge. London: Earthscan, 207-238. 
 
Subramaniam, A., and M. Qaim (2009). “Village-wide Effects of Agricultural Biotechnology: The 
Case of Bt Cotton in India.” World Development (37:1) 256-267. 
 
_____. (2010). “The Impact of Bt Cotton on Poor Households in Rural India.” Journal of Development 
Studies (46:2) 295-311.  
 
Tabashnik, B.E., G.C. Unnithana, L. Masson,  D.W. Crowder, L. Xianchun, and Y. Carrière (2010). 
“Asymmetrical cross-resistance between Bacillus thuringiensis toxins Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab in pink 
bollworm”. Proceedings Of The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (106:29) 
11889-11894. 
 
Thompson, J and I. Scoones (2009). “Addressing the dynamics of agri-foodsystems: an emerging 
agenda for social science research.” Environmental Science and Policy (12) 386-397. 
 
 233 
Timberg, Y. (2004). “Why Is India Shining? An Aristotelian Approach.” Economic and Political Weekly 
(39:39) 4324-4328. 
 
Tintner, G. (1941). “The Theory of Choice Under Subjective Risk and Uncertainty.” Econometrica 
(9:3/4) 298-304 . 
 
Tomalin, E. (2004). “Bio-Divinity and Biodiversity: Perspectives on Religion and Environmental 
Conservation in India.” Numen (51:3) 265-295. 
 
Toye J. (1987). Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-revolution in Development 
Theory and Policy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Tullock, G. (1967) “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic  
Journal (5:3) 224-232. 
 
Turvey, R., J. de V. Graaff, W. Baumol, and G.L.S. Shackle (1949). “Three Notes on ‘Expectation in 
Economics’.” Economica (16:64) 336-346. 
 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981). “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” 
Science (211:4481) 453-458. 
 
UNEP (1992). “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.” 
 
van Zwanenberg, P., A. Ely, and A. Smith (2008). “Rethinking Regulation: International 
Harmonisation and Local Realities.” STEPS Working Paper 12, Brighton: STEPS Centre. 
 
van Zwanenberg, P., A. Ely, A. Smith, C. Chuanbo, D. Shijun, M. Fazio, and L. Goldberg (2010). 
“Regulatory harmonization and agricultural biotechnology in Argentina and China: Critical 
assessment of state-centered and decentered approaches.” Regulation & Governance 1-21. 
 
Venkatesan, V. (2010). “Legal Struggle” Frontline 27:5. 
 
Vignon, J. (2001). “Governance and Collective Adventure” in de Schutter, O. et. al (eds.), Governance 
in the European Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC. 
 
Viljoen, C. D., B.K. Dajee, G.M. Botha (2006). “Detection of GMO in food products in South Africa: 
Implications of GMO labelling.” African Journal of Biotechnology (5:2) 73-82. 
 
Visvanathan, S. and C. Parmar. (2002). “A Biotechnology Story: Notes From India.” Economic and 
Political Weekly. (37:27) 2714-2724. 
 
Vogel, D. (2001). “The new politics of risk regulation in Europe.” CARR Discussion Papers, DP 3. 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK. 
 
Vogt, D.U., and Parish, M. (2001) “Food Biotechnology in the United States: Science, Regulation, 
and Issues.” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 
Washington DC. 
 
Von Neumann, J and O. Morgenstern (1947). Theory of games and economic behaviour. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 234 
Weaver, S. and M. Morris (2004). “Risks associated with genetic modification: an annotated 
bibliography of peer reviewed natural science publications.” Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics (18) 157–189. 
 
White, L. (1997). “Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Financial Regulation: The 
Challenges for Public Policy”. Centre for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-33, Wharton 
School Centre for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
White, S. (2003) (ed.) Participatory Video: Images that transform and Empower. London: Sage. 
 
Wiener, J. (2004). “The Regulation of Technology, and the Technology of Regulation”. Technology in 
Society. (26) 483–500. 
 
Wiener, J.B. (2002). “Convergence, Divergence, and Complexity” in N. Vig and M. Faure, eds. 
Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union. Princeton: MIT 
Press. 
 
Wiener, J.B. and M.D. Rogers (2002). “Comparing precaution in the United States and Europe.” 
Journal of Risk Research (5:4) 317-349. 
 
Wolf, O. Ibarreta, and P. Sørup (eds.) (2004). “Science In Trade Disputes Related To Potential Risks: 
Comparative Case Studies.” IPTS Technical Report Series, European Commission. 
 
Wolgin, J. (1975). “Resource Allocation and Risk: A Case Study of Smallholder Agriculture in 
Kenya.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (57:4) 622-630. 
 
World Bank (1991). “Managing Development: The Governance Dimension.” Washington: World 
Bank. 
 
Wrubel, R.P., S. Krimsky, and M.D Anderson (1997). “Regulatory Oversight of Genetically 
Engineered Microorganisms: Has Regulation Inhibited Innovation?” Environmental Management 
(21:4) 571-586. 
 
Wynne, B. (1991). “Knowledges in context.” Science, Technology, and Human Values (16:1) 1–21. 
 
_____ (1995). “Public Understanding of Science”, in S. Jasanoff, G.E. Markle, J.C. Petersen, and T. 
Pinch (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage, 361-388. 
 
_____ (2001). “Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs.” Science as 
Culture (10:4) 445—481. 
 
Young, D.L. (1979). “Risk Preferences of Agricultural Producers: Their Use in Extension and 
Research.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (61:5) 1063-1070. 
 
Zepeda, J.F. (2006) “Coexistence, Genetically Modified Biotechnologies and Biosafety: Implications 
for Developing Countries.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (88:5) 1200-1208. 
 
Zhao, J.H., P. Ho, and H. Azadi (2011). “Benefits of Bt cotton counterbalanced by secondary pests? 
Perceptions of ecological change in China.” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment (173) 985–
994. 
 
 
 
 235 
APPENDIX 1 
INDIAN REGULATION ON TRANSGENICS WITH REGARDS TO PLANT 
GENETIC RESOURCES 
 
The management of transgenics in Indian agriculture via regulation reflects ambitions within two 
spheres.  First, an almost nationalistic fervour to lead, be recognized as a leader, and to be self 
sufficient; to become a regional player in the biotech industry by providing incentives for domestic 
innovation via intellectual property rights.  Second, to ensure “biosafety”; ensuring scientifically sound 
best practices within a system of stringent checks and balances for the “safe” management of the technology 
in the context of commercial release and R&D.  These ambitions manifest themselves via a regulatory 
framework that is both ambitious in scope as well as technically comprehensive. 
 
India’s regulatory framework spans science and technology, the environment, agriculture, food 
and health, and trade.  With the exception of the Patent Act, Biological Diversity Act, and Plant 
Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act (which are not expressly concerned with transgenics 
but are still linked), all the existing frameworks refer back to the Environmental Protection Act 
(1986) as the basis for all regulation surrounding transgenics 1.   
 
The objective of this appendix is to characterize and summarize all the relevant mechanisms within 
the management of transgenics in agriculture in India.  They are presented in three sections: Rules 
and Policies, Guidelines, and Acts and Bills.  This distinction does not indicate that some are 
legally binding and others not; with the exception of bills, all are legally enforceable.  It should be 
noted that in what follows, only those domestic frameworks that have implications on agriculture 
are considered; pharmaceuticals and aquaculture are not considered, nor are the international fora 
that have often (but not always) acted as a catalyst for domestic regulation. 
 
A1.1 Rules and Policies 
 
A1.1.1 The 1989 Rules 
 
In 1989, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) notified the Rules for Manufacture, Use, 
Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous Microorganisms, Genetically Engineered Organisms 
or Cells (1989)2.  The stated rationale for the 1989 Rules are to protect “…the environment, nature 
and health, in connection with the application of genetechnology and micro-organisms”, and to 
 236 
address activities involving the manufacture, use, import, export, storage and research of 
transgenics including microorganisms, plants and animals (Damodaran 2005, MoEF 2006)3.  In 
practice, two ministries are responsible for the implementation of these rules, the MoEF and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) via the Department of Biotechnology (DBT)4.  The 1989 
Rules mandate and characterize the role of six competent authorities for the management of 
transgenics. 
 
MoEF and MST Authorities as Mandated by the 1989 Rules 
 
Authority & Accountability (Policy) Primary Role 
Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (RDAC) 
MOEF→DBT 
Presents recommendations for upholding safety 
regulations for GMO research and management; 
authored the Recombinant Safety Guidelines (1990) 
(RSG 1990)5 
Review Committee on Genetic 
Manipulation (RCGM) 
MOEF→DBT (RSG 1990) 
Provides guidelines to those interested in transgenic 
R&D, use, and application; reviews and permits all 
high risk rDNA experiments; restricts the 
import/sale/use of transgenics; authorizes field trials 
up to 20 acres in size; visits trial sites; ensures safety 
measures are met as per RSG 1990 
Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee (GEAC) 
MSE (EPA 1986) 
Permits transgenics commercial products and 
applications; authorizes large scale transgenic 
production and release, authorizes punitive action 
under EPA 1986 
Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(ISBC) 
MST→DBT→GEAC, RCGM 
The nodal point within the DBT for all parties 
intending on transgenic R&D; alerts SBCC, DLC, and 
GEAC about experiments; reports to and seeks 
approval from RCGM for category III risk or above 
experiments; ensures experimentation occurs on 
mandated areas based on protocol 
State Biosafety Coordination 
Committees (SBCC) 
Chief Minister→Relevant State Ministries 
Inspects and takes punitive action if policy violation 
occurs via state ministries; periodically reviews 
institutional safety/control measures, acts as the 
nodal agency within the state in case of damage 
caused by transgenics, is the main link to Centre 
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Ministries in the transgenic context, can nominate 
state representatives for transgenic field inspection  
District Level Committees (DLC) 
DISTRICT COLLECTOR→SBCC→GEAC 
(EPA 1986) 
Monitors safety regulations in installations; reports to 
SBCC or GEAC in case of violations, acts as nodal 
agency at the district level to assess potential damage 
 
Source: MoEF 2006a 
 
The IBSC, RCGM, and GEAC are the primary agencies involved in the approval of new transgenic 
crops in the context of biosafety; in general, the ISBC acts as the nodal point for receiving the initial 
application submitted by any party interested in research activities, with the final decision being 
made by the RCGM, except in “large-scale” experiments where the application is directed towards 
and considered by the GEAC6.  With regards to monitoring and safety concerns, the Monitoring 
and Evaluation Committee (MEC) acts under the RCGM to visit small-scale field sites and to 
recommend safe and viable crops to the GEAC and RCGM.  
 
A1.1.2 The Seed Policy 
 
India’s Seed Policy (2002) has seen a number of amendments since 1988, with the catalyst being 
both the advancement of transgenic technologies and the need for regulatory frameworks as well 
as the prescriptive commitments that India is bound to as a member state of the World Trade 
Organization.  The salient aspects of the Seed Policy (SP) with regards to transgenics are found in 
Chapter 6 under “Transgenic Plant Varieties”, where linkages are made to the EPA 1986, and thus 
the 1989 rules.  
 
• All transgenic seed will be tested prior to commercial release as per the EPA 1986. 
• The importation of transgenic seed into India must be received only by the National 
Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources (NBPGR), and only after GEAC approval. 
• Transgenic seed must be labelled as such, and must be tested for at least 2 years by the 
Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) in coordination with all other tests as 
stated in the EPA 1996.  After commercial release, the Ministry of Agriculture and State 
Departments of Agriculture will monitor transgenic crops for five years. 
• Transgenic varieties are afforded the same IPR protection as non-transgenic varieties as 
stipulated in the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act (2001). 
 
 238 
It should be noted that the Seed Policy (2002) is distinct from the Seed Act (1966) and the proposed 
successor to the Seed Act, the Seed Bill (2004)7.  The Policy is primarily of interest to those firms 
involved in commercial R&D as a procedural indication of what the Centre will require of them as 
suppliers, whereas the Act covers all aspects and users of seed. 
 
A1.1.3 The Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 
 
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA) was enacted in 1954 for ensuring the quality and 
safety of food marketed in the country.  It is managed by the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW) under the central PFA Division, and has seven salient features. 
 
1. Enhance the availability of safe and wholesome food.  
2. Consumer protection from deception, fraud and food-borne diseases.  
3. Risk analysis, risk management and risk communication.  
4. Ensure safety of genetically modified food.  
5. Enhance the involvement of NGOs and Home Science Institutes.  
6. Educational authorities to ensure better consumer protection.  
7. Promote a voluntary management system, the Code of Ethics, through principles of Good 
Manufacturing Practices and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points8. 
 
Of particular interest here are the third, fourth, and fifth points.  In May 2006, the PFA notified the 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, which amended the PFA act9.  There are two relevant 
additions that relate to the labelling of GM food products.  Rule 37(e) states that:  
 
GM food […] whether it is primary or processed or any ingredient of food, food additives or any 
food product that may contain GM material shall be compulsorily labelled without any exceptions.  
 
Similarly, rule 48(f) has been added, which states that: 
 
No person shall, except with approval of and subject to the conditions that may be imposed by the 
Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) constituted under the Environment Protection 
Act, 1986, manufacture, import, transport, store, distribute or sell raw or processed food or any 
ingredients of food, food additives or any food product that may contain GM material in the 
country: Provided that in case of imported genetically modified foods, the importer shall submit 
documents supporting the purported clearance at the time of import. 
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The GoI press release that released this information also stated that “the draft rules in the 
notification will be taken into consideration after the expiry of 60 days.  [O]bjections or suggestions 
in respect of draft rules may be addressed to the Secretary, MoFHW. 
 
A1.1.4 The Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Rules 
 
The 2003 Rules manifest a framework for undertaking the provisions of the Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers Rights Act (2001)10.  Refer to section A.3.3 for the salient features of the 
2001 Act. 
 
A1.2 Guidelines 
 
A1.2.1  The Recombinant Safety Guidelines 
 
The DBT formulated the Recombinant Safety Guidelines (RSG) to address risk and safety 
concerns in light of research activities undertaken by Indian institutions and industry.  The 1990 
guidelines were then revised in 1994 “…to cover R&D activities on GMOs, transgenic crops, large-
scale production and deliberate release of GMOs, plants, animals and products into the 
environment, [and the] shipment and importation of GMOs for laboratory research” (Ahuja and 
Jotwani, Undated)11.  The guidelines are classified into three categories based on the level of the 
associated risk and requirement for the approval of competent authority. 
 
EXPERIMENT CATEGORIZATIONS WITHIN THE RSG 
 
Category Characterization 
I Experiments involving self cloning and interspecies cloning belonging in 
organism in the same exchanger group; exempt from approval 
II Containment levels II, II, IV 
III Toxin gene cloning, gene cloning for vaccine production. 
 
Source: Ahuja and Jotwani 
 
These guidelines draw from principles of “good laboratory practices” as noted in the World Health 
Organization laboratory safety manual on genetic engineering techniques involving 
microorganisms12.  Specifically, the RSG requires those parties involved in transgenic R&D to 
evaluate risk in terms of “…possible interaction with other disease causing agents and infected 
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wild plant species” and that an independent review be conducted to assess risk on a case by case 
basis prior to release (MoEF 2005).   
 
A1.2.2 The Guidelines for Research in Transgenic Crops 
 
In 1998, the DBT established the Guidelines for Research in Transgenic Crops (GRTC) 1998 due to 
the “…enormous progress that has been made in rDNA research and its widespread use in 
developing improved microbial strains, cell lines, and transgenic plants for commercial 
exploitation” (DBT 1998). While similar in scope to the RSG, the GRTC has a specific focus on 
transgenic PGR, unlike the RSG which also covered animals.  Specifically, the GRTC addresses 
areas of rDNA research on plants including the development of transgenic plants and their growth 
in soil for molecular and field evaluation.  The guidelines also deal with import and shipment of 
genetically modified plants of research purposes (Ahuja and Jotwani, Undated).  In this context, 
the GRTC outlines three categories of experiments on plants. 
 
EXPERIMENT CATEGORIZATIONS WITHIN THE GRTC 
 
Category Characterization 
I Routine cloning of defined genes, defined non-coding stretches of DNA and 
open  reading frames in defined genes in E. coli or other bacterial/fungal hosts 
which are generally considered  as safe to human, animals and plants. 
II Lab and green house/net house experiments using  defined DNA fragments 
non-pathogenic to human and animals for genetic transformation of plants,   
both model species and crop species. 
III Experiments where the escape of transgenic traits into the open environment 
could cause significant alterations in the biosphere, the ecosystem, plants and 
animals by dispersing new genetic traits which cannot be judged precisely.  
This also includes experiments having risks conducted in green houses and  
open field conditions. 
 
Source: Chapter 4, GRTC (1998) 
 
A1.3 Acts and Bills 
 
Aside from Rules, Policies, and Guidelines, there are also exist a number of legally binding acts 
and not yet enacted bills that exist within the context of transgenics. 
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A1.3.1 The Food Safety and Standards Bill 
 
In 2005 the Ministry of Food Processing Industries introduced the Food Safety and Standards Bill 
(FSSB) to facilitate scientific standards for food articles and regulate their manufacture, storage, 
distribution, sale and import. As per the provisions of the Bill, no person shall manufacture, 
process, export, import or sell genetically modified articles of food, organic foods, functional foods, 
neutraceuticals, health supplements etc. except in accordance with the regulations made under the 
FSSB.  Moreover, the salient aspects of the PFA 1954 (and presumably the 2006 PFA Rules) and the 
EPA 1996 are to be considered in tandem with the FSSB, thereby implying testing and labelling. 
 
A1.3.2 Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import into India) Order 
 
The Destructive Insects and Pests Act (1914) was notified in 2003 via the Plant Quarantine 
(Regulation of Import into India) Order, and has been amended several times to meet the SPS 
guidelines of the WTO13.  The relevant portions of the order are in section 8, which assigns the role 
to the National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources (NBPGR) as the sole party that can receive 
GMOs via importation, conditional on RCGM approval and the 1989 Rules. 
 
A1.3.3 The Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act 
 
As a response to the WTO mandated prescriptions of plant variety protection under Article 27.3(b) 
of TRIPS, India introduced the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Act (PPVFR) in 2001, 
which was notified in 200514.  The salient aspects of the PPVFR with regards to transgenics can be 
found in section 29.2, which disallows the formal registration of Gene Use Restrictive, or 
“Terminator”, Technologies (GURTs).  Moreover, section 39.1(iv) details Farmers’ Rights 
provisions, and disallows farmers to sell seed that is “branded”.  However, Indian farmers are 
allowed to save formally protected seed under the PPVFR, regardless of the protection conferred to 
that seed in other countries.  This has implications on the saving of formally protected transgenic 
varieties of seed by Indian farmers, which, according to the PPVFR, is allowed, provided the 
farmer does not sell it.  Yet the stipulation of “branded” is unclear and seems to imply that farmers 
are free to repackage branded seed and sell it as “non-branded” with no legal implications.   
 
A1.3.4 The Seed Bill 
 
The 2004 Seed Bill forms the basis for the revised Seed Act, which is expected to replace the 
existing 1966 Seed Act15.  In terms of transgenics, the bill has two relevant aspects.  First, section 
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12.1 details the modalities of a Registration Subcommittee, whose primary role is to maintain a 
National Register of Seeds encompassing ”…all kinds and varieties of seed”16.  Second, section 15.1 
by states that “…no seed of any transgenic variety shall be registered unless the applicant has 
obtained clearance in respect of the same as required by or under the provisions of [the] EPA 
(1986)”.  Third, as in the PPVFR (2001), GURTS are banned under section 18.2.  Fourth, farmers are 
provided with an accountability mechanism in Section 20, whereby if “…such registered seed fails 
to provide the expected performance under such given conditions, the farmer may claim 
compensation from the producer, distributor or vendor under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986”.  
Fifth, it establishes culpability for those parties supplying spurious seed in Section 38.2 by stating 
that “…[i]f any person furnishes any false information relating to the standards of genetic purity, 
misbrands any seed or supplies any spurious seed or spurious transgenic variety, [or] sells any 
non-registered seeds he shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees or both.” 
 
A1.3.5 The Patents Act 
 
Under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 1970 Patent Act (PA) has been amended in 1999 
and 200217.  The 2002 amendments removed the term “plants” from section 3(i), which previously 
disallowed patents on “…any process for the medical, surgical, creative, prophylactic or other 
treatment of human beings or any process for a similar treatment of animals or plants or render 
them free of disease or to increase their economic value or that of their products.”  Further, section 
3(j) was added, which disallows patents on “…plants or animals or any part thereof other than 
microorganisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological processes for 
production or propagation of plants and animals”18.  These amendments are reflected in the 
current 2005 Patent Act. 
 
While the PA 2005 still disallows patents on plants, animals, and seeds, a precise definition of 
“microorganism” and “biological process” is not defined19.  Moreover, it has been argued that only 
those microorganisms that are the result of human invention, or due to an “inventive step” as 
opposed to those commonly found in nature, can be patented (Sharma 2005).  In light of the 
amendments to 3(i) and the addition of 3(j), it could be argued that patenting of processes such as 
the insertion of the Bt gene into Cotton are now admissible, though the actual resultant seed (i.e. 
Bollgard) is not. 
 
The other salient feature of the 2005 Act is the move from a process to product patent regime; India 
was mandated to ensure their IPR policy was fully TRIPS compliant by Janaury 1, 200520.  The two 
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amendments addressed plant variety protection; the only other TRIPS compliant measure was the 
enactment of a product patent regime, which the 2005 act now addresses21. 
 
A1.3.6 The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 
 
Aside from patents, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry also regulates export/import (EXIM) 
activities, and as such, notified the 1992 Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act (FTDR) 
in April 2006 to amend Chapter 1A in the context of the import of transgenics22. The salient aspects 
of the notification are: 
 
• imports are governed by the EPA 1986 and the 1989 Rules 
• import approval can only be given by the GEAC 
• parties wishing to import must submit their proposal to the RCGM 
• imported goods must be declared (but not necessarily labelled) as transgenic 
• penal action as outlined in the FTDR can be taken against those to parties who knowingly 
export GMOs to India without the proper declaration 
 
A1.3.7 The Biological Diversity Act 
 
The Biological Diversity Act (BDA) was enacted in 2002 in light of the best practices outlined by 
the CBD in the context of access to PGR and details the procedural hierarchy that exists for those 
parties interested in doing so23.  The objectives of the Bill are:     
 
• The conservation of biological diversity 
• The sustainable use of its components 
• The equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of biological resources. 
 
These are precisely the three objectives of the CBD, with one small change; rather than genetic 
resources, the third objective refers to biological resources.  The Bill defines biological resources as 
“plants, animals and micro organisms and parts thereof, and their genetic material and by-
products, with actual or potential use or value, but does not include human genetic material.”  The 
stated objective of the act is to provide for conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its 
components and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use of biological 
resources and knowledge.  In the context of transgenics, section 36.4 outlines the duties of the 
central and state governments in the context of the act, and states that the central government shall 
undertake an environmental impact assessment of any project “… which is likely to have adverse 
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effect on biological diversity, with a view to avoid or minimise such effects and where appropriate 
provide for public participation in such assessment”.  More specifically, the central government 
will “…regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified 
organisms resulting from biotechnology likely to have adverse impact on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and human health. 
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Endnotes: Appendix 1
                                                
1 Refer to http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/act1.html for the text of the EPA 1996.  Briefly, the relevant sections of the 
EPA in the context of GMOs are sections 6 (relating to environmental pollution), 8 (adherence to safety standards in 
the context of hazardous substances), and 25 (the power of the Indian government to enforce).  
2 Hereafter referred to as the “1989 Rules”.  Refer to http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/rules.html for the text of the 1989 
Rules. More recently, there appear to be moves to amend the 1989 Rules within the context of importation and GEAC 
approval.  A recent public notice by the GoI has suggested that GEAC import approval would only be required in the 
context of LMOs, and that some GMOs (i.e. Round up Ready Soybean oil) would not require GEAC approval (MoEF 
2006b). 
3 The approvals and prohibitions of the rules can be summarized along twelve points: 1. No person shall import, 
export, transport, manufacture, process, use or sell any GMOs, substances or cells except with the approval of the 
GEAC.  2. The use of pathogenic organisms or GMOs or cells for research purpose shall be allowed under the 
Notification (1989) of the EPA (1986).  3. Any person operating or using GMOs for scale up or pilot operations shall 
have to obtain permission from GEAC.  4. The ISBC is the contact for experiments on GMOs for the purposes of 
education, as per the guidelines of the Government of India.  5. The deliberate or unintentional release of GMOs is not 
allowed. 6. Production processes in which GMOs are generated or used shall not be commenced except with the 
approval  of GEAC. 7. GEAC supervises the implementation of rules and guidelines. 8. GEAC carries out supervision 
through SBCC, DLC or any authorized person. 9. If these orders are not complied to, the SBCC/DLC may take 
suitable measures at the expenses of the person  who is responsible. 10. In the context of immediate interventions to 
prevent damage, the SBCC and DLC can take suitable  measures and the expenses incurred will be recovered from the 
person responsible. 11. All approvals shall be for a period of 4 years at first instance, renewable for 2 years at a time. 
12. The GEAC shall have powers to revoke approvals in case of:  a) Any new information on harmful effects of GMOs. 
b) GMOs causing damage to the environment not envisaged when approval was given. c) Non-compliance of any 
conditions stipulated by GEAC.  Refer to Ahuja and Jotwani, p. 3. 
4 While two ministries are directly involved, in total six ministries are indirectly involved, along with a host of other 
committees and agencies. 
5 Refer to http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/guidelines_90.pdf for the text of the RSG 1990. 
6 In terms of size, the RSG states that experiments above 20 L for research and industrial purposes and above 20 acres 
for agricultural purposes is considered large-scale, and require approval from the GEAC.  Large-scale agricultural 
trials are conducted by the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), who the report their results and findings 
to the GEAC.  Refer to Chapter 7 of the RSG 1990. 
7 Refer to http://agricoop.nic.in/seedsact.htm for the 1966 act and http://agricoop.nic.in/seeds/seeds_bill.htm for 
the 2004 bill. Initial preparation for the 2004 Bill began in 1998; refer to Sharma (2005) for a useful review of this 
process. 
8 GMP and HACCP are standards and guidelines developed by the US Food and Drug Administration.  Refer to  
http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/gmp.html for an overview of GMP and 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/haccp.html for an overview of HACCP. 
9 Refer to http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=17941 for the text of the PFA Rules. The PFA Rules appear to be 
a direct consequence of the best practices detailed in the Codex India Procedural Manual, prepared by the National 
Codex Committee under the PFA as a consequence of membership to the Codex Alimentarius Comission, created by 
FAO/WHO in 1963 to develop food standards, guidelines and related texts (i.e. codes of practice) under the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. Refer to 
http://codexindia.nic.in/Codex%20(India)%20Procedural%20Manual.pdf for the Indian Procedural Manual and 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp for the Codex Alimentarius website. 
10 Refer to http://agricoop.nic.in/seeds/farmersact2001.htm for the text of the PPVFR Rules. 
11 Refer to http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/guidelines_90.pdf and http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/guidelines_94.pdf for 
the RSG 1990 and 1994 respectively. 
12 Refer to http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/en/Biosafety7.pdf for the manual. 
13 Refer to http://plantquarantineindia.org/PQO_amendments.htm for the 2003 order and successive amendments. 
14 Refer to http://agricoop.nic.in/PPV&FR%20Act,%202001.pdf for the text of the PPVFR 2001. While the PPVFR opts 
for a plant breeders/farmers’ rights regime on plants and seeds as opposed to a patent regime, patents on PGR are 
admissible under the Patents Act (2005). 
15 Refer to http://agricoop.nic.in/seeds/seeds_bill.htm for the text of the Seed Bill. 
16 At this stage, it is unclear which parties the Registration Subcommittee will be comprised of.  Some critics have 
noted that registration in the context of the subcommittee could subordinate the registration process detailed in the 
PPVFR via the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Authority outlined in section 3.1 of the PPVFR, 
namely the registration activities outlined in section 8.2 (Kuruganti 2005).  Moreover, the PPVFR Authority is 
mandated to contribute to a Register of Plant Varieties, which appears to be distinct from the National Register of 
Seeds mandated in the Seed Bill.  The spectre of duplication requires consideration.  Similarly, while the PPVFR 
allows for anyone (i.e. farmers or public/private sector breeders) to intimate registration (as per Section 16), the Seed 
Bill does not contain this explicit provision.  Essentially, critics consider the Seed Bill to be directed towards those 
seeking to register GM seeds (i.e. private sector firms) as opposed to the PPVFR which has a broader mandate of plant 
variety protection, and there are concerns as to how the two frameworks will interact in tandem (Shiva 2005a). 
17 Refer to http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patAct1970-3-99.html, 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF, and 
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http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf for the original 1970 Act and the two amendments 
respectively. 
18 Note that this language is almost a verbatim transfer from article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, where these terms are similarly 
left undefined.  Apart from WTO obligations, the amendments also reflect obligations to the WIPO Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT).  Briefly, the PCT aims to facilitate a process whereby parties wishing to invoke a patent in 
many countries can do so with one application, though WIPO itself cannot grant protection.  
19 Refer to http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf for the 2005 act. The Technology  Information, 
Forecasting & Assessment Council (TIFAC), an autonomous authority under the Department of Science and 
Technology, recently released a report titled “Patenting of  Microorganisms”.  This report states, inter alia, that bacteria 
does constitute a microorganism (i.e. Bacillus thurengenisis) and patents have been allowed on them in other countries.  
Refer to http://www.tifac.org.in/discus/dispfc.htm. 
20 A process patent allows the same products to be produced by different producers with different processes, whereas 
a product patent does not allow other firms except the patent holder to produce a particular product. 
21 This has serious implications for the pharmaceutical industry in the context of the production of generic drugs, or 
treatment regimes based on drugs that are, in essence, domestic “copies” of drugs developed elsewhere but made in a 
slightly different manner so as to avoid litigation under a process patent regime. 
22 Refer to http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/not/not06/not0206.htm for the text of the amendment. 
23 Refer to http://grain.org/brl/?docid=322&lawid=1378 for the text of the BDA. 
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APPENDIX 2 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ABLE Association for Biotechnology Lead Enterprises 
AICBA All India Crop Biotechnology Association  
AKI US-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture 
APMC Agricultural Produce Marketing Centre 
BGII BollGard 2 
BIO  Biotechnology Industry Organization 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party 
BKU Bharatiya Kisan Union 
Bt Bacillus thuringiensis 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CIC Central Information Commission 
CICR Central Institute for Cotton Research 
CII Confederation of Indian Industry 
CIRCOT Central Institute for Research on Cotton Technology 
Cry1AC The toxin produced by Bacillus thuringiensis that is used as a pesticide 
CSA Centre for Sustainable Agriculture 
CSIR  Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
DBT Department of Biotechnology 
DLCC District Level Co-ordination Committee 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid 
EBAM Event Based Approval Mechanism 
EC2 Expert Commission 2 
EPA Environmental Protection Act 
EU European Union 
FBAE Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education 
FDA United States Food and Drug Administration 
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GE Genetically Engineered 
GEAC Genetic Engineering Approval Committee 
GM Genetically Modified 
GURT Gene Use Restrictive Technology 
ICAR  Indian Council for Agricultural Research 
ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics  
INR Indian Rupees 
IPR Intellectual Property Right 
ISAAA International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 
IT Information Technologies 
ITO International Trade Organization 
KRRS Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangh 
LMO Living Modified Organism 
MGMPS Maharashtra Government Monopoly Procurement Scheme 
MNC Multinational Company 
MoA Ministry of Agriculture 
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MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forests 
MRTPC Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
MSCCGMF Maharashtra State Cooperative cotton Growers Marketing Federation Limited 
MSP Minimum Support Price 
MST Ministry of Science and Technology 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NBB National Biotechnology Board  
NBRA National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority 
NCP Nationalist Congress Party 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
NSAI National Seeds Association of India 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPV  Open Pollinated Variety 
PIL Public Interest Litigation 
PMO Prime Ministers Office 
PPP Public-Private Partnerships 
PVP Plant Variety Protection 
RAM Regulatory Affairs Manager 
RCGM Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation 
RFTSE Research Foundation for Technology, Science, and the Environment 
RSG Recombinant Safety Guidelines 
RTI  Right To Information (Act) 
SBCC State Biotechnology Coordination Committee 
SBIRI Small Business Innovative Research Initiative 
STS Science And Technology Studies 
TNAU Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UAS University of Agricultural Sciences 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
VJAS Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti  
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 249 
APPENDIX 3 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
  
1 Anonymous Regulatory Affairs Manager, Multinational Firm. New Delhi. 
2 B. Thool, Farmer. Chikhali. 
3 C.K. Rao, FBAE. Bangalore. 
4 D. Raghunandan, Greenpeace. Bangalore.  
5 D. Taywade, Farmer. Chikhali. 
6 G. Nagargoje, TAO. Chikhali. 
7 G. Patankar, Farmer. Chikhali. 
8 J. Bhutade, Joint Director of Agriculture (Vidarbha Region), Government of Maharashtra. 
Nagpur. 
9 J. Mittur, Senior Vice President of BioAgriculture, Avesthagen. Bangalore. 
10 K. Kuruganti, CSA. Hyderabad. 
11 K. Tiwari, Farmers' Leader, VJAS. Pandarkhawada. 
12 K.K. Nayaranan, General Manager, Metahelix. Bangalore. 
13 K.K. Tripathi, DBT.  New Delhi. 
14 K.R. Kranthi, Director, Central Institute for Cotton Research. Nagpur. 
15 M.K. Sharma, Managing Director, Mahyco. Mumbai. 
16 N. Bongare, Farmer. Chikhali. 
17 P. Raut, Farmer. Chikhali. 
18 P.M. Bhargava. Hyderabad. 
19 R. Thool, Farmer. Chikhali. 
20 R. Warier, Director, MoEF. New Delhi. 
21 S. Chaturvedi, Senior Fellow, Research and Information System for the Developing 
Countries (RIS). New Delhi.  
22 S. Chikhalkar, Farmer. Chikhali. 
23 S. Sahai, Convener, Gene Campaign.  New Delhi. 
24 S. Shah, Greenpeace GMO Campaigner. Bangalore. 
25 S. Shantaram, Director, ABLE. New Delhi. 
26 S. Sreenivasan, Director, CIRCOT. Mumbai. 
27 S. Umre, Agrodealer. Deoli. 
28 S.R. Rao, Scientific Advsor, DBT. New Delhi. 
29 T. Bhagate, Farmer. Pandarkhawada. 
30 V. Jawandhia, Farmers' Leader. Wardha. 
31 V. Shivarkar, Farmer. Chikhali. 
 
